private security companies the case for regulation SIPRIPP09

PrivateSecurityCompanies

TheCaseforRegulation

SIPRIPolicyPaperNo.9

CarolineHolmqvist

StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute

January2005

©SIPRI,2005

Contents

Preface

Abbreviationsandacronyms

1.Introduction

Theemergenceofprivatesecuritycompanies

Thediversityoffirms,activitiesandclients

Privatesecurityservicesandthenewsecurityenvironment:problemor

opportunity?

2.Privatesecurityintheweakstate

Privatesecurityasasymptomofstateweakness

Thepromiseofprivatesecurityinweakstates?

Thestateatthecentre

3.Privatesecurityandthe‘efficient’state

Challengesinoutsourcingpolicyimplementation

Whopaysthepricefortheefficientstate’sprivatesecurityfailures?

4.Theglobalwaronterrorismandprivatizationofsecurity

UScounter-terrorismstrategyandtheattractivenessoftheprivate

securitysector
Politicallegitimacyintheglobalwaronterrorism

5.International,regionalandnationalresponses

Issues,interestsandoptions

Theinadequacyofinternationallegalinstruments

UNapproachestoprivatesecuritycompaniesandprospectsforan

internationalregulatorybody
Self-regulation:theindustryanditsinternationalnon-stateclients

Costsandbenefitsofself-regulation

Existingnationallegislation:modelsforreplication?

Regulationattheregionallevel

6.Conclusions:thelimitsofregulation

Abouttheauthor

Preface

TheprominentusemadeofprivatesecurityservicesbytheUnitedStatesduringits
Iraqcampaign,andthewayinwhichthisusehasbecomelinkedwithconcerns
aboutbothhumanrightsabusesandbusinessethics,hasuncoveredthetipofwhat
isinfactaverylargeicebergofaproblem.Theservicesprovidedbyprivatecom-
paniesinthesecuritysectortodaycoveranenormousrange,faroutstrippingand
arguablymakingredundantthetraditionaldefinitionofa‘mercenary’.Theyare
drawnuponbothby‘weak’statesandbysomeoftheworld’smostpowerfulgov-
ernments.Itishardtoseehowthistrendtowardsthe‘privatizationofsecurity’can
quicklybeblockedorreversed,giventheincreasingpreferenceforinterventionist
modesofsecurityaction,thegrowingscaleofambitionof‘peace-building’efforts,
andthelackofbothmoneyandmentoincreaseorevenmaintainthelevelsof
state-owneddefenceandsecurityforces.

Buildingonthebestresearchavailable,CarolineHolmqvistinthisPolicyPaper

addressesthechallengesposedbythemanifoldactivitiesofprivatesecurityser-
vicestodayfromanotablyobjectiveandbalancedperspective.Shegivesasmuch
attentiontothewaysuchservicesareusedbystrongstates,whosedemocraticcre-
dentialsarenotgenerallyindoubt,astothemorecommonlyrecognizedproblem
ofweakstateswhereexcessiveresorttoprivateservicesbothmarksandaggravates
thefragmentationofauthority.Whilerecognizingtheshort-termappeal,andeven
thelogic,thatsuchsolutionsmayhaveinindividualcases,sherightlydrawsatten-
tiontotheproblemsthatlieinwaitifeitherthelocal,orintervening,authorities
delegatethewrongfunctionstoprivateprovidersandfailtodefineandenforcethe
rightstandardsofperformance.Evenincaseswherethereisnoabuseoftrustby
privatecompanies,itishardtoavoidalossoftransparency,ofdemocraticcontrol
andoflocal‘ownership’ofsecurityprocessesinthebroadersense.

Havingidentifiedwherethepreciseproblemsandrequirementsforbetterregu-

lationofprivatesecurityactivitieslie,thefinalchapterofthisPolicyPaperdis-
cussesawiderangeofpossibleapproachestothechallenge.Itsrecommendations
aredirectedat,anddeservecarefulattentionby,internationalorganizationsand
multinational companies as well as traditional nation states and their regional
groupings.Theproposalsoffered,inparticulartotheUnitedNations,theAfrican
Union and the European Union, recognize these organizations’ will to improve
boththequalityandquantityoftheirconflict-relatedwork—ambitionswhich,in
thegivenconditions,makeithardforthemtoavoidatleastshort-termrelianceon
privatesectorhelpthemselves

butemphasizehowimportantitisforthemtoshow

leadershipindefining,andabidingby,theappropriatenorms.

P R EF AC E v

Thanksforthiscompellingandthought-provokingstudyareduetotheauthor;to

DrRenataDwan,headoftheSIPRIArmedConflictsandConflictManagement
Programme, for her valuable contributions at all stages; and to Connie Wall,
SIPRI’sPublicationsManager,whoeditedthetextforpublication.

AlysonJ.K.Bailes

Director,SIPRI

December2004

Abbreviations and acronyms

ACOTA

AfricanContingenciesOperationsTrainingandAssistanceProgram

ACRI

AfricanCrisisResponseInitiative

AMIS

AfricanUnionMissioninSudan

AfricanUnion

BritishPetroleum

CFSP

CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy

CPA

CoalitionProvisionalAuthority

CSC

ComputerSciencesCorporation

CSDP

CommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

DDR

demobilization,disarmamentandreintegration

DFI

DefenseForecastsIncorporated

DFID

DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DOD

(US)DepartmentofDefense

DRC

DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo

DSL

DefenceSystemsLimited

EuropeanCommunity

ECOMIL

ECOWASMissioninLiberia

ECOMOG

ECOWASMonitoringGroup

ECOWAS

EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates

ExecutiveOutcomes

ESDP

EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy

EuropeanUnion

EUPM

EUPoliceMissioninBosniaandHerzegovina

FARC

FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia

FMA

ForeignMilitaryAssistance

GAO

GovernmentAccountabilityOffice

GWOT

globalwaronterrorism

HSPN

HumanitarianSecurityandProtectionNetwork

HUMINT

humanintelligence

ICC

InternationalCriminalCourt

ICE

ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement

ICRC

InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

IDIQ

infinite-delivery,infinite-quantity

IMF

InternationalMonetaryFund

IPOA

InternationalPeaceOperationsAssociation

AB B R EVIATIONS AND AC R ONYM S vii

informationtechnology

ITAR

InternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation

JHA

JusticeandHomeAffairs

MDM

MédécinsduMonde

MNC

multinationalcorporation

MPRI

MilitaryProfessionalResourcesIncorporated

MSF

MédécinsSansFrontières

MSS

MedicalSupportSolutions

NPRC

NationalProvisionalRulingCouncil

NEPAD

NewPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment

NGO

non-governmentalorganization

OAU

OrganizationofAfricanUnity

ODTC

OfficeofDefenseTradeControls

OECD

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

PA&E

PacificArchitectsandEngineering

PMC

privatemilitarycompany

PSC

privatesecuritycompany

QDR

QuadrennialDefenseReview

RUF

RevolutionaryUnitedFront

SAIC

ScienceApplicationsInternationalCorporation

SSR

securitysectorreform

TTIC

TerroristThreatIntegrationCenter

UCMJ

UniformCodeofMilitaryJustice

UnitedNations

UNHCR

UNHighCommissionerforRefugees

UNITA

UniãoNacionalparaaIndependênciaTotaldeAngola

UNTAET

UNTransitionalAdministrationinEastTimor

1.Introduction

ItwasestimatedinMarch2003that15000–20000privatesecuritycontractors
wereworkinginIraq,andtheconflicttherewasreferredtoas‘thefirstprivatised
war’.

Sincethen,boththenumberandthevisibilityofcontractpersonnelinIraq

haveincreased,triggeringabroaddebateontheroleofprivatecompanieswhich
providemilitaryandsecurityservicestostates,corporationsandnon-governmental
organizations(NGOs).However,thephenomenonisneithernewnorexclusiveto
theIraqiconflict.Thepastdecadehasseentheriseandconsolidationofaglobal
industryforprivatesecurityprovision,withover100companiesoperatinginas
manycountriesworldwide.

Theprivateprovisionofsecurityandmilitaryserviceschallengesconventional

assumptionsabouttherolesofthenationstateasthemainprotagonistinmilitary
affairsandastheguarantorofphysicalsecurityforitscitizens.Intheabsenceof
effectivelegalorregulatorystructures,suchactivitiesraiseissuesoflegality,legit-
imacyandaccountabilityinthesphereofsecuritypolicy.Thisstudyassessesthe
impactof‘theprivatizationofsecurity’invarioussecuritycontextsandexamines
some of the ways in which the international community might respond to this
development.

Theemergenceofprivatesecuritycompanies

AccordingtosociologistMaxWeber’sconceptionofthemodernnationstate,a
definingcharacteristicisthestate’smonopolyonthelegitimatemeansofviolence,
including the sanctioning, control and use of force.

Although this view of the

nationstatecontinuestoinformandunderpinmostofthedebateoninternational
security,stateexclusivityinthemilitaryrealmis,infact,anexceptionhistorically.
Theincidenceofthesupplyofmilitaryservicesbyprivateactorsisasoldaswar-
fareitself.

Ancient armies, from the Chinese to the Greek and Roman, were to a large

extent dependent on contracted forces, as was Victorian Britain, the Italian
citystatesoftheRenaissanceperiodandmostoftheEuropeanforcesduringthe
Thirty Years’ War of 1618–48.

Similarly, private actors have played a role

throughout US military history: contractors have supported the US military in

‘Military-industrialcomplexities’,TheEconomist,29Mar.2003,p.56.

ForthemostcomprehensiveaccountoftheindustryseeSinger,P.W.,CorporateWarriors:The

RiseofthePrivatizedMilitaryIndustry(CornellUniversityPress:Ithaca,N.Y.,2004).

Weber,M.,ed.T.Parsons,TheTheoryofSocialandEconomicOrganization(FreePress:New

York,1964),p.154.

Foracomprehensiveoverviewofthehistoryofprivatemilitaryactorssee‘Privatizedmilitary

history’,Singer(note2),pp.19–40;Shearer,D.,InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,Private
ArmiesandMilitaryIntervention,AdelphiPaper316(OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford,1998);and
Milliard,T.S.,‘Overcomingpost-colonialmyopia:acalltorecognizeandregulateprivatemilitary
companies’,MilitaryLawReview,vol.176(June2003),pp.6–8.

2P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

everycontingencysincetheAmericanRevolutionaryWarof1775–83.

Characters

suchas‘MadMike’Hoare,theformerBritishsoldierwhoduringthe1960sheaded
agroupintheBelgianCongocalled‘theFifthCommando’(commonlyknownas
‘Les Affreux’, or The Horrible), and former French soldier Bob Denard, who
served alongside Hoare in the Congo and later independently in Biafra, Chad,
MoroccoandRhodesia,contributedtotheimageofthelonemercenaryinAfrica’s
post-colonialwars.

However, instances of mercenary activity during the 1960s

weresporadicandlimited,withimmediatepersonalfinancialgainthemainmoti-
vation.Althoughisolatedmercenaryactivityisstillcarriedouttoday,itisrelated
moretotherealmofcriminalactivitythantothebroaderdevelopmentofthepri-
vateprovisionofsecurityservices.

Theriseofthecontemporaryinternationalprivatemilitaryandsecurityindustry

beganintheearly1990s,withtheemergenceofprivatesecurityproviderswith
clearcorporatestructures.Avarietyofbothdemand-andsupply-sidefactorshave
been associated with the rise of the current corporate security sphere, although
threefactorsaremostoftencited:(a)thedominanceofpost-coldwarfreemarket
modelsofthestate,propellingastrongtrendtowardstheoutsourcingoftraditional
governmentfunctions;(b)theglobaldownsizingofnationalmilitaries,providinga
vast pool of trained former military personnel for recruitment by private com-
panies;and(c)thegradualdisengagementofthemajorpowersfrommanypartsof
thedevelopingworld.

Othercommentatorsviewtheemergenceofprivatesecurity

serviceprovidersasalogicalprogressionfromtheprivatizationofmilitarygoods
production(thearmamentsindustry)inEuropeandNorthAmerica.

Whereas all these factors have played a part in the broader ‘privatization of

security’,theexplanationsfortheindustry’sgrowthvarywiththespecificsecurity
contexts.Inweakorfailingstates,‘privatization’isessentiallyamisnomer,since
consumers have turned to the private sector because of the lack of functioning

Worden,L.,‘Downsizingandoutsourcing,we’vesprungPandora’sBox’,TheSignal,27June

2004,URL<http://www.scvhistory.com/scvhistory/signal/iraq/sg062704.htm>.

DenardwasatonepointcontractedbytheUSCentralIntelligenceAgencytosendateamof

20men to support Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA army against the left-wing regime in Luanda,
Angola.Silverstein,K.,PrivateWarriors(Verso:London,2000),pp.146–47.

Casesofthissortin2004includetheactivitiesofformerUSsoldierJonathan‘Jack’Idemain

Afghanistan and Pakistan and the alleged plot by mercenaries to carry out a coup in Equatorial
Guinea.Peele,M.,‘EquatorialGuineaseekscoupplotevidencefromThatcher’,Financial Times,
30Aug.2004.TheIdemacaseillustratedhowthelinesmaystillbeblurredbetweenindependentand
state-hiredsecurityservices:evenNATOforcesbelievedthatIdemaliaisedwiththeUSGovernment
andon3occasionsrespondedtohiscallsforback-up.Smith,C.S.,‘AtoughnewfaceofUSabroad’,
InternationalHeraldTribune,14Oct.2004.

Between1987and1996,thenumberofindividualsinnationalarmedforcesworldwidefellby

6million.Spearin,C.,‘Privatesecuritycompaniesandhumanitarians:acorporatesolutiontosecur-
inghumanitarianspaces?’,International Peacekeeping, vol. 8, no. 1 (2001), pp. 27–28. See also
Shearer(note4).

E.g.,firmssellingarmamentsmayincreasinglyofferaccompanyingservicessuchasmaintenance

ortrainingintheuseofweapons.Krahmann,E.,ThePrivatizationofSecurityGovernance:Devel-
opments,Problems,Solutions,ArbeitspapierezurInternationalenPolitikundAußenpolitik(AIPA),
AIPA1/2003(LehrstuhlInternationalePolitik,UniversityofCologne:Cologne,2003),pp.13and17,
URL<http://www.politik.uni-koeln.de/jaeger/downloads/aipa0103.pdf>.

INTR ODUC TION3

publicsectorsecurityinstitutions.Indeed,inmanycasestherewaslittletopriva-
tize.Thiscontrastswiththesituationinstrongor‘efficient’states,whereprivate
actorshavebeenusedtosupplementfunctioningstateinstitutions.

Twoinstancesofprivatesecuritysectorengagementwereparticularlyinfluential

insettingthescenefortheinitialdebatesaboutprivatesecurityandmilitaryser-
vices:theinvolvementoftheSouthAfricancompanyExecutiveOutcomes(EO)in
theconflictsinAngolaandSierraLeonein1995–97,andthatofSandlineInter-
national(aninternationalcompanyregisteredintheBahamasbutwithofficesin
London and Washington, DC) in Sierra Leone in 1997–98.

Hired by national

governmentstoprovidedirectmilitaryassistanceandparticipateincombatagainst
rebelforces,EOandSandlineandtheiroperationswerewidelyviewedasrepre-
sentingthereturnofmercenaryactivity,albeitinanewshape.

These‘pioneer’

companiesmadenoefforttoconcealtheirprovisionofgunsforhire:indeed,itwas
emphasizedthattheirexistencecouldusherinanewerainthepoliticsofinter-
nationalsecurityinwhichprivatecompanies,intheabsenceofinternationalinter-
vention,could‘helpendconflictsinplaceslikeAfrica’.

Inreality,therehavebeenfewinstancesofnationalgovernmentshiringprivate

companiestowagewars,andthetwomaincompaniesofferingready-to-goforces
forcombat,EOandSandline,arenowbothdefunct.

Intheshadowoftherela-

tivelyfewinstancesofgenuine‘contractwars’,awiderindustryofprivatesecurity
provisionhasproliferated.Castingthedebateasoneaboutthevirtuesandvicesof
‘mercenaries’hasobscuredwhatisinfactamuchbroaderphenomenonandhas
precludedrealcriticalengagementwiththesubjectofsecurityprivatization.

Thediversityoffirms,activitiesandclients

Distinguishing contemporary private security actors from their mercenary fore-
runners is at once a complex and a straightforward task. Mercenary activity is
illegalunderboththe1989InternationalConventionAgainsttheRecruitment,Use,
FinancingandTrainingofMercenariesandthe1977OrganizationofAfricanUnity
(OAU—now the African Union, AU) Convention for the Elimination ofMer-

Krahmann(note9).

ForelaborateaccountsofEOandSandlineoperationsinAngolaandSierraLeoneseeShearer

(note4);Singer(note2);andMusah,A.-F.andFayemi,J.K.(eds),Mercenaries:AnAfricanSecurity
Dilemma(PlutoPress:London,2000).

Brooks,D.,‘Mercenariesormessiahs?:thefutureofinternationalprivatemilitaryservices’,

International Peacekeeping,vol.7,no.4(2000);foranearlycriticalaccountseeCilliers,J.and
Mason,P.(eds),Peace,ProfitorPlunder:ThePrivatisationofSecurityinWar-tornAfricanSocieties
(SouthAfricanInstituteforSecurityStudies:Johannesburg,1999),pp.37–39,URL<http://www.iss.
co.za/Pubs/Books/Blurbppp.html>.

SeetheSandlineInternetsiteatURL<http://www.sandline.com/site/>.

EOhasbeendefunctsince1999,whenanewlawtargetedatmercenaryactivitywaspassedin

SouthAfrica.SandlinecloseditsoperationsinApr.2004.However,itisgenerallyagreedbyindustry
commentators that the dissolution of these companies has been followed by the reformation and
establishmentofnewfirms.

4P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

cenarisminAfrica.

However,neitheroftheseinternationallegalinstrumentsis

applicable to the activities of private security companies.

The United Nations

(UN)definitionofmercenaryactivityintheInternationalConventionhingesona
vague,restrictivecriterionofindividualmotivationbyfinancialgain,whilethe
OAU/AU convention specifically targets mercenary activity aimed at the over-
throwofgovernmentsandofOAU/AU-recognizedliberationmovements.

This

leavesthelegalparametersforprivatesecurityprovisionlargelyunclear.Thelack
ofagreeddefinitionshasobstructedbothanalysisofthebroaderprivatizationof
securityandthedevelopmentofnewinternationallegalandregulatorystructures.

Mostprivatesecuritycompaniesarelikeanyotherprivatecompany:theyhave

conventionalcorporatestructures,operateaslegalentities,andmaintainInternet
sitesandcorporateties.Manyarepartoflargerindustrialconglomerates,someof
them included in the Fortune 500 list.

Such companies are generally capital-

intensive,benefitfromregularsystemsoffinancingandmoveeffortlesslyinthe
internationalarena.Theservicesofferedbyprivatesecurityandmilitarycompanies
range from the provision of operational support in combat, military advice and
training, and arms procurement and maintenance to logistical support, housing,

TheInternationalConventionwasadoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyinResolu-

tion44/34,4Dec.1989,andenteredintoforceon20Oct.2001.FortheInternationalConventionsee
URL<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r034.htm>andforthelistofthe16signatoriesand
26partiesseeURL<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/
treaty6.asp>.FortheOAU/AUConventionandthelistof26signatoriesand25partiesseetheInter-
netsiteoftheAfricanUnionatURL<http://www.africa-union.org>.

Ballesteros,E.,‘Internationalandregionalinstruments’,PaperpresentedatWiltonParkConfer-

ence on The Privatization of Security: Framing a Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy
Agenda,19–21Nov.1999(thefullconferencereportisavailableontheInternationalAlertInternet
site, ‘Privatization of security: briefings and conference papers’, URL <http://www.international-
alert.org/publications.htm>);andSinger,P.W.,‘War,profitsandthevacuumoflaw:privatizedmili-
taryfirmsandinternationallaw’,Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol.42, no.2 (2004),
pp.522–24, URL <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jtl/Vol_42_2_files/singer.html>. For more on the
inapplicabilityofthe2conventionstocontemporaryprivatesecurityactivitysee,e.g.,Cleaver,G.,
‘Subcontractingmilitarypower:theprivatisationofsecurityincontemporarysub-SaharanAfrica’,
Crime,LawandSocialChange,vol.33,no.1–2(2000),pp.131–49.

BothdefinitionsderivefromAdditionalProtocol1totheGenevaConventionsof12Aug.1949,

Article47,para.2,availableatURL<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm>.Sixcriteriamust
bemet:‘Amercenaryisanypersonwho:(a)Isspecificallyrecruitedlocallyorabroadinorderto
fightinanarmedconflict;(b)Does,infact,takeadirectpartinthehostilities;(c)Ismotivatedtotake
partinthehostilitiesessentiallybythedesireforprivategainand,infact,ispromised,byoronbehalf
ofaPartytotheconflict,materialcompensationsubstantiallyinexcessofthatpromisedorpaidto
combatantsofsimilarranksandfunctionsinthearmedforcesofthatParty;(d)Isneitheranationalof
aPartytotheconflictnoraresidentofaterritorycontrolledbyaPartytotheconflict;(e)Isnota
memberofthearmedforcesofaPartytotheconflict;and(f)Hasnotbeensentbyastatewhichisnot
aPartytotheconflictonofficialdutyasamemberofitsarmedforces’.EnriqueBallesteros,former
SpecialRapporteuroftheUNCommissiononHumanRightsontheeffectsoftheuseofmercenaries,
has repeatedly argued that the UN definition needs to be amended to deal effectively with con-
temporaryprivatesecurityactivity.SeeSinger(note16),p.528.

On the basis of revenue for 2003, Northrop Grumman Corporation was ranked number 55,

HalliburtonCo.122andComputerSciencesCorporation175.AssociatedPress(AP),‘ListoftheFor-
tune500’,USAToday,22Mar.2004,URL<http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2004-03-
22-fortune-500-list_x.htm>.

INTR ODUC TION5

communicationsservices,securityservices,intelligencegatheringandcrimepre-
vention.

Attemptstosubdivideandcategorizeprivateactorsinthesecurityservicesector

more precisely have been much debated. A distinction is often made between
‘private military companies’ (PMCs) and ‘private security companies’ (PSCs).
PMCsaredefinedasprivatecompaniesprovidingoffensiveservices,designedto
haveamilitaryimpact,whereasPSCistakentorefertocompaniesofferingdefen-
siveservices,intendedmainlytoprotectindividualsandproperty.Thisdistinction
isproblematicontwoaccounts.First,whatisperceivedas‘defensive’underone
setofcircumstancesmaywellturnouttohave‘offensive’repercussionsinanother.
Second, short-term situational demands as well as immediate or medium-term
businessopportunitiesleadcompaniestoappropriatenewtaskswithrelativespeed
andease,makingthe‘offensive–defensive’or‘active–passive’distinctionsirrele-
vantatbestandmisleadingatworst.

The obfuscation of terminology is worsened by the frequent reference in the

mainstreammediasimplyto‘contractors’.Inthemostcomprehensivecoverageof
theindustrytodate,PeterW.Singersuggestsaclassificationsystemforfirms,
basedonamilitary‘tipofthespear’analogyinbattlespace—wherethe‘tip’indi-
catesthefrontline.Hedistinguishesbetweenthreetypesoffirm:militaryprovider
firms (type1), military consultant firms (type2) and military support firms
(type3).

Thisclassificationcategorizesfirmsbytherangeoftheirservicesand

thelevelofforceused:type1firmsprovideservicesatthefrontline,suchascom-
mandofforcesandimplementation;type2firmsoffermainlyadvisoryandtrain-
ingservices;andtype3firmsareusedforthecontractingoutof‘non-lethalaidand
assistance’,includinglogisticfunctionssuchasfeedingandhousingtroopsand
providingtransport.

WhileSinger’sclassificationisusefulbecauseitprovidesamoredetailedpicture

thanthe‘militaryversussecurity’dichotomyandhelpstoschematizethebroad
trendswithinavastmarket,mostcompaniesdefysuchclearcategorization.Fur-
thermore,thetemptationtocategorizefirmsaccordingtotheirrelativeproximityto
thefrontlineisproblematicbecausetheimpactonthesecuritycontextmaybe
significantevenforlower-echelontasks.Inotherwords,thestrategicimpactof
providing,forexample,militaryadviceortraining(eveninaclassroomsetting)
maybeasgreatasthatofthedirectparticipationofaprivatecompanyincombat—
indicatingthefutilityofbasinganalysisona‘hierarchy’ofservices.ThisPolicy
Papereschewsthedistinctionbetween‘military’and‘security’andemploysthe

The distinction between PMCs and PSCs and between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ is used

widely.See,e.g.,Makki,S.etal.,‘Privatemilitarycompaniesandtheproliferationofsmallarms:
regulating the actors’, International Alert Briefing 10 (2001), URL <http://www.international-
alert.org/pdf/pubsec/Btb_brf10.pdf>;andGenevaCentrefortheDemocraticControlofArmedForces
(DCAF),‘FactSheetfortheMeetingofthePFPConsortiumSecuritySectorReformGroup,Stock-
holm, 25–26 Mar. 2004’, URL <http://www.dcaf.ch/pfpc-ssr-wg/Meetings/Stockholm_03.04/
Papers/Private_Companies.pdf>.

Singer(note2),pp.91–93.

Singer(note2),p.93.

6P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

term‘privatesecuritycompany’todenoteallcompanieswithintheindustry.While
itisarguablythecasethatsegmentsoftheindustrycovermilitaryactivity,there
canbenocleardividinglineinthefinalanalysis,makingtheterm‘PSC’more
appropriateinthecumulativesense.

Whereverpossible,argumentsaresubstan-

tiatedbyreferencetospecificcompanyactivitiesorcontractsratherthantothe
typeoffirm.

Mostofthecompaniesintheprivatemilitaryandsecuritysectorhavelimited

infrastructure, are highly mobile and make use of a flexible workforce. Larger
companiesmaintainvastdatabasesofformermilitaryandlaw-enforcementper-
sonnel,allowingthemtokeepthesizeoftheirpermanentstaffataminimum.

Becausecompaniesprimarilyrecruitformermilitarypersonnel,theyseldomneed
to provide staff training, which helps to limit costs. They are able to quickly
assembleatailoredforceforeachmissionorcontract,drawingonindividualswith
theappropriateexperienceandtraining.Databasesaresometimessharedbetween
companies,andmorethanonefirmmayemploythesameindividual.Inaddition,
PSCscarrytheadvantagefortheclientofguaranteedconfidentialityandagener-
allyapoliticalnature.

ThelinkbetweenPSCsandrelatedbutmoremainstreamindustrialundertakings

suchasgoodsandservicesfromthearmsproduction,construction,computer,elec-
tronicsandcommunicationsindustrieshasbeenstrengthenedinrecentyears,asa
varietyofmultinationalcorporations(MNCs)havemovedintothesecuritysector.
Forexample,theUSfirmMilitaryProfessionalResourcesIncorporated(MPRI)
was bought in 2003 by the communications giant L-3 Communications, while
NorthropGrummanCorporation,whichdealsnotonlyindefenceproductsbutalso
inelectronicsystemsandinformationtechnology,hasacquiredtheUScompany
VinnellCorporation.

InMarch2003DynCorp,oneofthekeyplayersonthepri-

vatesecuritymarket,wasacquiredbyComputerSciencesCorporation(CSC).

The provision of risk analysis, coupled with complete security solutions, is a
growingsegmentwithintheindustry;othernotableadditionstoprivatesecurity
activitiesareinterpretationandinterrogationservices.

Contrarytopopularperceptions,notonlygovernments(andnotonlyAfrican

governments)butalsointernationalorganizations,NGOs,humanitarianagencies,
membersoftheinternationalmediaandMNCscontractprivatesecurityservices.

PSC is also the favoured general term in i.a. Avant, D., TheMarketforForce:TheConse-

quencesofPrivatizingSecurity(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,forthcoming2005);and
Spearin,C.,EndsandMeans:AssessingtheHumanitarianImpactofCommercialisedSecurityonthe
OttawaConventionBanningAnti-PersonnelMines,YCISSOccasionalPaperno.69(YorkCentrefor
InternationalandSecurityStudies(YCISS),YorkUniversity:Toronto,Nov.2001),p.1,URL<http://
www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/occasion_main.htm>.

Avanthasdevelopedanotherversionofthe‘tipofthespear’analogy,basedoncontractsrather

thantypeoffirm.Avant(note22),p.14.

Avant,D.,‘Thinkagain:mercenaries’,ForeignPolicy,July/Aug.2004,p.21.

‘Employment’, Military-Science.com, URL<http://www.military-science.com/employment.

shtml>.

ComputerSciencesCorporation(CSC),‘ComputerSciencesCorporationcompletesacquisition

of DynCorp’, CSC press release, 7Mar. 2004, URL <http://www.csc.com/newsandevents/news/
2025.shtml>.

INTR ODUC TION7

TheUNhascontractedprivatesecurityserviceprovidersinsupportofanumberof
peace operations. For example, two South African firms (KZN Security and
EmpowerLossControlServices)werecontractedtoprovidelocalintelligenceto
the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2001, while
DynCorpprovidedlogistics,transportandcommunicationsservices.

Similarly,

staffoftheBritishDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)wereunder
privateprotectioninIraqin2004.

MNCssuchasShellandChevronhavecon-

tractedprivatesecurityfirmsinNigeria,ashasBritishPetroleum(BP)inColom-
bia.

ThediversityofclientsusingPSCscomplicatestheclearcategorizationof

theprivatesecurityindustryand,indeed,theassessmentofitseffects.

Anotherobstacletoanalysingtheprivatizationofsecurityprovisionliesinthe

intrinsicdifficultyoffindingreliableinformation.Despiteoperatinginanopen
marketandwithcompaniesoftenseekinglegitimacyandpromotingthemselvesas
professionalandreliableentities,theworldofprivatesecurityandmilitarycom-
paniesstillretainsanairofsecrecy.Thereisnoexhaustivelistofcompaniesoper-
atingwithintheprivatesecuritysector.

Onthebasisofananalysisofcontract

sizes, operating expenditure in military budgets and interviews with investors,
SingerestimatesthatthenumberofPSCsoperatingworldwideisinthehundreds
and that they account for combined annual global revenues of close to $100
billion.

Earlier estimates of the scale of the industry indicated global annual

revenuesof$55.6billionin1990and,onthebasisofcompoundedannualgrowth
of7percent,projectedanincreaseto$202billionby2010.

Inmanyrespects,itisthescopeandsizeoftheprivatesecurityindustrythat

makeitapotentforceinworldaffairs.Theconfusionoverwhichservices(and
companies) constitute the global private security industry, the secrecy that sur-
roundsthiswork,andthepiecemealgrowthandconsolidationoftheindustryhelp
explainwhybothacademicandpolicycircleshavebeenslowtorecognizeand
respondtoitsdevelopment.

Singer(note2),p.183.

Avant, D., ‘The privatisation of security and change in the control of force’, International

StudiesPerspectives,vol.5,no.2(2004),p.154.

Avant(note28);andMandel,R.,ArmiesWithoutStates:ThePrivatisationofSecurity(Lynne

Rienner:London,2002),p.54.

OnesourceofinformationonPSCcontractsisadatabasemaintainedbytheInternationalCon-

sortiumofInvestigativeJournalists.SeetheInternetsiteoftheCenterforPublicIntegrity,Washing-
ton, DC, ‘Windfalls of war: US contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan’, URL <http://www.
publicintegrity.org/wow/>.

Singer,P.W.,Personalcommunicationwiththeauthor,May2004.

DatafromtheEquitableSecuritiesCorporation,EquitableSecuritiesResearch,27Aug.1997,

quoted in Vines, A., ‘Mercenaries and the privatisation of security in Africa in the 1990s’, eds
G.MillsandJ.Stremlau, ThePrivatisationofSecurityinAfrica(SouthAfricanInstituteofInter-
nationalAffairs:Johannesburg,1999),p.47.

8P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Privatesecurityservicesandthenewsecurityenvironment:problemor
opportunity?

ThefrequencywithwhichconcernsareraisedaboutthelegitimacyofPSCopera-
tionssignalsaseeminglyinstinctivereluctancetorelinquishthestate’sroleasthe
providerofsecurity.InthewordsofUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan,‘theworld
maynotyetbereadytoprivatisepeace’.

Therootsofthatscepticismcannot,

however, simply be reduced to knee-jerk protectiveness about state power and
sovereignty.Apprehensivenessaboutaglobalindustryfortheprovisionofsecurity
servicesrelatesinprincipletotwolegitimateandinterrelatedconcerns.

First,althoughstatedominanceofsecurityrelationshasbeenchallengedbya

varietyofnon-stateactors,theimpactofprivatesecurityactorsonthestate’spri-
macyintheprovisionandguaranteeingofsecurityraisesnewquestions. States
havecometorecognizeandincreasinglyacceptthattheyarenottheonlyactorsto
addressinternationalsecuritythreats;norisitperhapsfruitfulforthemtoretaina
monopoly in this realm. Efforts to tackle ‘new threats’—such as transnational
crime, environmental hazards or the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction—requirestatestoactlargelythroughorwithinternationalorregional
organizationsandNGOswithinabroaderstructureofsecuritygovernance.

This

has taken place without a fundamental redefinition of state capacity: states still
enjoytheleadingroleintheinternationalsystemandareseenasthesolesource(if
nolongerthesoleobject)oflegallybindinginternationalregulation.Certainlyin
therealmofmilitaryaffairs,statesstillclaimtheprerogativeofcreatingandjudg-
ingpoliticallegitimacy.

Ifthestateisundercutormarginalizedinthisrespect,

there is a risk that one of the traditional cores of security governance—states’
collective as well as general control of the use of force—will be destabilized,
affectingnotonlythestateactorbutalsotheinternationalsystemitself.

Forthe

roleofthestateinmilitaryaffairstobemaintainedinthefaceofa‘privatizationof
security’,theuseofprivatesecurityandmilitaryserviceprovidersneedstotake
placewithinagreedstructuresandprocessesdesignedtosafeguardlegitimacyand
accountabilityinmilitaryaffairs.Atpresentsuchstructuresarelacking.

Annan’sstatementreferredtothequestionthatwasposedtotheUNin1994ofwhethertocon-

tractaprivatecompanytokeeprefugeesandfightersapartintheRwandacrisis.Fidler,S.andCatán,
T.,‘Privatemilitarycompaniespursuethepeacedividend’,FinancialTimes,24July2003.

Bailes,A.J.K.,‘Businessandsecurity:public–privatesectorinterfaceandinterdependenceat

theturnofthe21stcentury’,edsA.J.K.BailesandI.Frommelt,SIPRI, BusinessandSecurity:
Public–Private Partnerships in a New Security Environment (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2004),pp.1–23;andKrahmann,E.,‘Fromstatetonon-stateactors:theemergenceofsecuritygov-
ernance’,ed.E.Krahmann,NewThreatsandNewActorsinInternationalSecurity(Palgrave:New
York,forthcoming2005),p.9.

Guéhenno,J.-M.,‘Theimpactofglobalisationonstrategy’, Survival, vol. 40, no. 4 (winter

1998/99).

Ballesteros(note16),p.50.

INTR ODUC TION9

Second,theprivateprovisionofsecuritysectorfunctionsstrikesatthecoreof

thedebateaboutsecuritysectorreform(SSR).

Instrivingtoupholdtheroleofthe

stateastheguarantorofsecurity,thequestionofwhatkindofstateistobeupheld
iscrucial.Theestablishmentoffunctioninglaw-and-orderandsecurityinstitutions
(military,policeandintelligence)isoftencitedasaminimumrequirementforsta-
bilityinstates.However,whentheobjectiveisbroadenedtoensuringanequitable
distributionofsecurity,thedemocraticcredentialsofsecurityinstitutionsarecen-
tral.Recognitionthatensuring‘security’isnotmerelyaquestionofprotectingthe
statebutalsoofprotectingitscitizensisthebasisfortheSSRagenda.Inthissense,
theuseofprivatesectoractorsforprovidingsecurityandmilitaryservicesrepre-
sentsaparticularchallenge.PSCsareresponsibletoshareholdersratherthanto
voters,andmakingfundamentallyapoliticalactorscontributeconstructivelytothe
establishmentofdemocraticandaccountablesecurityinstitutionsisaparticularly
toughcircletosquare.

Itoftennotedthat,inmanycases,theuseofprivatesecurityservicesistheonly

option available. Deborah Avant has made the case that any evaluation of the
impactofprivatizationmustcompareprivatealternativesagainstacommonstand-
ard—‘mostsuitablytheotheravailablealternativesratherthananunachievable
ideal’.

However, the choice of the standard against which to compare private

security providers does not simply constitute an analytical benchmark but also
indicatesanormativestandpoint.Theextenttowhichprivatesecurityproviders
canfitintonewformsofinternationalsecuritygovernancewillultimatelydepend
ontheextenttowhichtheircapacitiescanbedirectedtowardsahigher,long-term
goal—onethatisgovernedbypoliticsandlawratherthansimpleeconomics.

Thecruxoftheprivatesecuritysector’scapacitytobealegitimateactoronthe

internationalscenethusliesintherelativecapacityofstatestomanagetheuseof
privatecompaniesandtoensurethatitiscompatiblewiththepromotionofgood
governance,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Inthecurrentstateofaffairs,
thescopeforinstitutionallyweakorunstablestatestoharnesstheactivitiesofthe
privatesectorinthiswayislimited.However,evenforthestrongorinstitutionally
soundstate,effectiveuseofprivatesecuritycompaniesremainspartiallyblocked
aslongasthischallengeisunresolved.Theneedtotakeaccountofthecontextin
whichprivatesecurityactorsoperatealsoarisesfromthebasic,significantpoint
that the ultimate consumers of the services in the end may not be the actual
contractholdersorclientsofprivatesecurityfirms,butratherthelocalpopulations.

Theconsequencesoftheprovisionofsecuritybytheprivatesectorareglobal

andinvolveareformulationofsomeofthebasicpremisesofinternationalsecurity
politics. In this respect, an analysis based on the perspectives of ‘weak’ versus

ThedefinitionofsecuritysectorreformwhichismostwidelyrecognizedisthatoftheOrgani-

sationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD).SeeOECD,DevelopmentAssistance
Committee (DAC), Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, DAC
Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD: Paris, 2004), pp. 16–18, URL <http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>.

Avant(note22),p.6.

Singer(note16),p.524.

10P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

‘efficient’statesmayhelptomakesenseofacomplexandmultifacetedissue.

almosteverycaseoftheuseofPSCs,bothweakandstrongstateshaveastake:the
companiesgenerallyoperateinaweakstatebutarebasedinastrongstate,paidfor
byastrongstateorusedbyastrongstatetohelpimplementitsexternalpolicy.
Therefore, the impact of reliance on the private sector can be considered from
eitherstate-basedperspectiveinvirtuallyallcases.However,byjuxtaposingthe
two contexts or perspectives, different dimensions of the private provision of
securitymaybehighlighted.Ultimately,anyattempttorespondtotheriseofa
globalindustryforsecurityandmilitaryserviceswillhavetotakefullaccountof
bothperspectives.

Avantalsousestherelativecapacityofstatesasakeyvariableintheanalysisoftheprivatiza-

tionofsecurity.Avant(note24),p.7.

2.Privatesecurityintheweakstate

Privatesecurityasasymptomofstateweakness

Privatesecurityandmilitarycompaniesaremostimmediatelyassociatedwiththe
contextofweakorconflict-pronestates,particularlystatesontheAfricancon-
tinent.Althoughthereisnoreliableinformationonthemagnitudeoftheactivityof
privatesecuritycompaniesinAfrica,itisgenerallyagreedthatPSCactivityisfar-
reaching,particularlyinsub-SaharanAfrica.

Onestudyshowstheinvolvementof

15privatemilitarycompaniesinconflictareasduringtheperiod1950–89andof
65companies in the period 1990–98.

The direct involvement of international

PSCsinconflict,however,isonlythetipoftheiceberg.Thisexcludesthevast
number of domestic companies operating on a continuous basis to provide
protection of property, assets and individuals in relatively peaceful states. For
instance, some 2800 private security companies operate in South Africa, and
privatesecurityguardsoutnumberthepoliceforces.

PrivatesectorinvolvementinAfricaistoagreatextentsymptomaticofstate

weaknessandthefailureofthestatetoprovidephysicalsecurityforitscitizens
throughtheestablishmentoffunctioninglaw-and-orderinstitutions.

Inthesame

wayascommentatorshavecharacterizedtheformationoflocalmilitiasasacheap
popularresponsetoinsecurity,privatesectorsecurityprovisionmaybeseento
representa‘dictatedchoice’,withexternalactorsincreasinglytakingonfunctions
conventionallyreservedforstateinstitutions.

OnesuchexampleistheIsraelifirm

Levdan, Limited: under a contract with the Congo-Brazzaville Government,
Levdantrainedthelocalarmyandpresidentialbodyguards.

MostoftheearlyresearchonprivatesecuritywasconductedbyAfricanresearchinstitutesand

universities.CilliersandMason(note12).

MusahandFayemi(note11),appendix1,pp.265–74.

Leander,A.,GlobalUngovernance:Mercenaries,StatesandtheControloverViolence,COPRI

WorkingPaper4/2002(CopenhagenPeaceResearchInstitute(COPRI):Copenhagen,2002),p.6.In
theUnitedStates,domesticprivatesecuritycompaniesperformarangeofservicesfromtheestab-
lishmentof‘gatedcommunities’totheprotectionofcashtransfersbetween banks.Duffield,M.,
GlobalGovernanceandtheNewWars(ZedBooks:London,2001),p.65.Forfurtherconsideration
of domestic private security see Dupont, B., Grabosky, P. and Shearing, C., ‘The governance of
securityinweakandfailingstates’,CriminalJustice,vol.3,no.4(2003),pp.331–49.

LundeandTaylorarguethattheexistenceofanextensiveprivatesecuritysector,especiallyifit

isindigenous,canserveasanimportantindicatorthatstatesecurityprovisionisinadequate.Lunde,
L.andTaylor,M.,withHuser,A.,Commerce or Crime? Regulating Economies of Conflict,Fafo
Report424(ForskningsstiftelsenFafo:Oslo,2003),URL<http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/424/index.
htm>.SeealsoVonTangenPage,M.andLilly,D.,Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and
OpportunitiesofthePrivatisationofSecurity(InternationalAlert:London,Sep.2002),p.7.

ForfurtherdiscussionofthispointseeReno,W.,WarlordPoliticsandAfricanStates(Lynne

Rienner:Boulder,Colo.,1999);andEro,C.,‘Vigilantes,civildefenceforcesandmilitiagroups:the
othersideofprivatisationofsecurityinAfrica’,ConflictTrends(AfricanCentrefortheConstructive
ResolutionofDisputes),vol.1(June2000),pp.25–29,URL<http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2000-1.
htm>.

CilliersandMason(note12),p.5.

12P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

However,stateincapacityorfailureprovidesonlyapartofthestoryofthepro-

visionofprivatesecurityservicesinthecontextofweakstates.Equallyimportant
forexplainingtheproliferationofPSCsistheestablishmentofparallelor‘shadow’
structuresofpowerandauthority.

Politicalcronyismandthecorruptionofpolice

andmilitaryforcesareoftenlinkedwithandreinforcedbyeconomicstructuresof
exploitationandelitedomination,featuringaninequitabledistributionofresources.
PSCs often operate at the intersection of these structures and processes, by
accompanying MNCs in the extractive business and by protecting weak and
ineffectualdomesticrulers.Onecommentatorhasreferredtotheestablishmentof
suchstructuresas‘mortgagingpartsofthestate’seconomy’.

The private security sector has contributed to maintaining the status quo of

inequitablesecuritydistributioninweakstates—apatternnotexclusivetoAfrica.
Colombia,Chechnya(Russia)andTajikistanareothercaseswhereeconomicinter-
estinaninsecureenvironmenthastranslatedintothegrowthoftheprivatesecurity
sector.

Extensiverelianceonprivatesecurityrisksmakingweakstatesweakerinthree

ways:(a)bycreatingafalseimageofsecurityintheshortterm,whichdistorts
proper assessment of security needs; (b)by leading to a skewed distribution of
security among populations; and (c)by crowding out the establishment of
legitimateandfunctioningstateinstitutions.Eachoftheseproblemsisexploredin
moredetailbelow.

PSCsinconflict:theshort-termimpact

TheoperationofPSCsinconflictsontheAfricancontinentisoftenexplainedwith
reference to the relative swiftness of deployment and operation which they can
offer.ThecaseofEO,hiredbytheNationalProvisionalRulingCouncil(NPRC)
governmentofSierraLeonePresidentValentineStrasserinMarch1995tocombat
therebelforcesoftheRevolutionaryUnitedFront(RUF),isperhapsthemostoften
citedexample.EOforceswerehighlyeffectiveinpushingbackRUFforcesand
retaking the diamond-rich Kono region. However, initial optimism about the
stabilitycreatedbyEOoperationswanedasthecompanyfailedinitsaimofclear-
ingouttheRUFfromotherareasofthecountry.

ThewithdrawalofEOin1997

wasfollowedbyacoupwhichoustedthegovernmentandplungedthecountry
backintoconflict.

Inthesamevein,theoperationsofSandlineInternationalin

Reno (note 45), p.2. On the connection between weak government and war see also, e.g.,

Fearon,J.andLaitin,D.,‘Ethnicity,insurgencyandcivilwar’,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,
vol.97,no.1(Feb.2003).

VonTangenPageandLilly(note44),p.23.Foradiscussionofwareconomiesandprivate

firmsseeTaylor,M.,‘Law-abidingornot,CanadianfirmsinCongocontributetowar’,31Oct.2003,
URL<http://www.fafo.no/nsp/Globecomment311002.html>.

SeeSinger(note2),pp.64–66,foradiscussionofthecriminalizationofconflictandprivate

security.

Spear,J.,Market Forces: The Political Economy of Private Military Security (Forsknings-

stiftelsenFafo:Oslo,forthcoming2005),p.17.

Spear(note50),p.18.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY IN

THE WEAK S TATE13

Sierra Leone in 1997–98 were initially hailed as successful but, as the country
againdescendedintoviolencein1998,assessmentsoftheeffectivenessofPSCs
wererevised.

TheoperationsofEOandSandlineintheSierraLeoneconflictshowhowshort-

term‘effectiveness’isoutweighedbyafailuretohaveanimpactonthemedium-
tolong-termevolutionofconflict.EnriqueBallesteros,thenSpecialRapporteurof
theUNCommissiononHumanRightsontheeffectsoftheuseofmercenaries,
arguedthatPSCscreated‘anillusionofstability,butleftuntouchedsubstantive
problemsthatcouldneverbeaffectedbyaservicecompany’.

Inthisrespect,the

contrast between the involvement of PSCs in the Sierra Leone conflict and the
Britishmilitaryinterventionin1999isinstructive:Britishmilitaryeffortswerenot
only sustained beyond the immediate term but also coupled with international
politicalanddiplomaticeffortsaswellassubstantialdevelopmentaid.Foraffected
governmentssuchasthatofSierraLeone,theattempttocapitalizeontheshort-
termtacticalgainsofPSCinterventionmaybemadeattheexpenseofarealistic
assessmentofthestrategicsituationandbalanceofpower.Similarly,optimistic
claimsonthepartofoutsideobserversthatitispossibleto‘writeacheck,enda
war’throughtheadditionofhiredgunsaretemperedbythenecessarilystop-gap
qualityofPSCoperations.

Furthermore,theweakstaterisksbeingfurtherweakenedbythehiringofPSCs

byrebelgroupsorothernon-stateactorspartytointra-stateconflicts.Rebelgroups
inAngola,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC)andSierraLeonehaveall
usedPSCstobolstercapacitythroughtrainingandassistanceintheuseofhigh-
technology weapons, and all sides of the conflict in Colombia have received
support from PSCs.

The Serb military learned a valuable lesson in its

underestimationofCroatiancapabilitiesinthespringof1995,whentheCroatian
ArmylaunchedasurpriseattackinOperationStorm.TheCroatianArmyhadbeen
covertly transformed ‘from a ragtag militia into a modern Western-style army’
undertheaegisofMPRI.

Insum,thedegreetowhichshort-termorstop-gapPSCintervention,whether

throughtheenhancementofmilitarycapabilitiesorthroughdirectparticipationin
combat,canhaveanimpactontheultimateresolutionofaconflictisquestionable.
DirectcombatparticipationonthepartofPSCsisinfactrareandcouldbeprohib-
itedwiththeenforcementofexistingnationalanti-mercenarylaws.However,a
broader range of security services are not covered by current regulations, and
analysisoftheirimpact—inconflictandothersituations—isconsiderablymore
intricate.

QuotedinVines(note32),p.54.

Brooks,D.,‘Writeacheck,endawar:usingprivatemilitarycompaniestoendAfricancon-

flicts’,ConflictTrends,vol.1(June2000),pp.33–35,URL<http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2000-1.
htm>.

Singer,P.W.,‘Corporatewarriors:theriseandramificationsoftheprivatizedmilitaryindustry’,

InternationalSecurity,vol.26,no.3(winter2001/2002),p.32.

Singer(note2),p.5,andforadetailedaccountofMPRI’sactivitiespp.119–36.

14P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Localizingsecurity

Privatesecurityactivitiesalsoriskworseningtheconditionsforstabilityinweak
statesbycontributingtoalocalizedandskeweddistributionofsecurity.Contrary
to the notion of security as a public good, to which all state citizens should be
entitled, security from attack and physical abuse becomes conditioned on the
accesstofinancialresourcesandtowillingprivatepartners.

Theestablishmentofprivatelyguardedpremisesforcompanies,particularlyin

theextractivesector,leadsinmanycasestothecreationofunnaturalenclavesof
securitywithinanotherwiseunstableenvironment.Wheretheunequaldistribution
ofrevenuesfromnaturalresourceextractionfeaturesasagrievanceonthepartof
rebelgroups,thismayhaveparticularlydetrimentaleffects.Evidencesuggeststhat
adeep-rootedsenseofalienationandexclusiononthepartofciviliansgoesalong
waytowardsexplainingthereadinesstotakeuparmsandparticipateintheillicit
transferofassets,aprocessrecognizableincountriessuchastheDRC,Liberiaand
SierraLeone.

TheprovisionofsecurityforcertainsegmentsofastatemaygivePSCsundue

leverageinweakstates.TheinfluentialpositiontakenbyPSCsunderthesecondi-
tionsisillustratedbyanincidentinNigeriainMay2003,whendozensofBritish
andUSoilworkersweretakenhostagebystrikingco-workers.PSCswerecalled
upon to intervene before the crisis could be resolved.

The acting company,

NorthbridgeServices,aBritishPSC,statedthatthecontractfortheoperationwas
awardedbyan‘independentcompany,actingonbehalfofoneofthegovernments
involved’,butitdeclinedtospecifywhichcompanyorgovernment.

Theconfu-

sionovertheNigerianaffairillustratesthewayinwhichsecurityisbecominga
project for outsiders in many African states, weakening national governments’
effectiveauthority.ThecontractingbyBPofDefenceSystemsLimited(DSL),a
privateUScompany,totrainlocalforcesfortheprotectionofcompanyfacilitiesin
Colombia is another example of a PSC effectively undermining state authority
throughitsoperations.

Thecapacityofaweakstatetouseprivateactorstofurthergoodsecuritygov-

ernanceinthecountryislimitedmainlybyitslackofinfluenceoverwhocontracts
privateservices.Bycreating‘secure’areasindependentlyofthestateinchronically
unstableareas,thepresenceofaPSCrisksexacerbatingthegrievancesthatledto
theconflictinthefirstplace.Furthermore,theuseofPSCsbyexternalactorsmay

Thisisrecognizedbyavarietyofauthors:see,e.g.,Keen,D.‘Incentivesanddisincentivesfor

violence’andDuffield,M.,‘Globalization,transbordertradeandwareconomies’,edsM.Berdaland
D.M.Malone,GreedandGrievance:EconomicAgendasinCivilWars(LynneRienner:Boulder,
Colo., 2000), pp. 19–42 and 69–90; and Bangura, Y., ‘Understanding the political and cultural
dynamicsoftheSierraLeonewar:acritiqueofPaulRichard’s“FightingfortheRainForest”’,Africa
Development,SpecialIssueonSierraLeone,vol.22,nos2and3(1997).

Vidal,J.,‘Oilrighostagesarefreedbystrikersasmercenariesflyout’,TheGuardian(London),

3May2003,URL<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,948685,00.html>.

Vidal(note57).

Mandel(note29),p.54.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY IN

THE WEAK S TATE15

offeraverypublicdemonstrationofthestate’sincapacityinprovidingsecurityfor
itspopulation,therebyperpetuatingthoseverystructures.

Crowdingoutstateinstitutions?

Thearrivalofinternationalprivatesecurityactorsinweakstatessignalstheavail-
abilityofanalternativetothepublicprovisionofsecurity.Financialconstraintson
state resources make the option of hiring private security services attractive to
many states precisely because of its temporary quality. Rather than burdening
governmentbudgetswithfundamentalrestructuringofstandingarmiesorpolice
forces,rootingoutcorruption,andensuringtheefficiencyandloyaltyofpublic
forces,governmentsmaybetemptedtoresorttothequickfixofprivatesector
intervention.

Engaging PSCs carries the ‘advantage’ of receiving only the service that is

immediatelydemanded,whereaspublicforceshavetobepaidevenwhentheyare
notneeded.Furthermore,thereisperceivedbenefitinshiftingtheburdenofcosts
forprotectionfromthepublictotheprivatesector,asMNCs,aidagencies,NGOs
andinternationalorganizationsshoulderthecostofprovidingfortheirownprotec-
tion.

Some countries, such as Angola, even make the entry of MNCs on the

domestic market conditional on their bringing their own means of protection.

Thisshort-termrelianceontheprivatesectormayfurthergovernments’immediate
objectives,butthewayinwhichittendstocrowdoutthepublicsecurityapparatus
meansthatextensiverelianceonPSCsinthelongertermweakensstateauthority.

Asagainstthis,theroleofPSCsinfurtheringsecuritysectorreforminweak

stateshasrecentlyreceivedattention.

AlthoughPSCsareabletoprovideaquick

boostintermsofcapacityandcapabilitiesofregularforces,extremecaremustbe
takentoensurethatthisisnotcarriedoutattheexpenseofdemocraticaccountabil-
ityandtransparencyinthesecuritysector.Oneaspectofdonor-sponsoredSSRthat
hasseenahighdegreeofprivatesectorinvolvementistheprovisionofmilitary
traininginweakstates.US-basedPSCstrainedmilitariesinmorethan42countries

Thephrase‘crowdingout’hasalsobeenusedbyLeander(note43),p.10.

For a detailed discussion of national defence reform in Africa see Williams, R., ‘National

defencereformandtheAfricanUnion’,SIPRIYearbook2004:Armaments,DisarmamentandInter-
nationalSecurity(OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford,2004),pp.231–49.

Leander,A.,DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies(DIIS),TheCommodificationofViolence,

Private Military Companies and African States,WorkingPaperno.11(2003),p.4,URL<http://
www.copri.dk/publications/workingpapers.htm>.

Isenberg,D., SoldiersofFortune:AProfileofToday’sPrivateSectorCorporateMercenary

Firms (Centre for Defense Information: Washington, DC, 1997), p. 4, available at URL <http://
www.cdi.org/issues/mercenaries/merc1.htm>.

VonTangenPageandLilly(note44).ForanelaborationofsecuritysectorreformseeOrgani-

sationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),InformalDACTaskForceonConflict,
PeaceandDevelopmentCo-operation, SecuritySectorReformandDevelopmentCo-operation:A
ConceptualFrameworkforEnhancingPolicyCoherence(OECD:Paris,Feb.2000),URL<http://
www.oecd.org/document>.

16P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

duringthe1990s.

InAfrica,theUSStateDepartmentandtheUSDepartmentof

Defense(DOD)haveoutsourced(inwholeorinpart)militarytrainingtoScience
ApplicationsInternationalCorporation(SAIC),MPRI,DefenseForecastsIncor-
porated(DFI)andLogicon,amongothercompanies.

UndertheUSA’sAfrican

CrisisResponseInitiative(ACRI),theprivatesecuritysectorwasusedforclass-
roomtrainingofseveralnationalmilitariesandcontinuestoplaythisroleunder
ACRI’s successor scheme, the African Contingencies Operations Training and
AssistanceProgram(ACOTA).

Forexample,theACOTAtrainingprogrammein

Ghana, both field and classroom, has been conducted entirely by civilian
contractors.TheBritishDFIDisalsoincreasinglyrelyingonprivatesecurityactors
toimplementelementsofSSRprogrammesabroad.

WhetherPSCsarecontracteddirectlybyaweakstatetobolstersecuritycapabil-

ities or by a donor government to carry out military training or increase other
capacitywithinsecuritysectorinstitutions,thecurrentdeficiencyofPSCsinterms
ofaccountabilityandlegitimacyposesaproblem.AmnestyInternationalUSAhas
pointedoutthattherearenorequirementsfortheinclusionofanyhumanrightsor
humanitarianlawcontent(norofarmsproliferation-relatedstandpoints)inmili-
tary,securityorpoliceforcetrainingconductedbyprivatesecurityactors.

InJune

2004,MPRIconductedanassessmentofSaoTome’sdefencerequirementsinthe
hopeofreceivingacontracttoprovidesecurityassistancetothecountry’sdefence
establishment,despitethefactthatdoubtsaboutthehumanrightsrecordofthe
SaoTomearmedforceshadbeenraised.

Thefactthatthetrainingofforceswith

poor human rights records may lend itself to misconduct on the part of private
actorsdoesnotseemtobeanunfoundedanxiety.

Theoutsourcingofmilitarytrainingmaybemostsuccessfulwhencompanies

supportregularforcesratherthanassumingfullresponsibilityforthemission.For
example,underOperationFocusedRelieftheUSAcontractedPacificArchitects
andEngineering(PA&E)fortrainingmissionsinGhana,NigeriaandSenegal.

PSCshavetrainedforeignmilitariesinAngola,Bolivia,BosniaandHerzegovina,Colombia,

Croatia,Ecuador,Egypt,EquatorialGuinea,Ethiopia,Ghana,Haiti,Hungary,Kosovo(Serbiaand
Montenegro),Peru,Liberia,Malawi,Mali,Nigeria,Rwanda,SaudiArabia,Senegal,Sweden,Taiwan
andUganda(Sudaneseforces).Avant,D.,‘Privatizingmilitarytraining’,ForeignPolicyinFocus,
vol.7,no.6(May2002),URL<http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol7/v7n06miltrain_body.html>.Amnesty
International USA also collects information on US companies which train foreign militaries; see
AmnestyInternationalUSA,‘Internationaltradeinarmsandmilitarytraining’,URL<http://www.
amnestyusa.org/arms_trade/ustraining/students.html>.

Avant(note65).

Wheelan,T.,DeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenceforAfricanAffairs,‘RemarkstoIPOA

dinner’,Washington,DC,19Nov.2003,URL<www.ipoaonline.org/content/Whelantranscript.pdf>.

Conference on Private Sector Approaches to Security Sector Reform, International Peace

Academy(IPA)andDemos,London,22Oct.2004.

AmnestyInternationalUSA(note65).

Belida,A.,‘PrivateUSsecurityfirmassessingSaoTomémilitary’,VoiceofAmericaNews

Online, 16June 2004, URL <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/06/mil-
040616-399df0bc.htm>.

AlthoughUSembassiesinrecipientcountriesarechargedwithgeneraloversight,no one has

specificresponsibilityforthemonitoringofPSCactivities.Avant(note65).

Wheelan(note67).

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY IN

THE WEAK S TATE17

PA&EthensupportedbothUStrainingstaffandtheAfricantroopswhoreceived
training, providing them with military and commercial equipment and general
support.

Fortheweakstate,theuseofPSCscanprovideaboosttosecuritysectorcapa-

bilitiesandprovideaquickavenuefordonorstatestochannelsupport.However,
theuseofPSCsinthiscontextmaybeattheexpenseoftheaimofincreasingstan-
dards of democratic accountability within security sector institutions. From the
donorperspective,usingprivateactorstoimplementSSRprogrammesinweak
statesinvolvescertainlossessuchasknowledgeoflocalconditionsandthefuture
interoperabilityofforces,bothwithdonorstatesandwiththeirownneighbours.In
thisway,theuseofPSCstocarryoutmilitarytrainingorotherSSRtasksrisks
depriving the relationship between donor and recipient of political content and
exacerbatingthedifficultyofsecuringlocalownershipinSSRprojectsbyintro-
ducingathird,commercialratherthanpolitical,actorintotheequation.

Thepromiseofprivatesecurityinweakstates?

PSCssupportingpeaceoperations

Initialdebatesaboutthe‘newmercenaries’tookplaceinthemidstofareassess-
mentofUNpeaceoperationsduringtheearly1990s.

Disillusionmentbecauseof

thefailureofUNmemberstatestocommitsufficienttroopstoUNoperationswas
exploitedbyPSCadvocateswhoarguedthatanymoralqualmsaboutturningtothe
privatesectorwereunderminedbytheWest’sunwillingnesstoriskanythingofits
own.

The1994genocideinRwanda,inparticular,strengthenedpro-PSCargu-

ments:wasnotanyintervention,evenifitwasbyaprivatecompany,betterthan
theinternationalcommunityactingasabystandertotheunfoldinghorrors?The
ideaofprivatesecuritycompaniesprovidinganalternativetonationaltroopcontri-
butionsinUNorothermultilateralpeaceoperationsstillcontinuestobecanvassed
insomecircles.

TheInternationalPeaceOperationsAssociation(IPOA),aUS-

basednon-profitindustryorganizationformilitaryserviceproviders,hassinceits
inceptionarguedfortheuseoftheprivatesectortomitigatetheinternationalcom-
munity’sreluctancetointervenemilitarilyandriskitsownsoldiers’livesincon-
flicts.

The5NigerianbattalionstrainedunderOperationFocusedReliefremaincohesiveunits,and

1wasdeployedinLiberiain2003.Wheelan(note67).

ForadetaileddiscussionofthelocalownershipproblemsthatariseeveninaEuropeancontext

seeCaparini,M.,‘SecuritysectorreformintheWesternBalkans’,SIPRIYearbook2004 (note61),
pp.251–85.

Malan,M.,‘Thecrisisinexternalresponse’,edsCilliersandMason(note12),pp.37–39.

Duffield,M.,‘Post-modernconflict:warlords,post-adjustmentstatesandprivateprotection’,

CivilWars,vol.1,no.1(1998),p.95.

Mørup,L.,‘StrengtheningAfricansecuritycapacities:abriefontheDIISconference16Aug.

2004’,DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies(DIIS),Copenhagen,Oct.2004,URL<http://www.
diis.dk/sw2892.asp>.

InternationalPeaceOperationsAssociation(IPOA)Newsletter,IPOAQuarterly,issue1(5Oct.

2004),URL<http://www.ipoaonline.org>.

18P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Althoughthereplacementofregulartroopcontributionstomultilateralpeace

operationsbyPSCforcesisbothunlikelyandundesirable,theuseofPSCsina
supporting capacity in such operations deserves consideration. In the transition
fromaconflicttoapost-conflictenvironmentinweakstates,enhancingsecurity
hasalreadybecomeataskforoutsidersthroughthecommitmentofmultilateral
peacemissions.Peaceoperationsincreasinglyoperateundermorecomprehensive
peace-buildingmandates,includingsuchtasksasthedemobilization,disarmament
andreintegration(DDR)offormercombatantsandSSR.

Inthiscontext,scep-

ticismaboutusingprivateactorsforstatecapacity-buildingtasksinaweakstate
might be tempered by the degree of political legitimacy conferred on PSCs if
employedaspartofaUN-sanctionedmultilateraloperation.Indeed,asmentioned
above,theUNhasalreadymadesignificantuseofPSCsforlogisticalandother
supportinitsoperations.De-miningisanotherareawheretheUNhasonrepeated
occasionscontractedcompaniessuchasDSL.

Africanregionalorganizationshavebeensimilarlyhamperedbythelackofcapa-

bilitiesandadequateresourcesforaddressingpeacekeepingchallenges,andthey
havedrawnontheprivatesectorforsupportinpeaceoperations.TheEconomic
CommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS)MonitoringGroup(ECOMOG)in
SierraLeonein1998contractedSandlineforlogisticsandtransportationsupport.

PA&E, an international logistics company, supported ECOMOG forces in the
ECOWASMissioninLiberia(ECOMIL)in2003.

TheAfricanUnionMissionin

Sudan(AMIS)iscurrentlysupportedbytwoPSCs—PA&EandMedicalSupport
Solutions (MSS)—contracted to prepare bases, set up logistics systems, and
provide transport and communication services.

Part of the funding for the

expansionofAMISisprovidedbytheUSStateDepartment,butnewtasksare
outsourcedtoDynCorpandPA&E.

Whencontractedtosupportmissionswithclearpoliticalsupport,authorityand

mandates,privatesecurityactorsareenlistedinabroaderpoliticalprocess.Inthis
respect,thedifferencebetweenPSCscontractedbyanindividualstatefacinginter-

For a detailed discussion of current peace-building missions see Wiharta, S. and Dwan, R.,

‘Multilateralpeaceoperations’,SIPRIYearbook2005:Armaments,DisarmamentandInternational
Security(OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford,forthcoming2005).

Spearin(note22),p.1.

Fisher-Thompson,J.,‘PrivatefirmshaveroletoplayinpeaceoperationsinAfrica’,AllAfrica,

22Oct.2003,

URL<http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/AllAfrica-PMCs_Africa.html>.

Wheelan(note67).

USStateDepartment,‘ImportantroleseenforprivatefirmsinAfricanpeacekeeping’,15Oct.

2004, available on the IPOA Internet site at URL <http://www.ipoaonline.org/news_detailhtml.
asp?catID=3&docID=98>.

ThePA&EandDynCorpcontractswiththeUSStateDepartmentarevaluedat$20.6million

and are part of a 5-year contract between the State Department and the 2 companies to ‘support
peacekeepingandconflictmanagementsupport-relatedtasksthroughsub-SaharanAfrica’.Underthis
‘infinite-delivery,infinite-quantity’(IDIQ)contract(seechapter3),theStateDepartmenthasalso
purchasedservicesforbothBurundiandLiberia.Lynch,C.,‘3,200peacekeeperspledgedonmission
toDarfur’,WashingtonPost,21Oct.2004;andChatterjee,P.,‘Darfurdiplomacy:enterthecontrac-
tors’,CorpWatch,21Oct.2004,URL<http://www.corpwatch.org>.IDIQcontractshavealsobeen
awardedtoHalliburtonforoperationsinAfghanistanandIraq.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY IN

THE WEAK S TATE19

naloppositionandcivilwarandcompaniesactinginsupportofmultilateralinstitu-
tionscannotbeoveremphasized.Thedegreetowhichprivatesecurityservicescan
becontractedinanopenandaccountablewayincreaseswiththeamountofpolit-
icalcapitalinvested.Suchpoliticalcapitalislikelytobehigherinamultilateral
peaceoperationthanwhenstatesunilaterallycontractPSCsupport.

TheuseofPSCsinmultilateraloperationsstillindicatesarelinquishingofstate

control over the means of violence and in this sense represents a break with
principlesoftheUNCharterinthiscontext:thatmemberstatestakeresponsibility,
underUNauthority,forthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity.

Thecapacityof

multilateralinstitutionstomanagesuchatransferralofresponsibility(eveninthe
limitedcontextoftheimplementationofcorrectlymandatedactivities)willhavea
crucial impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of private sector support for
multilateralpeaceoperations.Atpresent,theUNandregionalorganizationslack
adequatestructurestoensurehighstandardsofconductforPSCsand,aboveall,
thelong-termsustainabilityofoperations(seechapter5).

Privatesecurityandaidagencies

Anotherwayinwhichtheprivatesecuritysectorcouldactasaresourceforthe
populationsofweakstatesisincontractedsupportforthedeliveryofhumanitarian
aid.Atpresent,theadministrationanddeliveryofdirecthumanitarianaidinmany
countriesareseverelythreatenedbysecurityriskstointernationalaidworkers.The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International
CommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),CAREUSA,theSavetheChildrenAlliance,
MédécinsduMonde(MDM)andMédécinsSansFrontières(MSF),forexample,
haveallbeentargetsofdeliberatephysicalattackinarangeofcountries.

The

withdrawalofMSFfromAfghanistaninJune2004,after24yearsofoperationin
the country, and the kidnapping and killing in late 2004 of Margaret Hassam,
directorofCAREInternationalinIraq(alsocausingtheorganizationtosuspend
operationsinthecountry),areillustrativeofthetargetingofhumanitarianworkers
inconflict-riddenandfailedstates.

Aidagencies,bothgovernmentalandnon-governmental,havecontractedand

continuetocontractPSCsinanumberofcapacities:aboveallforthephysicalpro-
tectionofstaffandpremises,butalsoforriskanalysis,staffsecuritytrainingand
crisismanagementadvice,forexample,onhowtobehaveincasesofkidnapping

UNCharter,Article2,availableatURL<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>.

FormoreonagenciesthathavebeenattackedseeSpearin(note8),p.24.

Joyce,M.,‘MédecinsSansFrontièrespullsoutofAfghanistan’,29July2004,RUSINews,

URL <http://www.rusi.org/media/ref:N41091FB430BCC/>; and ‘Agency halts aid operations in
Iraq’,BBCNewsOnline,20Oct.2004,URL<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3758354.stm>.

20P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

andabduction.

Forinstance,theICRChashiredDSLforprotectioninKinshasa,

DRC.

Therelationshipbetweentheprivatesecuritysectorandthehumanitarianaid

communityiscomplicatedbytwomuch-debateddilemmasfacingaidagencies.
First, attention has been drawn to a trade-off between upholding the traditional
principleofimpartialityindeliveringaid(setoutinthe1994CodeofConductfor
theInternationalRedCrossandRedCrescentMovementandNGOsinDisaster
Relief) and avoiding the risk of becoming and being seen as complicit in the
fuelling of conflict.

Second, aid agencies face the difficulty of an increased

‘militarization’or‘politicization’ofhumanitarianspace:asmilitariesbecomemore
involvedinthedeliveryofaid,thereisariskthataidagencieswillbesuspectedof
havinghiddenagendasandwillbeseenaspartialbylocalpopulations(whichin
turnmaymakeaidworkersevenmorelikelytargetsofattack).

PSCscannotof

coursebeequatedwithregularforces,butbyaddingtothearmedpresenceand
general militarization of the environment they may risk making populations
increasingly edgy and insecure and thereby raise the stakes in the conflict.

Furthermore,thereistheriskthatPSCswillnotbeperceivedas‘neutral’actorsin
thefirstplace.ThisisespeciallythecasewherethereisasignificantPSCpresence
tied to the MNCs operating in the extractive industry. As indicated above, in
conflicts where natural resources occupy a central role, protected extraction
facilitiesunder‘foreign’controlarelikelytofurtherrebelgrievances.Itmaywell
be that the same PSC provides protection for both an MNC in the extractive
industryandaidagenciesinacountry:aspointedoutinonereport,itisnothardto
imagine this leading to accusations of hypocrisy and the spiralling distrust of
humanitarianactors.

HowdoPSCsfitintothisdualbalancingact?Inthefirstinstance,thereisavery

realneedtoensurephysicalprotectionforhumanitarianstaff,ataskthatisgoingto
be sensitive regardless of whether it is carried out by regular forces or private

Vaux,T.etal.,HumanitarianActionandPrivateSecurityCompanies:OpeningtheDebate

(InternationalAlert:London,Mar.2002),p.8,URL<http://www.international-alert.org/publications.
htm>.

Vauxetal.(note88);andFisk,R.andCarrell,S.,‘Occupiersspendmillionsonprivatearmyof

securitymen’,TheIndependent,28Mar.2004,reproducedatURL<http://www.commondreams.org/
headlines04/0328-02.htm>.

The Red Crescent–Red Cross Code of Conduct is available at URL <http://www.ifrc.org/

publicat/conduct/code.asp>.OntheproblemsofaidfuellingconflictseeAnderson,M.B.,DoNo
Harm:HowAidCanSupportPeace—OrWar(LynneRienner:Boulder,Colo.,1999).

KirstenZaat,aformerUNLiaisonOfficerinIraq,expressedthiscautioninanappealforthe

releaseofMargaretHassam.‘Viewpoint:“MargaretHassanmustbereleased”’,BBCNewsOnline,
28Oct.2004,URL<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3955539.stm>.Onthepoliticizationofhumanitarianaid
seeLilly,D.,ThePeacebuildingDimensionsofCivil–MilitaryRelations,InternationalAlertBriefing
Paper(InternationalAlert:London,Aug.2002),p.7;andStöre,J.G.(SecretaryGeneraloftheNor-
wegianRedCross),‘Resolvingtheconflictbetweenprovidingsecurityandhumanitariansupport’,
PaperpresentedattheDefenceAcademyFoodforThoughtLunch,Swindon,14Oct.2004.

Lilly, D., The Privatization of Security and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action

(InternationalAlert:London,Sep.2000),URL<http://www.international-alert.org/publications.htm>,
p.25.

Vauxetal.(note88),p.17.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY IN

THE WEAK S TATE21

securitypersonnel.Perhapsparadoxically,thePSCoptionmaybethelesssensitive
one:ratherthanbeingassociatedwithonepartyorsideintheconflict,PSCprotec-
tioncouldbeseenastheenlistingofan‘impartial’actor.Insuchcases,thought
needs to go into the degree of distance (perceived and real) between PSCs and
nationalmilitaries,aswellasthenationalityofPSCemployees,toensurethatan
imageofpartisanshipisnotconveyed.Inthesecondinstance,thereistheneedto
take into account the sustainability of operations, in this case the aid agencies’
stayingpower.Itiseasytoseetheshort-termrationaleforthecontractingofpri-
vatesecurityservicesbyaidagenciestokeeptheirpersonnelsafeandallowthem
accesstorelief-dependentareas,butinthelongtermitmaymakethedeliveryof
aiddependentonanexternalvariable—themarket.

ThemainproblemswithPSCsusedinsupportofaiddeliveryrelatetothecon-

ductofthefirmitself.AreportpublishedbyInternationalAlertsetthegroundfor
debatetodetermineandoutlineappropriateethical,political,professionalandpub-
licaccountabilitystandardsthatPSCsneedtoupholdinordertobealegitimate
resourceforaidagencies.

Theseissueshaveyettobeaddressedinacomprehen-

sivewaybytheinternationalaidcommunity(seechapter5).

Thestateatthecentre

BoththepromiseandtheperilofPSCactionintheweakstaterelatetothelackof
afunctioningpublicsecurityapparatusanddemocraticallyaccountablelaw-and-
orderinstitutions.IncaseswheretheweakstateitselfcontractsPSCs—whetherto
interveneinaninternalconflictortobolsteritssecuritysectorcapacities—therisk
is that it will do so with a view only to short-term ‘hard’ security. The aim of
equitablesecuritygovernancerisksbeingdemotedtoasecondaryobjective,with
PSCseffectivelycolludingintheestablishmentandmaintenanceofasystemof
securityforthefewattheexpenseofthemany.Similarly,whatmayappearas
collusion between MNCs, PSCs and weak regimes in resource extraction
risksthrowingtheprocessofdemocraticstatebuildingofftrackand,indeed,gen-
eratingfurthersourcesofpopulargrievance.

TheuseofPSCsinsupportofmultilateralpeacemissionsandaidagencyopera-

tionsholdsatleastsomepromisefortheweakstate,althoughitisarguedabove
that great caution and sensitivity—formalized under regulatory structures—is
requiredinordertocapitalizeonthisopportunity.However,usingPSCsengaged
by an external actor risks further marginalizing the host (weak) state, because
placingthesourceoflegitimacyandofdeliveryinoutsiders’handsdistancesthe
statefromthenormalsystemofnationalandinternationalsecuritygovernance.In
buildingstructurestogoverntheinternationaluseofprivatesecurityservices,there
isaneedtoensurethatweakstateshavesomeleverageinthatprocessandthat
theymaintaininfluenceoverPSCoperationsontheirterritory.Aboveall,theuse

Theeffectofmarketforcesisconsideredinmoredetailinchapter3,below.

Vauxetal.(note88),p.8.

22P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

ofPSCsshouldbedirectedatbuildinguptheweakstate.Inthisrespect,successful
handlingofthelargepresenceofPSCsinweakstatesrequireselementsofboth
preventiveandresponsiveaction,includingthebuild-upofstateinstitutionstopre-
cludeover-relianceonprivateactors.Againstthebackgroundofwell-functioning
statelaw-and-orderinstitutions,theuseofprivatesecurityservicesislikelybothto
bemoreefficient,equitableandaccountableandtohelpcreatetheconditionsfor
itsownphasingout.

3.Privatesecurityandthe‘efficient’state

Theuseofprivatesecurityprovidersisnotassociatedexclusivelywiththeinability
ofweakstatestoeffectivelyfillasecurityvacuum.JustasmostinternationalPSCs
arebasedin(orhavegrownoutof)developedstates,soarestrong,or‘efficient’,
statesamongthekeyemployersofprivatesecuritypersonnel.

Fortheefficient

state, outsourcing of health care, transport and other government functions has
effectivelypavedthewayfortheprivatizationofdefencesector-relatedtasks.

Although this process is starting to spread in many European states, it is most
apparent in the USA. In the UK, for instance, combined revenues for British
securityfirmshaverisenfivefoldsincethestartofthewarinIraqin2003,from
$350millionbeforethewartonearly$2billionasofApril2004.

Thischapter

concentratesonexamplesoftheUSA’suseofPSCs,buttheobservationsapplyto
‘efficient’statesgenerally.

TheUSA’strendofcontractingoutitsmilitarytasksabroadgainedmomentum

overthepastdecade.Sincethe1991GulfWar,whentheratioofcontractorstoUS
active-dutypersonnelwas1

50,theratiohasconsistentlydiminished.Withthe

terroristattacksof11September2001andtheensuingUSreassessmentofinter-
nationalsecuritythreats,abasicincompatibilityofaimsarose:loweringthenum-
ber and exposure of US troops, while at the same time increasing the use and
impactofUSstrengthabroad.

Theoutsourcingprocess,underwayformorethan

a decade, gained momentum with the military campaigns in Afghanistan
(OperationEnduringFreedom)andIraq(OperationIraqiFreedom).

100

Theratioof

UStroopstoPSCpersonnelinthe2003warinIraqhasbeenestimatedat1

10,

andsincetheformalendingofthewarinMay2003thenumberofcontractorshas
increased.

101

AlthoughthereisnodefinitivewordonthenumberofPSCsactivein

Iraq, one analyst estimated in November 2004 that well over 20000 private

‘Efficient’isusedheretoindicatestatesthathavedemonstrablyfunctionalinstitutionsofgov-

ernmentandaregenerallyabletoenforceacoercivemonopolyonforcewhileadheringtodemocratic
standards.

Krahmann,E.,‘Privatefirmsandthenewsecuritygovernance’,PaperpresentedtotheInter-

nationalStudiesAssociation43rdAnnualConvention,23–27Mar.2002,NewOrleans,availableat
URL<http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/krahmann.html>.

Murphy, C., ‘Iraq’s mercenaries: riches for risks’, BBC News Online, 4 Apr. 2004, URL

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/3590887.stm>.

O’Hanlon,M.‘RebuildingIraqandrebuildingtheUSArmy’,MiddleEastMemo,no.3(4June

2004),URL<http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20040604.htm>.

100

TheBritishGovernmenthascontractedwidelyinbothIraqandAfghanistan.E.g.,Babcock

InternationalprovideslogisiticssupporttoBritishtroopsinAfghanistanundera£20millioncontract.
Krahmann(note9),p.18.

101

Isenberg,D.,AFistfulofContractors:TheCaseforaPragmaticAssessmentofPrivateMili-

tary Companies in Iraq, British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Research
Report2004.4 (BASIC: London, Sep. 2004), p. 7, URL <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/
research.htm>.

24P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

personnel, employed by over 60 firms, were carrying out military functions.

102

NeithertheUSDODnortheCoalitionProvisionalAuthority(CPA)inIraqkepta
completeregisterofallcontractsawardedtoPSCsinthecountry.

103

Giventheelementofdeliberatepolicydesign,itwouldseemfairtoassumethat

theuseofprivatesecurityservicesbyanefficientstateisconductedinamore
regulatedorcontainedfashionthanwhenitisresortedtobyaweakstate.How-
ever, the efficient state also faces numerous problems in its contracting out of
security,althoughofasignificantlydifferentnaturefromtheproblemsfacedbyan
institutionallyweakstate.

Challengesinoutsourcingpolicyimplementation

Thetaskscarriedoutbyprivatesecuritycompanies(mainlyUSandBritish)inIraq
rangefromthefeedingandhousingoftroopsandthearmedprotectionofoilfacil-
ities,powerlinesandaboveallhigh-levelofficials(bothcoalitionandIraqi),tothe
maintenanceofkeyweaponsystemssuchasM-1tanks,Apachehelicoptersand
B-2stealthbombers.TheoccupationofIraqalsobroughtattentiontonewareasof
privatesecuritysectoractivity,suchasinterpretationandinterrogationservices.
DuringhistenureinIraq,L.PaulBremer,PresidentialEnvoytoIraqandAdminis-
tratoroftheCPA,wasundertheprotectionofBlackwaterSecurityConsulting,a
US-basedcompany.Similarly,PresidentHamidKarzaiandotherhigh-leveloffi-
cials in Afghanistan continue to rely for their protection on DynCorp security
guards.

104

VinnellCorporation,asubsidiaryofNorthropGrummanCorporation,

hasbeenawardeda$48millioncontracttotrainthenucleusofanewIraqiarmy,

105

andDynCorphasbeencontractedtorecruitandtrainthenewIraqipoliceforce.

Theuseofprivatesecurityandmilitaryservicesbyanefficientstatecanatone

levelbeassessedaccordingtocriteriasimilartothoseappliedfortheoutsourcing
ofothergovernmentfunctions.Towhatextentarethedeliveredservicesofthe
same quality as when they are provided by the state? How do they compare in
termsofcost-effectiveness?Whatisthemeasureofcontrolexercisedoveropera-
tions?Thesequestionsneedtobeaddressedinanyexaminationoftheimpactof

102

Singer,P.W.,ThePrivateMilitaryIndustryandIraq:WhatHaveWeLearnedandWhereto

Next?,DCAFPolicyPaper(CentrefortheDemocraticControlofArmedForces(DCAF):Geneva,
Nov. 2004), URL <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Publications%20New/Policy%20Papers/PP4_
Singer.pdf>.

103

RaddenKeefe,P.,‘Iraq:America’sprivatearmies’,NewYorkReviewofBooks,12Aug.2004.

TheCPAwasestablishedinJune2003toprovideforthetemporarygovernanceofIraq,untilthe
country gained sovereignty in July 2004. Although the CPA attempted to compile a list of PSCs
whichareactiveinIraq,thishasbeenoflimitedconsequence:only8ofthec.60companiespresent
inIraqatthetimewerelistedundercontractswiththeCPA.SeeLettertoUSSecretaryofDefense
DonaldH.RumsfeldfromIkeSkelton(Dem.),2Apr.2004,andResponsefromRumsfeldtoSkelton
withattachment‘Discussionpaper:privatesecuritycompaniesoperatinginIraq’,4May2004,avail-
ableatURL<http://www.house.gov/skelton/pr040504a.htm>.

104

Isenberg,D.,‘SecurityforsaleinAfghanistan’,AsiaTimesOnline,4Jan.2003,URL<http://

www.atimes.com>.

105

SeetheVinnellInternetsiteatURL<http://www.vinnell.com>.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY AND

THE

‘

EF F IC IENT

’

S TATE25

privatesecurityservices.Aprobleminmuchofthedebate,however,isthatthe
issueshavebeensetasideortreatedasdistinctfromthebroaderissueofhowthe
useofprivateactorsaffectspoliticallegitimacy.

ItissignificantthatPSCactivityinthecasesofAfghanistanandIraqtakesplace

intandemwithalargeinternationalmilitaryforcepresence.TheUSGovernment’s
relationshipwiththeprivatesecuritysectorispremisedontheguidingprinciple
thatasmuchaspossibleshouldbeoutsourced,withtheexceptionof‘coregovern-
ment’or‘mission-critical’functions.

106

Inthe2001QuadrennialDefenseReview

(QDR),corefunctionsaredefinedasthose‘directlyrelatedtowarfighting’.

107

This

distinctionisbasedonclassicalmodelsofthenatureofwarfare,however,andit
breaks down in a context where post-war reconstruction and enhancement of
economicandpoliticalstabilityareequallyimportantformilitarysuccess.

108

Fourcentralproblemsintheefficientstate’suseofprivatesecurityservicesare

consideredhere:(a) the problem of establishing clear mandates, (b)thelackof
PSCaccountability,(c)problemsofoversightandcontrolinaskewedmarket,and
(d)problems of basic and practical coordination of efforts both among private
actorsandbetweenPSCsandregularforces.

Unclearrulesofengagementandmandates

ThehighlyinsecureenvironmentinbothAfghanistanandIraqhasmeantthatcom-
panies operating there have had to respond to significantly more dangerous
situations than were initially envisaged. Because modern PSCs are malleable
entities and can take on new tasks at short notice, they can often meet such
situationaldemands.However,thiscanresultinanincreasinglackofcontrolover
theprecisenatureofPSCoperations.Althoughbasicstipulationsaremade—for
instance,whetherornotcontractorswillcarryarms—initialmandatesforPSCsare
ofteninsufficientlydetailedorarenotappropriatelyupdated.Furthermore,rulesof
engagementandPSCmandatesarecloudedbybasicsubjectivityofinterpretation.

Theproblemofthelackofclearlyestablishedmandatesmanifestsitselfinwhat

canbecalledprivatesecurity‘missioncreep’.Therehavebeenfrequentreportsof
trigger-happiness on the part of security contractors ostensibly employed for
‘defensive’guardingtasks.AllegationshavealsobeenmadethatPSCemployees
inIraqhaveclaimedthattheyhaveauthoritytodetainpeople,erectcheckpoints
withoutauthorizationandconfiscateidentitycards.

109

Forexample,theUSprivate

securitycompanyDynCorpwasemployedundera$50millioncontractwiththe
StateDepartmenttoprovide1000adviserstohelporganizeIraqilawenforcement
andcriminaljusticesystems.

110

WhenitwasrevealedthatfourDynCorpemploy-

106

USDepartmentofDefense, QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,30Sep.2001,p.53,URL

<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

107

USDepartmentofDefense(note106),p.53.

108

Schadlow,N.,‘Warandtheartofgovernance’,Parameters,autumn2003,p.91.

109

Murphy(note98).

110

Merle,R.,‘DynCorptookpartinChalabiraid’,WashingtonPost,4June2004,p.A17.

26P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

eeshadtakenpartinIraqipoliceraidsonthehomeandofficesofformerexile
leaderAhmedChalabiinJune2004,thepicturewasdrasticallyaltered.Thecon-
tractors not only wore body armour and carried rifles but also were effectively
directingtheraids—ataskthatmaywellbeconsideredbeyondtheirofficialman-
date.

111

Tosomeextent,investingPSCswithameasureofdiscretioninexecutingtheir

tasksisendemictothewayinwhichtheprivatesecurityindustryoperates.Itis
perhaps not surprising that private security contractors may take the liberty of
decidingforthemselveswhatactionisrequiredinorderforthemtofulfiltheircon-
tractualobligationsinanareaofgreatphysicalinsecurity;onthisshowing,the
blameassignedtoindividualcompaniesforactingbeyondtheirmandatemaybe
overstated.WhenHartGroupLimited,aLondon-basedPSC,washiredtoprovide
protectionforCPAstaff,thiswasintendedtobealimitedand‘passive’task.If
they came under direct attack by Iraqi insurgents, company employees were
instructedtocallonmilitarysupportfromregularcoalitionforces.Themanaging
directorofHartGrouphastestifiedthatonseveraloccasionsthisassistancewas
notforthcoming,andcompanyemployeesconsequentlyfoundthemselvesobliged
to hold positions for considerable periods of time, effectively engaging in a
strategicallysensitivetask.

112

AsensibleengagementofPSCsbytheefficientstatemustthusreasonablybegin

withclarityandagreementontheirmandateandscopeforaction.Clearlyestab-
lished limits on what are and are not acceptable methods for carrying out, for
example, a guarding service, constitute the basic premise for holding PSCs
accountable.Inparticular,thequestionofwhatconstitutes‘mission-critical’activ-
ities(requiringthattheybekeptunderthedirectcontrolofthestateorinternational
authorities)demandsrethinking.Inparticular,inthecontextofa‘battleforhearts
and minds’, conventional assumptions about what constitutes mission-critical
activitiesarelessthanclear-cut.

113

Asonecommentatorremarkedonthesubjectof

protectingPresidentKarzaiandCPAAdministratorBremer,‘itdoesn’tgetmuch
moremission-criticalthanthat’.

114

111

SuchproblemsarenotexclusivetotheIraqiscene;officiallyemployedtoprovidepilottraining

andtechnicalsupportfortheColombianNationalPolice’seradicationofillicitplantsinthesouthof
the country, DynCorp personnel have several times been reported as being actively involved in
counterinsurgencyinareascontrolledbytheFARCmovement.Burton-Rose,D.andMadsen,W.,
‘Corporate soldiers: US privatizes the use of force’, MultinationalMonitor, vol. 22, no. 3 (Mar.
1999).

112

BBCRadio4Fileon4programme,broadcastat20.00,25May2004,fulltranscriptavailable

atURL<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/file_on_4/3708232.stm>.

113

CombellesSiegel,P.,‘Adebacleinthebattleforheartsandminds’,ForeignPolicyinFocus,

13May2004.

114

Priest,D.andFlaherty,M.P.,‘Underfire,securityfirmsformanalliance’,WashingtonPost,

8Apr.2004,p.A01.

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY AND

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Accountabilityunderlaw

HoldingPSCsaccountableunderlawfortheiractionsinthecurrentstateofaffairs
is problematic even for the ‘efficient’ state.

115

The task of holding individuals

accountableformisconductorevenwarcrimesfallsonnationalgovernments—
either in the state where the company is registered or in the state in which it
operates.InthecaseofIraq,contractorsareeffectivelygrantedimmunityfrom
local prosecution under CPA Order 17 (issued in June 2003 and renewed on
27June2004toremaininforceforthedurationofthemandateauthorizingthe
MultinationalForce).

116

Evenwhenthe‘homestate’intheoryassumesresponsibilityforholdingcontrac-

torsaccountableunderlaw,thishassofarbeenlargelyhypothetical—eveninthe
UnitedStates,whichintheorypossessesthecapacitytoestablishandenforcelegal
constraints on individuals employed to work abroad. Despite the fact that the
regulationofPSCsisbetterdevelopedintheUSAthaninmostothercountries,the
failuretoholdindividualcontractorsaccountableforcrimeshasmetwithsustained
criticism. The case of DynCorp employees implicated in sexual abuses in the
Balkansinthemid-1990sisoftencitedinthisrespect,buttheproblemiscommon
toUSPSCactivityelsewhere.

117

DynCorpcontinuestobetrustedasoneofthe

mainrecipientsofcontractsfromtheUSDOD.

118

Thefailuretoholdindividualcontractors,muchlesscompanyentities,account-

ableformisconducthasbeenreplicatedinIraq,withPSCcomplicityintheabuse
ofIraqiprisonersattheAbuGhraibprisonacaseinpoint.Individualsworkingfor
theUScompaniesCACIInternationalandTitanIncorporatedprovidedinterpreta-
tionservicesandpartookintheinterrogationofIraqisatAbuGhraib.Theofficial
USinquirylaunchedbyMajorGeneralAntonioM.TabugainJanuary2004found
thatatleasttwoprivatecontractorswere‘eitherdirectlyorindirectlyresponsible
fortheabuses’,butsofarnonehasbeenbroughttojustice.

119

TheUSGovernment

struggled to locate the contract under which the individuals were serving at
AbuGhraib:initially,itwasthoughtthatCACIinterpreterswerehiredbytheUS
DOD, only to later emerge that it was the National Business Center of the US

115

TheUSmodelofregulationisconsideredindepthinchapter5.

116

SeeCoalitionProvisionalAuthority(CPA),CoalitionProvisionalAuthorityOrdernumber17

(revised):statusoftheCoalitionProvisionalAuthority,MNF–Iraq,certainmissionsandpersonnelin
Iraq, CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/17, 27 June 2004, URL <http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
#Orders>.ImmunityforcontractorshasbeengrantedinColombia,attheinstigationoftheUSState
Department.

117

Smith,C.S.,‘AtoughnewfaceofUSabroad’,InternationalHeraldTribune,14Oct.2004.

118

Ratnam,G.,‘SomeUSfirmswaryofsecurity’,DefenceNews,24May2004.

119

Article15-6Investigationofthe800thMilitaryPoliceBrigade(TabugaReport),([USArmy:

Washington, DC], 2004), p. 44, available at URL <http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_
report.pdf>; and Von Hall, G., ‘Vakter tar over soldaters roll’ [Guards take over soldiers’ role],
SvenskaDagbladet,31Aug.2004.However,DavidPassaro,accusedofhavingbeatenasuspected
TalibansympathizertodeathinaPakistaniprisoninJune2003,facedcriminalcharges.Chaffin,J.
andSevastopulo,D.,‘Contractworkerindictedoverdeathofdetainee’, Financial Times,18June
2004.

28P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Department of the Interior that had enlisted the company’s services.

120

Despite

allegationsofmisconduct,CACIInternationalwasawardedyetanothercontract,
valuedatanestimated$23million,toprovideinterrogationservicesinIraq.

121

Legalloopholesinthecontrolofprivatesecuritysectoractivityneedtobeclosed

attheinternationallevel.Asafirststep,however,existinglawsgoverningPSC
employeesworkingabroadundergovernmentcontractsfromtheUSA,theUKor
other countries with relevant jurisdiction and regulatory instruments must be
enforced.

Accountabilityundercontract

Thedifficultyinholdingprivatefirmsaccountablewhentheyareundercontract
centresonthefactthattheyarenotpoliticallybutcommerciallymotivatedactors.
Asinanyinstanceofoutsourcingorcontractingforaservice,acertainlevelof
trustmustbeestablishedthatacontractwillbefulfilled.

122

AfailureonthepartofPSCstodeliveroncontractscouldariseasaresultof

eitherthecompanyasawhole‘defecting’orofindividualemployeesdoingso.In
the first instance, a change in the conditions for operation, whether related to
securityorfinancialconsiderations,mightleadtoachangeinacompany’sability
orwillingnesstocarryoutthemissionforwhichitwascontracted.

123

Although

manyofthelargerandmoreestablishedPSCsaremindfuloftheirreputation,there
isultimatelynoguaranteethatacompanywilldeliveronacontract.Withthenum-
berofcontractorstargetedforattacksinIraqconsistentlyontheincrease,thelike-
lihoodishighthatsomePSCsmightsimplyfindthejobtooriskyandterminate
contracts. Indeed, such concerns are being expressed from within the industry
itself.

124

Inoneinstanceofdeliberatetargeting,DynCorpofficesinKabulwere

attackedinAugust2004,killingsevenpeople.

125

USestimatesofthenumberof

contractors killed in Afghanistan and Iraq have varied greatly: according to a
memberoftheUScongressionalHouseArmedServicesCommittee,inJune2004
thenumberwasintherangeof50–60deaths.

126

ByNovembertheestimatehad

risento150killedandmorethan700woundedinIraq.

127

120

RaddenKeefe(note103).

121

McCarthy,E.,‘CACIgetsnewinterrogationcontract’,WashingtonPost,5Aug.2004.

122

Singer(note2),pp.151–69.

123

Anotherproblemisthatcompaniesmayabandonacontractforfearthattheywillnotbepaid

fortheirservices.SandlineInternationalhadsignedupforacontractwiththePapuaNewGuinea
Governmentin1997,butthemissionwasnevercarriedoutbecausethecompanydoubtedtheclient’s
abilitytopay.Thistypeofconsideration,however,isobviouslylessofaproblemforPSCsworking
forarichstate.

124

Thismayfurtherthedebateabouttheregulationofcontractors.AspointedoutbyPierreChao,

defenceanalystattheCentreforStrategicandInternationalStudies,Washington,DC,theriskthat
companiesmightthinktwiceaboutbiddingforcontractsmightpromptgovernmentstothinkharder
aboutdefiningrolesandresponsibility.Ratnam(note119).

125

TheattackwaslaterclaimedbytheTaliban.Mayar,W.,‘BlasthitsUSfirminKabul’,CNN

Online,30Aug.2004;andOtis,J.,‘Kabulblastkills2fromUS’,HoustonChronicle,30Aug.2004.

126

Worden(note5).

127

Singer(note102).

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Theriskofindividualemployeesdefectingfrommissionsaggravatestheprob-

lemofensuringtheaccountabilityofPSCs.Securitypersonneldonotfallunderthe
1951UniformCodeofMilitaryJustice(UCMJ)unlesstheUSCongresshasmade
a formal declaration of war, meaning that there is effectively no guarantee that
privatecontractorswillstayinahostileenvironment.

128

Afterinsurgentsnorthof

BaghdadkilledtwoSouthKoreansubcontractorsinDecember2003,60oftheir
colleagueslefttheirpositionsforfearofsufferingsimilarfates.

129

Herein lies a

dilemma over relying on contractors even for seemingly uncontroversial tasks,
suchasfeedingtroops:ifacorporateactordecidestowithdrawstafftokeepitsafe
fromattack,regulartroopsfindthemselvesindifficultyandhavelittleleverage
over the situation. Concerns about the growing use of PSCs among national
militariesoftencentreonthelikelihoodorriskofthistypeofsituationarising.

Finally,PSCaccountabilityisseverelycompromisedbyinadequatevettingof

personnel.InIraq,USandBritishfirmsturnedtolocalandotherforeignnationals
tofillthedemandforpersonnel,andtheinfluxofthird-countrypersonnelhasbeen
high. Private security personnel in Iraq currently include individuals from Fiji,
Nepal(Gurkhas),SerbiaandMontenegro,andBosniaandHerzegovina,tonamea
few.ThislessenstheaccountabilityofPSCsintworespects:(a)employingstaff
from a third country complicates procedures for prosecution in the event of
misconduct; and (b)the ‘gold-mine mentality’ associated with the Iraqi private
security market also attracts individuals with less than perfect human rights
records.

130

Concerns about the quality of recruitment are not voiced merely by

outsideobserversbutarealsobeingraisedfromwithintheindustry.

131

Blackwater

Security Consulting, a strategic division of Blackwater USA, exemplifies this
trend:asthecompanyhasgrownby300percentovereachofthepastthreeyears,
highdemandhastranslatedintoslackproceduresofrecruitment.Thecompany’s
chiefexecutive,GaryJackson,hasconfirmedthatcommandoshavebeenrecruited,
forexample,fromformerforcesloyaltoChileanPresidentAugustoPinochetfor
workinIraq.

132

128

Zamparelli,S.J.,ContractorsontheBattlefield:WhatHaveWeSignedUpFor?, Air War

College Research Report (Air University, Air War College: Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Mar.
1999).FortheUCMJseeURL<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ucmj.htm>.In2000theUS
CongressattemptedtorectifythisoversightbyinvokingtheMilitaryExtraterritorialJurisdictionAct,
intendedtoextendfederalUSlawtopeople‘employedbyoraccompanyingthearmedforcesoutside
theUnitedStates’.PublicLaw106-523,22Nov.2000,URL<http://www.pubklaw.com/hi/pl106-
523.pdf>.However,thisextensionappliesonlytocontractorshiredbytheDOD.

129

Surowiecki,J.,‘ArmyInc.’,NewYorker,12Jan.2004.

130

ThishasalsobeenaproblemwithPSCsoperatinginColombia,whereUSPSCshavemadethe

hiring of personnel from other Latin American countries a common practice, thereby evading
congressionalcontrol,whichappliesonlytoUScitizensworkinginthecountry.

131

KennKurtz,chiefexecutiveofSteeleFoundation,amultinationalPSCwithasignificantpres-

enceinIraq,hasstatedthatheseriouslydoubtsthegeneralqualityofindividualsemployedinthe
country.Leyne,J.,‘ThebusinessofwarinIraq’,BBCNewsOnline,25May2004,URL<http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3744489.stm>.

132

Arun,N.,‘Outsourcingthewar’,BBCNewsOnline,2Apr.2004,URL<http://news.bbc.co.uk/

2/hi/middle_east/3591701.stm>.

30P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Problemsoftransparencyandoversightonanunlevelplayingfield

Oneofthemostfrequentlyvoicedargumentsinfavourofoutsourcingsecurityand
militaryservicesisthatprivatesecurityprovisionisalwaysthecheaperoption.

133

However,theeffectivenessofmarketforcesinensuringthatcostsarekeptdownin
thesecurityindustryisdisputable.Formarketforcestoleadtocostdepression,
thereneedstobeeffectivecompetition.

134

Theprivatesecuritymarket,however,

suffersfromseveralimpedimentstoperfectmarketconditionsandassuchmore
resemblesaskewedmarketor‘unlevelplayingfield’.

Oneimpedimenttoperfectmarketconditionsisfoundinthehighlypersonalized

nature of relations within the industry. PSC executives, often with high-level
experiencefromnationalmilitaries,areoftenwellconnectedbothwithgovern-
mentsandamongthemselves.AmongUSPSCsoperatinginIraq,seniordirectors
of Diligence LLC, the Steele Foundation and CACI all enjoy such positions.

135

Furthermore,significantlobbyingandpoliticalcampaigndonationsonthepartof
PSCs have been shown to have a bearing on the awarding of contracts.

136

One

source estimates that only 40 per cent of US DOD contracts between financial
years1998and2003wereawardedonthebasisof‘fullandopencompetition’.
Thisfiguredropsto36percentifthose‘fullandopen’contractsthatattractedonly
onebidderarededucted.

137

In an example of questionable tendering processes,in June 2004 one of the

largestcompaniesintheindustry,DynCorp,lostouttoasmallandrelativelynew
British company, Aegis Defence Services, in the bid for the then largest Iraqi
securitycontract.Thecontract,valuedat$293million,stipulatedthecoordination
ofworkandintelligencesharingbetweenupto50otherPSCsinthecountry,as
wellastheprovisionofsecurityteamsfortheUSProjectManagementOffice.

138

response,inJuly2004DynCorpsubmittedaformalprotesttotheUSGovernment
Accountability Office (GAO).

139

Similarly, the formidable dominance of the

HalliburtonconglomerateinIraqhasprompteddebateandaccusationsofcronyism
intheGeorgeW.BushAdministration,fuelledbythemultipleinvestigationsofthe

133

Brooks(note12);andShearer(note4).

134

Markussen,A.,‘Thecaseagainstprivatizingnationalsecurity’,Paperpresentedatthe2001

MeetingoftheInternationalPoliticalStudiesAssociation,UniversityofOklahoma,20Mar.2001;
andKrahmann(note4),pp.20–21.

135

Isenberg(note104),p.8.

136

Isenberg(note104).TheInternationalConsortiumofInvestigativeJournalists(ICIJ)estimates

thatprivatecontractorsinIraqdonatedmorethan$500000toGeorgeW.Bush’s2004presidential
campaign.See‘Windfallsofwar’,URL<http://www.publicintegrity.org/icij>.

137

Makinson,L.,‘OutsourcingthePentagon:whobenefitsfromthepoliticsandeconomicsof

nationalsecurity?’,29Sep.2004(InternationalConsortiumofInvestigativeJournalists,ICIJ),avail-
ableatURL<http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid=385>.

138

Griffin,T.,‘Irish–AmericanstargetIraqcontract’, Asia Times,30July2004,URL<http://

www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FG30Ak03.html>;seealso‘Aegislatestinformation’,URL
<http://www.aegisdef.com>.

139

Griffin(note138).

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY AND

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companyoverallegationsrangingfromoverchargingtheUSGovernmentinIraq
andKuwaittopayingbribesinNigeria.

140

Competition between firms in the private security sector makes transparency

within the industry difficult to achieve, both during tendering processes and in
termsofoversightonceacontractisgranted.Theindustryischaracterizedbya
climateofconfidentiality,andfirmsfrequentlyretaintheirrighttokeeptheconsid-
eration of contracts secret. In a further complication, there is a general trend
towardsawardingso-called‘infinite-delivery,infinite-quantity’(IDIQ)contracts,
alsoknownas‘umbrellacontracts’,whereapriceisfixedinadvancetocoveran
unspecifiednumberandnatureoftasksforacertainperiod.

141

Kellogg,Brownand

Root—aUSengineeringandconstructioncompany,privatemilitarycontractorand
a subsidiary of Halliburton—has been operating under an IDIQ contract in the
Balkanssince1995.Thecontractwasextendedtwice,in1997and1999,andnow
runsuntil2004;itcontainsonlyverybroadworkdescriptions,suchas‘freedomto
use latest commercial practices and techniques to meet requirements success-
fully’.

142

AnIDIQcontracthasalsobeenawardedtoDynCorpforthetrainingand

equippingofthenewIraqiarmy.

143

IDIQcontractshavebeencriticizedforbeing

particularlyopentoabuseandover-charging,loweringtheleveloftransparencyin
thecontractingofPSCs.

Oversightofthecontractingprocessisfurthercomplicatedbytheextentofsub-

contractingbetweenPSCs.Accordingtooneestimate,theUSAhasawardedsome
2800contractsinIraq,valuedatmorethan$11.7billion,buthasverylittleinflu-
enceoverthesubcontractingprocess.

144

Mark Whyte, of Pilgrims Security Ser-

vices,aUK-basedPSCoperatinginIraq,testifiesthatlargenumbersofsecurity
staff are not recruited directly by the companies active in the country but are
employedasfreelance‘consultants’.

145

Subcontractingleadstoafurtherdispersal

ofauthorityinpolicyimplementationandleavestheoriginal‘client’withlimited
meansofoversight.

Finally,problemsofoversightunderskewedmarketconditionscanalsomanifest

themselvesinadepletionofstateresources.Giventhatthestatehasnoinfluence
over salaries or other conditions of employment in the private sector, it has no
leverageovertheabilityoftheprivatesectortoenticeawayhighlytrainedindivid-

140

Catan,T.,‘HalliburtonemergesasthebiggestrecipientofIraqioilmoney’,FinancialTimes,

16July2004;andCatan,T.,‘KerryvowstotargetBushoverHalliburton’,FinancialTimes,12Aug.
2004.

141

Chatterjee(note84).TheincidenceofIDIQcontractshasincreasedintheUSA,asopposedto

theUK,wheretherehasbeenanincreasingemphasisonfixedcontracts.E.Krahmann,Conversation
withtheauthor,25Nov.2004.

142

USGeneralAccountingOffice(GAO),Contingency Operations: Army Should do More to

ControlContractCostintheBalkans,ReporttotheChairman,SubcommitteeonReadinessandMan-
agementSupport,CommitteeonArmedServices,USSenate(GAO:Washington,DC,2000),p.7,
citedinKrahmann(note9),p.22.

143

‘Iraqreconstructioncontractsforfirmsfromsupportingnations’,memofromDeputySecretary

of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Determination and Findings, 5 Dec. 2003, available at URL
<http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0312/doc07.htm>.

144

Worden(note5).

145

Arun(note132).

32P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

ualsfromstateservice,especiallyinspecialoperationsforces.

146

Concernsabouta

‘braindrain’ofspecialoperationsforcesasrecruitsbegintodeserttoprivatecom-
panieshavebeenvoicedbymembersoftheUScongressionalHouse ArmedSer-
vicesSubcommitteeonTerrorism,whowarnedthattheUSmilitarymaybelosing
covertforcesfasterthantheycanbereplaced.

147

Suchisthelevelofexodusfrom

both US and British special forces that military commanders are finding them-
selvesobligatedtoformulatenewfinancialandeducationalincentivestoretain
personnel.

148

Lackofcoordinationandpracticalstumblingblocks

OversightofPSCoperationsisfurthercomplicatedbybasicpracticalobstaclesto
effectivepublic–privatepartnership.Tosomeextent,theproblemofintegrating
diverse resources and interests in long-term strategic planning is of course a
generalone,evenwithinregularforces.

149

However,coordinationbetweenregular

forcesandPSCsoperatinginthesametheatreisfurthercomplicatedbyadisparity
inorganizationalcultureandevenmutualsuspicion.

Oneobstacleforpracticalcoordinationarisesfromthesimpleissueofidentifica-

tion.Manysecurityguardsprefertokeepalowprofilebytravellinginunmarked
vehiclesanddressingincivilianclothes.Thelackofestablishedpracticeonidenti-
ficationinthefieldposesobviousproblems,especiallywhencontractorsaredrawn
fromdifferentnationalitiesandthereisnoimmediatewayofidentifyingsomeone
as‘onthecoalitionside’,forexample.Inextremecasesthishasledtoanexchange
of‘friendlyfire’:anemployeeoftheHartGrouprecallshowcolleaguestravelling
throughthecountryonaninspectionmissionweremistakenforadversariesbyUS
troops.Thetroopsopenedfireontheconvoy,killingtwopeople.

150

Moreover,PSCssometimescometothefieldill-equipped.Reportsofcompany

employeeslackingeventhebasictoolsofthetrade,suchasmapsorfunctioning
long-rangeradiodevices,compoundproblemsofcommunicationandimpedePSC
operations.

151

Thecurrentpractice,wherebycontractorsrelyoninformalcontacts

withmembersoftheregularforcesforaccesstobothmaterialsupport(suchas
maps)andinformation,isuntenable.Thereisaclearneedtodevelopformaland
established procedures for the practical interaction between private and public
forces as well as other actors in the field, especially in post-conflict situations.

146

Theproblemofretainingqualifiedstaffwithinthemilitary,withprivatesectorcompetitionfor

personnel,wasacknowledgedinUSDepartmentofDefense(note106),pp.8–10.

147

Jelinek,P.,AssociatedPress,‘Manyelitesoldiersleaveforbetterpay’,20July2004,URL

<http://webserve.govst.edu/users/ghrank/Political/Not-So-Great%20Expectations/civilian.htm>;and
Mullen,R.,‘Specialopsretentionaproblem,witnesssay’,DefenseToday,21July2004.

148

Isenberg(note101),p.8.

149

Isenberg(note101),p.10.

150

The2individualskilledhappenedtobeIraqis,contractedbyHartasinterpreterandchauffeur.

BBCRadio4(note112);andWilson,J.,‘Privatesecurityfirmscallformorefirepowerincombat
zone’,TheGuardian,17Apr.2004,URL<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1193718,
00.html>.

151

BBCRadio4(note112).

P R IVATE S EC UR ITY AND

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Suchprocedureswillhavetobecarefullyconsideredandwillultimatelyendup
being a balancing act between the different interests and working philosophies
involved.

Whopaysthepricefortheefficientstate’sprivatesecurityfailures?

Whenthestatefailstocarryoutitshoped-forroleintheimplementationofpolicy,
thepriceforextensiverelianceontheprivatesectorishighinpracticalandpoliti-
calterms.Thecostoffailureiscompoundedwhentheefficientstate’spolicyis
beingexercisedinaforeigncountry.Insuchcasesitisnotsimplythegovernment,
asthecontractingparty,thatistheconsumerofPSCservices:localpopulationsare
alsoaffected.AlthoughtheaimofthischapteristoconsiderPSCreliancefromthe
point of view of the efficient state, two further reflections are made about the
effectsofastrongstateimposingalargeprivatesecuritypresenceonforeignpopu-
lations.

The missions in Afghanistan and Iraq can be conceived as attempts to

re-establishthefundamentalsocialcontractusinglargelyprivatemeans.Thelong-
termeffectsontheattitudesoflocalpopulationscanatthispointintimeonlybe
guessedat,giventheunprecedenteddegreeofPSCactivity.However,itisclear
thattheUS-ledcoalition’sdegreeofsuccessinmanagingitsprivatepartnersin
bothcountrieswillprovideabasisforlessonstobediscussedandlearnedinthe
future.

Inthewordsofonecommentator,theoutsourcingofsomanyresponsibilities

risksbeingseenas‘anattempttocreateadistancebetweenthecoalition’sactions
andtheconsequencesofitsactions,betweenitsphysicaloccupationandthepoliti-
cal ramifications of the occupation’.

152

Concerns that the USA is seen to lack

rigourinitspracticeofoutsourcinghavebeenvoicedevenfromwithintheUS
Congress.

153

AlthoughPSCconductnecessarilyvaries,thereisariskthatajob

half-donewillprovokesignificantresentmentamonglocalpeople.Inthisrespect,
criticismthatthenewIraqipoliceandarmyhavebeensoldshortasaresultof
trainingunderPSCauspicesmayproveparticularlycompromising.

154

TheinfluxoftensofthousandsofforeignworkersintoIraqwillhaveanimpact

onconditionsintheemerginglabourmarket.AsinternationalPSCshaverealized
theadvantagesofhiringlocalstaff,inparticularbecauseofthelocalknowledge
andlowersalarydemands,therehasbeenasurgeintheiremploymentofIraqis.
Oneinternationalsecurityservicesandriskconsultancycompany,ErinysInter-
national,nowemploys14000Iraqisthroughoutthecountry.

155

Asinternational

PSCshavebecomeincreasinglywaryoftherisingcostsanddifficultyinretaining

152

Isenberg(note101);andO’Neill,B.,‘Anewkindofprivatewar’,SpikedOnline,16Apr.

2004,URL<http://www.spiked-online.com>.

153

Isenberg(note104).

154

Calbreath, D., ‘Iraqi army, police fall short on training’, SanDiegoUnion–Tribune,4July

2004,URL<http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040704/news_mz1b4iraqi.html>.

155

SeetheErinysInternationalInternetsiteatURL<http://www.erinysinternational.com>;and

Isenberg(note101),p.7.

34P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

stafffromtheircountriesoforigin,PSCinfluxisalreadycreatingatwo-tierwork-
forceinthelocalsecuritysector,dividedbetweenhighlypaidrecruitsfromWest-
ernspecialservicesandcheaperechelonsdrawnfromlocalpopulations.

156

Even

thelatter,however,normallyearnconsiderablymorethanthoseinthestatesecurity
services,letalonetheirfellowcitizensinotherbranchesofwork.

Finally,asdiscussedinchapter2,PSCpresencedetractsfromthelocalinputinto

andownershipofinstitutionbuilding.InbothAfghanistanandIraqithasbeendif-
ficulttorecruitcompetentpersonnelforthenewnationalarmiesandpoliceforces,
aslocalpeopleprefertakingupemploymentwithforeignPSCs.

157

ResponsiblefortheimplementationofalargeshareofUSpolicyinIraqand

elsewhere,PSCsneedtobeheldaccountableunderbothlawandcontract.Failure
todosowillhaveasignificantimpactontheimplementationofpolicy,givingthe
phrase‘missionfailure’awholenewcontent.

158

Thefollowingchapterconsiders

anotherfacetoftheUSA’suseoftheprivatesecuritysector,whereitisnotdrawn
upontocomplementregularforcesbutrathertoreplacetheapplicationofpublic
resourcesonanongoingbasisandinnon-conflict-relatedspheres.

156

Cha,A.E.,‘UnderclassofworkerscreatedinIraq’,WashingtonPost,1July2004,p.A01.

157

Vendrell,F.,EUSpecialRepresentativeinAfghanistan,Personalconversationwiththeauthor,

14June2004.

158

Campbell,G.L.,‘Contractorsonthebattlefield:theethicsofpayingcivilianstoenterharm’s

wayandrequiringsoldierstodependonthem’,PaperpresentedtotheJointServicesConferenceon
ProfessionalEthics,Springfield,Va.,Jan.2000,URL<http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/
Campbell00.html>.

4.Theglobalwaronterrorismand

privatizationofsecurity

UScounter-terrorismstrategyandtheattractivenessoftheprivatesecurity
sector

Althoughindustrycommentatorsgenerallyagreethattheglobalwaronterrorism,
(GWOT)hasledtoanincreaseduseofprivatesecuritycompanies,littleanalysis
hassofarbeendevotedtothespecificnatureofthesetasksortotheireffects.

159

Whileexpertsdisagreeonwhetherterrorisminthe21stcenturyisqualitativelyor
evenquantitativelynew,itisclearthattheissuewillremainatthetopoftheinter-
national agenda for the foreseeable future.

160

While the US operations in

AfghanistanandIraqaredeclaredtobepartofthewiderGWOT,intheforegoing
chapterstheyareconsideredascasesofmilitaryinterventionandoccupation.This
chapterexaminestheincreaseduseoftheprivatesectorinthemoreelusive(low-
profile and covert) aspects of the GWOT.

161

Again, the focus is on the United

Statesanditsstrategicoutlook,butthefindingshavegenericrelevanceforefficient
statesgenerally.

ThemaindocumentsettingouttheUSapproachtotheGWOT—theQuadrennial

DefenseReviewof30September2001—listssevenstrategictenetsforachieving
defencepolicygoals,threeofwhichhaveadirectbearingontheroleoftheprivate
sectorintheGWOT:(a)thefocusonriskmanagement,(b)thedevelopmentofa
capabilities-based approach, and (c) the transformation of the US military and
defenceestablishment.

162

Risk management starts from the assumption that challenges are constantly

changing.Thisplaysoutasafundamentaltensionbetweenpreparingfortherisks
ofthefutureandaddressingthethreatsofthepresent.Therecognitionthatsome
risksarelessthanwellunderstoodisfundamentaltoariskmanagementapproach
tosecuritypoliticsandclearlysetsitapartfromearlierthreat-basedapproaches,
whichwerebuiltonavailableintelligenceaboutaparticularandidentifiableadver-

159

Hasham, M., ‘Public wars, private profit’, World Today, June 2004, URL <http://www.

theworldtoday.org>.

160

On problems in accurately charting the global incidence of terrorist activities, including a

critiqueoftheUSStateDepartment’s2003PatternsofGlobalTerrorismreport,seeKrueger,A.B.
andLaitin,D.,‘“Misunderestimating”terrorism’,ForeignAffairs,Sep./Oct.2004,pp.8–14.Onthe
effectoftheSep.2001attacksonUSstrategicconsciousnessseeMorgan,M.J.,‘Theoriginsofthe
newterrorism’,Parameters,spring2004,p.41.

161

‘The activities of these [private companies] follow the traditional logic of covert action.’

Guéhenno(note35),p.12.

162

The other US strategic tenets are: defending the United States and projecting US military

power,strengtheningalliancesandpartnerships,maintainingfavourableregionalbalancesanddevel-
opingabroadportfolioofmilitarycapabilities.USDepartmentofDefense(note106),pp.13–14and
57–65.

36P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

sary.

163

Riskmanagementisamenabletoprivatesectorusepreciselybecauseit

requiresrespondingto(orpre-empting)risksatshortnoticeandwithlittleinstitu-
tionalpreparation.

A‘capabilities-basedapproach’tostrategyreinforcestheattractivenessofpri-

vatesectorsecurityserviceprovision.Underpinningthisapproachistheviewthat
theUSAcannotknowwithconfidencewhichactor(stateornon-state)willposea
threattovitalinterests.Accordingly,thefocusshiftstohowanadversarymight
fightratherthantheidentityoftheadversaryorthelocationwhereconfrontation
mightoccur.

164

Thisapproachrelieson‘surprise,deceptionandasymmetricwar-

fare’inthefaceofanunknownadversaryanddemandsarefocusingofthearmed
forces’mission.

165

Iftheprivatesectornotonlytakesoverthemanybasictasksof

operationbutalsoshouldersalargepartofthecostsforthedevelopmentofnew
technologies,resourcesarefreedupforamorestreamlineddefencesector.

166

Third,theQDRsetsoutthetransformationoftheUSmilitaryanddefenceestab-

lishment itself as involving ‘experimentation with new approaches to warfare,
operationalconceptsandcapabilities,andorganisationalconstructs’andgeneral
‘innovationinDepartmentofDefense(DoD)processes’.

167

The view that ‘only

thosefunctionsthatneedbeperformedbytheDoDshouldbekeptbytheDoD’has
alreadyledtoasignificantincreaseinoutsourcingandwillcontinuetodosointhe
conceivablefuture.

168

AlthoughthethreetenetsdescribedabovedonotdojusticetoUSdefencestrat-

egyasawhole,theyareimportantinindicatingreasonsforanincreasedprivatiza-
tioninthecontextoftheGWOT.Whilethenewthreatperceptionhasopenedup
andhighlightednumerousrolesfortheprivatesectorandforpublic–privateinter-
action—forexample,inthecontrolofterroristfinancingandmovement,technol-
ogyleakageandtheprotectionofcriticalinfrastructure—thisdiscussionfocuseson
theparticularroleofprivateprovisionofintelligenceinsupportofcounter-terrorist
policy.

169

163

Gormley,D.M.,‘Thelimitsofintelligence:Iraq’slessons’,Survival,vol.46,no.3(autumn

2004),p.8.USSecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeld’sassessmentofthecurrentsecurityclimate
demonstratestheUSA’sincreasedriskaversityinthewakeofthe2001attacks:‘thereareknown
knowns;therearethingsweknowweknow.Wealsoknowthatthereareknownunknowns;thatisto
sayweknowtherearesomethingswedonotknow.Buttherearealsounknownunknowns—theones
wedon’tknowwedon’tknow’.Quotedin‘RumremarkwinsRumsfeldaward’,BBCNewsOnline,
2Dec.2003,URL<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm>.

164

USDepartmentofDefense(note106),pp.13–14.

165

USDepartmentofDefense(note106),p.14.

166

ForadetaileddiscussionseeHagelin,B.,‘Science-andtechnology-basedmilitaryinnovation:

theUnitedStatesandEurope’,SIPRIYearbook2004(note61),pp.285–304.

167

USDepartmentofDefense(note106),p.32.

168

USDepartmentofDefense(note106),pp.53–54.

169

Counter-terrorismisdistinctfromanti-terrorism,whichcoversawiderrangeofactivities.Fora

comprehensivecoverageofwaysinwhichtheprivatesectorisincreasinglyengagedinanti-terrorist
activityseeedsBailesandFrommelt(note34).

THE WAR ON TER R OR IS M

AND S EC UR ITY P R IVATIZATION 37

Privatesecurityandintelligencegathering

Preventive counter-terrorist strategies place emphasis on intelligence functions.
Thiswasofcoursethecasebeforetheattacksof11September2001,butsincethen
theissuehasmovedswiftlyuptheUSforeignpolicyagenda.Therecognitionof
intelligencefailuresbothinpredictingtheattacksandinthelead-uptothewarin
Iraqpromptedreneweddebateonintelligenceneedsandorganization.

170

Although

theprimestrategicimportanceofhumanintelligence(HUMINT)inthecontextof
theGWOThasbeenestablishedbothinnumerousUSgovernmentdocumentsand
in independent analysis, the means by which an adequate, agile and reliable
HUMINTforcecanbegeneratedhavebeenwidelycontested.

171

Somearguethat

the traditional shape of intelligence agencies, exhibited through formal,
hierarchicalandcompartmentalizedinformationstrategies,needstobereplaced
with‘flexible,decentralizednetworksofpublicandprivateinformationproviders,
analystsandusers’.

172

Thistrendisreflectedinthemorespecializedintelligence

activityofPSCs.

FrequentlinksbetweenPSCsandcompanieswithintheinformationtechnology

(IT) and electronic systems industries make private security actors seem well
placedforthetechnology-intensiveaspectsofintelligencegathering.Indeed,many
oftheimportantactorswithinthe‘intelligencebranch’oftheprivatesecuritysec-
torhaveoriginatedasITortelecommunicationscompanies,onlytothendiversify
theirportfoliostocoversecurity-relatedservices.

PSCsaretodayusedforawidevarietyofintelligencetasks:fromthegathering

of intelligence from satellites and sophisticated sensors, to interpreting and
analysingresultsanddistributinginformationamongrelevantgovernmentbodies.
AirScan,aFlorida-basedcompany,hasprovidedaerialintelligence-gatheringser-
vicesinAngola,theBalkans,ColombiaandSudan.

173

TheUSStateDepartment

hired PSCs to provide intelligence on rebels of União Nacional para a
IndependênciaTotaldeAngola(UNITA,NationalUnionfortheTotalIndepen-
denceofAngola)inAngolaandtoinvestigatetheguns-for-gemstradeinAfrica;
eventheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)hascontractedprivatefirmsforintel-
ligence.

174

DynCorpisanotherUSPSCinvolvedinintelligenceprovision,inthis

caseworkingfortheColombianMinistryofDefencetoprovideintelligenceon

170

See,e.g.,The9/11CommissionReport:FinalReportoftheNationalCommissiononTerrorist

Attacks Upon the United States (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2004), URL
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/>;andReview of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Butler Committee Report), HC898 (Stationery Office: London, 2004), URL <http://www.
butlerreview.org.uk/>.

171

USDepartmentofDefense(note118),p.38;andSteinberg,J.B.,Graham,M.andEggers,A.,

BuildingIntelligencetoFightTerrorism,BrookingsInstitutionPolicyBriefno.125(BrookingsInsti-
tution:Washington,DC,Sep.2003).TheUS9/11CommissionbroughtabouttheresignationofCIA
DirectorGeorgeTenetandsetthestageforamajorrestructuringoftheintelligencecommunity.See
alsoBlack,C.,‘Thesecurityofbusiness:aviewfromthesecurityindustry’,edsBailesandFrommelt
(note34),pp.173–82.

172

Steinberg,GrahamandEggers(note171),p.2.

173

Singer(note2),p.16.

174

Singer(note2),p.182.

38P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

rebelsofFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC,Revolutionary
ArmedForcesofColombia).

175

ThechieffinancialofficerofCACIInternational

statedinJanuary1998that‘theintelligencecommunitywouldbeagreatmarket-
placeforus’;oneacquisitionand10monthslater,thecompanyproclaimedasig-
nificantboostinrevenueowingtoitslandingintelligencecontractsworthatotalof
$29million.

176

Since then the company has continued to expand its intelligence

servicescapacityand,despiteembroilmentinthescandaloverabuseattheAbu
GhraibprisoninIraq,isoneofthekeyplayersinthisnewsegmentofthemarket
forprivatesecurity.

PSCs are also increasingly used in the realm of human intelligence. This

involves primarily smaller companies supplying former intelligence agents as
actual‘bodiesontheground’insensitivelocations,notablyinPakistan,whichUS
soldiershavebeenforbiddentoenterintheirsearchforal-QaedaleaderUsamabin
Laden.

177

Theprivatesectorhasalsobeenawardedcontractsintherealmofcyber

terrorism, setting up businesses to monitor suspicious Internet sites—what US
DeputyDefenseSecretaryPaulWolfowitzcalls‘cybersanctuaries’.

178

Anexample

ofthisistheSearchforInternationalTerroristEntitiesInstitute,operatingoutof
(undisclosed)locationsintheUSAandIsrael.

179

In further testimony to the proliferation of private sector intelligence, private

placementcompaniesthatspecializeinsupplyingtalenttointernationalPSCshave
sprung up in recent years, and the US Department of Homeland Security has
announcedthatitmightseekaprivatevendortoprovideintelligenceresearchand
operations specialists for its Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agency.

180

Politicallegitimacyintheglobalwaronterrorism

Strong emotional reactions worldwide to the attacks of September 2001 set the
stageforwidespreadcontentionoverwhatthestrategicgoalsoftheGWOTshould
be.TheUSAhasinvariousofficialdocumentsaffirmedacommitmenttodealing
withtherootcausesofterrorism,identifyinginparticulartheproblemoffailed

175

Quintanilla,J.,‘TheinvisibleUSwarinColombia’,ScoopMediaOnline,1July2004,URL

<http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/WO0407/S00009.htm>.

176

McCarthy,E.,‘IntelligenceworkcomestoCACIviaacquisitions’,Washington Post,8July

2004,URL<http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040708-caci-intell-work.htm>.

177

Chaffin,J.,‘USturnstoprivatesectorforspies’,FinancialTimes,17May2004;USdeepening

of counter-terrorist cooperation (primarily intelligence) with the Philippines is set out in the US
National Security Strategy (NSS), published in Sep. 2002. See URL <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss.html>,p.26.Seealso‘USconcernedaboutgroupinPhilippineslinkedtoal-Qaeda’,
ReutersandAP,publishedinTaipeiTimes,28June2004.

178

Lipton,E.andLichtblau,E.,‘Evennearhome,anewfrontisopeningintheterrorbattle’,New

YorkTimes,23Sep.2004.

179

LiptonandLichtblau(note178).

180

Chaffin,J.,‘USturnstoprivatesectorforspies’,FinancialTimes,17May2004;Dizzard,W.

P.,‘DHSeyesoutsourcingintelligencework’,GovernmentComputerNews,GCN.Com,5Oct.2004,
URL<http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/homeland-security/27527-1.html>.FormoreontheICEseethe
agency’sInternetsiteatURL<http://www.ice.gov>.

THE WAR ON TER R OR IS M

AND S EC UR ITY P R IVATIZATION 39

statesandlaunchinganumberofinitiativestothiseffect,suchastheEastAfrica
CounterterrorismInitiative.

181

Atthestrategiclevel,counter-terrorismpolicycan-

notbereducedtoresponsiveactionorevendeterrenceofterroristactionbutulti-
matelyboilsdowntoaconvertingofopinions.Inacontestthatisbyitsverynature
a‘contestforheartsandminds’,thewayinwhichpolicyisimplementedcarries
significantpoliticalweight.

Theuseoftheprivatesecuritysectorcan,byitsverynature,onlyfocusonshort-

tomedium-termcounter-terroristmeasures.Over-concentrationonthisshort-term
aspectoftheproblemcancombinewithexcessiverelianceoncommercialsector
actors to convey an image of disengagement and disinterest in addressing root
causesofterrorismonthepartoftheUSA.

182

Thereis,inthewordsofonecom-

mentator,ariskthat‘strategy’sgoalbecomesnotidentifyingthebestpossibleout-
comeandfindingthemeanstoattainit,butkeepingasmanyoptionsopenforas
longaspossibletomaximisetacticalflexibility’.

183

If the GWOT is to be con-

ceivedofinthecontextofglobalsecuritygovernance,wherestateandnon-state
actorsacttogether,theuseofPSCsneedstobemuchmorevisiblyincorporated
intoapoliticalstrategythatalsoinvokesandexploresthecapacityoftheprivate
sectorasawholetoplaymorecreativeandnon-zero-sumrolesinsecuritybuild-
ing,withinastrongnormativeframework.

184

Moreactors,moreproblems?

The inadequacy of inter-agency communication has been pointed out in recent
investigationsintotheperformanceofbothUSandBritishintelligenceagencies.

185

Clearly, the proliferation of private actors within the intelligence world further
complicatesthepicture,andensuringthattherightinformationreachesallrelevant
partiesandisputtotherightusebecomesincreasinglydifficult.Theclassicprob-
lemsofintelligencegatheringandinterpretationalsorequirereconsiderationinthe
light of the use of PSCs: infiltration,methodsproliferationandhumanresource

181

Shinn,D.H.,‘FightingterrorisminEastAfricaandtheHorn’.ForeignServiceJournal,Sep.

2004,p.42.OnsimilaritiesofrootcausesofinternalconflictandrootcausesofterrorismseeRich-
mond,O.P.,‘Realizinghegemony?:symbolicterrorismandtherootsofconflict’,StudiesinConflict
and Terrorism, vol. 26, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2003), pp. 289–309, available at URL <http://www.
polisci.taylorandfrancis.com/ter_content.html>.TheUSNationalSecurityStrategyestablishesthe
securitythreatsposedbyfailedstates(seenote177).Foracritiqueofthelackofstrategytoimple-
mentthisfocusseeRice,S.,TheNewNationalSecurityStrategy:FocusonFailedStates,Brookings
Institution Policy Brief no. 116 (Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, Feb. 2003), URL
<http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb116.htm>.

182

‘ThereisusuallynoquestionaboutthelevelofUSresolveandinterestifthereareUStroops

ontheground.Ifweonlyprovidecontractors,whiletheymightbereallyeffectiveintermsofmission
accomplishment,theycanleadtochargesofUSambivalenceorlackofinterest.’Wheelan(note67).

183

Guéhenno(note35),p.14.

184

Bailes, A. J. K., ‘Business and the security agenda: victim, accomplice or ally?’, Opinion,

Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Oct. 2004, URL <http://transatlantic.sais.jhu.edu/Publications/
opinions>.

185

‘CIA slated over Iraq intelligence’, BBC News Online, 9 July 2004, URL <http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3878969.stm>;seealsoQuintanilla(note175).

40P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

mismanagementapplytopublicandprivatesectorsalike.

186

TheTabugaReport

pointedoutthatthehiringofthird-countrynationalsforintelligencecollectionwas
particularlyproblematic.

187

There are no guarantees that individual employees

hiredbyaPSCtoperformintelligencetaskswillbefavourablydisposedtowards
theclient’sbroaderagendas.

Asearlyas26December2000,theUSArmyindicateditsawarenessoftherisks

associatedwithoutsourcingintelligenceinamemorandumissuedbyPatrickT.
Henry,AssistantSecretaryoftheArmy.

188

Thememorandumarguesthat,atthe

operational, strategic and tactical levels, the intelligence function ‘should be
exemptedfromprivatesectorperformanceonthebasisofrisktonationalsecur-
ity’.

189

Specifically,thememorandumcautionsthatcontractors‘maybeacquired

byforeigninterests,acquireormaintaininterestsinforeigncountriesorprovide
supporttoforeigncustomers’.

190

PSCs frequently operate on a global basis and

provideservicestoanumberofclientsatatime,varyinginnationalityandinclud-
ingotherinterestgroups,suchasthecorporatesectoritself.Inanexampleofdubi-
ousintelligenceprovision,severalIslamicgroupsandcharitiessuedtheSearchfor
InternationalTerroristEntitiesInstitute,acompanyworkingoncyberterrorism,for
defamation.

191

Fundamentally,theuseofPSCsintheintelligencesectormeanstheintroduction

of a new ‘protagonist’ in security politics. All aspects of intelligence gathering
requireinterpretation,andwhenactorswhosemainresponsibilityisnottovoters
anddemocraticinstitutionsbuttoshareholdersperformthis,thereisreasonfor
concern.

Losingcompetence?

The repercussions of losing competence in the realm of intelligence gathering
vastlyoutweighthepotentialdetrimentofprivatesectordependenceintheareaof,
forexample,logisticsupport,giventhecentralroleoccupiedbyintelligenceser-
vicesinthecurrentsecurityclimate.Fromtheperspectiveofthefirmsthemselves,
thetemptationtorecruitdirectlyfromgovernmentagenciesiseasilyexplained:
such individuals have been thoroughly trained, are knowledgeable about the
functioningofpublicintelligenceagenciesandpossesstheadditionaladvantageof
possessingrelevantsecurityclearances.

192

186

Sorel,M.,‘Wholetthedogsout?:theintelligencerisksofUnitedStatesprivatemilitaryfirms’,

Unpublishedpaper,YaleUniversity,NewHaven,Conn.,8May2004,marc.sorel@yale.edu.

187

Worden(note5);andtheTabugaReport(note119).

188

USDepartmentoftheArmy,OfficeoftheAssistantSecretary,ManpowerandReserveAffairs,

‘MemorandumThruAdministrativeAssistanttotheSecretaryoftheArmy,DirectorofArmyStaff’,
availableontheInternetsiteoftheCenterforPublicIntegrity,URL<http://www.publicintegrity.
org/wow/report.aspx?aid=328>.

189

USDepartmentoftheArmy(note188).

190

USDepartmentoftheArmy(note188).

191

LiptonandLichtblau(note178).

192

Bamford,J.,‘Thisspyforrent’,NewYorkTimes,13June2004.

THE WAR ON TER R OR IS M

AND S EC UR ITY P R IVATIZATION 41

Interestingly,however,privatesectoractivityintheareaofintelligencegather-

ingalsoprovidespositiveopportunitiesinthecontextofriskmanagement.With
limitedresourcesandademonstratedlackofcompetenceinforeignlanguages,the
intelligenceworldneedstoquicklyfindwaysofboostingcapacity.Privateactors
ingeneral(includingcompaniesnotinthebusinessofsecurity)operatinginpoliti-
callysensitiveorunstableareasoftenpossessawealthofinformationaboutlocal
conditionsandeventsonthegroundwhichcouldbeveryusefulforgovernments.
Asitstands,theprivateintelligencesectoroperateslargelyinavacuum,withthe
associatedrisksbothofintelligencemisuseandofintelligencenotreachingrele-
vantparties.Anew,clearstructureforpublic–privateinteractioninthisfieldwould
beneededtodrawoutthispotentialinawaythatavoidsoroffsetstheproblems
mentionedabove.

193

Innovationintermsofpublic–privatepartnershipmodelswas

madeapriorityfortheUnitedStatesinthe2001QDRbutsofarhasyieldedlittle
practicalresult.Oneinteresting,butlargelyuntried,initiativeinthisrespectisthe
US Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), whose purported purpose is to
‘closethe“seams”inintelligenceanalysis’.

194

Ifintelligenceisnotproperlyintegratedorfallsintothewronghands,theeffects

willbehugelydetrimentaltosecurity.ThecasefordrawingPSCsintoaclearer
andmorerobuststructureofsecuritygovernancedemandsthattheiruseiscon-
ductedinanopen,transparentwayandthatproperaccountabilityisensured.Each
decisiononpossibleoutsourcingshouldcarefullybalancethepotentialvalueadded
byusingPSCsagainsttheriskofvaluebeinglost.Asonecommentatorpointed
out,‘justbecausewecanprivatisedoesn’tmeanweshould’.

195

193

Black(note171).

194

Chaffin,J.,‘USturnstoprivatesectorforspies’,FinancialTimes,17May2004.

195

Singer(note2),p.242.

5.International,regionalandnational

responses

Somecriticsoftheprovisionofsecuritybyprivatefirmshavearguedthatregulat-
ingtheindustrywouldconferunduelegitimacyonwhatareinherentlyillegitimate
actors.

196

ThesecriticsadvocateatotalbanonPSCsandtherenationalizationof

securityandmilitaryserviceprovision.Theextentofthedemandforandsupplyof
privatesecurityservicesaroundtheworldindicates,however,thatabanisunreal-
istic:itwouldbeimpossibletoenforceand,importantly,wouldworkagainstthe
aimofgreatertransparencyandaccountabilityinthesecuritysectorbyincreasing
thelikelihoodthattheindustrywouldbepushedunderground.Furthermore,most
would agree that, even if it were practically possible, entirely banning PSCs is
undesirable. The establishment of a global private security industry is a fait
accompliandtoeschewanyengagementwithitwouldmeanthewasteofapoten-
tiallyusefulresource.

Attheotherendofthespectrum,afewcommentatorshavearguedthatthemar-

ket’sinvisiblehandwillultimatelyensureaninformalpunishmentof‘bad’private
securitybehaviourandthatforthisreasonregulationisunnecessary.Thislineof
argumentisequallyuntenable:theputativemagicofthemarkethassofarnotbeen
sufficienttodiscourageroguebehaviourbyindividualfirmsand,evenifitwere,
thismarketwouldnotbecapableofaddressingthewiderquestionsofaccountabil-
ityoutlinedabove.

197

Realistic responses to the growth of the private security industry need to be

foundatintermediatelevels.ThepushforregulationofPSCactivityhasacceler-
atedwiththewarinIraq.Theinternationalcommunityshouldthereforeseizethe
opportunitytocapitalizeonthismomentum.

198

Issues,interestsandoptions

Theeffectsofrelianceontheprivatesecuritysectordependonthenatureofthe
statethatcontractsPSCsandthestrategicenvironmentinwhichtheyareused.If
PSCsaretobeconstructivelyengagedinabroadersystemofsecuritygovernance
bystateandnon-stateactors,threemainissuesneedtobeaddressed.First,thereis

196

TheviewwasexpressedinedsMusahandFayemi(note11),whereitwasarguedthatPSCs

stemmeddirectlyfromold-stylemercenariesandhavenoplaceinconflictmanagementandpeace-
building. See also Adejumbi, S., ‘A view from Africa’, eds Bailes and Frommelt (note34),
pp.242–53.

197

Nossal, K. R., ‘Global governance and national interests: Regulating transnational secur-

itycorporations in the post-cold war era’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol.2,no.2
(2001),p.459.

198

Evans, S., ‘Privatised wars “need new laws”’, BBC News Online, 10 May 2004, URL

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3699957.stm>;andLovell,J.,‘Iraqmakesitaboomtimefor
former dogs of war’, Reuters, 22Sep. 2004, URL <http://in.news.yahoo.com/0409222/137/
2g71g.html>.

INTER NATIONAL

R EGIONAL

NATIONAL R ES P ONS ES 43

thequestionofaccountability.Withoutlegalaccountabilityofindividualcontrac-
tors, the use of PSCs will continue to be viewed with suspicion. Second is the
widerquestionoflegitimacy.IfPSCsaretotakeanactivepartintheconstruction
ofsecuritygovernance,theyneedtobeviewedaslegitimateactorsbyotherstate
andnon-stateactors,aswellasbythepeoplewhoaretheultimateobjectsofthe
systemsandservicessupplied.Morethanjusttheoreticallegalaccountabilityis
neededtoensurethatappropriatePSCactionisperceivedaslegitimate—whether
throughthesanctioningofoperationsbystatesorbyotheractors.Thelegitimacy
ofPSCswillalsodependonhavingadequatelevelsoftransparencyanddemocratic
standards in terms of the companies’ operations, finances and conduct. Third,
practicalimpedimentstoeffectivePSCactionneedtobeaddressed,andsystems
forpublic–privateinteractionontheinternationallevelneedtobedeveloped.This
willrequirePSCsincreasinglytoworkwithstates,ratherthanattheexpenseof
states,aswellasinconcertwithotheractorssuchasinternationalandregional
organizations,NGOsandothernon-stateactors.

Avarietyofinterestsmustbebalancedinorderforprivatesecurityusetobe

botheffectiveandequitable.

199

Firstandforemost,theinterestsofthe‘hoststate’

(thestatewherePSCsoperate)anditspopulationmustbetakenintoaccount.This
appliesparticularlytoweakstates,wherePSCsarelikelytobeoperatingunder
contractsfromexternalactors.Second,the‘homestate’(thestateoforiginofa
particularcompany)needstohaveinfluenceoverwhere,howandforwhomaPSC
operates.Third,industryactorsthemselvesneedtoseethebenefitofregulatoryand
legislative measures guiding their use as a means of ensuring that good PSC
behaviourisrewardedandrogueconductpenalized.

200

Onlybytakingintoaccount

theinterestsofallpartiescanregulationhavebothpracticalandnormativeeffect.

Twomaintypesofresponsetotheprivatizationofsecurityareconceivable:legal

andregulatory.Boththeseframeworksare,intheoryatleast,amenabletooperat-
ingatthreedifferentlevels:national,regionalandinternational.Legalframeworks
areadvantageousgiventheircapacityforretribution.Inaddition,legalframeworks
havebeenshowntohaveadeterrenteffect.

201

Regulatoryframeworks,incontrast,

havesofarbeenlargelynon-enforceableandcanbesaidtobeprimarilypreven-
tive,takinganinclusiveapproachtotheindustryandencouraginggoodpractice
generally.

202

InformulatingresponsestoPSCactivity,considerationneedstobe

giventothecontinuumbetween‘hard’versus‘soft’lawandthedevelopmentof
normsandcodesinrelationtomultinationalcorporationsmorebroadly.

203

Differ-

199

Lilly,D.,‘GreenPapersubmission:privatemilitarycompanies:optionsforregulation’,Inter-

nationalAlert,July2002,p.3,availableatURL<http://www.international-alert.org/publications>.

200

Thisisalludedtoin,e.g.,Kinsey,C.,‘Regulationandcontrolofprivatemilitarycompanies:

thelegislativedimension’,ContemporarySecurityPolicy(forthcoming2005).

201

Akhavan,P.‘Beyondimpunity:caninternationalcriminaljusticepreventfutureatrocities’,

AmericanJournalofLaw,vol.95,no.1(2001).

202

UNSecurityCouncilResolution1540,28Apr.2004,onthenon-proliferationofweaponsof

mass destruction, indicates an important new direction here. For the resolution see URL
<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

203

Vagts,D.F.,‘TheUNnormsfortransnationalcorporations’,LeidenJournalofInternational

Law,vol.16(2003),pp.800–802;andChinkin,C.,‘Normativedevelopmentintheinternationallegal

44P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

entresponsemeasureswilltargettheprivatizationofsecurityfromdifferentdirec-
tions—fromthetargetingofthecompaniesthemselvesandtheiremployees,tothat
ofprospectiveoractualclientsofcompanies.Thesetwostrandsarenecessarily
complementary: companies need to behave according to certain standards, but
considerationmustalsobegiventothecircumstancesandconditionsunderwhich
PSCsshouldbecontracted.Thefragmentednatureoftheindustryandthediversity
ofitsclientsmakeitisunlikelythatanyoneinstrumentwillcaptureallactivitiesof
theprivatesecuritysector.Acombinationofmutuallyreinforcingincentivemech-
anismscouldprovideanetworkofoverlappingstructuresofregulationthatstand
somechanceofcapturingalargepartofprivatesecurityandmilitaryservicepro-
vision.

Theinadequacyofinternationallegalinstruments

Thebenefitsofaddressingtheprivatizationofsecurityattheinternationallevelare
clear,giventhetransnationalnatureofcompaniesthemselves,theirfieldsofopera-
tion,theidentityofclientsandtheeffectsofsecurityprivatization.Themostfre-
quentlycitedinternationallegaldocumentsintheliteratureonprivatesecurityare
theUNandOAU/AUconventionsonmercenaryactivity.

204

Neitherconventionis

ultimately applicable to the activities of contemporary PSCs, even where PSCs
havebeenhiredforcombatservicesinthecontextofarmedconflict.

205

Thelackof

practical applicability of the International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use,FinancingandTrainingofMercenaries is reflected in the fact that it took
12yearsforittoberatifiedbytherequiredminimumof22countriesandtoenter
intoforce.NoneofthemajorWesternpowersaresignatories.

Amendingthesetwoconventionsbyredefining‘mercenaries’toincludeprivate

contractorsisunlikelytobeparticularlyeffectiveinmitigatingthewiderconse-
quencesofprivatesecurityprovision.

206

First,thereareinherentdefinitionalprob-

lems.Thedistinctionbetween‘combat’and‘non-combat’tasksistenuous,anda
banonclear-cut‘mercenary’activitymightbeseenasnotonlyinconsistentbut
alsohypocriticalsinceitwouldleaveunaddressedsuchtasksastraining,strategic
adviceandoperationalsupport—allofwhicharecentraltomilitarymissionsand
canbeinstrumentalintheoutcomeofconflict.

207

Furthermore,directparticipation

systemincommitmentandcompliance:theroleofnon-bindingnorms’ed.D.Shelton,Commitment
andCompliance:TheRoleofNon-BindingNormsintheInternationalLegalSystem(OxfordUniver-
sityPress:Oxford,2003).

204

Seechapter1andnote15.

205

Singer(note16),pp.530–32.

206

TheAUisreportedlyconsideringthepossibilityofupdatingtheConventionfortheElimination

ofMercenarisminAfrica(seenote15)tomakeitmorerelevanttopresent-daycircumstances.How-
ever,therehavebeennoresultssofar.Boshoff,H.,InstituteforSecurityStudies,Pretoria,South
Africa,Personalconversationwiththeauthor,Nov.2004.

207

ThedefinitionalproblemsarealsoconsideredinBritishForeignandCommonwealthOffice

(FCO), ‘Annex A: Mercenaries: Africa’s experience 1950s–1990s’, PrivateMilitaryCompanies:
Options for Regulation, HC577 (Stationery Office: London, Feb. 2002), URL <http://www.fco.
gov.uk/Files/KFile/mercenaries,0.pdf>,p.23.Furthermore,theDiplockCommittee,inits1976report

INTER NATIONAL

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incombatortheeffectivereplacementofregulartroopswithPSCsisnowcom-
parativelyrareandsuchabanwouldaddressonlyaverysmallsegmentofprivate
securityactivity.Second,agreementbetweenstatesonamendinginternationalleg-
islationisslow,asindicatedbytheslowpaceofratificationoftheexistingInter-
nationalConvention.Third,evenwhenenacted,internationallegislationisnotori-
ouslydifficulttoenforce.

Althoughitispossibletotryindividualcontractorswhohavetransgressedinter-

nationalhumanitarianorhumanrightslawininternationalcourtssuchastheInter-
nationalCriminalCourt(ICC),effectiveresponsestoprivatesecuritycompanies
must also be directed at the company level.

208

Some scholars have suggested

wideningthescopeforprosecutingcorporateentitiesininternationalcourts,but
thisissofaruntried.

209

ThefailuretoestablishthepreciselegalstatusofPSCsininternationallaw,as

well as the meagre prospects for fruitfully amending (and implementing) inter-
nationallegaldefinitions,makesnationallegislationamoreeffectivemeansinthe
near term. However, instruments that are regulatory rather than legally binding
shouldalsobeconsideredattheinternationallevel.

UNapproachestoprivatesecuritycompaniesandprospectsforan
internationalregulatorybody

TheUnitedNationsistheprimaryactorresponsibleforthemaintenanceofinter-
nationalpeaceandsecurity.AclearUNstanceontheissueofPSCsandtheircon-
ductwouldcarryimportantnormativeweight,evenifitwouldnotcarrytheforce
oflaw.Asthehighestinternationalauthority,theUN’sroleasapromoterofnorms
cannotbeoverstated.Moreover,theorganizationhasaclearneedtorespondtothe
newrealityandextentofinternationalprivatesecurity.

Asastartingpoint,theUNcouldaddresstheissueofitsownuseofPSCs.As

pointedoutabove,theUNhasmadeextensiveuseofPSCsinsupportofpeace
operations,andthisPolicyPaperarguesthatsuchusebyalegitimateinternational
organizationmaybeoneofthemostfruitfulwaysofcapitalizingonprivatesector
resources.

210

However,thesignificanceofaccountabilityandlegitimacystandards

inpeaceoperationsrunsbothways:justasthegeneralpoliticallegitimacyofUN
effortsconferslegitimacyonprivatesecurityactors,alackofPSCaccountability
mayreflectbadlyontheUNitself.

followingtheinvolvementofBritishmercenariesinAngola,tooktheviewthatablanketbanon
privatemilitaryactivityabroadwouldbean‘unwarrantedinterferencewithindividualliberty’.British
FCO(note232),p.23;andSinger(note16),p.532.

208

On developments in the ICC see Wiharta, S., ‘Post-conflict justice: developments in inter-

nationalcourts’,SIPRIYearbook2004(note61),pp.191–206.

209

See,e.g.,Kamminga,M.T.andZia-Zarifi,S.(eds.),LiabilityofMultinationalCorporations

underInternationalLaw(KluwerLawInternational:TheHague,2000).

210

Thisisnottosuggestanyreplacementofnationaltroopsforpeaceoperations,whichisboth

undesirableandhighlyunlikely.Lilly(note199),p.7.

46P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

TheUNneedstodevelopandmakepublicstandardsforPSCswhichtheymust

observe in order to qualify for contracts with the organization. PSC support of
peaceoperationsneedstobemadeopenandtransparent.Afirststepwouldbeto
maintainapubliclyaccessiblelistofcompaniescontractedbytheUN,specifying
theirtasksandmandates,‘rulesofengagement’,contractsizeandareaofdeploy-
ment.Thiswouldpermitpublicscrutinyofcompaniesengagedinsupportofpeace
operationsandwouldchallengethegeneralacceptanceof‘clientconfidentiality’
thatcurrentlyprevailswithintheindustryandwhichblocksdiscussionofcompany
conductandoperation.Standardsforcontractingcompaniesshouldbeconsidered
carefullybutshouldataminimumincludecompliancewithinternationalhumani-
tarianlaw,unconditionalrespectforhumanrights,theensuringoftransparencyand
accountabilityofindividualcontractors,sufficientvettingandtrainingofstaff,and
the exclusive use of companies with established track records in these regards.
ContractingofPSCsinconjunctionwithpeaceoperationscouldthusprovideafirst
avenue for drawing private security actors closer into a system of international
securitygovernancepremisedoninter-sectoralcriteriaforlegitimacy.

AUNreviewofthePSCsusedforinternationalpeaceoperationscouldalsobe

seenasabasisfordevelopinginternationalregulationofPSCswhentheyarecon-
tractedbypartiesotherthantheUNitself.

211

Suggestionshavebeenmadefora

regulatorybodyforinternationalcontractingofprivatesecurityservicestobeset
upeitherundertheauspicesoftheUNSecretary-General’sSpecialRapporteuron
Mercenarism

212

orunderaseparatebody,replacingtheroleoftheSpecialRappor-

teurratherthanenhancingit.AbodysetupundertheUNcouldkeeparegisterof
PSCsthatconformtoagreedstandardsofoperationandthereby‘accredit’such
companieswithacertaindegreeoflegitimacy,thusallowinginternationalstateand
non-stateclientstomakeabetter-informedchoiceamongsuppliersbeforecon-
tracting.AnotherpossibilitywouldbefortheUNtoactinanauditcapacityby,for
example,sendingindependentagentstoverifythestandardsofconductofindivid-
ualcompaniesandcontracts.However,thisislikelytobecostly,itwouldrunup
againstdifferencesinthegenerallegalenvironmentforcompanyregulationindif-
ferentjurisdictions,anditwouldbereliantonstateactionforenforcementinthe
caseofrevealedabuses.

Self-regulation:theindustryanditsinternationalnon-stateclients

Anotherpotentialwayofregulatingtheoperationoftheprivatesecurityindustryat
theinternationallevelmightbethroughinternationalvoluntaryagreements.Such
mechanismswouldnotcarrytheforceoflaw,andcompliancewouldessentiallybe
voluntary;theycouldbetargetedateithertheindustryitselforatclientsofthe
industry.

211

Milliard(note4);andSinger(note16),pp.545–47.

212

Singer(note16),p.545.

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Self-regulationoftheprivatesecurityindustrywouldentailtheformulationof

codesofconduct,settingstandardstowhichcompanieswouldhavetoconformin
carrying out contracts. Clients would then be able to make an informed choice
aboutthegeneralconductandbehaviourofaspecificcompanybeforedecidingon
whetherornottohireitforthedeliveryofaparticularservice.

213

Industrymembersthemselvescould,inaconcertedeffort,drawupsuchcodesof

conduct.TheparticipationofindividualPSCsinthisprocesscouldbemotivatedby
suchfactorsasprestigeandreputationconcernsaswellas‘peerpressure’within
theindustry.SuchaninitiativehasbeentakenbytheIPOA,whichcurrentlyhasa
membership of 12PSCs. The draft IPOA Principles of Conduct, while vague,
addresssomeofthemostimportantissuesofPSCactionsuchasstandardsregard-
ing human rights, transparency, accountability, acceptable clients, safety and
employee protection, rules of engagement, arms control (weapons only to be
obtained legally), and the health and quality of employees. Furthermore, the
organizationhasdrafted‘minimumstandardsandtrainingrequirementsforprivate
securityprofessionals’.

214

AlthoughthedraftIPOAPrinciplesneedtobesubjectto

muchwiderdebateaswellasconsiderablerefinement,theyarecommendableasa
firststeptowardsself-regulationoftheindustry.Specificattentionmustbegivento
theriskofPSCscontributingtothespreadofarms;thesensitivitiesofparticular
areasofoperations;andthedefinitionofacceptableclients(currentlydefinedinthe
IPOA draft as ‘legitimate, recognised governments, international organisations,
NGOsandlawfulprivatecompanies’).

Forcompaniestobemotivatedtoparticipateinvoluntaryself-regulation,the

normativestandingconveyedbytheschememustbeconsiderable.Theendorse-
mentofvoluntarycodesforprivatesecurityindustrybehaviourbyactorsexternal
to the industry itself is likely to increase the prestige associated with company
compliance.ThisisoneofthemostimportantshortcomingsoftheIPOAPrin-
ciples:unlesstheyaresanctionedbystatesorinternationalorganizations,theyare
likelytobeaveryweakinstrument.

215

Itisworthnotingthatafewcompanieshave

drawnupcodesofconductorcodesofethics,buttheyareoftenunhelpfullyvague
andsufferfrombeingdirectedattheindividualcompanyratherthantheindustry
level.

A more comprehensive way of approaching self-regulation of the private

securityindustryisthroughmodelsthattargetindustryactorsbutarebindingatthe
statelevel,suchastheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment
(OECD)GuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises(generaltoallcorporateactors)

213

Thiswouldmeananinstrumentakintotheenvironmentalcertificationschemedrawnupunder

theInternationalOrganizationforStandardization(ISO).

214

The IPOA membership, Principles of Conduct and Standards are all available at URL

<ipoaonline-iraq.org/>.

215

Inthisrespect,self-regulationwithinaframeworksuchastheUNGlobalCompact(whichalso

stipulatesstandardsforcorporatebehaviourbutisdrawnupbyactorsexternaltotheindustryitself)is
likelytobemoreeffectiveinconferringlegitimacyontheIPOAPrinciplesandtherebyencouraging
compliance.TheGlobalCompacthasnotsofarexplicitlydealtwithitsmembers’responsibilitiesin
thesecurityfield,eitherwhendirectlycarryingoutsecuritytasksorthroughindirectimpact.Seethe
GlobalCompactInternetsiteatURL<http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm>.

48P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

andtheKimberleyCertificationProcess(dealingspecificallywithoneindustry,in
this case the international trade in rough diamonds).

216

Regulating the private

securityindustrythroughthevoluntarycomplianceofstatesimplementingnational
legislationorregulationwouldcarrytheadditionaladvantageofincludingmore
actorsandtherebyincreasingtheprestigegainsassociatedwithcompliance.The
KimberleyProcessisparticularlyinstructiveinthatguidelinesweredrawnupafter
severalinternationalmeetingswheregovernmentofficialsworkedtogetherwith
representativesfromtheindustryandNGOsandbecauseitissubjecttoperiodic
reviews,includingobserversfromavarietyofgroups.

217

Self-regulationcouldalsobecarriedoutbyinternationalclientsofPSCs,notably

MNCsandNGOs.Sofar,therehasonlybeenoneattemptatregulatingindustry
clients:aninitiativebytheUS,BritishandDutchgovernmentsforagreementona
setofprinciplestogoverntheuseofPSCsbyMNCsintheextractiveandenergy
sectorsunderthe2000VoluntaryPrinciplesforSecurityandHumanRights.

218

The

VoluntaryPrinciplesreceivedhigh-levelendorsement,notonlyfromgovernments
butalsofromMNCsandNGOsengagedintheprocess,andaresignificantasa
firstattemptatregulationoftheindustrybytargetingasegmentofitsclients.

219

PSCs were excluded from the process, however. The principles call for the
observanceofthe1990BasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLaw
EnforcementOfficials;

220

consultationsonandthemonitoringofprivatesecurity

providers;andthehiringonlyofcompaniesthat‘donotattempttoreplacestate
militaryandlawauthorities’.

221

However, the Voluntary Principles are weakened by the permissive language

usedtodefinethecircumstancesandconditionsforprivatesecurityusebyMNCs
andbyalackofmonitoringmechanisms.

222

TheeffectsoftheVoluntaryPrinciples

have not been chartered, and the conspicuous infrequency with which they are
mentionedintheliteratureonprivatesecurityregulationindicatesboththatthey
havesofarhadafeebleimpactandthegenerallycompartmentalizednatureofthe

216

FortheOECDGuidelinesseeURL<http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34889_

1_1_1_1_1,00.html. On the Kimberley Process see URL <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:
8080/site/?name=home>.

217

Bone,A.,‘Conflictdiamonds:theDeBeersGroupandtheKimberleyProcess’,edsBailesand

Frommelt(note34),pp.129–39,explicitlyadvocateswideruseofthismethod.SeealsoLeBillion,
P.,‘Internationalinstrumentsofenforcement’,GovernanceofNaturalResourcesRevenuesProject,
Paperno.5,UniversityofBritishColumbia(unpublished,n.d.),pp.37–38.

218

VoluntaryPrinciplesonSecurityandHumanRights,StatementbytheGovernmentsofthe

United States of America and the United Kingdom, 2000, URL <http://www.state.gov/www/
global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_principles.html>.

219

Gagnon,G.,Macklin,A.andSimons,P.,DeconstructingEngagement:CorporateSelf-Regula-

tioninConflictZones:ImplicationsforHumanRightsandCanadianPublicPolicy,Universityof
Toronto, Public Law Research Paper no. 04-07, Jan. 2003, p. 81, URL <http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557002>.

220

TheBasicPrinciples,adoptedbytheEighthUnitedNationsCongressonthePreventionof

CrimeandtheTreatmentofOffenders,Havana,Cuba,27Aug.–7Sep.1990,areavailableatURL
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp43.htm>.

221

Lilly(note199),p.13.SeealsoMaze,K.,‘Regulatingtheprivatesecurityindustry:zonesof

accountability’,Unpublishedthesis,McGillUniversity,Montreal,Canada,2003,p.30.

222

Maze(note221).

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debate. However, if sharpened, refined and picked up by a wider audience, the
VoluntaryPrincipleswouldprovideagoodmeansforaddressingtheuseofPSCs
byaspecificsegmentofusers—multinationalcorporations.BoththeNorwegian
Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science and the International Peace Academy
have suggested that the Voluntary Principles should be included as a standing
clauseincontractswithPSCs.

223

Afinalvariantofself-regulationoftheprivatesecurityindustrywouldbethe

designofcodesforthehumanitarianaidsectorinthehiringofPSCsbyNGOs.
AlthoughtherehasbeenareluctanceonthepartofNGOsandthehumanitarianaid
communitytobeinvolvedintheissueofprivatesecurity,manyactorsarenow
wakinguptoit,andsomeofthestigmathathassurroundedthedebatehasworn
off.

224

Forexample,theICRChasindicatedthatitwantstoengagewiththeprivate

sectortoensurethatacceptablehumanitarianstandardsaremet.

225

International

Alert has suggested setting up an information-sharing database between
humanitarianaidagenciestoinformtheirchoiceofPSCsforprotection.

226

Two

networkforumsweresuggested:theUSInterActionSecurityWorkingGroup;and
theHumanitarianSecurityandProtectionNetwork(HSPN)hostedbyVOICEin
Europe.

227

Sofar,however,thereappearstohavebeenlittlepracticalprogress.

Costsandbenefitsofself-regulation

Thevariousmechanismsandbodiesthroughwhichself-regulationcouldbecon-
ceivedshouldnotbeseenasmutuallyexclusive.Therewouldbevirtueinestab-
lishing overlapping forms of regulation, targeting the proliferation of the inter-
nationalprivatesecurityindustryfromdifferentdirections:thebehaviourofPSCs
themselves;andthechoicesmadeandconditionsimposedbyinternational,non-
stateandgovernmentalcustomersofsecurityservices.However,suchmechanisms
shouldbemutuallyreinforcingratherthanconflictingorduplicating,sothatdiffer-
entregimescanworktowardsabroadinternationalconsensusontheuseandoper-
ationofprivatesecurityactors.

Thereareclearupsidestoself-regulation,whethertargetedatPSCsdirectlyor

throughtheirclients.Underidealcircumstances,self-regulationwouldmeanthat
PSCsthatdonotconformtotheacceptedbehaviourwouldeventuallygooutof
businessandthatclientsofPSCswhohiredisreputablefirms,ininappropriatecir-
cumstances, would be shunned internationally. Although self-regulation leaves

223

Spear(note50),p.54.

224

NGOshavebeenreluctanttoengagewiththisissueinasystematicwaybecausetheyshun

associationwiththeuseofweaponryingeneral,whichstrikesatthenormativedistinctiontheysee
betweenthemselvesandotheractors.Vauxetal.(note88),p.27.

225

InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),‘TheICRCtoexpandcontactswithprivate

militaryandsecuritycompanies’,Pressrelease,4Aug.2004.

226

Vauxetal.(note88),p19.

227

InternationalAlertandFeinsteinInternationalFamineCenter,TuftsUniversity,ThePoliticisa-

tionofHumanitarianActionandStaffSecurity:TheUseofPrivateSecurityCompaniesbyHumani-
tarianAgencies,InternationalWorkshopSummaryReport(TuftsUniversity:Boston,Mass.,Apr.
2001),p.5,URL<http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/Tuftrep.pdf>.

50P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

legalaccountabilityaside,itmayservetoincreasethelegitimacy of PSCs and
thereby serve to draw them into an emerging web of international governance
withinthesecuritysector.

However,focusingontheconductofNGOsandMNCsinthehiringofprivate

security actors or on PSCs themselves can arguably be seen as accepting the
growing marginalization of the state as the primary security actor—taking for
grantedthatnon-stateactorsontheinternationalsceneshouldhavetoprovidetheir
ownsecurityinonewayoranother.Thereareinherentlimitstothisapproachand,
likeregulationunderUNauspices,itneedsbecomplementedbystateactionand
legislation.Furthermore,itplacesahighburdenofcostforregulationontheactors
themselves.Finally,thesamegeneralconcernapplieshereaswithmanyotherself-
regulation schemes: that such instruments will become (or be perceived as) an
alternativetothedevelopmentofenforceable(legal)instruments.

Existingnationallegislation:modelsforreplication?

The reasons for addressing the issue of regulation of PSCs through national
legislationaretwofold.First,thisperspectiveaffirmsthecentralityofstateactors
within international security relations. If countries that are home to the largest
numberofPSCs,theUSAandotherWesternstates(efficientstates),takerespon-
sibility for the export of security services, this would go some way towards
ensuringtheaccountabilityofPSCoperationsalsoattheinternationallevel.As
indicated,PSCsareoftenperceivedasanextensionofastate’sforeignpolicyeven
whennotoperatingundercontractwiththeirhomestate,anditisthereforeinthe
interest of the state to regulate firms operating from its territory.

228

Second,

nationallegislationstandsthebestchanceofbeingenforced.

However,withfewexceptions,nationallawsignoretheexistenceoftheprivate

securityindustry.

229

The USA and South Africa are two of the few countriesto

haveinplacenationallegislationontheindustry,andtheirmodelsthereforemerit
consideration.ThesetwocountriesareamongthebiggestproducersofPSCssoitis
perhapsnotsurprisingthattheyhavecomethefarthestinregulatingtheindustry.
TheUKinitiatedapolicydiscussionin2002withaGreenPaper

230

buthassofar

failedtofollowupwithlegislation.WhenitrecentlyemergedthataSwedishcom-
pany,DynamicSolutions,wasrecruitingandtrainingformermilitarypersonnelfor

228

Aclearexampleisthe‘armstoAfrica’affairin1997when,despiteaUNembargo,Sandline

InternationalwasfoundtohavesoldarmstotheSierraLeoneGovernment,reflectingbadlyonthe
BritishGovernment.ThenotionoftheuseofPSCsamountingto‘foreignpolicybyproxy’isdis-
cussedinSilverstein,K.,‘Privatizingwar:howaffairsofstatesareoutsourcedtocorporationsbeyond
public control’, The Nation, 28 Aug. 1997, available at URL <http://www.
mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/silver.htm>;andWhyte,D.,‘Lethalregulation:state-corporatecrimeand
the United Kingdom’s new mercenaries’, Journal of Law and Society, vol. 30, no. 4 (2003),
pp.590–91.

229

Singer(note16),p.524.Theissueofregulatingprivatesecurityandmilitaryserviceproviders

wasraisedrecentlyintheGermanBundestag,indicatingthatnewthoughtisbeginningtobegivento
theissueatthenationallevel.Krahmann,E.,Personalcommunicationwiththeauthor,25Nov.2004.

230

BritishFCO(note207).

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USandotherPSCsoperatinginIraq,expertsdifferedonthelegalstatusofsuch
activity.

231

TheUnitedStates

Under the US model, the key piece of legislation is based on the connection
between arms exports and the export of security and military services. The US
StateDepartmentissueslicencesforassistance(includingtraining)toforeignper-
sons,whetherintheUnitedStatesorabroad,intheuseofarmsunderthesame
exportguidelinesasfortheexportofarmaments.TheInternationalTrafficinArms
Regulations(ITAR)constitutethekeypieceoflegislationandrequiretheapplica-
tionforlicencesbycompaniesprovidingknowledge,servicesorgoodswithinthe
militaryrealmwiththeDepartmentofState’sOfficeofDefenseTradeControls
(ODTC).

232

Applicationsarethensubjecttoaninternalreviewinvolvingvarious

offices. Commentators generally agree that the ITAR licensing scheme is
inadequate or even idiosyncratic: contracts are administered by various depart-
mentsandofficeswithoutproceduralconsistency.

233

Intermsofoversightandcontrol,onceacontractisgranted,theprovisionsof

USlegislation(whilefullerthanmost)aremeagre.TheUSGAOprovidessome
oversight of the awarding and implementation of PSC contracts, but this is
limited.

234

Congress is notified of contracts valued at more than $50 million, a

thresholdgenerallyconsideredtoolowtoensuresufficientdemocraticaccount-
ability.Contractsarefrequentlysplituporpartiallysubcontractedtoavoidcon-
gressionaloversight.

235

AnewformofregulationwasproposedbytheUSDODandpublishedintheUS

Federal Register in March 2004.

236

It would give military commanders more

powerovercontractorsusedinconjunctionwithnationalforcedeployment.For
example,itwouldbanprivatepersonnelfromcarryingprivatelyownedweapons
unlessauthorizedbyamilitarycommander,anditwouldauthorizethecombatant
commandertoissueweaponsandammunitiontoPSCemployees.

Despiteitsomissions,theUSsystemoflicensingexportsofmilitaryandsecurity

servicesalongthesamelinesastheexportofgoodsprovidesarelevantmodelfor
nationallegislationelsewhere.Lessonsshouldbelearnedprimarilyfromtheprob-
lems of ensuring oversight once a contract is granted and from the limits to

231

Letmark,P.,‘SvenskabefälvärvassomlivvakteriIrak’[Swedishofficersrecruitedasbody-

guardsinIraq],DagensNyheter,12Dec.2004.Inparticular,concernswereraisedaboutthepolitical
consequencesofapresenceofSwedishformermilitarypersonnelinIraq,giventhatSwedendidnot
jointheUS-ledcoalitioninthewar.

232

Maze(note221),p.24;Nossal(note199),p.467;andIsenberg(note103),p.40.ITARcanbe

foundontheODTC’sInternetsiteatURL<http://www.pmdtc.org/reference.htm>.

233

Avant(note65).

234

E.g.,GeneralAccountingOffice(GAO),RebuildingIraq:FiscalYear2003ContractAward

ProceduresandManagementChallenges,GAO-04-605,URL<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?
gao-04-605>.

235

Isenberg(note101),p.11;andAvant(note65).

236

‘Contractors accompanying a force deployed’, Federal Register, vol. 69, no. 56 (23 Mar.

2004),availableatURL<http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fedreg/a040323c.html>.

52P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

accountabilitywhenaforeignclientratherthanaUSgovernmentdepartmentcon-
tractsaUSPSCdirectly.

SouthAfrica

InthewakeofthecontroversysurroundingtheoperationsofExecutiveOutcomes
in the mid-1990s, in May 1998 South Africa passed the Regulation of Foreign
MilitaryAssistance(FMA)Acttoclampdownonprivatesecurityactivity.

237

The

purpose of the act was twofold: to ban ‘mercenary activity’, defined as ‘direct
participationasacombatantinarmedconflictforprivategain’;andtoregulate
militaryassistanceabroad.Takingawidesweepattheprivatesecurityindustry,
the FMA Act stipulates that any sort of military assistance (including advice,
training, personnel, logistics, finance, operations, recruitment, procurement of
equipmentand‘anyotheractionthathastheresultoffurtheringthemilitaryinter-
estsofapartytothearmedconflict’)requirescompaniestoobtainpermissionfrom
theNationalConventionalArmsControlCommitteebeforeacceptingacontract.

238

Althoughthisrepresentsthestrictestexistingformofnationallegislationonpri-

vatesecurityserviceexports,theSouthAfricanGovernmentiscurrentlyconsider-
ingextendingtheFMAActtocoverallwar-zoneworkbyitsnationals.

239

This

wouldineffectentailabanonexportsofprivatesecurityservicestowarzones.
However,therecordforenforcementoftheexistinglegislationisextremelypoor.

Anextensionofthiskindfacesproblemsbothwithregardtotheconstitutional

rightofSouthAfricanstofreelychoosetheirtrade,occupationorprofession,and
in terms of practical enforceability.

240

Furthermore, most would agree that a

completebanonworkinwarzonesisundesirable.However,theSouthAfrican
discussionsonprivatesecurityregulationareinstructiveinthattheyrecognizethe
indivisibilityoftheprivatesecuritysectorandthefutilityofdrawingclearlines
between‘controversial’and‘non-controversial’servicesorbetween‘defensive’
and‘offensive’services.

241

Britishsuggestionsandotheroptionsfornationalcontrol

The UK does not currently have legislation that effectively covers the private
securityandmilitaryservicesector.Inrecognitionofthis,in2002theBritishGov-
ernmentpublishedaGreenPaperoutliningtheoptionsforregulatingtheindustry.
Althoughgivingrisetosubstantialdebateatthetime,includingsubmissionsfrom

237

FortheactseeURL<http://www.up.ac.za/publications/gov-acts/1998/act15.pdf>.

238

Nossal(note197),p.466.

239

Reed, J., ‘South Africa considers block on all war zone work under anti-mercenary law’,

FinancialTimes,10Sep.2004.

240

Reed(note239).

241

Isenbergrecognizesthegreyzonebetweentheformalroleof,e.g.,privatebodyguardsinIraq

andtherealitiesofoperatinginadefactocombatzone.Isenberg(note101),p.48.

INTER NATIONAL

R EGIONAL

NATIONAL R ES P ONS ES 53

variousNGOs,industrymembersandtheForeignAffairsCommittee,theGreen
Paperhassofarnotledtoanychangesinexistingnationallegislation.

242

TheGreenPapersuggestswaysinwhichregulationofBritishPSCscouldbe

addressed,includingamendingexistinglegislationbanningmilitaryactivityabroad
(andrecruitmentformilitaryactivityabroad),toincludetheactivitiesofcontempo-
raryPSCs.

243

Italsoconsidersself-regulationoftheindustry.BanningPSCsatthe

nationallevelisnotlikelytohaveanyrealeffectsincecompanieswouldsimply
shiftbasesandregisterabroad.Betweenthesetwo‘allornothing’approachesthe
GreenPapersetsoutthreedifferenttypesoflicensingschemesfortheexportof
privatesecurityservices.

244

ThereappearstobeabroadconsensusintheBritish

debatethatsomeformoflicensingschemeisbestsuitedfornationallegislationfor
PSCs.

245

Oneoptionistheintroductionofalicensingregimefortheexportofmilitary

serviceswherebyactivitiesforwhichlicenceswererequiredwouldbedefinedin
legislationandcriteriafortheexportofserviceswouldbeestablishedalongthe
samelinesasforthoseforexportsofarms.

246

Thiswouldmeanasystemwithclose

affinitiestothelicensingregimeoperatingintheUSA.Asecondoptionoutlinedis
legislationrequiringBritishcompanieswhichwanttotakeupcontractsabroadto
registerandnotifythegovernmentofcontractsforwhichtheywerebidding.This
would mean a less intrusive intervention by the state in the functioning of the
industry:thegovernmentwouldonlyintervenetopreventBritishPSCsfromtaking
upcontractsthatruncountertoBritishinterestsorforeignpolicy.

247

Athirdoption

suggestedintheGreenPaperforthelicensingofBritishPSCssuggestedthecre-
ation of a general licence for companies themselves. Rather than considering
privatesecurityprovisiononthebasisofindividualcontracts,companieswould
applyforagenerallicencetoprovidealistofspecifiedactivitiesundersubsequent
contracts.Thisoptionisanalogoustotheabove-mentionedUSIDIQcontractsand
posesthesameprimafacieproblems.

OfthethreelicensingoptionssuggestedintheGreenPaper,thefirstislikelyto

haveboththegreatesteffectivenessandthewidestpurchase.Basingregulationon
the export of military and security services on models governing the export of
armamentscapitalizesonexistingmechanisms,understandingandexperience(e.g.,
regardinglikelyeffectsinthereceivingcountryorproblemsofend-userdefinition)
andallowsforcontract-by-contractassessment.Importantly,suchaschemewould
takeintoaccountthefactthattheimpactofprivatesecurityservicesvarieswiththe
contextinwhichitisused.AlthoughmanyoftheprovisionsgoverningtheBritish
Government’sguidelinesapplydirectlytoPSCservicelicensing(e.g.,relatingto

242

BritishFCO(note207).Therehave,however,beenadhocdecisions,e.g.,thedecisionbythe

BritishGovernmentinOct.2003tograntpermissionfortheexportofsub-machinegunsandpistols
fortheusebyprivatesecurityfirmsinIraq.Isenberg(note103),p.48.

243

SeeBritishFCO(note207),pp.22–23.

244

BritishFCO(note207),pp.24–26.

245

Kinsey(note200),p.13.

246

BritishFCO(note207),p.24.

247

BritishFCO(note207),p.25.

54P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

embargoeddestinationsandrespectforhumanrights),additionalconcernsabout
theparticularcircumstancesinwhichPSCoperationmightbeappropriatewould
alsohavetobeaddressed.

Alloftheaboveoptionsfacesignificantproblemsintermsofoversightandcon-

trol,inmuchthesamewayastheregulatorysystemsthatareinplaceintheUSA
andSouthAfrica.Thequestionofmonitoringwouldalsohavetobeaddressedat
thenationallevel,whichislikelytobebothcostlyandcumbersome.

248

TheUS

GAOisinauniquepositionintermsofitsavailableresources,buteventhisbody
haslimitedcapacitiesandtendstofocusonthelargestcontracts.

Nevertheless,adecisiontakenbytheBritishGovernmentontheissueoflegisla-

tionislikelytobeinfluentialasthefirstsystematicengagementwiththeissueon
thepartofaEuropeangovernment.Itcouldactasaprecedentfordeliberationsin
otherEuropeancountriesandintheinstitutionalcontextoftheEuropeanUnion
(see below). In an analogy to the linkage between export controls on arms and
controlsonsecurityandmilitaryservices,oneanalysthasalsoproposedthatexist-
inglawsonprivatepolicing(regulatingthedomesticuseofprivatesecuritycom-
panies) could be extended to cover the export of these same services.

249

This

approachhasmeritinthatitalsodrawsonexistinglegislationandwouldbepar-
ticularly informative when it comes to standards for the vetting and training of
staff.However,theissuesraisedbytheinternationaluseofPSCs,particularlyby
clientsotherthanthehomestate,areconsiderablymorecomplex:privatepolicing
lawsalonecouldonlyprovideaverythinbaselineforlegislationgoverningthe
conductandimpactofinternationalPSCsandtheirwiderangeofactivities.

Shortcomingsofnationallegislation

Legislationonprivatesecurityactivityatthenationallevelisundoubtedlythemost
effectiveandmosteasilyenforced,butitisinsufficienttoaddressprivatesecurity
activityforthreemainreasons:(a)becauseoftheabilityofPSCstoadaptinorder
tocircumventorevadelegislation;(b)becauseoftheproblemofextraterritorial
enforcement;and(c)becauseofthelackofadequatemechanismsforoversightof
companiesoperatingabroad.

250

Thecompanies’transnationalnatureandoperations

meanthattheyareabletoshiftlocationtoastatewithlessornocontrolovertheir
activitieswith relative ease. Indeed, Sandline International was registered in
Bahamas,allowingthecompanytobenefitfromtaxadvantagesaswellastoevade
existingBritishlegislationandpublicscrutiny.

248

Krahmann,E.,Conversationwiththeauthor,25Nov.2004.

249

Krahmann,E.,‘Regulatingtheprivatesecuritysector:whatrolefortheEU?’,Contemporary

SecurityPolicy,vol.26,no.1(forthcoming2005).TheestablishmentoftheSecurityIndustryAuthor-
ity(SIA)intheUKinApr.2003providesaninterestingcasestudyinthisrespect.TheSIAwasset
uptomanagethelicensingofthedomesticprivatesecurityindustryinEnglandandWalesandto
promoteprofessionalismandspreadbestpracticeintheindustry.SeetheSIAInternetsiteatURL
<http://www.the-sia.gov.uk>.

250

Singer(note16),pp.535–36.

INTER NATIONAL

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NATIONAL R ES P ONS ES 55

Furthermore,aninherentproblemwithregulatingtheindustryfromanexporter’s

perspectiveisthedifficultyofensuringthatsufficientaccountistakenoftheeffect
oftheservicesontherecipientor‘host’state.Thiswillrequireintimateknowledge
of,andsensitivityto,localconditions.Asanecessary,butnotonitsownsufficient,
measure,nationallegislationneedstobecomplementedbyothermeasures,suchas
self-regulation along the lines described above. Another way of addressing the
inherently limited reach of national legislation is through the harmonization of
nationallawsattheregionallevel,effectivelycreatingaprivatesecurity‘regime’
fornationsthatshareasinglemarketforthedevelopmentofprivatesectoractivity
in general or have common policies and activity plans in the field of external
security.

Regulationattheregionallevel

Short of a global enforceable regime covering the activities of private security
companies,regulationbyandthroughregionalorganizationscanofferwiderscope
andpurchasethanregulationatthenationallevelalone.Tworegionalorganiza-
tionsstandoutinthisrespect:theAfricanUnionandtheEuropeanUnion.

TheAUcouldprovideausefulframeworkforrespondingtothedevelopmentof

theinternationalprivatesecurityindustryforanumberofreasons.First,thesheer
extent of PSC activity in Africa makes the issue impossible to ignore. Second,
muchPSCdeploymentinAfricatakesplaceundercontractswithexternalactors
suchasforeigngovernmentsorMNCs.TheAUneedstoworkinthiscontextto
safeguardtheinterestsoftheweakstateinthefaceofPSCproliferation.Thisis
especially important given the extensive use of PSCs within the framework of
securitysectorreform,anaimwhichisendorsedbytheAU.Third,forthesame
reasonsasindicatedwithrespecttoPSCuseinsupportofUNpeaceoperations,the
AUneedstoreviewitsownuseofPSCswhenorganizingpeacemissions.

TheAUcurrentlyhasalimitedinstitutionalcapacitytoaddresstheuseofPSCs.

However,afirststepwouldbetoworkwiththeinternationalcommunityindraw-
ingupminimumstandardsforPSCstobeconsideredforcontractswiththeAU
itselfandpossiblywithsub-regionalactorstowhichitdelegatestasks(alongthe
linesdescribedabove.DeliberationswithintheAUwouldprovidethenecessary
‘weakstate’perspectiveand,eventhoughsuchregulatorymechanismswouldnot
carrylegalforce,theywouldbeendowedwithadditionallegitimacyifapprovedby
Africanstatesorsub-regionalgroups.ThePeerReviewMechanismestablished
undertheNewPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment(NEPAD)isanotherforumin
whichtheuseofPSCsonthecontinentshouldbediscussed.

251

AlthoughthePeer

ReviewMechanismisvoluntary,largelyuntriedandnotlikelytobecomeparticu-
larlyeffectiveintheimmediatefuture,itcouldprovideasuitableforumfortheair-
ingofexperiencesandconcernsandlaythegroundworkforfurtherinternational
debate.

251

Williams(note61).

56P R IVATE S EC UR ITY C OMP ANIES

Bycomparisonwithotherregionalbodies,theEuropeanUnion(EU)hasavery

stronginstitutionalcapacity.Forthisreason,besidesthepresenceoftheUKand
otherlesserEuropeanPSCproviderswithintheEU’smembership,addressingthe
questionofPSCregulationinanEUcontextprovidesaninterestingavenue.

252

The

EU’suniqueintegrativemodelmakestheregulationofitsmembers’economies
andgovernancesystems,notexcludingprivatesectorelements,apartofitscore
competence. EU enlargement and the increasing emphasis placed on the EU’s
externalpolicyandcrisis-managementoperations,interaliaindirectsupportofthe
UNandinpartnershipwithotherregionalgroups,indicatethattheEUhasbothan
incentive and imperative to address the issue. If the EU could successfully
implementaregulatoryschemeforPSCservicesemanatingfromitsterritory,this
wouldaddressalargeportionoftheinternationalprivatesecurityindustrythatis
currentlynotcoveredundereithernationalorinternationallegislation,aswellas
settingausefulprecedentforregulationofPSCactivityelsewhere.

Althoughthetradeinsecurity-relatedservicesisnotexplicitlymentionedinthe

1957TreatyEstablishingtheEuropeanCommunity(ECTreaty),thereareseveral
ways in which the EU could address the question.

253

First, following from the

discussionofnationallegislation,theEUcouldaddressPSCactivityintermsof
exportcontrols.Expandingthe1998EuropeanUnionCodeofConductonArms
Exportstoincludetheexportofsecurityandmilitaryservicesisalogicalextension
ofthediscussionofnationallegislation(andisindeedmentionedintheBritish
GreenPaper).

254

The control over arms brokering indicates that the EU already

regulatesserviceswhichoverlapwiththoseofferedbyPSCs.

255

Theexportofdual-

use goods (goods that have both civilian and military use) is also regulated to
ensure that civilian trade does not undermine the security interests of member
states;thereisnoreasonwhythisthinkingshouldnotbeextendedtoconsiderthe
export of privatesecurityservices.

256

Second,PSCactivitiescouldberegulated

separatelyundertheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP),throughJoint
Actions,CommonPositionsorDecisions,althoughsuchregulationwouldbead

252

ForthesepointstheauthorisindebtedtoKrahmann(note249).However,theEUframework

hasbeenalludedtobyafewothercommentators,e.g.,Lilly(note17).FortheapplicationoftheEU’s
multi-level and multi-sector competence to another new challenge, transnational terrorism, see
Burgess,N.andSpence,D.,‘TheEuropeanUnion:newthreatsandtheproblemofcoherence’,eds
BailesandFrommelt(note34),pp.84–102.

253

BritishFCO(note207),p.27.Article296oftheECTreatyallowsmemberstotakemeasures

necessaryfortheproductionofessentialinterestsofitssecuritybutrefersonlytotheproductionof
andtradeinarms,munitionsandwarmaterial;servicesarenotincluded.

254

ForadiscussionofrecentdevelopmentsintheEUCodeofConductandforthetextofthe

documentseeBauer,S.andBromley,M.,TheEuropeanUnionCodeofConductonArmsExports:
Improving the Annual Report, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 8 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Nov. 2004), URL
<http://editors.sipri.se/recpubs.html>.

255

ForadiscussionofEUcontrolsonarmsbrokeringseeAnthony,I.andBauer,S.,‘Transfer

controlsanddestructionprogrammes’,SIPRIYearbook2004(note61),pp.737–62;foradetaileddis-
cussionofthepossibilitiesforstrengtheningtheCodeseeSaferworld,TakingControl:TheCasefora
MoreEffectiveEuropeanUnionCodeofConductonArmsExports(Saferworld:London,Sep.2004).

256

Council Regulation (EC) no. 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of

exportsofdual-useitemsandtechnology,22June2000,OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanCommuni-
ties,L159/1(30June2000),URL<http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/111418.htm>.

INTER NATIONAL

R EGIONAL

NATIONAL R ES P ONS ES 57

hoc,temporaryandcountry-specific.

257

Third,theEUcouldaddresstheissueof

PSCs through the harmonization of national laws on privatepolicing,regulated
undertheInternalMarket.

258

Furthermore,asarguedwithregardtotheUNandtheAU,theEUneedstobe

clearaboutthecircumstancesandconditionsunderwhichitmightconsidercon-
tractingprivatesecurityservices,anditneedstoensurethatthisisdonetothe
highest standards of accountability, transparency, respect for human rights and
generalmindfulnessofthedelicatenatureofinternationalsecurityrelations.There
arelikelytobeseveralsituationsinwhichtheEUmightconsidertheuseofPSCs:
insupportofcrisismanagementorotherEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy
(ESDP)operations(wheretheissuewillariseevenifsubstantialuseistobemade
of PSCs by individual contributing nations) in the context of the delivery of
humanitarianaidininsecureareasandfortheprotectionofdiplomaticrepresenta-
tivesanddelegationsabroad.Indeed,theEUhascontractedPSCsforcloseprotec-
tionandbodyguardservices,forexample,forofficialsservingundertheEUPolice
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM).

259

Finally, any prospects for EU

legislationorextensionoftheEUCodeofConductonArmsExportsshouldbe
cross-referencedwiththemeasuresforcontrolusedintheUSA,asasteptowards
theestablishmentofaninternationalconsensusontheuseofPSCs.Moreover,they
should be discussed with the AU in the context of EU support for local
peacekeepingandsecurity-buildingprocessesinAfricaaswellaswiththeEU’s
othernationalandregionalCFSPdialogueprocessesasappropriate.

TheprospectsforregulatingPSCactivitieswithintheEUframeworkhavesofar

receivedinsufficientattention.Thisshouldberedressed:theformidablecapacityof
theEuropeanUnionaswellasitsroleasaninternationalnormpromotermakesit
wellplacedtoinstigatethecreationofamodelregional,best-practiceregime.The
regulationofPSCswithinanEUframeworkcouldbeseentounderlinetheneed
fordialogueandcoordinationbetweentheEUJusticeandHomeAffairs(JHA)
DepartmentandtheCFSPmoregenerally.

257

Krahmann(note256),pp.14–16.SeealsoAnthony,I.,‘EuropeanUnionapproachestoarms

control,non-proliferationanddisarmament’,SIPRIYearbook2001:Armaments,Disarmamentand
InternationalSecurity(OxfordUniversityPress:Oxford,2001),pp.599–614,onmechanismsofEU
decisionmaking.

258

Krahmann(note249),pp.13–14.

259

Officials of the Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Conversations with the

author,Nov.2004.

6.Conclusions:thelimitsofregulation

The starting point of this Policy Paper is a recognition of the existence of the
industryandtheimplausibilityofdoingawaywithit.Fromthispremise,itcallsfor
morecoherentanddirectedthinkingontheissueandsetsoutoptionsforregulation
asthepragmaticnextstep.

Substantiveissuesareraisedbytheuseofprivatesecurityactorsthatsimply

cannotbeaddressedthroughregulation.Eveniftheprocessesbywhichcompanies
arehiredwereformalized(e.g.,inopenandcleartenderingprocesses)andifit
were possible to regulate who hires them to operate and where, and how firms
delivertheirservices(withadequatevettingofpersonnel,humanrightsstandards
andpunishmentforindividualwrongdoers),therestillremainsignificantlosses
whenaprivatecompanyperformsservicesinthissensitiveareaofpolicy.These
lossesareforthemostpartintangible—lossofknowledgeoflocalconditionsby
the primary donor and of personal relationships between donor and recipient
(especiallyincasesofforeignmilitarytraining);lossofvisibleauthorityandpres-
tige;and,aboveall,aweakeningoflong-termcommitmentandsustainabilityof
securityandmilitaryrelationships.Long-standingrelationshipsbetweendonorand
recipient states need to be political as well as personal, and they can never be
replaced by an anonymous private actor or be reduced to questions of
‘management’.Privatesecuritycompaniescanonlycontributetothefurtheringof
suchrelationshipsiftheyarebroughtintosuchcloseandformalrelationshipwith
governments as to effectively make them ‘quasi-governmental’ bodies. This is
unlikely to occur on any significant scale as it would compromise the inde-
pendenceandflexibilityofthecompanies,andtheverypointofusingtheprivate
sectorwouldbelost.

Theseproblemsareendemictoanystyleofactionbyprivateratherthanpublic

actorsinthesecuritysphereandjeopardizecontroloverthepoliticaldimensionin
securityrelations.Asarguedinthisstudy,short-termgainsfromtheuseofPSCs
needtobebalancedagainstpossiblelong-termlossesateveryinstanceofoutsourc-
ing.Theprobleminthisrespectisthatisolateddecisionsaretakenwithoutawide
perspectiveonthecumulativeeffectsofprivatizingsecurity.

The‘efficient’stateshaveaparticularresponsibilitytoshoulderandshouldtake

theleadindiscussionsaboutthelong-termchangestotheinternationalsystemand
internationalsecurityrelations.NorthAmericanandEuropeanstatescanaffordto
choosewhetherornottooutsource,whethertoaidSSRprojectsinweakerstates
andwhethertosustaineffortstocreatesecureenvironments(e.g.,inAfghanistan
andIraq)aftermilitaryinterventions.

260

Iftheytaketheirresponsibilityseriouslyin

theserespects,thehiringofPSCsneednotbeseenasdictatedbynecessity.

260

O’Hanlon,M.E.andSinger,P.W.,‘InAfghanistan,ajobhalfdone’,BostonGlobe,15Sep.

2002,availableatURL<http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20020915.htm>.

C ONC LUS IONS 59

Fortheweakstate,theriskthatprivatizationwillleadtoadisenfranchisingof

thestateremains.Everyeffortmustbemadetoencouragetheestablishmentof
functioninganddemocraticstatesecurityinstitutionsinthefirstplace.Onlyby
escapingfromtheshort-term‘tyrannyofthemarket’canweakandstrongstates
alike harness the burgeoning international security industry with the aim of
counteringthreatsandpromotingequitablesecuritygovernance.

Abouttheauthor

CarolineHolmqvist(Sweden)isaResearchAssistantintheSIPRIArmedCon-
flict and Conflict Management Programme. She holds degrees in International
RelationsfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE)and
haspreviouslyheldaninternshipwiththeRiskandSecurityProgrammeattheFor-
eignPolicyCentre,London.Sheisacontributortothechapteronarmedconflicts
in SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
(forthcoming 2005). Her research interests include questions of international
governanceandthedynamicsofconflict.

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