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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

AGENCE OTAN DE NORMALISATION (AON)

1110 BRUSSELS

Tel : [phone]

Fax : [phone]

[e-mail]

ARMY BOARD

10 April 2002

NSA(ARMY)0250-LO/2129

Army Board Distribution List Nº 5

STANAG 2129 LO (EDITION 7) - IDENTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES ON THE
BATTLEFIELD AND IN AN AREA OF OPERATION

References:
a.

NSA(ARMY)0100-TOP/2129 dated 23 January 2001 (Edition 7) (Ratification

Draft 1)

b.

MAS(ARMY)190-TOP/2129 dated 23 July 1997 (Edition 6)

1.

The enclosed NATO Standardization Agreement which has been ratified by nations

as reflected in page iii is promulgated herewith.

2.

The references listed above are to be destroyed in accordance with local document

destruction procedures.

3.

APP-4 should be amended to reflect the latest status of the STANAG.

ACTION BY NATIONAL STAFFS

4.

National staffs are requested to examine page iii of the STANAG and, if they have

not already done so, advise the Army Board, NSA, through their national delegation as
appropriate of their intention regarding its ratification and implementation.

Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director, NSA

Enclosure:
STANAG 2129 (Edition 7)

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STANAG Nº 2129
(Edition 7)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

(NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY

(NSA)

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT

(STANAG)

SUBJECT:

IDENTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN AN AREA OF
OPERATION

Promulgated on 10 April 2002

Jan H ERIKSEN
Rear Admiral, NONA
Director, NSA

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

No.

Reference/date of

amendment

Date

entered

Signature

EXPLANATORY NOTES

AGREEMENT

1.

This NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) is promulgated by the Director NSA

under the authority vested in him by the NATO Military Committee.

2.

No departure may be made from the agreement without consultation with the tasking

authority. Nations may propose changes at any time to the tasking authority where they will be
processed in the same manner as the original agreement.

3.

Ratifying nations have agreed that national orders, manuals and instructions implementing

this STANAG will include a reference to the STANAG number for purposes of identification.

DEFINITIONS

4.

Ratification is "In NATO Standardization, the fulfilment by which a member nation formally

accepts, with or without reservation, the content of a Standardization Agreement" (AAP-6).

5.

Implementation is "In NATO Standardization, the fulfilment by a member nation of its

obligations as specified in a Standardization Agreement" (AAP-6).

6.

Reservation is "In NATO Standardization, the stated qualification by a member nation that

describes the part of a Standardization Agreement that it will not implement or will implement only
with limitations" (AAP-6).

RATIFICATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESERVATIONS

7.

Page iii gives the details of ratification and implementation of this agreement. If no details

are shown it signifies that the nation has not yet notified the tasking authority of its intentions.
Page iv (and subsequent) gives details of reservations and proprietary rights that have been
stated.

FEEDBACK

8.

Any comments concerning this publication should be directed to NATO/NSA – Bvd

Leopold III - 1110 Brussels - BE.

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Agreed English/French Text

STANAG 2129
(Edition 7)

NAVY/ARMY/AIR

NATO STANDARDISATION AGREEMENT

(STANAG 2129)

IDENTIFICATION OF LAND FORCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD

AND IN AN AREA OF OPERATION

Annex:

A.

Challenging by Guards and Sentries

B.

Techniques and Procedures for Use of Combat Identification Devices
(short term solution)

Related Documents:

STANAG 2020 LO

Operational Situation Reports

STANAG 2102 LO

Establishing Liaison

STANAG 4579 C3

Battlefield Target Identification Devices

AAP- 6

-

NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
(English and French)

ATP-27

Air Interdiction and Close Air Support

ATP-35

Land Forces Tactical Doctrine

ATP-40

Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in times
of crisis and war

ACP- 150

Recognition and Identification Instructions Air, Land and
Sea Forces

AIM

1.

The aim of this agreement is to standardise the procedures and combat

identification devices (CID) to be used by NATO forces for enabling them to identify each
other as friendly on the battlefield, or in an area of operation.

AGREEMENT

2.

Participating nations agree that NATO forces are to use the procedures and

combat identification devices described in this STANAG so to enable friendly forces to
identify each other on the battlefield or in an area of operation.

DEFINITIONS

3.

The following terms and definitions are used for the purpose of this agreement:

a.

Password. A challenge and its reply, often a combination of two or more
words, letters or numbers;

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b.

Challenge. Any process carried out by one unit or person with the object of
ascertaining the friendly or hostile character or identity of another (AAP-6).
Often the first part of a password;

c.

Reply. An answer to a challenge (AAP-6). Often the second part of a
password;

d.

Combat Identification Devices (CID)

(1)

Far Infrared (IR) Devices. Active emitters or materials of low
emissivity producing contrasting hot or cold spots which provide a
characteristic alteration to the vehicle signature, visible in the Far IR
spectrum when viewed through thermal imagers;

(2)

Near Infrared Emitters. Devices emitting signatures in the Near IR
spectrum that are visible to image intensifying (II) sensors; and

(3)

Vehicle Markings. Alphanumeric and symbolic markings visible in the
visual light spectrum.

DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT

4.

General. The problems of recognising forces on the battlefield or in an area of

operation will be overcome by a combination of control procedures, technical means and
effective training. Because the difficulties in recognising forces increase as distances
become greater and in conditions of reduced visibility, the principal means of preventing
misidentification and fratricide, especially above the unit level, will be through effective
command and control measures.

5.

Friendly land forces may identify themselves on the battlefield by establishing

liaison (see STANAG 2101) and/or by the use of some of the following control methods
and procedures:

a.

Agreed Lines. Such as:

(1)

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) (see AAP-6 and/or ATP-27);

(2)

Phase Lines (see AAP-6 and/or ATP-35); and

(3)

Boundaries and Sectors;

b.

Coloured Smoke. Red and white smoke should not be used, as they are not
suitable for identifying friendly forces;

c.

Lights and Pyrotechnics. Red should not be used, as it is not suitable for the
intended purpose;

d.

Ground/Air Marking Panels. Fluorescent marking panels may be used,
subject to limitations imposed by topography or possible enemy

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identification. Where such panels are used, they should be oriented to
provide maximum visibility for the friendly attacking air forces/crews.
ATP-27 provides further detail on the use of such panels;

e.

Manual and Automatic Challenge and Reply Systems. To include:

(1)

Non-Verbal. Non-verbal methods of challenging and replying include:

(a)

use of coloured smoke, lights, pyrotechnics, panels or other
signals;

(b)

electronic methods, including radio calls on stipulated
frequencies;

(c)

electro-optic methods, including lasers.

(2)

Verbal. The method of challenging to be used by guards and sentries
is at Annex A.

f.

Combat Identification Devices (CID). CID are affixed to vehicles, equipment
or installations to give them a distinctive signature when viewed through
acquisition devices. CID may also be used to:

(1)

complement target acquisition and identification techniques and
procedures; and

(2)

complement command and control techniques and procedures.

Techniques and procedures for employing CID are listed at Annex B.

6.

In addition, where a unit is not identifiable by one of the means above, other

methods aiding in establishing its identification are:

a.

Location

(1)

knowledge of friendly and enemy tactical boundaries and positions;
and

(2)

comparing a unit’s position or track with its position given in a
situation report (see STANAG 2020) or by higher headquarters;

b.

Behaviour. This includes orientation or armaments, direction, and manner of
movement, speed, formation, or hostile actions;

c.

Appearance. Silhouette, colour, markings, layout, and general aspect of
troops, vehicles, and equipment will all aid identification and recognition;

d.

Time. Determining whether forces have crossed a designated position at a
specified time will assist in identification;

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e.

Sound. The distinct audio characteristics of certain weapons and equipment
will aid in recognition and identification;

f.

Electronic Emissions. Electronic systems can in some instances recognise
or identify electronic emissions as being friendly (especially radar
equipment); and

g.

Thermal Emissions. Recognition and identification can be aided by the
exploitation of thermal imagery (TI).

7.

Limitations. The above methods, because they can be compromised, should be

regarded only as evidence and NEVER as proof of friendly or enemy forces.

8.

Other procedures and considerations to aid in the identification of friendly forces

are as follows:

a.

to lessen the risk of compromise, challenges and replies must be changed
periodically and only distributed on a need-to-know basis;

b.

similarly, challenges and replies should not - be used forward of the Forward
Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) except in special circumstances, e.g., link-
up with an airborne bridgehead;

c.

the failure to give a correct reply to a challenge is not necessarily proof of
enemy as presence as the reply may not be known to some friendly troops;

d.

some methods are not effective by day, or by night, or in conditions of poor
visibility;

e.

no challenge should be made until the challenger is ready to take offensive
action; and

f.

CID should be protected from disclosure to the enemy until the latest
possible time to maintain security for their use.

9.

Responsibility of Commanders. Commanders are responsible for prescribing the

challenges and replies, and for the CID configurations to be used in both operations and
training. Verbal and non-verbal challenges and replies and CID configurations are
decided upon at the highest applicable level of command, and notified in advance to
subordinate formations and units. Neighbouring and higher formations are also to be
informed. Additionally:

a.

challenges and replies and alternates are usually issued on a daily basis
through the chain of command. CID configurations will be controlled by the
same means;

b.

alternate challenges and replies and CID configurations will be implemented
in the event of a compromise of challenges and replies, or of CID
configurations; and

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c.

Allied Communications Publication. ACP 150 provides additional
information and guidance.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

10.

This STANAG is implemented when the necessary orders/instructions putting the

procedures detailed in this agreement into effect have been issued to the forces
concerned.

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ANNEX A TO
STANAG 2129
(Edition 7)

CHALLENGING BY GUARDS AND SENTRIES

METHOD

1.

Challenging by voice is most commonly used to identify unknown persons

approaching a position. It is based on a password, which normally changes at least once
a day at a specified time, and which is common within national formations, or within
specified command groupings, or areas.

2.

The words used to form a password must be easily pronounceable. The

combination selected should not have an obvious connection from which, given the
challenge, the reply could be guessed.

3.

The password is decided upon at the highest applicable level of command and

notified in advance to subordinate formations and units. Neighbouring and higher
formations are also to be informed.

4.

When forces of two or more nations are in the same formation, or area, great care

is necessary to ensure that the password chosen is pronounceable by the nationalities
concerned. In these circumstances two or more letters of the NATO phonetic alphabet
must be used, e.g.:

Challenge

-

“Bravo”

Reply -

“Foxtrot”

For the sake of clarity both challenge and reply may be given twice.

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PROCEDURE

5.

The following procedure is to be used:

Action by Sentry

Action by Persons or Group Challenged

a. Alerts his immediate

Commander of the approach of a
person/group, and covers him/them with
his weapon.

b. Waits until the person/group approaching

is within audible range, but not so close
that the position can be rushed, and then
orders him/them to stop with the
command "HALT-HANDS UP".

Halts, raises hands.

c.

Orders by voice or sign one person to
approach "ADVANCE ONE".

Person (or group leader) advances
towards sentry, position.

d. Allows the unknown person to approach

close enough for visual identification, or to
give the challenge in a quiet voice, and
then orders him to stop "HALT".

Halts.

e. Gives the challenge

Quietly - e.g. "BRAVO" - if he does not
identify the person.

Gives the reply - e.g.,
"FOXTROT”

f.

Calls forward the
Remainder of the group, either as
individuals "ADVANCE ONE" - or
altogether - "ADVANCE" as the situation
or his orders dictate.

Second unknown person, or the
remainder of the group, advances to be
identified by the sentry, assisted by the
group leader who stays with the sentry
until all have passed.

FIRING BY SENTRIES

6.

The circumstances under which a sentry is to be instructed to fire on persons or

groups failing to heed a challenge is left to national authorities and must, necessarily, vary
depending upon the particular situation and the Rules of Engagement being applied.

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ANNEX B TO
STANAG 2129
(Edition 7)

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

FOR USE OF COMBAT IDENTIFICATION DEVICES (CID)

(SHORT TERM SOLUTION)

PREFACE

1.

CID are used in conjunction with appropriate acquisition and identification

procedures for identification of friendly forces. They are a supplement to aid in
identification of friendly forces on the battlefield or in an area of operation in order to
reduce the risk of fratricide. CID, because of their potential for compromise will be
employed or activated only for a specified and fixed period of time. The appropriate level
of command will issue time guidelines/limitations for use of CID. This Annex describes
current CID and their employment.

INTRODUCTION

2.

Fratricide is the employment of friendly weapons and munitions which, due to mis-

identification of an intended target, results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury
to friendly personnel. Fratricide also occurs during training. Reasons for fratricide include:

a.

the confusion of battle and simulated battle which greatly reduces the ability
to recognise friendly forces; and

b.

inadequate training of troops in identification of friend or foe (IFF) and IFF
procedures.

3.

In order to minimise occurrences of fratricide, techniques and devices to assist in

friendly forces identification will be used as herein described, subject to their availability
and the operational requirement.

FAR INFRA-RED (IR) DEVICES - COMBAT IDENTIFICATION PANELS
(CIP)

4.

Concept. The concept of the CIP is to affix to vehicles, equipment and installations,

devices which change the appearance of friendly systems when viewed through Far IR,
thermal imagers. When seen through thermal imagers (TI), the CIP will produce a
contrasting cold spot on a hot target image. Gunners use this contrast to help determine if
the friendly system is friendly or “other”. Lack of contrast does not positively identify a
target as enemy, but does tell the gunner that he has not positively identified the target as
friendly.

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5.

Description.

a.

The CIP is a board or surface approximately 0.6m x 0.8m. The CIP can be
made of any durable material, has a low thermal emissivity on one side, and
is designed to be reversed or masked. The reverse side should be painted
to match the surface of the host platform. CIP are normally affixed to
vehicles but can also be affixed to other equipment and platforms. Vehicles
should have from 4 to 10 CIP positioned to make them visible from all
aspects.

b.

The CIP operates as a thermal mirror. It reflects temperature from a cooler
area, i.e., the sky. This reflection is only visible through thermal imagers,
which detect the characteristic cold spot of the CIP. CIP may be flat panels
or a series of narrow panels arranged like venetian blinds.

6.

Reflecting Angles. Combat Identification Panels must be placed to ensure "cool"

radiation from the sky is reflected while providing sufficient surface to be recognised at
engagement ranges through thermal imagers. The CIP will not present a distinct cold spot
if sufficient angle is not used to allow for effective reflection and sufficient surface area is
not presented for imager recognition. To be most effective, the CIP panel must be at an
angle of 20-30 degrees from the vertical (see Figure 1).

MOUNTING AND ATTACHMENT OF CIP

7.

Loss of Combat Identification Panels may make a friendly vehicle appear as an

"other’, vehicle when seen through thermal imagers. Application of CIP, therefore,
requires durability, uniformity, and simplicity. Durability is most important. Uniformity of
CIP placement ensures confidence in identification and uniformity of shape and facilitates
maintenance and transferability. Simplicity in mounting also reduces maintenance and
system costs.

8.

The most effective mounting system is a metal frame. CIP can then be installed in

an operational mode, or non-operational mode by masking or reversing them in the frame.
The frames can be affixed with brackets or Velcro.

TARGET ACQUISITION AND IDENTIFICATION

9.

Combat Identification Panels extend the maximum range of positive identification;

however, their performance is dependent on the quality of the thermal sensor. CIP will be
less effective beyond 2,500 metres, especially for vehicles on the move. Use of CIP at

a = Angle of the CIP from
the vertical. Best
performance is with angle of
20° - 30° from vertical.

Vehicle

a

CIP

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ranges greater than 1,500 metres is complicated by the fact that the sight reticules
obscure the cold image. Even at ranges less than 1,500 metres it may be difficult to
identify the CIP when performing a direct lay of the sight on the target. Switching polarity
of the thermal imager can mitigate this limitation. Using "white hot" and "black hot,’
polarities will improve probability of positive identification of CIP when acquiring and
engaging targets. The cold contrast of the CIP image to the hot vehicle is much clearer
when using the "black hot" polarity.

10.

Identification Training. If quickly and positively identified, CIP will assist weapons

crews in their decision to STOP an engagement of a friendly vehicle. The addition of CIP,
therefore, should be incorporated into the TI recognition training already in use. When
arriving in theatre, rehearsals should be conducted to confirm CIP performance before
initiating operations. This should include "white hot,’ and "black hot" recognition prior to
engaging. Libraries for thermal threat profiles must also be developed and utilised in
training.

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION PANEL CONSIDERATIONS

11.

General. CIP should not be used as the single target identification criterion. CIP

should be seen as contributing to situational awareness and command and control
capabilities.

12.

CIP Degradation. Combat Identification Panel performance can be degraded

under certain circumstances. Contrast between the CIP and the vehicle or platform can
be reduced by the effects of low overcast cloud cover, battlefield obscurants or overhead
foliage cover. Terrain features, trees and other vegetation, proper defilade firing positions
and other obstacles will break up the image of any vehicle and make CIP more difficult to
identify. A matrix describing best conditions for use and those which are most likely to
degrade CIP performance
is at Appendix 1.

13.

CIP Security. The use of particular configurations of CIPs will not maintain security

for long periods. The enemy will be able to duplicate such configurations with relative
ease and speed. Emphasis should, therefore, be placed on the use of CIPs as late in the
operation as safety allows.

14.

CIP Deception. CIPs are very open to deception by an enemy as they can be

mimicked in two ways: active or voluntary imitation; and passive or involuntary imitation.
In either case thermal or visual recognition should be the deciding factor in the gunner’s
engagement decision.

a.

Active Imitation. In this case, the enemy intentionally copies the panels in
order to exploit or undermine their effectiveness. Potential enemy use of
panel-like devices must be an item of Essential Elements of Information for
intelligence gathering. The counter-measure action is to "turn off," friendly
force panels to non-operational mode.

b.

Passive Imitation. In this case, features on the target create a "cold spot"
image similar to that of a CIP to the thermal sensor. This effect has been
observed on some vehicles with features such as toolboxes, stowage bins,

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and track guards. Training on thermal signature recognition, with special
emphasis on utilising cues from the entire target image, not just a CIP, is the
counter-measure action.

15.

Maintenance of CIP. The simplicity of the CIP makes it relatively easy to maintain.

CIP must be kept clean in order to maintain its reflective nature. Vegetation, high winds,
or battlefield effects may cause the CIP to be damaged or lost.

PRE-COMBAT INSPECTIONS

16.

Combat Identification Panels must be a high priority item when conducting Pre-

Combat Inspections (PCI) and Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services. CIP are
intended to reduce the risk of fratricide; therefore, proper PCI may save lives, Inspection of
CIP requires a few simple steps.

a.

emplace all CIP in the proper positions and ensure that none are missing;

b.

check for damaged or loose CIP or mounts;

c.

replace or repair all loose, damaged, or missing CIP;

d.

clear all dust, mud, sand, snow, or other concealing elements from the CIP,
as a build-up of deposits will reduce the CIP’s ability to reflect the cool sky.
A soft cloth, free from oils, grease, or fuels, should be used for cleaning;

e.

if thermal tape is used, ensure that it is still adhering to the backing materiel;
and

f.

ensure that each CIP is visible through a thermal imager.

THERMAL IDENTIFICATION BEACONS (TIBs)

CONCEPT AND METHODOLOGY

17.

TIBs is a flashing beacon which is only visible in the Far IR waveband using

thermal imagers. It aids the identification of vehicles by adding a regularly flashing hot spot
to the thermal signature of the target vehicle. When viewed through a thermal sight, the
flash appears as an alternating hot and cold spot represented by single flooded pixel
changing between white and black. TIBs is a cheap and effective CID, not weather
dependent, easy to install and easily recognised with minimum of training. As a
supplement to CIPs it fills the capability gap in the far infra red spectrum. With TIBs there
are CID is possible across the direct fire weapon engagement spectrum from Far IR to
visible light. TIBs is an active means of ID and therefore subject to inclusion in emission
control (EMCON) orders and must comply with surveillance and target acquisition plan
(STAP) control procedures.

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DESCRIPTION

18.

The TIBs consist of a base assembly unit, a TIBs Control Box (TCB) and a vehicle

specific installation kit. The TCB drives the TIB with the vehicles internal electrical power
supply and indicates the operational status of TIBs. TCB has a red light to indicate “power
on” and a green light to indicate “TIB Good”. The emitter platform has a radiating thermal
element and a reflector, positioned centrally on a turntable. A plated steel wire cage to
prevent physical damage of the thermal element surrounds the rotating element. Attached
to this cage is a highly transmissive plastic film to provide environmental protection.
Power is regulated by the TCB to be not greater than 130 Watts from an 18-28 volt DC
power supply. This, in turn, controls the output power.

MOUNTING

19.

TIBs are mounted on, and powered by, the orange traffic beacon socket and

circuitry. It works by heating a black body element using the rotating amber traffic beacon
mount and power supply. A parabolic reflector rotates around the element and focuses the
radiated energy in a concentrated unidirectional beam. A temporary shield of masking
tape or similar substance can be applied to part of the outer cage to prevent radiation in
the arc towards the threat or enemy sensors. The TIB is a line replaceable unit that has an
appearance and mechanical design based upon the Amber Road Traffic Beacon fitted to
most armoured vehicles. The electrical power to the TIB is provided from within the vehicle
to ensure that continuous operation, including “silent watch” (operating from vehicle
battery power only), is possible. Electrical and mechanical connection to TIBs is via the
base unit using a standard DIN 14620 Form A socket which is compatible with the existing
Amber Traffic Beacon. TIBs should be issued with an Integration Kit (IK) which will ensure
it can be adapted to the widest variety of vehicles and fitted by vehicle crews.

TARGET ACQUISITION AND IDENTIFICATION

20.

Prevailing visibility conditions and the effectiveness of the thermal sight used to

view it limit the operational range of TIBs. Test results have given a typical recognition
distance of not less than 1500m and not greater than 4000m. Horizontal visibility is 360º
normal to the vertical axis. Vertical visibility is from -10º to +30º normal to the horizontal
axis. When a potential target is acquired the presence of a TIBs provides an additional
prompt to the weapons crew to hold their fire until a positive identification is made.

21.

TIBs will display a flashing pixel on the potential target when viewed through a

thermal sight. TIBs’ changes to the host platform are slight. It does not alter the target
image characteristics in any other way in the visual, thermal or IR spectra. Therefore, it
does not impede other recognition practices nor significantly increase the host vehicle's
detectability.

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TIBs CONSIDERATIONS

22.

TIBs is not a complete Target Identification Device. It is an aid that should be used

to reinforce or prompt existing recognition procedures. It may be useful when deployed on
vehicles operated by allies or coalition partners whose equipment’s thermal signatures
may be unfamiliar to weapon crews. Under many circumstances the presence of TIBs will
be the first indication that a target is indeed a friendly vehicle. The absence of a TIBs
indication does not indicate a hostile vehicle. It could be neutral or a friendly vehicle with
inoperative TIBs or not equipped with TIBs. TIBs can easily be fitted to allied or coalition
partner vehicles as well as other agency vehicles such as aid convoys or other authorised
personnel. TIBs is an active system that can be seen with equal ease by any friend or
adversary equipped with a Thermal sensor (e.g. FLIR) device. Therefore its deployment
must be evaluated against TIBs’ vulnerability to enemy detection and the enemy’s thermal
detection capability. EMCON and STAP procedures and orders should specify conditions
and methods of use. Such procedures and orders may have to be adjusted to include CID
devices. TIBs may have to be partially shrouded in the enemy direction to afford protection
from enemy observation. TIBs may also be used as an aid to movement control at night
(especially for convoys) and assist in command and control. In situations that allow, and in
circumstances of reduced visibility, an active system may be used in which case TIBs
could be deployed as a replacement or supplement to CIP.

23.

TIBs Degradation. Thick mist, dust, battlefield obscurants and foliage can degrade

thermal sights. However, developmental trials have shown that TIBs have greater
penetration through rapid blooming obscurants (smoke) than residual thermal signatures.
TIBs is a relatively delicate device and susceptible to physical damage. It should be
removed and safely stowed when not in use. Although not dependent upon the weather
for use, it should be kept as clean and dry as possible. Strong winds, which cause the
element to cool rapidly, will degrade range detection performance.

24.

TIBs Security. TIBs is a relatively inconspicuous device and its function is not

immediately apparent. However, the function of the TIBs could become apparent to
enemy forces early in its deployment. TIBs is vulnerable to capture and use by
unauthorised persons, as there is no method of encryption. Effects of capture could range
from a mere nuisance to a serious loss of friendly forces depending on the number
captured. To imitate TIBs in any quantity would require modern engineering and
production facilities.

NEAR INFRA-RED (IR) EMITTERS

25.

Electronic or chemical Near IR emitters are alternative-identification devices used

to aid in Combat Identification and Command and Control. They operate using active
Near IR which can only be viewed through Image Intensifying (II) Devices and are
therefore only effective during night-time. IR emitters may be pulsed or steady and may
be directional or omnidirectional.

26.

Smoke, fog and dust hinder the use of IR emitters. Examples are the BUDD Light

and the IR Chem-light. See Appendix 1 for conditions when these emitters are most
effective.

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BUDD LIGHT

27.

The BUDD Light is a compact IR source using a 9-volt battery as its power source.

Both the BUDD Light and its power source can be held in the palm of the hand. The size
of the BUDD Light makes it convenient for fixed sites, vehicle identification and for use by
ground personnel. The average life span of the battery power for a BUDD Light is eight
hours of continuous use.

28.

The IR pulse emitted by the BUDD Light is similar to a strobe light. However, the

nature of the IR spectrum makes it visible only to II devices. The BUDD Light pulses
every two seconds and is invisible to the naked eye and thermal imagers. The pulse is
best seen when pointing the beam directly at the II device because the beam dispersion
angle is only forty degrees.

29.

The directional characteristic of the beam makes it possible to limit observation by

an enemy. It also limits the BUDD Light reliability for target identification unless multiple
lights are mounted that can be seen from all aspects. To increase directionality, a shield
can be made to surround the light emitting diodes (LED). Shields can be made from small
cans or duct tape.

30.

Caution must be used when employing BUDD Lights in dense foliage, smoke, fog,

or battlefield obscurants because, like car headlights in fog, a halo of reflected IR light may
develop around the source.

IR CHEM LIGHT

31.

The IR Chem Light does not flash but emits a steady/constant IR light that can be

seen by II devices. IR Chem lights can be used in the same ways as BUDD Lights,
except their range is limited and they are omnidirectional. IR Chem Light average life is
three hours.

NEAR INFRA-RED EMITTER CONSIDERATIONS

32.

Observers must be cautioned that a pulse pattern of an IR emitter can be confused

for muzzle flashes of small arms fire. When employing IR emitters, it should be
considered that the output is limited by battery life and chemical reaction duration. Near
IR sensors (II), unlike Far IR imagers (thermal), are relatively inexpensive and available in
quantity. This must be a consideration when employing Near IR emitters in combat
situations, as the enemy can detect them as easily as can friendly troops.

COMMAND AND CONTROL USES

33.

Near IR emitters are used to mark fixed sites, ground troops, and vehicles. They

may be used in patterns to indicate unit identification, turned on/off to signal
accomplishment of a task, e.g., crossing of a phase line. They are best used as specific
marking or signalling devices from one ground position to another specific position, ground
or air. They are an effective means to increase situational awareness and target
identification, thus increasing combat effectiveness. They can also be used as an
effective means for ground troops to signal air support, giving a specific location of friendly
troops. They are most effective for use as marking devices (i.e., obstacle and breach

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sites). They are also useful to specialised units such as pathfinders for the marking of
pickup, drop, or landing zones.

VEHICLE MARKING SYSTEM

34.

A vehicle marking system consists of a standardised set of combinations of

numbers and symbols which provide visible discrimination between vehicles in a unit.
Markings are standard size and may be placed on CIP or other similar mounting surfaces.
Markings will be made of material that contrasts in colour with the background material.

Appendix 1 - Combat Identification Operational Factors Matrix

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
STANAG 2129
(Edition 7)

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION OPERATIONAL FACTORS MATRIX

FACTOR

SITUATION

EMPLOYMENT

Mission

Attacking
Forward Passage of Lines
Advance to Contact

Defending
Rearward Passage of Lines

CIP: Mark toward front until passage of lines is
completed then, mark sides and rear.
TIBs: On, front arc shielded.

Mark sides and rear, front as required for CAS.
TIBs: Off to reduce chance of detection; On for
CAS.
CIP: Mark sides and areas facing friendly line.
TIBs: On, front arc shielded.

Enemy

Few using Near IR sensors

Most using Near IR sensors

Few using Far IR sensors
enemy side

Most using Far IR sensors

Capable of mounting CIP/TIB like -devices
TIB like -devices
Probably mounting CIP/

Use BUDD Lights with caution

Do NOT use BUDD

CIP: On sides and rear - off to front.
TIBs: On, front arc shielded.

CIP: on rear only - off to front & sides and areas
facing enemy.
TIBs: On for specific purposes only, (e.g. convoy
drills, CAS); front and/or side arcs shielded as
necessary.

Mount own CIP/TIBs with caution.

Off

Troops

Joint /
Combined /
Multi - national Force

Rehearse with devices - co-ordinate use.
Include CID use in EMCON and STAP orders.

Terrain
(Weather)

Warm to Hot
Clear, Dry

Clear, Humid

Cloudy, Humid - Wet

Cool to Cold
Clear, Dry

Clear, Humid

Cloudy, Humid - Wet

Wet & Windy

TIBs, CIP and BUDD performance good.

CIPs and TIBs good, (Use White Hot Thermal
Polarity); BUDD may have Halo effect.

TIBs good. CIP performance significantly
degraded. BUDD may have Halo effect.

TIBs and CIP performance good

TIBs and CIP good; BUDD may have Halo effect.

TIBs and CIP good; BUDD may have Halo effect.

TIBs may be degraded, (shield from wind). CIP
good; BUDD may have Halo effect.

Time

Day

Night

TIBs, CIP, and Combat Vehicle Marking System

TIBs, BUDD, CIP