Science et Esprit, 64/2 (2012)
179-192
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS
E
l i z a b e t h
T
r o t t
I. The Canadian Constitutional Dialectic
The tension between democracy and constitutionalism
The Canadian political framework has become distorted under pressure and
is now one, I suggest, that may be weakening in the face of social contradic-
tions.1 We begin with the tension between democracy, and the sovereignty of
elected officials, and constitutionalism. Parliamentary sovereignty maintains
that parliament has the power to “change any law whatsoever.”2 But this threat-
ens to leave no room for genuine constitutional precommitment.3
Constitutional precommitments legally enshrine fundamental rights and
policies so as to bind successive generations and thereby safeguard future
choices. If we entrench basic norms, the threat the short-sighted will of
the majority may pose to future generation will be deterred.4 By binding
themselves, voters “can better achieve their solid and long-term collective
aims.”5
1. The furor about the general success of multiculturalism in this country has not been
without its critics. Although the policy was entrenched in the very early 70s (1971) a mere 20
years later Penguin published Neil Bissoondath’s book Selling Illusions, the Cult o f Multiculturalism
in Canada, Toronto, Penguin, 1994. The policy, he argues, sets us apart and adrift by highlight-
ing differences rather than similarities that unite us.
2. Albert Venn
D
ic e y
,
Introduction to the Study o f the Law of the Constitution, Part One,
8th Edition, 1915.
3. See Stephen
H
o l m e s
,
Passions and Constraint: on the theory of liberal democracy, Chicago
IL, University of Chicago Press, 1995.
4. Both Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson questioned this practice: a) How it can be
justifiable for one generation to impose binding obligations and restrict the choices o f future
generations
( H
o l m e s
,
Passions, pp. 39-141)? b) Does precommitment impede the human capac-
ity for epistemic growth
( H
o l m e s
,
Passions, pp. 142-143)? For a critical analysis of Thomas
Paine’s, The Rights of Man, 1791, see Alfred Jules
A
y e r
,
Thomas Paine, London, Faber and Faber,
1989. Paines declaration about not binding future generations is on page 73 o f Ayer’s book.
5.
H
o l m e s
,
Passions,
p.
135.
E. T R O T T
1 8 0
The dialectic o f Canadian political culture
The British North America Act, 1867 marks the beginning of Canadas consti-
tutional dialectic. The preamble states that Canada is to be united, “with a
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom.” That is, a
constitution in tension with parliamentary sovereignty.
The preamble of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44 endorses the
“rule of law” and claims to be “desirous of enshrining (...) human rights and
fundamental freedoms.” The preamble also affirms that the Bill of Rights “shall
reflect the respect of Parliament for its constitutional authority...” However,
s. 2 introduces a clause that gives Parliament the power to pass legislation
notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. (A similar notwithstanding clause creating
a parliamentary override is also found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, s. 33.)
In short, the Bill of Rights expresses the constitutional spirit of entrench-
ment while reaffirming the democratic supremacy of Parliament. Thus the
essence of Canadian political culture lies in the dialectic of debate itself. If a
constitutional instrument is treated as a mere canon or rule of interpretation,
it reaffirms the supremacy of Parliament. On the other hand, an appeal to a
constitutional instrument can also be done with the intent of giving an exist-
ing decision greater constitutional force. Does the constitution shackle liber-
ties or function as a freedom-enhancing instrument in a liberal democracy?
Instead of defending a yes or no answer, one can follow Stephen Holmes
in arguing that the paradoxical tension between the two models constitutes a
synthesis of an on-going dialectical debate.6
On the one hand constitutionalism entrenches certain civic capacities
under the rule of law. On the other hand democracy promotes the possibility
of change through civic participation. The Canadian constitution as we under-
stand it today is comprised of regulative and constitutive rules that preserve
and expand the realm of freedom.7 Whereas the concept of constitutional
democracy is a static synthesis, in practice the tension between poles (democ-
racy and constitutionalism) is freedom enhancing. This interpretive flexibility
will be played out in the courts as different decisions get made.
The presumption o f universal values
Yet can we be sure that our present constitutional precommitments are seen
as the long term collective aims that Holmes identifies? How are we to identify
6. Although Holmes does not use the dialectical language o f synthesis and poles, this lin-
guistic frame of reference does not substantively alter his argument. I am indebted for this
articulation o f the Canadian framework to a paper “The Canadian Constitutional Dialectic”
written by Lucan Gregory for the McGill Faculty of Law in 2006.
7.
H
o l m e s
,
Passionsy p. 163.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
!81
these long term collective aims, if each culture is to be given room to survive
and flourish? The presumption that the collective aims of individual cultures
will not come into conflict is naïve.
Let us consider several examples of values hitherto unchallenged as cor-
nerstones of our constitutional democracy that can no longer be held as givens
of our political culture.
1) The limitations constitutional precommitments impose on government
serve to protect the people's power. But the limitations also presume all people,
men and women alike, understand themselves to have power and are encour-
aged to value it. At the very least, the strength of a constitutional instrument
presumes a nation states universal acceptance of, and belief in, its principles
of governance. A multicultural nation state weakens those presumptions.
2) The precommitment to freedom of expression and other rights and
freedoms presupposes of course that these are universally recognized human
goods, that people would rather be free to speak their minds than not free,
that people would rather be free to determine their own choices than be not
free to do so. Yet not every culture has a history of promoting these values.
The precommitment to multiculturalism offers opportunities for other world
views to pursue their agendas democratically.
3) Can we assume that reason and the ensuing practice of rational debate
are factors of society that are recognized and valued by all cultures? By
enshrining freedoms of speech, association, the press etc., a constitution
secures the necessary preconditions for public debate.8 “Democracy is govern-
ment by rational and free public discussion among legally equal citizens...”9
The capacity to secure the preconditions for public debate exemplifies a
“possibility-generating restraint״ and “helps explain the contribution of con-
stitutionalism to democracy.10״ Or so one hopes. There are those who may not
want to adapt to rational discussion as a mode of being in the world.
4) Finally can we even be sure that the idea of ‘the people’ has the univer-
sality we once assumed under our civic society? With a commitment to a
multicultural state does the idea of‘the people’ have any application? Presumably
‘the people’ are the members of the civic society and presumably that means
shared values. Multiculturalism calls that assumption into question. Not even
the idea of a ‘civic society’ is on the horizen of every cultural world view. We
can no longer assume that a ‘Canadian’ constitutional precommitment will be
recognized as an unassailable value by all cultures that comprise our nation
state.
8. H o l m e s ,
Passions
, pp . 169-172. H o lm e s rem a rk s th a t p u b lic d is a g r e e m e n t a n d u n c e n -
sored deb a te h a v e a “tr u th -g e n e r a tin g c a p a c ity ” (p. 170).
9. H
o l m e s
,
Passions
, p. 171.
10. H o l m e s ,
Passions
, p. 172.
E. T R O T T
1 8 2
The vulnerability o f democracy
The argument that constitutional precommitments will protect these values
holds only as long as the Constitution holds. We can agree that a constitution
can help secure the preconditions that make intellectual and political growth
possible. A constitution in a democratic society is not an unalterable docu-
ment. It does not bind future generations to the errors of the past. Nor does
it bind them to its successes. By making the amendment process difficult, it
helps ensure that when fundamental changes are made, reason, not the pas-
sions, prevail. Canadian democratic procedures offer the route to make
change.
But suppose other cultures with every right to speak and market their
views believe that the truth has been revealed, or/and that public debate is
unnecessary, or that epistemological progress means enacting truths that have
been given through an absolute authority? Perhaps a culture holds that the
concept of ‘a people* means followers of designated truth givers. Can such
challenges to constitutional precommitments shake the foundations of the
constitution as a positive “instrument of government”7.11 Could democracy be
the available route to further its own demise? A state held together by dialec-
tical good will be vulnerable to those who do not value the freedom enhanc-
ing opportunities the Canadian political culture has advertised.
II. The political fallout and the role of political correctness
The political unease
Janet Ajzenstat, in her book The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parlia-
menty
asks the question: “What did the Canada’s founders think a country is
‘for’?”12 She suggests that the founders committed to the political values of
equality, nondiscrimination, the rule of law, and the mores of representative
government. Then she writes:
But they refused to define the new nation in terms o f social values. BNA [British
North America] was home to people from different countries, with different
backgrounds, there was no consensus on social values. The Fathers concluded that
the attempt to write social values into the Constitution would offend some indi-
viduals, groups and religions. It would breach the nondiscrimination principle.
(Preface xii)
Ajzenstat goes on to cite Charles Taylor's concept of a “collective provision”
as an example of a social value. By this Taylor means that expressions of pref-
11.
H
o l m e s
,
Passions, p. 159.
12. Janet
A
j z e n s t a t
,
The Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament, Montreal-
Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press, 2007, Preface xi.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
1 8 3
erences for big government or for local rule, for strong adherence to law or to
civil liberties (public safety vs. the rights of the accused) are matters for delib-
eration by legislative assemblies. Our national institutions were to provide
forums for such debates, not define them. But Ajzenstat suggests the public
pendulum has swung to demand some official recognition of collective provi-
sions. Those who value collective provisions want more and more for these
provisions to be entrenched in regulatory systems. An example from business
culture would be that big business does not just want lobbying rights, but
legislation that protects corporate culture from the voting whims of democra-
cies. (Here I am assuming that “big business” qualifies as a cultural group.)
When the provisions sought to be entrenched have culturally specific political
dimensions, the stakes are higher still.
Can we maintain the political values of equality, freedom, nondiscrimina-
tion, and democratic participation under the possibility of some social and/or
economic values becoming law? If collective provisions are no longer lobbying
positions of a voting public who can make an effort to affect parliamentary
decisions, but such provisions become laws that are defined by specific orien-
tations towards (e.g. economic systems, as in the example above) could legisla-
tion that protects social values be demanded on the part of other cultures?
Perhaps radio station will face even more stringent rules concerning what can
be said; perhaps universities will not receive funding unless they provide
multiple places of worship.
I have raised above the possibility that not every culture in our multicultural
nation state may think equality and freedom as articulated in the constitution,
to be of significance. Cultures could have as dominant social values a) a com-
mitment to meritocracy, b) inheritance entitlements or oligarchy, c) religious
hierarchy of values which literally determines a way of life and thereby negates
the concept of free choice, hence the right to self determination.
The boundaries between constitutional precommitments such as freedom
of speech or equality and the employment of those political values as social
lobbying tools may find resistance by other cultures and that resistance can
take form as political correctness. Political correctness can be thought of as
the public wand of lobbying that deters our present constitutional precommit־
ments from being reinforced. Avoiding social commentary and criticism so as
to not show disrespect where respect has now been demanded, or to not cause
offense, means the voices of others can fill the silent void.
The uncertainty o f social and political values
In as much as the Fathers of our constitution did not want to dictate social
values, nowhere did they leave us with a clear distinction between a political
and a social value. A. John Simmons argues that political values accrue to the
E. T R O T T
1 8 4
existence of states; and these he defines as entities having limited sovereignty
and the ability to distribute needed goods and services.13 Beyond that, the
above political values of nondiscrimination and equality exist only through
reflections of social will. Even the concept of justice or Kant’s sole meaningful
right, the right to freedom, will be shaped by the democratic expression of
what those ideas will really mean and how they will be enacted. Equality (and
the complementary concept of freedom) express vague measures of acceptable
public goals and have little pragmatic force when merely contemplated as
Platonic forms. Thus the promotion of these political values will be directed
by the discourses of their promoters.
The role o f discourses in understanding social and political values
Both the concept of equality and the concept of freedom can be used in dif-
ferent discourses. For example, religions, political systems, families, economic
theories develop their own ways of using these above two concepts to further
their position on events and to promote appropriate behaviour. Even games
and sporting competitions employ the concepts in their discourses. Each
concept (freedom and equality) can also be explored independently of the
other.
We begin with equality. Equality can be meaningful within political con-
texts and discourses: it can refer to one’s status as a civilian, such as equal
before the law; equality can mean equal exercise of rights, equal demands in
accordance with civic duties and the rule of law. Equality can be found in
cultural discourses: for example, one’s status within a cultural hierarchy could
find one equal to others sharing ones place in a family or a tribe; equality can
be a logical indicator of an idea such as a number or an individual, or refer to
an economic status bearer; equality can find contextual meaning within a
defined belief system, such as equal before ones God or equal as a member of
a caste system. If we begin to talk of equality and freedom as two complemen-
tary ideas, the analysis becomes even more dense.14
For example the equal right to freely express one’s religion through verbal
and non verbal practices can mean equally free to exercise one’s rights (within
one’s cultural or religious beliefs) to treat others whose social identity is struc-
tured through those beliefs in accordance with equally applied laws and
punishments. Honour killings raise the issue of multicultural conflict with the
rule of Canadian law.
No longer does the equal opportunity (freedom) to speak out, a constitu-
tional precommitment, entail that each cultural discourse, where the terms of
13. A. John
S
i m m o n s
,
Political Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 200), p. 38.
14. Admittedly large texts have been written about these two concepts. For the purposes
o f this paper, the possible meanings within discourses, I hope, will suffice.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
1 8 5
freedom and equality are employed, enjoy a similar kind of public protection.
Yet surely the freedom to express opposition to religious practices should be
protected by political correctness as well. Surely those who are offended at
being condemned by others for holding and promoting atheistic beliefs deserve
the shielding political correctness promises. Can the crusading atheist and the
crusading believer both claim the other is practicing expressions of hate and
offense?
Political correctness as a social value (restraining free expression by appeal
to multicultural respect) is not equally applied to all cultural identities.
Rational atheists can be offended but easily dismissed and ignored or charged
with political incorrectness (see Appendix I).
Whither Reason?
It is not clear in a multicultural world that rationality is a social or political
value recognized, or even understood in any uniform way, by all cultures. In
the literary canons of some cultures, the recognition of a contradiction (usu-
ally discussed as a logical contradiction) is the measure of ones ability to
engage in debate and arrive at conclusions. The law as we know it in Canada
relies completely on the dialectical procedures we categorize as rational. Now
let us consider the possibility that for some cultures/religions, accepting and/
or tolerating the beliefs of others is a contradiction. The word contradiction
for some culture could mean a violation of a given principle or world view.
With an Absolute Truth as the measure of contradictory claims, the concepts
of equality and free speech can acquire determinate parameters for their
employment. Rational debate about their meaning and application will be
unnecessary. Political correctness can be appealed to under the guise of offense
thereby enabling the promotion of singular conceptions of truth.
Appreciation of the meanings that can accrue to the concepts of “equality,”
freedom, reason, results through a system of an education committed to a) the
exploration of concepts and principles and b) reason as a social value. The
possibility that the above commitments may not be shared by all cultures has
been raised. But now our concerns about political correctness can acquire a
focus. One person's religions practices and ‘justified’ beliefs could violate
another individual^ commitment to the inviolable canons of rationality. Will
political correctness disguise practices of irrationality sanctioned by free
expression?
The discourses of individuals who want to freely express opposition to
religious expression can conflict with those who, under the rubric of multi-
culturalism, demand opportunities to freely express religious beliefs and
practices. In communities where the idea of open discussion and debate is not
a social, political, or religious value, multiple discourses can reveal conflicts
E. T R O T T
1 8 6
but may not promote conditions for disputants to gain practice at resolving
such conflicts. The channel for political dialectical debate, I suggest, begins in
the classroom and culminates in parliament. But not every multicultural
school and curriculum guarantee the channels are open, let alone made obvi-
ous to students. The resulting silence that political correctness demands does
not bode well for the exploration of rational options for problem solving.
An example to illustrate the cultural divide
An article in the Globe and Mail, Sept 26 2002, A5, cites the beating of a child
(on Prince Edward Island, Canada) with a stick 39 times in the name of a
religion. The event came to the attention of the courts.15 Citing the Bible and
the constitutional precommitments to freedom of religious expression, the
defense attempted to argue against the assault charges laid on his client by
appealing to religious freedom and the right to use force within reason in
parenting capacities.
Ultimately, after an astonishing thirty-three pages of explanation, the
accused was found guilty of assault. But the outcome of the case rested on the
interpretation of discourses surrounding both the right to religious pursuits
and the parental use of force within reason.
Today political correctness would disincline us to declare the religion
discussed in the defense trial as abhorrent. And yet the different discourses of
the legal case had one side claiming to have “corrected״ the child in the name
of God and the other to be charging the adult with “assault.” “I did not assault
him, I corrected him” declared the defendant. So whose ‘language* defines the
political values of free expression and or the right to religious expression?
The above kind of clash is not new to Canadian courts. Political correctness
now makes it increasingly difficult for shared public criticism to weigh in with
a loud voice, if indeed there are any shared values that can be cited.
III. Three expressions of unease
Two philosophers speak
In his recent book, The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life,
Kenneth Minogue observed that “political correctness is a department of
univalence in that it tries to suppress the possibility of conflict altogether.16״
By declaring all persons to be equal and equally valuable it imposes a frame
of reference rather than enabling critical judgment while remaining polite. It
is a step beyond good manners. Minogue does not think the slogan represents
15. R.v. Poulin, 2002 PESCTD 68.
16. Kenneth
M
i n o g u e
,
The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life, New York
NY, Encounter Books, 2010, p. 324.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
1 8 7
what either is the case or what we believe to be the case and it will very unlikely
be accepted by cultures unwilling to be told how to think. Minogue continues
by celebrating manners as a flexible skill and political correctness as a drill
frequently accompanied by “some bizarre process called sensitivity training.”17
Manners respond to unpredictable occasions while political correctness fosters
the restraints of a single correct response.
Will Kymlicka, in his recent book Multicultural Odysseys, describes the
difficulty with trying to export the slogans that define liberal multiculturalism
(and as academics we are exporting them into the classroom).18 He concludes
his report on the state of multiculturalism at the international level by observ-
ing that in spite of the efforts made and obstacles faced, for the policy to
acquire universal relevance “much work remains to be done...”19 Kymlicka is
not referring to measurable results in the field. He writes:
The most ambitious proposal would be to entirely redesign the framework of
international legal norms for minorities, supplementing or replacing the current
system of weak generic rights with a more robust system of multi-targeted and
sequenced minority rights (...) however I am not particularly optim istic....20
Kymlika thinks that at the international level, we need a re-articulation of the
fundamental concepts of multiculturalism which were assumed to be self-
evident.
I cite these two authors because each suggests that the ease with which we
promote slogans betrays a far more complex set of perspectives that must be
analyzed. The right to free speech and democratic empowerment are compli-
cated payoffs that have taken more than 500 years to be fostered by educational
development and promoted by the comfort of wealth. With our inclusive
constitution, and our balanced economy, Canadians can afford to dabble in
dialectical balancing acts. But we need to firmly promote without fear our
constitutional precommitments as frames of reference for all discussions
because their value may not be self evident to those to whom we administer
rights and freedoms either at home or in the international community at large.
An educator’s unease
The future for education is troubled.21 The book by Carlos Alberto Torres,
Democracy, Education, and Multiculturalismy explores in much detail the
17. M
i n o g u e
,
The Servile M ind,
p. 324.
18. Will
K
y m l i c k a
,
Multicultural Odysseys, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.
19.
K
y m l i c k a
,
Multicultural Odysseys,
p.
315.
20.
K
y m l i c k a
,
Multicultural Odysseys, p. 315.
21. Carlos Alberto Torres, in Democracy, Education and Multiculturalism (Oxford, Rowan
and Littlefield, 1998) explores the challenges facing educators in the United States, but speaks
far beyond borders.
E. T R O T T
1 8 8
multiple relations between education, democracy, and diverse identities. Its
scope is beyond review in a short paper, but Torres sees education as insepa-
rabie from the development of citizenship, and multiculturalism as the greatest
hurdle for fostering citizenship. Yet for all of the contradictions multicultural-
ism raises, he suggests, it has offered the greatest promise for the advancement
of all cultures, not just ethnic, but rich and poor, female and male, class, race,
and gender.22 None the less, Torres acknowledges the contradictions:
Multiculturalism, like democracy and citizenship is marked by egregious contra-
dictions. The first one is the distinction between universality and identity. That
is to say that knowledge as a universal domain constitutes the basis for rational-
ity, drawing upon the logic of the Enlightenment, and that the politics of identity
reflects a localized set of struggles defying any possible notion of universalism....
Secondly, similar to the contradiction of democracy is the fact that ethnic, racial,
and cultural distinctions in society that are not fully egalitarian persist, creating
a serious tension between freedom and equality. These contradictions underscore
serious challenges to a theory of multicultural citizenship.23
The present author’s comment
The educator is faced with, on the one hand, promoting freedom and equality
as such concepts define the Canadian citizen, and on the other hand, adjusting
to the social values of increasing numbers of different cultures. For example,
the freedom to become a social critic is not an educational aim that sits easily
with the multicultural platform educators must respect in delivering curricu-
lum. The expectation that teachers (including university teachers) respect all
differences without question or discussion effectively shuts down much of the
dialogue that the institution of education purportedly (at least in the minds
of philosophers), was to enable and encourage. Social criticism means all social
values should be held up for public scrutiny and rational debate, assuming
that we even continue to value those practices (see Appendix II). But increas-
ingly, the educator can find little protection for freedom of expression when
silenced by employers (concerned about the number of future enrollments),
University Administrations, Faculty Associations and parents groups, all with
vested interests hidden behind cloaks of political correctness (see Appendix I).
There is a fear factor and instead of asking of what are we afraid, we stay
silent and compliant. Could it be we are afraid of multicultural failure? The
gentle balancing of free speech and the gradual resolution of competing views
with civility, not rudeness, (supra 10) is a model of rationality that requires
acceptance of change in the face of reason and debate. Can we really teach and
promote freedom of expression when there are wealth, racial, religious, sys-
2 2 . T o r r e s ,
D em ocracy
, pp. 3-5.
23. T o r r e s ,
D em ocracyy
p. 235.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
1 8 9
temic class based cultures all of which believe their own particular world view
requires no defense, nor any change?
A political world view based on multi-cultures does not provide a clear
picture. If Parliamentary democracy and the constitutional rule of law act as
shifting figure and ground in their dialectical framework for providing cul-
tural and political identity then that framework needs teaching, promoting,
engaging, and defending. The freedoms entrenched therein need public
articulation not avoidance through fear of offending. For example, the freedom
to argue and teach that religion can promote both good and evil should be
exercised without fear, and not crippled by threats of political correctness.24
Conclusion: two solutions to the silencing
political correctness supports
1) The vote to silence ourselves
Freedom of expression can no longer be assumed to be a collective aim. And
here is where the concluding question in the Plan surfaces (supra page 1).
Without the freedom to really defend and encourage social criticism in the
classroom, students have little opportunity to practice the skills needed to
argue publically. Is it possible that fear could result in a majority of voters
supporting the restriction of freedom of expression? If social criticism of other
cultures becomes prohibited by law, that prohibition would ease our fear of
repercussions from our multicultural neighbours. Moreover, some of these
neighbours might not see “being offended” as the price one pays for freedom
of expression, but as the springboard to entrenching a way of life, democrati-
cally of course, where fear of offense dissipates as silence.
Admittedly the above suggestion sounds preposterous to Canadians of
many cultures and generations, to neighbours who value reason and the free-
dom to speak ones mind, to families whose dinner table conversations have
much gusto, if little direction. But then the 21 century has seen much that
would have been thought preposterous just a dozen years ago. Nothing should
surprise us. Not even the possibility that fear of offending could be reduced
(democratically) by not being able to speak out at all against any social value
that one thinks needs re-examining. The constitutional precommitments would
survive, albeit with a narrower number of discourses available. Democracy
would survive, just with a different platform of choices to be made. Fear would
24.
Over the years, I have faced increasing classroom silence on the part of students. In the
seventies one shouted spiritedly above the din of joyful student dissent in order to be heard. I
sometimes wonder if the increased use of technology creates a buffer zone used by professors
to protect themselves from direct engagement with students and ideas because they are afraid
to speak truthfully and encourage challenges to the positions o f others.
E. T R O T T
1 9 0
be reduced. And the irritations of multicultural nation states would be eased
with a re-orientation to a world view without social criticism.25
2) The continued promotion o f a ‘value neutral* discourse
The university has eased itself away from the discourses of engagement with
political and/or social values by adopting the discourses of the business world.
While this idea needs spelling out beyond the scope of this paper, I propose
that the discourse of corporatism shields the educational institution from
engagement with social and political values.26 Clients, bottom lines, profit־
ability, balance sheets, net gains and losses etc. are the terms of universal
economic exchange and thus devoid of culturally specific connotations and
denotations.
There is no chance of offence when the participants being discussed are
numbers and represent capital and loss. For the educator, the move towards a
discourse of indifference within economic frames of reference avoids the
dangers of offence and removes the dialectical vibrancy of debate. It also
silences those who might grasp at the opportunity to speak for themselves.
For example, The Toronto Star, Feb 16, 2011, ran an article about the United
Emirates, which demonstrated through interviews that the profits of corporate
success agreeably override the vagaries of free expression and democracy. The
language of numbers needs no Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Appendix I
The attempt to muzzle free expression happened at Ryerson University over the sum-
mer o f 2010. On the Ryerson Faculty Association email network a discussion ensued
when an announcement from the Administration was sent out regarding religious
holidays and faculty accommodations. A protest developed based on the fact that
four thousand different religious holidays could be identified, and yet only a select
few were being singled out for attention.
The defenders of secularism said that unless it was a government holiday, allow-
ance for missed classes and accommodations should not be the problem o f a secular
university. The argument was that students could take time if they chose, but at their
academic risk.
The defenders of the status quo refused to address the four thousand holidays
and merely quoted traditions, cultural identities, and our need to be multicultural
and recognize rights protected by the Charter o f Rights. The fact that the religious
25. Here I am not advocating; I am working out the implications o f the possible solution
- that of restricting free speech.
26. O f course business can reflect social values in orientation, but the discourse o f exchange
reflects a world of calculable entities not human beings. The reader is reminded that this dis-
course is infiltrating education increasingly. The present author is not supporting its use.
F R E E D O M OF S P E E C H A N D P O L I T I C A L C O R R E C T N E S S
1 9 1
groups with the largest populations seem to be dominating the arena of religious
recognition, generated a quantitative criteria for university recognition. The quanti
-
tative factor rallied the loudest voices on the RFA network while disregarding an
equally valid quantitative criterion, the total available number o f religious holidays
.
A utilitarian criterion of persuasion began to drown out the universalistic recogni
-
tion o f equality and religious freedom
.
The debate continued over a couple of weeks with various participants until
someone raised the “offended” word and the President of the RFA stepped in and
said the faculty network was not for this sort o f debate. I sent a final question: “What
could be more important than finding out the limits free speech and the reasoning
behind the requirement that we accommodate selected religious holy days
?
”
But we had been told to refrain from discussing the issue further on the Ryerson
net. Silence fell and not a single response to my question came forth
.
Appendix II
Many students are not exposed to Canadian cultural narratives which championed
the constitutional gems of free speech and social criticism. Calling down the hypoc
-
risies and pretenses of those who swaggered with entitlement attitudes have been
literary aims at the core of many Canadian authors* narrative journeys.27 The free
-
dom to establish culturally specific independent schools through community input
(
the electors o f the local Boards of Education hire the teachers), means that students
(
especially recent arrivals but also second generation students) may arrive at Ontario
universities with little knowledge about their country o f birth or choice, Canada. So
much emphasis is put on multicultural content, where everyone is recognized as
stories that are often challenges
־
different and special, that many Canadian stories
to the status quo, subjecting every cultural tradition and class distinction to close
scrutiny while exemplifying the entrenched rights of free expression - get ignored
because Canada is seldom listed as one of the many cultures.28 The freedom to
become a social critic is not an educational aim that sits easily with the multicultural
platform educators must respect in delivering curriculum. The expectation that
teachers (including university teachers) respect all differences without question or
discussion effectively shuts down much o f the dialogue that the institution of educa
-
tion purportedly (at least in the minds o f philosophers) was to enable and encourage
.
Philosophy Department
Ryerson University
27. See for example, Political Economics Professor Stephen Leacock, (see e.g. “The Great
Fight for Clean Government,” Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich, Pub., John Lane, 1914,
and his lectures on social justice published in the New York Times 1920), or W.O. Mitchell
(e.g.“Political Dynamite,” According to Jake and the K id, McClelland and Stewart, 1989.
28. Tolstoy and Salmon Rushdie are also writers who wrote fearlessly, and both paid the
price o f offending their cultural communities.
E. T R O T T
1 9 2
S U M M A R Y
This paper will argue that freedom of expression as it is entrenched in the
constitution is not obviously compatible with the discourses of multicultural-
ism. An explanation of the dialectic of parliamentary democracy and consti-
tutional precommitments, the two poles of Canadian political culture, frames
the claim that zealous adherence to the demands by different cultures for
politically correct ‘recognition* curbs social criticism. The freedom to exercise
ones rights and talents includes the right to be a social critic.
S O M M A I R E
Cette étude soutient que la liberté dexpression telle quelle se trouve affirmée
dans la constitution canadienne nest évidemment pas compatible avec les
discours du multiculturalisme. La dialectique entre démocratie parlementaire
et affirmations de principe constitutionnelles, qui constituent les deux pôles de
la culture politique canadienne, permet de comprendre comment une adhésion
fervente aux revendications faites par différentes cultures en vue d une « recon-
naissance » qui soit politiquement correcte limite la critique sociale. La liberté
d exercer ses droits et ses talents inclut le droit d’être un critique social.
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