Language Testing, Migration a...47063454 Language Testing.pdf

Advances in Sociolinguistics

Series Editor: Professor Sally Johnson, University of Leeds

Since the emergence of sociolinguistics as a new field of enquiry in the late 1960s,
research into the relationship between language and society has advanced almost beyond
recognition. In particular, the past decade has witnessed the considerable influence of
theories drawn from outside of sociolinguistics itself. Thus rather than see language as a
mere reflection of society, recent work has been increasingly inspired by ideas drawn
from social, cultural, and political theory that have emphasized the constitutive role
played by language/discourse in all areas of social life. The Advances in Sociolinguistics
series seeks to provide a snapshot of the current diversity of the field of sociolinguistics
and the blurring of the boundaries between sociolinguistics and other domains of study
concerned with the role of language in society.

Discourses of Endangermen: Ideology and Interest in the Defence of Languages
Edited by Alexandre Duchêne and Monica Heller

Globalization and Language in Contact
Edited by James Collins, Stef Slembrouck and Mike Baynham

Globalization of Language and Culture in Asia
Edited by Viniti Vaish

Linguistic Minorities and Modernity: A Sociolinguistic Ethnography, 2nd edition
Monica Heller

Language, Culture and Identity: An Ethnolinguistic Perspective
Philip Riley

Language Ideologies and Media Discourse: Texts, Practices, Politics
Edited by Sally Johnson and Tommaso M. Milani

Language in the Media: Representations, Identities, Ideologies
Edited by Sally Johnson and Astrid Ensslin

Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse
Andrea Mayr

Multilingualism: A Critical Perspective
Adrian Blackledge and Angela Creese

Semiotic Landscapes Language, Image, Space
Adam Jaworski and Crispin Thurlow

The Languages of Global Hip-Hop
Edited by Marina Terkourafi

The Language of Newspaper: Socio-Historical Perspectives
Martin Conboy

The Languages of Urban Africa
Edited by Fiona Mc Laughlin

Language Testing, Migration and Citizenship: Cross-National Perspectives on
Integration

Regimes

Edited by Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Contents

Acknowledgements vii
Notes on contributors

viii

INTRODUCTION
1 Testing regimes for newcomers

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

PART I CASE STUDIES IN EUROPE
2 The politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic context

Gabrielle

Hogan-Brun

3 Language, migration and citizenship in Sweden:

still a test-free zone

Lilian

Nygren-Junkin

4 Inventing English as convenient fiction: language testing

regimes in the United Kingdom

Adrian

Blackledge

5 Language, migration and citizenship in Germany:

discourses on integration and belonging

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

6 One nation, two policies: language requirements for

107

citizenship and integration in Belgium

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

7 Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

125

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

8 Regimenting language, mobility and citizenship in

148

Luxembourg

Kristine

Horner

9 Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration and

167

citizenship

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

PART II CASE STUDIES ABROAD
10 The language barrier between immigration and citizenship

189

in the United States

Tammy

Gales

1.1 Historical context

The face of migration in Europe has changed quite dramatically after
1991. Prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, which announced the end of
the Cold War, migrant groups were easily identifiable groups (in Europe,
mostly people from the Mediterranean basin). Such groups often became
sedentary in their host country, forming recognizably immigrant minor-
ity groups, which after having consolidated their presence became
‘ethnic’ communities in their own right. Traces of this group migration
are clear everywhere across Europe, and it would be unthinkable to
picture large European urban areas without them. This relatively trans-
parent migration pattern enabled the emergence of a research tradition
that focused on the histories of these groups, their language rights, their
(often underachieving) educational success, the language diversity that
typified their presence, their position on the labour market and, last but
not least, their civil and political participation. When the label ‘migra-
tion research’ is used in Europe, it generally refers to this kind of
research.

The aftermath of 1991 saw a new pattern of migration emerging.

Nowadays, this involves a far more diverse population from Eastern
Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. The pattern of migration differs
from the previous one for two reasons. First, migration is not supported
anymore by fairly liberal labour policies, like those that characterized
Northern Europe during the 1960s and the early 1970s, and Southern
Europe during the late 1990s. Second, migrants themselves are well
aware that Southern Europe is only the beginning of yet another migra-
tion trajectory that often takes them to Northern Europe. In the same
way, the motives for and the forms of migration have changed. People,
when permitted to enter European countries, arrive not only as tradi-
tional labour migrants but also as refugees, short-time migrants, transi-
tory migrants, highly educated work forces and so forth. This topping
up of the original diversity brought about by the migratory flux before
1991 causes difficulties in popular conceptions of the ‘other’. It becomes
more and more difficult to grasp what a migrant is, and to characterize

Testing regimes for newcomers

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and
Piet Van Avermaet

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

his legal and administrative presence. Furthermore, the post-1991 migrant
seeks housing and shelter in existing, authentic ‘migrant’ neighbour-
hoods, and so the latter become densely layered and very complex
communities that go beyond the circumscribed ethnic communities
that majorities were used to before 1991 (see Wright 2000 for a compre-
hensive overview).

The effect of this blending of ‘old’ and ‘new’ migration produces a

new form of diversity in Europe, one for which the term ‘super-diversity’
has been coined (Vertovec 2006: 1–2). This type of diversity is of a more
complex kind in which neither the origin of people, nor their presumed
motives for migration, nor their ‘careers’ as migrants (sedentary versus
short-term and transitory), nor their socio-cultural and linguistic fea-
tures can be presupposed. The cosy (dis)comfort of the old migration,
where migrants, their trajectories and their lives were understood, or at
least acknowledged by majority group members, has disappeared and
is replaced by a form of complexity that is presenting itself unequivo-
cally at Europe’s doors. This raises critical questions about the rationale
and the future of nation-states in Europe, about their dense and fast-
moving urban spaces and about the embedded and still omnipresent
supremacy of the (white) majority’s perspective within those institutions
that regulate the streaming of migrants (Stead-Sellers 2003; Blommaert
2008). It also raises practical issues of the first order. The presence
of these very diverse groups of people has effects on the capacity of
bureaucracies to handle cases successfully and brings politicians to
cogitate upon new methods to determine who can access the territory
and who cannot (a process in which language issues play a critical
role). Research has not yet addressed this new form of complexity, other
than in a fragmentary manner. There is also a strong need for addressing
these issues from both cross-national and crosslinguistic perspectives,
in order to get a deeper understanding of conceptual presuppositions
surrounding the public and political debate on these issues (Heller
2003; Shohamy 2007).

Against this background, a Working Group on Testing Regimes was

established in 2006 at the University of Southampton, aiming at cross-
national cooperation between four partner universities: Southampton
(Clare Mar-Molinero, Patrick Stevenson, Euan Reid), Bristol (Gabrielle
Hogan-Brun), Tilburg (Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti) and Ghent
(Piet van Avermaet). The project title Testing Regimes contains a delib-
erately chosen ambiguity and refers both to the regimes of testing and
to the testing of regimes. On its website (www.testingregimes.soton.
ac.uk/partners), the rationale of the project was motivated by the ‘EU
enlargement and the ongoing rise in the rate of migration into and
across Europe: both phenomena suggest that the salience of these issues

Testing regimes for newcomers

is likely to continue to grow.’ The project has led to two major book
publications, with a mix of same and different contributors (Hogan-
Brun, Mar-Molinero and Stevenson 2008; this Volume). The topic itself,
the public discourse and the political and legal regimes surrounding it
are in flux, generally moving in the direction of more restrictive regimes
over time across nation-states.

The present Volume comes to wrestle with new patterns of testing

regimes. Rather than exploring these from the perspective of the migrant
(Pavlenko and Blackledge 2004; Block 2006; Shohamy 2008), the Volume
takes the perspective of the nation-states’ machinery. It goes into both
the rites of passage that either allow or prevent newcomers from access-
ing a country and for the measures that are imposed on the immigrant
population at large in terms of societal and linguistic integration. More
specifically, the Volume takes stock, discusses and evaluates the very
regimes of testing that, primarily across Europe, are currently working
towards societal and linguistic integration. This introductory chapter
gives an outline of the link between the concepts of nation-states, lan-
guage and identity (Section 1.2) and goes into the European public and
political discourse on foreigners and integration (Section 1.3). Next, an
outline is given of the Common European Framework of Reference and
its (mis)use and (mis)interpretation in testing language skills of immi-
grants (Section 1.4). Finally, the structure and contents of this book are
presented (Section 1.5).

Much longer histories and documented experiences of testing

regimes are available outside Europe in contexts in which European
immigrants at least initially played a major role in establishing such
regimes. This is the rationale for our focus in the Volume on eight care-
fully selected European case studies without neglecting comparative
views on a selection of four non-European states that are referred to as
immigrant countries par excellence from an early European perspec-
tive of emigration (see Section 1.5).

1.2 Nation-states, language and identity

It may seem odd, but contrary to a widespread belief the concepts of
‘nation’ and ‘nation-state’ are relatively recent phenomena. In the con-
text of the reference that we make to nation-states in this Volume, we
also have to draw another distinction, that between nationality and
citizenship. Although these two concepts may often be used as syn-
onyms nowadays, we should be aware of their historical and contextual
difference in denotation (Guiguet 1998). Nationals belong to a nation-
state but they may not have all the rights linked to citizenship (e.g.,
voting rights). In this sense, citizenship is a more inclusive concept than

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

nationality, and as such it is key to the testing regimes that are dealt
with in this Volume. Barbour (2000) discusses the distinction between
the two concepts in terms of a legally defined entity, citizens, and an
(ethnic) population, respectively. Nations have frequently developed
from ethnic groups, but the two do not coincide. Ethnic groups are
either subsets of nations or they function as collective entities across
nation-state borders. It is through their construction and consolidation
that nation-states have also promoted yet another two (erroneous) pop-
ular beliefs: that of the existence of a national language common to all
fellow nationals and that of the primacy of the standard variety of this
same national language over other territorial language varieties (see
Blackledge, this Volume). The first belief, as it were, has made a lan-
guage correspond to a nation-state, as a consequence of which this lan-
guage was elected as a core value of an imagined community of fellow
nationals which then calls itself a nation (Anderson 1991; Brubaker
1996). On top of this, the second belief has resulted in a situation where
fellow nationals who master the standard variety of the national lan-
guage hold more powerful positions than those who do not (McColl
Millar 2005). The consequences of these two beliefs have been huge for
Europe, for its modern history, for its inhabi tants and for those indi-
viduals who want to enter its territory and legally reside in one of its
nation-states. The equation of a standard national language with a
national identity is the tangible product of a long-established ideologi-
cal industry of exclusion (Piller 2001). It is on this very ideological
industry that the testing regimes that we analyse in this Volume are
firmly grounded. Language standardization is one of the key features
that have provided the cultural back-up for aspiring polities to be rec-
ognized as nation-states ipso facto (see Fishman 1973: 39–85, 1989:
105–175, 270–287; Edwards 1985: 23–27; Joseph 2004: 92–131; Gal
2006: 13–27; for historical overviews). It is also the key feature that
authorizes those who live within a nation to ask those who want to
access their country and aspire to become citizens to learn the national
language.

A tangible example of the above is the equation of German and

Germany, as a reaction to the rationalism of the Enlightenment and
based also on anti-French sentiments. The concept of nationalism
emerged at the end of the eighteenth century; the concept of nationality
only a century later. Romantic philosophers like Johan Gottfried Herder
and Wilhelm von Humboldt laid the foundation for the emergence of a
linguistic nationalism in Germany on the basis of which the German
language and nation were conceived of as superior to the French. The
French, however, were no less reluctant to express their conviction that
the reverse was true. Although every nation-state is characterized by

Testing regimes for newcomers

heterogeneity, including linguistic heterogeneity, nationalistic move-
ments have always invoked this classical European discourse in their
equation of language and nation (cf. revitalized references in Germany
to such concepts as Sprachnation and Leitkultur; see also Stevenson,
this Volume). For recent studies on language, identity and nationalism
in Europe, we refer to Barbour and Carmichael (2000) and Gubbins and
Holt (2002), and for a comparative study of attitudes towards language
and national identity in France and Sweden to Oakes (2001).

The USA has not remained immune to this type of nationalism either.

The English-only movement, US English, was founded in 1983 out of a
fear of the growing number of Hispanics on American soil (Fishman
1988; May 2001: 202–224). This organization resisted bilingual Spanish-
English education from the beginning because such an approach they
felt would lead to ‘identity confusion’. Similarly, attempts have been
made to give the assignment of English as the official language of the
USA a constitutional basis. This was done on the presupposition that
the recognition of other languages (in particular Spanish) would under-
mine the foundations of the nation-state. This nationalism has its roots
in a white, protestant, English-speaking elite (Edwards 1994: 177–178).

Europe’s identity is to a great extent determined by cultural and lin-

guistic diversity. Although the same holds at the level of European
nation-states, nationalistic movements still call upon the equation of
language and nation in claiming their right of primacy on national
grounds. Table 1.1 serves to illustrate the heterogeneity – often disguised
as homogeneity because of the close connection between nation-state
references and official state language references – present among the 30
EU (candidate) nation-states with their estimated populations (ranked
in decreasing order of millions) and official state languages (Haarmann
1995).

As Table 1.1 makes clear, there are large differences in population

size among EU nation-states. German, French, English, Italian, Spanish
and Polish belong to the six most widely spoken official state languages
in the present EU, while Turkish would come second to German in a
further enlarged EU. Table 1.1 also shows that – with the exceptions of
Belgium, Austria and Cyprus – in 27 out of 30 cases, distinct official
state languages are the clearest feature used by state enterprises to dis-
tinguish themselves from their neighbours and so to claim their national
authority (Barbour 2000). This match between nation-state references
and official state language references obscures the very existence of
other languages that are actually spoken across European nation-states.
Many of these languages are indigenous minority languages with a
regional base, but there are many others that stem from abroad and are
characterized by another territorial link. Extra and Gorter (2001, 2008)

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

refer to these ‘other’ languages as regional minority (RM) and immi-
grant minority (IM) languages, respectively. Their downgraded status is
in line with the equation of language and nation-state. However, the
traditional nation-state model that acknowledges only official state lan-
guages cannot offer an adequate basis for societal belonging in this age
of globalization and migration (Castles 2005: 314).

Table 1.1

Overview of 30 EU (candidate) nation-states with estimated popu-

lations and official state languages (EU figures for 2007)

Nation-states

Population

(in millions)

Ofﬁ cial state language(s)

Germany

82.5

German

France

60.9

French

United Kingdom

60.4

English

Italy

58.8

Italian

Spain

43.8

Spanish

Poland

38.1

Polish

Romania

21.6

Romanian

The Netherlands

16.3

Dutch (Nederlands)

Greece

11.1

Greek

Portugal

10.6

Portuguese

Belgium

10.5

Dutch, French, German

Czech Republic

10.3

Czech

Hungary

10.1

Hungarian

Sweden

9.0

Swedish

Austria

8.3

German

Bulgaria

7.7

Bulgarian

Denmark

5.4

Danish

Slovakia

5.4

Slovak

Finland

5.3

Finnish

Ireland

4.2

Irish, English

Lithuania

3.4

Lithuanian

Latvia

2.3

Latvian

Slovenia

2.0

Slovenian

Estonia

1.3

Estonian

Cyprus

0.8

Greek, Turkish

Luxembourg

0.5

Luxemburgisch, French, German

Malta

0.4

Maltese, English

Candidate

nation-states

Population

(in millions)

Ofﬁ cial state language

Turkey

72.5

Turkish

Croatia

4.4

Croatian

Macedonia

2.0

Macedonian

Testing regimes for newcomers

Europe displays significant differences when looked at from a supra-

national institutional angle and when looked at in terms of a geogra-
phical unit (Gal 2006: 24). Both angles, though, converge when Europe
echoes a set of meanings that contrast with who and what is there out-
side of its territory. These who’s and what’s are world regions with their
own temporal connotations, but they are also people who try to access
Europe and who are characterized by social, cultural and linguistic
diversity. With the post-1991 migration flux, Europe’s scope and refer-
ence have changed considerably. The relationship between language,
nation-states and national identities has become less static, and changes
have occurred in three different arenas (Oakes 2001):

In the national arenas of the EU member-states: the traditional iden-
tity of these nation-states has been challenged by major demographic
changes (in particular in urban areas) as a consequence of processes
of international migration and intergenerational minorization.
In the supranational arena: the concept of a European identity has
emerged as a consequence of increasing cooperation and integration
at the European level.
In the global arena: our world has become smaller and more interac-
tive as a consequence of the increasing availability of new forms of
information and communication technology.

Major changes in each of these three arenas have led inhabitants of

Europe to no longer identify exclusively with singular nation-states.
Instead, they show multiple affiliations that range from transnational
ones to both global and local ones. The notion of a European identity
is a tangible product of these changes. Formally expressed for the first
time in the Declaration on European Identity of December 1973 in
Copenhagen, numerous European institutions and policy documents
have propagated and promoted this idea ever since, culminating in the
(rejected) proposal for a European Constitution in 2004. In discussing
the concept of a European identity, Oakes (2001: 127–131) emphasizes
that the recognition of the concept of multiple transnational identities
is a prerequisite rather than an obstacle. Such recognition not only
occurs among the traditional inhabitants of European nation-states but
also among members of IM communities across Europe (Phalet and
Swyngedouw 2002). Apart from identifying with ethno-religious fea-
tures that link them to their country of origin, IM communities also
hold ties with their host country. Key to a European identity is the abil-
ity to deal with increasing cultural and linguistic heterogeneity, thus
presenting multilingualism as an asset rather than a burden for twenty-
first century ‘Europeans’ (Van Londen and De Ruijter 1999; Brumfit
2006). Taken from the perspective that migrants are characterized by

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

a transnational mindset, a transnational identification and multilingual
competencies, IM community members across Europe could be consid-
ered as role models instead of ‘deficit groups’ for the development of
a European identity. The prevalent public, political and educational
discourses in Europe’s nation-states, however, still picture them as
outsiders. They neither receive the trophy of transnationality’s role
models within the official EU discourse, nor are they included in the
nation, lan guage and identity equation. Rather, both national and supra-
national discourses address the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity
of newly arrived migrants, of IM community members and of their
descendants as undermining the national (common) order. As such,
although immigrants might have embraced several different forms of
truncated multilingualism (Blommaert et al. 2000), they remain differ-
ent from indigenous majority and minority nationals and still have a
long way to go to citizenship.

1.3 The European discourse on foreigners and

integration

When going through the jargon used in the European public and poli-
tical discourse to refer to IM groups and to their languages, two major
characteristics emerge (Extra and Barni 2008). First, IM groups are often
referred to as non-national residents (allochtonen, étrangers, Ausländer,
foreigners, depending on the country taken into consideration). The
same connotation of not belonging to the nation also applies to their
languages addressed as non-territorial, non-regional, non-indigenous
or non-European. In the current European discourse, this conceptual
exclusion instead of inclusion derives from a restrictive interpretation
of the notions of citizenship and nationality. From a historical point of
view, such notions are commonly shaped by a constitutional jus san-
guinis (law of the blood), in terms of which nationality derives from
parental origins, in contrast to jus soli (law of the soil), in terms of
which nationality derives from the country of birth. When European
emigrants left their continent in the past and colonized countries
abroad, they legitimized their claim to citizenship by spelling out jus
soli in the constitutions of these countries of settlement. Good exam-
ples of this strategy can be found in English-dominant immigration
(sub)continents like the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa (see
Johnson et al. 1999 for an analysis of the concepts of naturalization and
citizenship in the USA; see also Gales, this Volume). In establishing the
constitutions of these (sub)continents, no consultation took place with
indigenous peoples, such as native Americans, Inuit, Aboriginals and
Zulus, respectively. At home, however, Europeans predominantly upheld

Testing regimes for newcomers

jus sanguinis in their constitutions and/or perceptions of nationality
and citizenship, in spite of the growing numbers of newcomers who
strive for an equal status as citizens (Extra and Yag˘mur 2004: 11–24).

The second major characteristic is the overarching focus on integra-

tion and the call on newcomers, and more generally on IM populations,
to integrate. Although extremely popular nowadays, the call for inte-
gration stands in sharp contrast to the jargon of exclusion reported
above. The notion of integration remains vague and therefore politically
popular as well. Integration may refer to a wide spectrum of underlying
concepts that vary across nation-states’ discourses of belonging, being
variation over space, and within their discourses of belonging, being
variation over time. Miles and Thränhardt (1995), Bauböck et al. (1996),
Kruyt and Niessen (1997), Joppke and Morawska (2003), Böcker et al.
(2004) and Michalowski (2004) are good examples of comparative case
studies on the notion of integration in a variety of EU countries that
have been faced with increasing immigration since the early 1970s. The
extremes of the conceptual spectrum range from assimilation to multi-
culturalism. The concept of assimilation is based on the premise that
cultural differences between IM groups and established majority groups
should and will disappear over time in a society which is proclaimed
to be culturally homogeneous from the majority point of view. At the
other end of the spectrum, the concept of multiculturalism is based on
the premise that such differences are an asset to a pluralistic society,
which actually promotes cultural diversity in terms of new resources
and opportunities. While the concept of assimilation focuses on unilat-
eral tasks for newcomers, the concept of multiculturalism focuses on
multilateral tasks for all inhabitants in changing societies. In actual
practice, established majority groups often make strong demands on IM
groups to assimilate and are commonly very reluctant to promote or
even accept the notion of cultural diversity as a determining character-
istic of increasingly multicultural societies.

Residence in a country does not necessarily imply citizenship, as many

newcomers to a nation-state find out soon enough. Across European
nation-states, there are variable demands on newcomers for obtaining
citizenship with all its rights and obligations. In their European Inclu-
sion Index, Leonard and Griffith (2005) offer the following checklist of
indicators for citizenship and inclusion:

What is the legal basis for citizenship of the member state?
Is dual nationality allowed?
How efficient/lengthy is the processing of citizenship applications?
How much does it cost the applicant?
What are the refusal rates?

z
z
z
z
z

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Does the applicant have a right to know the reasons for refusal?
How many years of legal residence does it take to become naturalized?
What civic/language requirements do member states impose for
citizenship?
Do governments provide language sessions? If so, how many hours
are provided free of charge?
Are citizenship lessons/tests a requirement?
Is language tuition provided?
What is the temperature of public opinion towards third-country
nationals, immigrants and minorities?
Is the government putting in place programmes aimed at shifting
public opinion?

In cooperation between the British Council and the Migration Policy

Group, both posted in Brussels, Citron and Gowan (2005) made a first
large-scale attempt to collect, analyse and present comparative cross-
national data in each of the 15 ‘old’ EU member-states on the following
five policy areas of civic citizenship and inclusion: labour market
inclusion, long-term residence, family reunion, nationality and anti-
discrimination. On the basis of the outcomes for each of these areas,
an Index was developed for the status quo of policies in each of the
member-states, measured against a European standard. As a follow-up
to this pilot European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, Niessen et
al. (2007) together with the same partners developed what they have
recently come to refer to as a Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)
for each of the more recent 26 EU member-states plus Switzerland
and Canada. In addition to the five areas referred to above, policies on
political participation were included in the comparative analyses. The
resulting country profiles are based on the outcomes of 140 indicators
for the six areas of study. In a cumulative proportional overall Index,
Sweden (88), Portugal (79), Belgium (69) and The Netherlands (68) take
up top-positions in the EU ranking, whereas Greece (40), Austria (39),
Cyprus (39) and Latvia (30) end up in bottom-positions. The 26 EU
countries score worst on policies for access to nationality and policies
for political participation. The MIPEX database is publicly available for
secondary analyses on the MIPEX website (www.integrationindex.eu).

Although the MIPEX data offer fascinating visualized cross-national

perspectives on the status quo of policies for all of the six areas
referred to above, they raise quite a number of methodological questions.
There is the problem of the definition and comparability of the concept
of ‘migrants’ across nation-states, the absence of a perspective on differ-
ent ethnocultural groups and the questionable reliability and validity
of scores obtained for each domain of analysis. In addition, the data

z
z
z

Testing regimes for newcomers

presented are based on evaluated policies on paper (i.e., document
analyses), which do not necessarily coincide with policies in practice.

Most importantly, however, the concept of ‘integration’ remains prob-

lematic, as was outlined before. It is interesting to compare the underly-
ing assumptions of ‘integration’ in the European public and political
discourse on IM groups at the national level with the assumptions made
at the level of cross-national cooperation and legislation. Across the EU,
politicians are eager to stress the importance of a proper balance between
the loss and maintenance of ‘national’ norms and values. A prime con-
cern in the public debate on such norms and values is cultural and
linguistic diversity, mainly in terms of the national languages of the EU.
National languages are often referred to as core values of cultural iden-
tity. Paradoxically, in the same public discourse, IM languages and cul-
tures are commonly conceived of as sources of problems and deficits
and as obstacles to integration, while national languages and cultures
in an expanding EU are regarded as sources of enrichment and as pre-
requisites for integration.

The public discourse on the integration of IM groups in terms of

assimilation versus multiculturalism can also be noticed in the domain
of education. Due to the growing numbers of IM pupils, schools are
faced with the challenge of adapting their curricula to this trend. Cur-
ricular modifications may be inspired by a strong and unilateral empha-
sis on learning (in) the dominant language of the majority in society,
given the significance of this language for success at school and on the
labour market, or by the awareness that the response to emerging mul-
ticultural school populations cannot be reduced to monolingual educa-
tion programming (Gogolin 1994). In the former case, the focus is on
learning (in) the national standard language as a second language, in
the latter case on offering more languages in the school curriculum. For
comparative European studies on this theme we refer to Barni and Extra
(2008), Extra and Gorter (2008) and Extra and Yag˘mur (2004).

At the EU level, the European Council meeting of Ministers of the

Interior/Integration, held in June 2003 in Thessaloniki, stressed the
importance of developing cooperation and exchange of information with
the newly established National Contact Points on Integration. At a follow-
up European Council meeting in November 2004 in The Hague, a series
of common basic principles were approved including the following:

integration is a dynamic two-sided process;
integration presupposes respect for the basic values of the EU;
basic knowledge of the language, history, and institutions of the
country of settlement is indispensable for integration;
employment plays a key role in the integration process.

z
z
z

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Moreover, a Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practi-

tioners (www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home) was presented, pre-
pared by Jan Niessen and Yongmi Schnibel of the Migration Policy Group,
on behalf of the European Commission (DG for Justice, Freedom and
Security), as an official publication of the European Communities,
Luxembourg 2004. According to the publishers, this Handbook offers
best experiences learned from 26 EU member-states on the following
themes: introduction courses for newly arrived immigrants and recog-
nized refugees, civic participation and indicators. It was developed in
close cooperation with the above-mentioned National Contact Points
on Integration and aims to promote the creation of a coherent European
framework on integration by facilitating the exchange of experience
and information. The Handbook is addressed to policy makers and
practitioners at the local, regional, national and EU levels.

In many cases across Europe, it is language that fulfils the role of

lubricant of the integration machinery and that works as a gatekeeper
of the national order. Although differences in national approaches can
be observed, it cannot be denied that a proliferation of integration tests
and courses is spreading across Europe through policy emulation
(Leung and Lewkowicz, 2006; Foblets et al. 2008). At the beginning of
2007, a small-scale study was conducted in cooperation with the Asso-
ciation of Language Testers in Europe (ALTE, www.alte.org) to compare
integration and citizenship policies across Europe. Data were collected
by ALTE members in 18 countries. Although an earlier ALTE survey in
2002 showed that 4 out of 14 countries (29 per cent) had language con-
ditions for citizenship, the 2007 survey showed that five years later this
number had grown to 11 out of 18 countries (61 per cent). Some coun-
tries, like Italy, which in 2007 did not have language requirements for
integration and citizenship, are in the process of revising their integra-
tion policy in the direction of such requirements. For a detailed com-
parison of European countries’ integration policies in this domain, we
refer to Van Avermaet (2008) and Van Oers (2006). In a small-scale com-
parative study of immigration policies in ten European countries, Dispas
(2003) revealed that in most of these countries the word ‘assimilation’
tends to be replaced by the supposedly politically correct concept of
‘integration’. A subsequent, more in-depth analysis of these integration
policies, however, reveals that, over a period of ten years, a shift can be
observed from policies that acknowledge cultural pluralism to policies
that emphasize the actual assimilation into the ‘host country’. This
means that in these cases the word ‘integration’ is not used in its mutu-
ally inclusive sense.

While the process of setting up stricter immigration conditions with

a strong emphasis on language is fairly common across Europe, the

Testing regimes for newcomers

developed policies and discourses at nation-state level do differ and
hidden agendas evidently feature in immigration policies across Europe.
In some cases, these policies are used as a mechanism for exclusion
(Extra and Spotti, this Volume). In others, they function as a mechanism
for controlled immigration. The discourse and the policies themselves
are often an expression of the dominant majority group. A policy may
be chosen as a firm defence against ‘Islam terrorism’ and be embedded
in a discourse that takes advantage of the ‘fear’ brought on by the possi-
bility of a terrorist attack. To some extent, these immigrant policies
have to be seen as a token of the revival of the nation-state, with its tra-
ditional paradigm of one language, one identity, and one uniform set of
shared societal norms and cultural values. This is supposed to instil
people with a feeling of national security, confidence and order. This
revival of the nation-state stands in stark contrast to the processes of
globalization and the enlargement of the EU on the one hand and the
increasing importance attached to regions, localities, cities and neigh-
bourhoods on the other, referred to as processes of glocalization (De Bot
et al. 2001).

1.4 The common European framework

of reference

Integration – whether societal or linguistic – is not only a word in the
mouths of the many who employ it when confronted with ‘others’ or
with how ‘others’ make the headlines, mostly in terms of what they
lack rather than what they own and may contribute. More particularly,
the concept of integration finds support in a battery of instruments pro-
moted at the European level. Europe’s main institutions, the Council
of Europe and the European Union, are major actors in promoting a
multilingual Europe and in promoting plurilingualism of all its citizens
(Extra and Gorter 2008). Many European countries have adopted the
Council of Europe’s Common European Framework of Reference for
Languages (henceforth CEFR, 2001) as a basic instrument for the devel-
opment of language policies for admission, residence and/or citizen-
ship of immigrants. The CEFR defines levels of language proficiency
that allow learners’ progress to be measured at each stage of learning
and on a life-long basis.

The major aim of the CEFR is to offer a frame of reference, a meta-

language. It wants to promote and facilitate co-operation among educa-
tional institutions in different countries. It aims to provide a transnational
basis for the mutual recognition of language qualifications. A further
aim is to assist learners, teachers, course designers, examining bodies
and educational administrators to co-ordinate their efforts. And a final

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

aim is to create transparency in helping partners in language teaching
and learning to describe the levels of proficiency required by existing
standards and examinations in order to facilitate comparisons between
different systems of qualifications. It is important to emphasize that
the CEFR is not a prescriptive model or a fixed set or book of language
aims.

The CEFR consists of two underlying dimensions. On the one hand,

it has a quantitative dimension with concepts like domains (school,
home, work), functions (ask, command, inquire), notions (south, table,
father), situations (meeting, telephone), locations (school, market), top-
ics (study, holidays, work), and roles (listener in audience, participant
in a discussion). The qualitative dimension, on the other hand, expresses
the degree of effectiveness (precision) and efficiency (leading to com-
munication) of language learning. Scales are provided for many of the
parameters of language proficiency. This makes it possible to specify
differentiated profiles for particular learners or groups of learners.

The descriptive scheme has been defined as follows:

Language use comprises the actions performed by persons who as
individuals and as social agents develop a range of competences,
both general and in particular communicative language competences.
They draw on the competences at their disposal in various contexts
under various conditions and under various constraints to engage
in language activities involving language processes to produce and/
or receive texts in relation to themes in specific domains, activating
those strategies which seem most appropriate for carrying out the
tasks to be accomplished. (Council of Europe 2001: 9)

The key elements that can be distinguished in the descriptive

scheme are communicative language competence, language activities and
domains. The chapter on communicative language competence con-
sists of a description of linguistic competences, sociolinguistic compe-
tences and pragmatic competences. In addition, an in-depth description
of language activities is provided. Instead of the traditional four skills
of reading, writing, speaking and listening, the CEFR is based on a more
dynamic, interaction-oriented approach of describing communicative
skills. It distinguishes between reception, including listening compre-
hension and reading comprehension; interaction, including spoken
interaction and written interaction; production, which includes spoken
production and written production and finally mediation. The third
key element within the descriptive scheme chapter consists of domains.
Language activities are contextualized within domains. These may be
very diverse themselves, but for most practical purposes in relation to
language learning the CEFR classifies them into four domains, being
the public, personal, educational and occupational domain.

Testing regimes for newcomers

Next to the descriptive scheme, the CEFR formulates a number of

common reference levels. A set of six defined criterion levels (A1, A2,
B1, B2, C1, C2) are distinguished for use as common standards (see
Appendix). These common standards are intended to help the provid-
ers of courses and examinations to relate their products such as course
books, teaching courses and assessment instruments to a common ref-
erence system, and hence, indirectly, to each other.

As mentioned before, the cornerstone of integration policies in most

European countries is language. Language here has to be read as the
national or standard language of the dominant group in a particular
country. Knowledge of this national language at particular levels is the
main condition for those who want to apply for admission, residence
and citizenship. To realize this monolingual policy, many European
countries use the CEFR as a tool. This raises a number of questions.
The CEFR has been developed for the learning, teaching and assessing
of foreign language skills and not for a context of second language
learning. However, most immigrants learn the language of their host
country from scratch. The CEFR descriptors at the lower levels clearly
imply an already existing basic knowledge and literacy. This is prob-
lematic when they are used for integration and citizenship programmes
and for tests where a large part of the target group are either function-
ally illiterate or have low literacy skills. The CEFR descriptors at higher
levels presuppose higher levels of education. Lower- and semi-skilled
people who have no higher education background or do not study at a
higher level are not part of the target group. Moreover, the CEFR descrip-
tors mainly refer to adults and adolescents; they are less appropriate
for children or young learners. And yet, in some European countries
the CEFR is used in primary and secondary education for both young
and old ‘newcomers’, being for newly arrived immigrants and their
children.

The misuse or misinterpretation of the CEFR becomes even more

problematic once we take into account the consequences attached to
language courses and tests for immigrants. On the basis of being unsuc-
cessful at a language test that was never intended for these purposes,
people are refused citizenship, residence or even admission. Policy
makers determine a level of language proficiency required for admission,
residence or citizenship of immigrants by using the CEFR six-level sys-
tem with the global scale as outlined in the Appendix to this chapter.
This approach looks user-friendly, straightforward and simple. However,
often without any rationale or validation, a particular CEFR level of
language proficiency is chosen when developing a language policy for
integration of immigrants. This is clearly illustrated by the variation
in CEFR levels chosen for admission, residence or citizenship across

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Europe (Van Avermaet 2008). In Denmark, the level of language profi-
ciency set for citizenship is B2; in The Netherlands it is A2. Moreover,
the level descriptors in the CEFR are often used as the basis for test
development. However, many of the descriptors lack both precision
and specificity, as a result of which test development for a specific lan-
guage at a specific level and for a specific purpose is not so straightfor-
ward as it may seem at first sight. The uncertainty increases when we
expect empirical evidence for a claim of a test at a certain CEFR level.
There is no real empirical evidence for what a language learner can
actually do at a certain level (Chapter 4 of the CEFR) nor for what the
given competencies of a learner are at a certain level (Chapter 5 of the
CEFR). Furthermore, there is no theory in the CEFR for what language
proficiency actually is and certainly not for L2 acquisition. However,
our main concern in the context of this Volume is that the CEFR, which
is essentially meant as a tool to promote plurilingualism, is used by
some policy makers as a scientific justification to promote monolin-
gualism in official state languages and to focus more on what newcom-
ers lack than on what they might be able to contribute and add in terms
of resources to a more diverse society (see also Stevenson, this Volume).
It is clear that the CEFR is not to blame for all of this, but it is important
to warn against its misinterpretation or misuse.

1.5 Structure and contents of this book

As it is impossible to deal with all aspects of testing regimes in cross-
national perspectives, we selected a total of 12 case studies for this
Volume. These case studies are grouped into two parts, 8 cases within
and across Europe and 4 cases outside Europe. Whereas Europe has
shifted from a continent of emigration to a continent of immigration,
immigrants from primarily European source countries have established
themselves in the nation-states in our selected cases abroad. The selec-
tion of European cases relies on the geographical spread of – larger
and smaller – EU countries and their official state languages from
Northern to Southern Europe. Furthermore, the cases selected cover
a wide spectrum ranging from rather liberal to very strict regimes of
admission, integration and (single or dual) citizenship, both across
countries (cf. Sweden vs. the Netherlands) and within countries (cf.
Flanders vs. Wallonia in Belgium). The selection made shows that the
testing regimes’ machinery varies not only in terms of geographical
space but also in terms of time (cf. the increasingly restrictive changes
in the access to citizenship in Australia). The common pattern across
nation-states is the emergence of increasing and increasingly complex

Testing regimes for newcomers

formal demands on knowledge of a/the national language and knowledge
of society. Key issues in all the contributions to this Volume are the
following:

which knowledge in these two domains is demanded by whom and
from whom?
how is this knowledge tested?
what are the implications of failure to pass?

Going from Northern to Southern Europe, the first part of this Volume

starts with an integrated chapter on the three Baltic Republics, all of
them being newcomers to the EU and having a historical contextuali-
zation which is very different from our other EU cases. What follows is
the Nordic example of Sweden with its rather liberal testing regime.
The United Kingdom and Germany are dealt with next and are followed
by three successive chapters on the BENELUX, Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg, respectively. The case of Belgium constitutes the
internally drawn crossing line between EU countries where Germanic
versus Romance languages are dominant. The Netherlands belongs to
the EU countries with the most complex and restrictive testing regimes
for newcomers, Belgium is a federal state with divergent integration
policies in Dutch-dominant Flanders and French-dominant Wallonia,
and Luxembourg is home to the highest proportion of foreign residents
in the EU, making up nearly half of the present population. The last
European case is Spain, an EU country with a recent and rapid shift
towards immigration after centuries of emigration. In the second part
of this Volume, we move to four non-European countries with a strong
history of immigration, in particular and at least initially from European
source countries. The USA and Australia are examples of English-
dominant immigration countries. Canada portrays itself as a bilingual
English-French immigration country with corresponding language
regimes. Finally, Israel is a Hebrew-dominant immigration country with
highly ideologically charged regimes on admission, integration and
citizenship as a consequence of the equation of (Jewish) ethnicity, reli-
gion and the concept of nation-state.

In her opening chapter, Gabrielle Hogan-Brun illustrates in great

detail how the language and citizenship laws that were enforced shortly
after the independence gained by the Baltic Republics in 2004 became
instrumental in determining citizenship applications based on an exam-
ination of language competence and cultural knowledge. By drawing
on a set of data taken from Latvia’s divided press, being both Russian-
and Latvian-medium, the author concludes that innocuous values –
generally based on recognition of norms relating to human rights and

z
z

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

tolerance for others – have quite an influence on the expectations the
majority of the people have with respect to minorities. That is, minori-
ties ought to conform to and be examined in their knowledge of the core
values of the Latvian nation-state.

The chapter on the Baltic Republics is followed by Lilian Nygren-

Junkin’s updated landscaping of the regulations surrounding immi-
gration, language and citizenship in Sweden. Because of an enduring
acquaintance of centuries with labour market immigration which has
left its marks on the Swedish language, and contrary to the more
general European trend, immigration and citizenship have only recently
become the subject of heated debate in Swedish politics. After having
secured permanent resident status – and with no serious governmental
attempt to ascertain citizenship through language testing – staying in
Sweden eventually brings the migrant to a stage where he or she can
file an application for citizenship.

In contrast to the more liberal Swedish approach to immigration,

Adrian Blackledge’s chapter considers the recently emerged symbiosis
among debates on English language and debates on immigration in the
United Kingdom. Blackledge ascertains that proficiency in English for
all UK residents together with fostering respect for and knowledge of
‘life in the United Kingdom’ are both seen as essentials for social cohe-
sion and modernist promulgation of national identity. Through a fine-
grained analysis of the recent discourse in the debate on language
testing for immigrants in the United Kingdom, Blackledge condemns
the fact that legislation does not draw a distinction between testing for
language proficiency on the one hand and language learning on the
other. Furthermore, he points out that legislation avoids any explicit
reference to the linguistic resources which immigrants bring along
upon their arrival on UK soil.

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze’s chapter on Germany shares

Blackledge’s preoccupation with language debates and curricula aimed
at paying lip service to the nation-state integration agenda. The authors
explore the consequences of German unification by charting the ways
in which knowledge of German, the official language of a ‘modern’
country of immigration, has been called upon in migration and citizen-
ship debates. Their analysis acknowledges a significant shift in public
and political discourses in Germany with respect to the use of such
concepts as integration and inclusive citizenship. However, the authors
also point out that the newly drawn-up integration plan in Germany
still has to prove its adequacy in meeting its noble aims. The plan has
to prove whether it will manage to move away from an emphasis on
migrants’ deficiencies towards an emphasis on the potential they bring
in as new citizens.

Testing regimes for newcomers

The United Kingdom and Germany are followed by Van Avermaet

and Gysen’s chapter, which analyses policies for integration and citi-
zenship of immigrants in the context of Belgium and of its three con-
stituent regions: Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels Capital Region.
Although officially trilingual and indicated as a country with a high
level of linguistic consciousness, Belgium displays a deep diversity in
the approaches and responsibilities of its government bodies in terms
of immigration, integration, naturalization and citizenship. In their
chapter, it becomes very clear that instead of a unified Belgian model
for integration, we find two rather different approaches. More specifi-
cally, there is a difference in integration policies between the two major
regions as there is in the emphasis put on language proficiency as pivotal
to successful integration. The emphasis on integration and language
proficiency is stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia. This phenomenon
reflects a more Latin universalistic approach to language, migration
and territory for Wallonia and a more Anglo-Saxon differentialistic
approach for Flanders. A shift can thus be detected from language learn-
ing as a right towards language learning as an obligation. From what-
ever angle it is tackled, however, the burden of integration rests on the
shoulders of the immigrant.

The burden brought on by testing regimes weighs heavily on the

migrant’s shoulders in the chapter by Extra and Spotti that deals with
rites of passage that newcomers face from the very moment they wish
to enter the Netherlands up to the point where they may wish to apply
for citizenship. The authors venture into the jargon of Dutch civic inte-
gration that together with the political discourse before and after 2007
appears to have set the trend for many European countries and their
immigration policies. The authors also point out that what is demanded
from newcomers in terms of knowledge about Dutch society is not com-
mon knowledge shared by the ‘average’ Dutch citizen. Furthermore,
many native Dutch people still consider tolerance and openness as
characteristics that are part of their national identity. The view that
foreign observers have on these matters points to the opposite. As a
consequence of the strict measures and discourses adopted by its gov-
ernment, the Netherlands as a country is losing its image of tolerance
and cosmopolitanism.

Language, mobility and citizenship are again the focus of attention

in Kristine Horner’s chapter, in which she analyses the situation of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. In so doing, she presents a comprehen-
sive overview of the language debate that has characterized the Grand
Duchy’s history and the ideologies that have escorted Luxembourgish to
hold the number one position as the country’s national language. Further,
Horner outlines that Luxembourg is home to the highest proportion of

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

foreign residents in the EU, the majority of whom are holders of EU
passports. This compositional diversity of its population provides a
glimpse of the linguistic heterogeneity Luxembourg is confronted with
at present. Such embedded diversity stands in sharp contrast, however,
to the Luxembourg state approach to legal citizenship. Luxembourgish
and/or the emphasis on a trilingual ideal are instances of competing
indexical, or even iconic, features of authentic ‘Luxembourgishness’.

While the previous chapters were all focused on debates surround-

ing admission, integration and citizenship in countries with a relatively
long history of immigration, the chapter by Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-
Molinero widens the discussion to Spain, a country acquainted mainly
with emigration. The fact that Spain has faced a historical challenge
in the acknowledged coexistence of different languages spoken on its
territory is a well-known matter. Less known is the potential clash of
paradigms and destabilization that IM languages currently bring to the
Spanish sociolinguistic landscape, to its conception of language rights
and to its relationship with national identity. The authors argue that it
is for these reasons that the Spanish state has preferred adopting a more
reserved standpoint in matters of eligibility for citizenship and require-
ments for learning the so-called ‘national’ language.

Moving away from the European legacy presented in Part I of this

Volume, Part II grapples with matters of language testing for citizenship
outside Europe in contexts in which European immigrants at least ini-
tially played a major role in establishing such regimes. As a result, much
longer histories and documented experiences of testing regimes are
available in our case studies selected outside Europe. These histories
and experiences enhance our understanding of the conceptual presup-
positions surrounding the public and political debate on these issues
(see also Section 1). Tammy Gales, Lilian Nygren-Junkin, Tim McNamara,
Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza confront the reader with language
testing for citizenship in non-European states that are often addressed
in the literature as immigrant countries par excellence from an early
European perspective of emigration: the United States of America, Canada,
Australia and Israel.

In her chapter, Tammy Gales spells out clearly that for non-US born

individuals, the path for becoming a naturalized citizen has remained
fairly consistent since the late nineteenth century. In terms of language
requirements, in fact, the acquisition of citizenship asks for a basic abil-
ity to read, write and speak the English language while English is no
officially declared national language. As a test for immigration though,
there are other, more indirect, tests at work under the guise of official
language policies that affect non-English-speaking immigrants on an
ongoing daily basis. Permanent residents in the US who do not speak

Testing regimes for newcomers

English are increasingly subject to tests that limit their public and pri-
vate life spheres and are shadowed by feelings of being unpatriotic or,
even worse, un-American.

As for Canada, Lilian Nygren-Junkin shows that Canadian citizenship

is based on the jus soli; having a Canadian father or mother, or both,
actually plays no role in conferring citizenship rights. Canadian multi-
culturalism makes for a generally tolerant and eclectic society. Nygren-
Junkin further explains that to become a Canadian citizen today, a
person must be someone who is legally entitled to permanent residence
and who has lived in Canada for at least three years without a criminal
record. The author then comments on recent developments of the
Canadian test for citizenship and teases apart the requirements a suc-
cessful applicant has to meet to be awarded citizenship.

In his chapter, Tim McNamara focuses on the policy shift and change

over time in test requirements in relation to immigration and citizen-
ship in Australia. More specifically, he focuses on the introduction of a
literacy requirement that has a suspicious precedent in other contexts,
that of the old Dictation Test. Although it is still early days to judge the
impact that the new test will bring, the response to its initial implemen-
tation and the controversy that has come along with it underscore the
role of Australian language testers. They, in fact, have much more criti-
cal soul searching to do as to whether and how they wish to participate
in the implementation of citizenship policies that involve overt and
covert language-based tests.

No better case than Israel could be taken as the conclusive chapter to

a Volume on language testing regimes. In their chapter, Elana Shohamy
and Tzahi Kanza discuss citizenship policies and their intermingling
with ethnicity and religion. Their chapter demonstrates how language
ideologies – the Hebrew language being a symbol of national and col-
lective identity of Jews in the creation of the state of Israel – serve
as conditions for citizenship and are adhered to even without official
tests. In the Israeli context, the authors argue for different levels and
different types of citizenship so that obtaining citizenship does not
entail complete social participation. The view of citizenship as essen-
tially ‘hollow’ also occurs with regards to immigrants for whom know-
ledge of Hebrew functions as a gatekeeper for full integration.

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

APPENDIX

Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), Council of Europe, Strasbourg

Understanding

Speaking

riting

Listening

Reading

Spoken

interaction

Spoken production

ting

I have no difficulty in

understanding any

kind of spoken

language, whether

live or broadcast,

even when

delivered at fast

native speed,

provided I have

some time to get

familiar with the

accent.

I can read with ease

virtually all forms of

the written

language, including

abstract, structurally

or linguistically

complex texts such

as manuals,

specialized articles

and literary works.

I can take part

effortlessly in any

conversation or

discussion and have

a good familiarity

with idiomatic

expressions and

colloquialisms. I

can express myself

fluently and convey

finer shades or

meaning precisely

If I do have a

problem I can

backtrack and

restructure around

the difficulty so

smoothly that other

people are hardly

aware of it.

I can present a clear

smoothly flowing

description or

argument in a

style appropriate

to the context and

with an effective

logical structure

which helps the

recipient to notice

and remember

significant points.

I can write clear

smoothly flowing text

in an appropriate

style. I can write

complex letters,

reports or articles

which present a case

with a effective

logical structure

which helps the

recipient to notice

and remember

significant points. I

can write summaries

and reviews of

professional or

literary works.

Testing regimes for newcomers

I can understand

extended speech

even when it is not

clearly structured

and when

relationships are

only implied and

not signalled

explicitly

. I can

understand

television

programmes and

ﬁ

lms without too

much effort.

I can understand long

and complex factual

and literary texts,

appreciating

distinctions of style.

I can understand

specialized articles

and longer technical

instructions, even

when they do not

relate to my ﬁ

eld.

I can express myself

fluently and

spontaneously

without much

obvious searching

for expressions.

I can use language

flexibly and

effectively for social

and professional

purposes.

I can formulate ideas

and opinions with

precision and relate

my contribution

skillfully to those of

other speakers.

I can present clear

detailed

descriptions of

complex subjects

integrating sub-

themes,

developing

particular points

and rounding off

with an

appropriate

conclusion.

I can express myself in

clear

, well-structured

text, expressing points

of view at some

length. I can write

about complex

subjects in a letter

, an

essay or a report,

underlining what I

consider to be the

salient issues.

I can select style

appropriate to the

reader in mind.

(Continued

)

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), Council of Europe, Strasbourg (Cond’d)

Understanding

Speaking

riting

Listening

Reading

Spoken

interaction

Spoken production

ting

I can understand

extended speech

and lectures and

follow even

complex lines of

argument provided

the topic is

reasonably familiar

I can understand

most TV news and

current affairs

programmes. I can

understand the

majority of films in

standard dialect.

I can read articles and

reports concerned

with contemporary

problems in which

the writers adopt

particular attitudes

or viewpoints. I can

understand

contemporary

literary prose.

I can interact with a

degree of fluency

and spontaneity that

makes regular

interaction with

native speakers

quite possible.

I can take an active

part in discussion in

familiar contexts,

accounting for and

sustaining my

views.

I can present clear

detailed

descriptions on a

wide range of

subjects related to

my field of

interest. I can

explain a

viewpoint on a

topical issue,

giving the

advantages and

disadvantages of

various options.

I can write clear

detailed text on a

wide range of subjects

related to my field of

interests. I can write

an essay or report,

passing on

information or giving

reasons in support of

or against a particular

point of view

. I can

write letters

highlighting the

personal significance

of events and

experiences.

Testing regimes for newcomers

I can understand the

main points of clear

standard speech on

familiar matters

regularly

encountered in

work, school,

leisure, etc.

I can understand the

main point of many

radio or TV

programmes on

current affairs or

topics of personal or

professional interest

when the delivery is

relatively slow and

clear

I can understand texts

that consist mainly

of high frequency

everyday or job-

related language. I

can understand the

description of

events, feelings and

wishes in personal

letters.

I can deal with most

situations likely to

arise whilst

traveling in an area

where the language

is spoken. I can

enter unprepared

into conversation on

topics that are

familiar

, of personal

interest or pertinent

to everyday life (e.g.

family

, hobbies,

work, travel and

current events).

I can connect

phrases in a

simple way in

order to describe

experiences and

events, my

dreams, hopes and

ambitions. I can

brieﬂ

give

reasons and

explanations for

opinions and

plans. I can

narrate a story or

relate the plot of a

book or ﬁ

and

describe my

reactions.

I can write simple

connected text on

topics which are

familiar or of

personal interest. I

can write personal

letters describing

experiences and

impressions.

(Continued

)

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), Council of Europe, Strasbourg (Cond’d)

Understanding

Speaking

riting

Listening

Reading

Spoken

interaction

Spoken production

ting

I can understand

phrases and the

highest frequency

vocabulary related

to areas of most

immediate personal

relevance (e.g. very

basic personal and

family in

forma

tion,

shopping, local

area, employment).

I can catch the main

point in short, clear

simple messages

and announcements.

I can read very short,

simple texts. I can

find specific,

predictable

information in

simple everyday

material such as

advertisements,

prospectuses,

menus and

timetables, and I

can understand

short simple

personal letters.

I can communicate in

simple and routine

tasks requiring a

simple and direct

exchange of

information on

familiar topics and

activities. I can

handle very short

social exchanges,

even though I can’t

usually understand

enough to keep the

conversation going

myself.

I can use a series of

phrases and

sentences to

describe in simple

terms my family

and other people,

living conditions,

my educational

background and

my present or

most recent job.

I can write short, simple

notes and messages

relating to matters in

areas of immediate

need. I can write a

very simple personal

letter

, for example

thanking someone for

something.

Testing regimes for newcomers

I can recognize

familiar words and

very basic phrases

concerning myself,

my family and

immediate concrete

surroundings when

people speak slowly

and clearly

I can understand

familiar names,

words and very

simple sentences,

for example on

notices and posters

or in catalogues.

I can interact in a

simple way

provided the other

person is prepared

to repeat or rephrase

things at a slower

rate of speech and

help me formulate

what I’m trying to

say

. I can ask and

answer simple

questions in areas of

immediate need or

on very familiar

topics.

I can use simple

phrases and

sentences to

describe where

I live and people

I know

I can write a short,

simple postcard, for

example sending

holiday greetings.

I can ﬁ

ll in forms

with personal

details, for example

entering my name,

nationality and

address on a hotel

registration form.

Guus Extra, Massimiliano Spotti and Piet Van Avermaet

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2.1 Introduction

Increasing transnational movements of people, particularly since the
2004 round of the European Union’s (EUs) eastward enlargement, have
led to a fresh focus on borders generating a new politics of migration
both in the new and old member-states. While the EU has become par-
ticularly concerned with the projection of territorial borders for the
regulation of new and more diverse migration flows, the maintenance
of functional and organizational borders has primarily remained in
the national domain (Geddes 2005: 790). Territorial control is in some
senses exercised at the international level with the 1985 Schengen
agreement in place that allows for the harmonization of external border
controls between participating countries. Functional and organiza-
tional borders of access to the labour market, welfare and citizenship
on the other hand involve the migrants’ making some claim (e.g., for
welfare benefits) in return for reciprocal responsibilities (e.g., learning
the national language). In dealing with the geopolitical widening of
migration, the organizational borders set by nation-states have become
more firmly linked with conceptual ones. As a consequence, new forms
of national policy responses to (new) migrants have evolved that are
more assimilatory and involve greater emphasis on socio-economic and
linguistic adaptation (Brubaker 2001).

With regard to citizenship, Squires (2002: 228f) distinguishes between

the rights/responsibility axis that is mostly used in mainstream Western
political theory, the territorial/cosmopolitan axis that is adopted in the-
oretical reflections upon nations and nationalism and the universal/
particular axis, focusing on the merits of and foundations for universal
norms and evaluation. The rights/responsibilities approach that sees
membership of a community as a status based on possession of specific
rights with associated responsibilities has increasingly become coupled
with the territorial/cosmopolitan approach to citizenship, thus rein-
forcing the boundary-staking functions of citizenship as a legal basis.
In this context, the right to enter or remain in a country has become a

The politics of language and
citizenship in the Baltic context

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

critical issue for citizenship and intensified the gatekeeping role of the
state to regulate access to territory. In contrast, and possibly fuelled
by globalization, the universalist paradigm seeks a more differentiated
model of citizenship that ensures fundamental rights based on broader
norms. Debates on citizenship issues tend to revolve around each of
these three axes.

In political debates on integration, migrants are increasingly linked

to security issues as well as rights. This ‘security-rights nexus’ (Sasse
2005: 673) is differently applied in EU’s old and new member-states,
with more attention being paid to the securitization of rights in the East
and to both security and rights in the West. These diverging approaches
to social inclusion and citizenship are essentially contextually embedded
(cf. Hansen 2002), and they frequently develop their own dynamics at
the national level. In the West, a shift has been observed to introduce
naturalization procedures, practised in the East since the mid-1990s,
which involve language proficiency testing for obtaining citizenship.
Because of the diverse state (formation) histories in Europe, the socio-
political context in which these new conditions have been set up and
language tests developed differ widely. While new countries or recently
re-established nation-states in Central/Eastern Europe are concerned
with instituting, or, in the case of the latter, overturning formerly
imposed language regimes, the challenge perceived in the West relates
to the increasing impact of multiculturalism resulting from extensive
westward migration. In the post-communist settings of Central/Eastern
Europe, where ethno-cultural diversity still tends to be perceived as an
existential threat to states, discourses on sameness and difference are
often embedded in the ‘security/loyalty’ framework (Kymlicka 2001:
22; Hogan-Brun 2005). In this region, identity politics has increasingly
become part of hegemonic discourse and political practice (O’Reilly
2001: 2), and language and culture continue to play a principal role
in nationalist ideologies against a largely heterogeneous reality that is a
legacy of past settings.

In what follows, we illustrate how, soon after the restitution of

independence in the Baltic Republics, the language and citizenship
laws that came into force were instrumental in determining national
naturalization procedures based on an examination of language compe-
tence and cultural knowledge. A case study that analyses the discursive
meaning-making in Latvia’s divided Russian and Latvian-medium press
is provided to highlight the role and salience of groups and political
actors in the shaping of approaches to the management of social diversity.
In conclusion, we shall see that though the values to which non-nationals
are required to subscribe are in fact generally based on recognition of
norms relating to human rights, and the rule of law and tolerance for

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

others (along the rights/responsibility axis), they are also presented
with an expectation to conform, and be examined in their knowledge
of, the core values of the nation-state in line with the territorial/cosmo-
politan axis if they aspire to become citizens.

2.2 Geopolitical and historical context

In the Baltic States, 50 years of planned Soviet immigration and popu-
lation transfer policies led to demographic changes, when a marked
increase in speakers of Russian paralleled a decrease in native speakers.
A large Russophone group (mainly Belorussians, Ukrainians, Jews and
Poles) had emerged, who used Russian as a lingua franca in both public
and private life. Some Baltic nationals had also switched to Russian,
which had led to asymmetrical bilingualism on their part. In the last
Soviet census held in 1989, 34.8 per cent of the total population in
Estonia, 42.5 per cent in Latvia and 11.7 per cent in Lithuania claimed
Russian as their first language (Hogan-Brun et al. 2007).

Language and culture have played a key role in the reconstruction

and consolidation of national identity in the Baltic Republics prior to
and after their restoration of sovereignty following Soviet rule. Long-term
language and integration policies with constitutionally anchored legal
backing were set in motion to deal with the complex ethno-demographical
situation which the Baltic countries inherited as a legacy of long-term
Soviet-time immigration. In each republic, over time the central criteria
evolved into the creation of social conditions that would ultimately
ease accession to the EU. The means to re-establish the official status
and sociolinguistic functionality of the titular languages after the resti-
tution of independence are strikingly similar in the three republics
and have evolved through a centralist approach. The main objective
of national language policy in this region is to guarantee the status of
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian as the only official language in each
republic, respectively, as enunciated in each Constitution and detailed
in several language laws. This has been a complex process, involving
inversion of the Soviet period language hierarchy. Language legislation
has continued to figure prominently here and is extensively focused on
in Hogan-Brun et al. (2007).

Proficiency in ‘national’ languages is considered to be a key element

or even prerequisite for social cohesion and integration and to reverse
the state of asymmetric bilingualism. Backed by explicit state language
laws, language testing procedures for citizenship were introduced in
all three republics. Proficiency in the titular language is considered to
be a key element. The question however remains as to what extent pos-
session of such language competence certificates affects actual language

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

behaviour in the private social and private economic spheres, particu-
larly in areas with dense Russian-speaking populations such as North-
Eastern Estonia, Tallinn, Riga, Liepaja, Jurmala, Latgale and Visaginas.
Overall, the percentage of people who claim to have proficiency in the
official language of their country of residence has increased over the
years.

2.3 Citizenship

The issue of citizenship had already started to be discussed in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania during the late 1980s. Concerns over citizenship
were clearly tied to the view that the Baltic Republics were illegitimately
occupied, and hence that the demographic influx itself during the Soviet
period was also illegitimate. While no open claims could be made when
the area was under Soviet control, this point was subsequently impressed
on the international community, with mixed success. The question of
who would form the political community now had to be decided with
a large contingent of Soviet-era settlers still in place, and criticism of
moves to limit the political community was quick to come from Moscow
and later from some western countries and institutions as well.

Lithuania had most radically challenged Soviet hegemony. Part of

this challenge involved declaring its own version of Lithuanian citizen-
ship in its fight for independence. In an argument over territory and
sovereignty, the republic could bank on the far less dramatic demo-
graphic shift in its territory than in the other two Baltic States, with
over 80 per cent of its population ethnically Lithuanian. Having so
firmly enunciated a citizenship policy, Lithuania thus adopted what
became widely known as the ‘zero option’: it declared all permanent
legitimate residents as citizens, excluding military, (the then) KGB and
other temporary units, and it defined its political community as the
entire permanent population.

In Estonia, where the ethnic population had sunk by a third to 62 per

cent by 1989, citizens’ committees were formed that eventually became
a Citizens’ Congress. This citizens’ movement asserted that the pre-war
Estonian republic that had been forcibly and illegally incorporated into
the Soviet Union needed to be recognized anew. Accordingly, its political
community also had to be recognized as a continuation of that commu-
nity; hence, only those who had been citizens in 1940 (when annexation
to the Soviet Union took place) or their descendants would now auto-
matically have the right to become citizens. They could be of any ethnic
group or background or language group, as the issue was only whether
they or their forebears had been citizens in 1940. After the restitution
of independence in August 1991, the Supreme Council maintained its

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

authority by agreeing to a restricted citizenship (based on the 1940 cri-
teria). But it was also able to decide on a naturalization process, a major
requirement of which would be basic competence in Estonian. For
those who were not citizens of Estonia, two measures were introduced
in 1993: an Alien Law stipulating that non-citizens needed to re-register
regularly in order to continue their residence in Estonia, and a naturali-
zation procedure that allowed non-citizens to become citizens by dem-
onstrating a basic writing, reading and speaking level of competence in
Estonian together with a basic knowledge of Estonian history and the
constitution (Toomsalu and Simm 1998: 45ff.).

In Latvia, where the ethnic population had sunk to 52 per cent by

1989, a similar citizenship movement had also gained impetus but had
not been formalized into a Citizen’s Congress. However, the Popular
Front, which was the major vehicle of political change in Latvia from
1998, indicated early on that Latvia agreed with the principle of a 1940-
based citizenship and stipulated a naturalization process. The latter
was strongly opposed by two citizens’ parties in particular and led to a
protracted standoff. While the Supreme Council confirmed the 1940
basis of Latvian citizenship after independence was regained in October
1991, Latvia did not adopt a citizenship law until 1994, more than a
year after Estonia, with a corresponding delay in beginning any natu-
ralization procedures at all. Moreover, the compromises over the citi-
zenship law introduced a system of ‘windows’; that is, naturalization
would not be available to all settlers at once, as this was considered
likely to overwhelm administration, but would be organized according
to the time when settlers arrived in Latvia. Those born in Latvia could
apply immediately; those who had lived longest in Latvia could do so
in the next several years, but those who had arrived most recently
would have to wait up to nine years to apply for naturalization.

The political struggle to define citizenship within Estonia and Latvia

led to sharp and often quite hostile reactions to these processes from
outside. The citizenship issues in Estonia and Latvia had a unique
character as they were the only two post-Soviet countries to introduce
restricted citizenship. Russia continued to demand the ‘zero option’ for
all concerned. Western observers viewed these processes with some
alarm. Within Estonia and Latvia, however, there were different reactions
from the non-citizen populations. In Estonia, the Alien Law, demanded
that Soviet period settlers regularly register and be allowed to stay in
the country only on a renewable short-term basis. This created deep
fear among the settler population, and a signi ficant number, over 80,000
as reported in the 2000 Census (Euromosaic 2004: 2.3), took out Russian
citizenship. They were hoping for greater protection from Russia but
also to escape from the situation of being stateless after the Soviet Union

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

ceased to exist. Partly to allay such fears, partly in response to consider-
able international criticism of such a policy of constant renewal of resi-
dence permits, the government amended the harshest aspects of the
Alien Law, making permanent residence the norm for non-citizens. In
recognition of the significant concentrations of Russians, particularly
in eastern Estonia, non-citizens were now also allowed to participate in
local government elections and to stand for local office. In Latvia, on
the other hand, there was no Alien Law, and the in-principle agreement
of naturalization, despite delays in implementation, did not result in
a huge uptake of Russian citizenship. Unlike Estonia, however, Latvia
did not grant non-citizens the right to participate in local government
elections, and this exclusion, together with the delays in implementing
naturalization, led to criticisms – from both East and West (Hogan-Brun
et al. 2007).

2.4 Legislation

Language laws had already been adopted before independence by the
three Supreme Soviets (Supreme Councils). After independence vari-
ous transitional arrangements (in the case of Lithuania) or residual ele-
ments giving status to Russian (in Estonia and Latvia) were removed,
leaving the titular languages as the ones used in administration and
public life. Further amendments ensued, and current language policies
are implemented through national State Language Laws: Estonia’s was
passed in 1995, Latvia’s in 1999 (both with subsequent amendments)
and Lithuania’s in 1995. (The texts of these State Language Laws are
available online and can be accessed via the websites listed in the refer-
ence section.) These laws regulate the use of the state language in the
main spheres of public life. They also stipulate its status and state the
legal implications for violations of the law. As earlier versions of these
laws were gradually refined, additional language knowledge demands
were introduced, especially in the laws relating to education and
citizenship.

Estonia’s citizenship law was first passed in 1993 (revised into the

current version in 1995), Latvia’s in 1994 (revised in 1998 after much
debate and pressure from Russia and the EU) and Lithuania’s in 1991
(the website addresses for each of these laws are provided in the refer-
ence section). Naturalization Boards with nationwide administrative
branches were also established. Lithuania’s citizenship legislation
diverges from that in its sister republics. Though theoretically Lithuanian
legislation could have emulated that of the other Baltic Republics, the
country has been in a position to opt for inclusive citizenship policies
as it hosts a relatively small percentage of immigrant communities

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

which already tend to have an adequate command of the state language.
The majority of Lithuania’s non-native population was, therefore, able
to acquire citizenship through a naturalization process that permitted
all individuals normally resident in the republic at the time of the
restoration of independence in 1990 to become Lithuanian citizens. In
contrast, the more heterogeneous neighbouring Baltic Republics intro-
duced stricter citizenship criteria pertaining to the immigrant popula-
tion that had settled there during the Soviet occupation. By law, those
who were Latvian/Estonian citizens in 1940, and their descendants, can
automatically claim Latvian/Estonian citizenship. Those who came to
Latvia/Estonia during Soviet occupation can obtain citizenship via
naturalization. The choice of procedures for the regulation of the status
of those people (about 400,000 in Estonia and 700,000 in Latvia) who
had settled after 1940 (i.e., during Soviet occupation) was accompanied
by heated and emotional debates. As initially many of these immigrants
requested citizenship, discussions soon revolved around the issue of
how to impose restrictions in this context. Especially in Latvia, it was
feared that a sudden surge in naturalization would result in an organ-
ized vote to reunite with Russia (Priedı¯te 2005). Here, the so-called
‘windows’ quota system set a timetable for eligibility for naturalization
according to length of residence in Latvia. In 1998, following various
recommendations made by the Organisation for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, a referendum leading to the deletion of the ‘window’
restrictions was held. Simultaneously, and also on the basis of their
advice, provisions were made for all children born in Latvia to non-
Latvian parents after 1991 to be granted citizenship if their parents
applied for it, and this was also done in Estonia.

The legal status of those immigrants who were permanent residents

in Estonia and Latvia but who had not been naturalized is termed non-
citizens (Estonian: mittekodanikud; Latvian: nepilson,i ). In Lithuania,
the adoption of the ‘zero option’ has meant that very few persons there
belong to this category. At present, these groups of people have almost
the same rights as citizens, with a few exceptions. In Latvia, they are
not allowed to vote for municipal elections or become state employees
(i.e., work in police and civil service; school teachers are not classed as
state employees). In Estonia, they can vote in local government elections.
In addition, they do not have to serve in the army. Most of them have
non-citizen passports, which give them a status equivalent to permanent
residency in other countries. They can reside in their republic indefi-
nitely and obtain most of public services (e.g., education and healthcare)
according to the same conditions as the citizens. Several foreign nations
also treat citizens and non-citizens from the Baltic countries differently,
admitting citizens without visa but requiring visas from non-citizens.

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

Russia used to have an opposite practice, requiring visas from citizens
but allowing non-citizens to travel to Russia without a visa.

2.5 Naturalization

Estonia and Latvia have very similar naturalization requirements and
the Latvian ones are described here in some detail. Residents can natu-
ralize at any time after five years of permanent residence. Apart from
payment of an administrative fee, the naturalization requirements involve
(in all three republics) the successful completion of a test measuring
lower intermediate level competence in the state language, plus a test on
knowledge of society. A handbook for applicants specifying both lin-
guistic and historical/constitutional knowledge has been prepared and
translated into English – largely for the sake of monitoring bodies inter-
ested in local citizenship arrangements. These requirements, together
with the other Baltic equivalents, set the pace in explicitly stating lan-
guage requirements for citizenship (Latvia. Naturalisation Board 2000).

The current Latvian language test for applicants of Latvian Citizen-

ship (LLTALC), the third model adopted since 1995, was introduced in
1999. It has been developed in cooperation with Council of Europe
experts from the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate
(UCLES) and the National Institute for Educational Measurement of the
Netherlands. As a free-standing test, it corresponds to ALTE (Association
of Language Testers in Europe) Level Two. The stated objectives are ‘to
assess the applicants’ Latvian language skills’, with the added rationale
that successful candidates ‘will be able to communicate satisfactorily
in everyday situations in Latvian, [which is considered as] one of the
principal prerequisites for the ability to integrate into the society of
Latvia’ (http://www.alte.org/members/latvian/test.php).

To pass the language test in Latvian, an applicant for citizenship

must undertake an oral and a written component (persons over 65 need
only do the oral part). The written section, for which a time of 90 min-
utes is allowed, consists of a listening and reading comprehension test,
an item requiring completion of a form and an item requiring the writing
of a letter on an everyday subject. Texts are drawn from topical media
pieces of a non-technical nature or equivalent, or standard bureaucratic
forms. The oral section is based on a 15-minute interview on an every-
day topic.

An additional knowledge-based examination (based on the princi-

ples of the Constitution of Latvia, the history of Latvia and the text of the
National Anthem) takes place either written or orally (as chosen by the
candidate). The two forms of this test are counted equally. Applicants
are asked to (re)cite the text of the National Anthem and answer ten

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

questions on the history of Latvia (eight of them being multiple choice)
and eight questions on the Constitution of Latvia (six of them being
multiple choice). The entire test takes 45 minutes.

From the inception of naturalization in 1995 until April 2007, some

124,186 people had been granted citizenship in Latvia (Newsletter
15/9–15/10, 2007). Around 90 per cent of all candidates pass the natu-
ralization test. Free language tuition is offered to people applying for
citizenship, and around 40 per cent of applicants are granted reduction
of or total exemption from the 20 Lat (equivalent about 30 Euro) full
examination fee, with significant reductions of 50–90 per cent for such
categories of candidates as the unemployed, the disabled or students.
As of the amendment of the citizenship law in January 1999, a total of
6,935 children (out of 7,974 applications), who were born in Latvia after
21 August 1991 to parents who are non-citizens or stateless persons,
have been granted citizenship (Newsletter 15/9–15/10, 2007). They do
not have to sit a test.

Naturalization rates in Latvia are only slowly reducing the signifi-

cant numbers of non-citizens in the country. Just over 19,000 persons
gained citizenship in 2005, the highest number for any year but this has
slowed down. As can be seen from Table 2.1, there were still 392,816
non-citizens in the country on 1 April 2007, amounting to nearly 19 per
cent of all permanent residents; many of them will never gain citizen-
ship. Significantly, the groups showing the lowest citizenship rates are

Table 2.1

Breakdown of the residents of Latvia as to Nationality

Nationality

Citizens of

Latvia

Non-

citizens*

Aliens** In total Proportion

Latvians

1,345,363

2,053

1,082

1,351,489

59.0%

Lithuanians

18,195

11,799

1,680

31,307

1.4%

Estonians

1,514

630

374

2,536

0.1%

Belorussians

30,694

55,254

2,102

86,594

3.7%

Russians

362,902

278,213

22,115

652,204

28.3%

Ukrainians

16,575

39,633

3,905

58,175

2.5%

Poles

40,807

13,369

655

54,831

2.4%

Jews

6,540

3,380

416

10,336

0.5%

Others

28,026

13,470

6,527

48,023

2.1%

In total

1,850,616

392,816

41,439

2,284,871

100.00%

Source : Board for Citizenship and Migration Affairs, http://www.np.gov.lv/index.

php?en=fakti_en&saite=residents.htm, 1 April 2007)

*‘Non-citizens’: residents who have not undergone naturalization (yet).
**‘Aliens’: holding another citizenship.

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

Belorussians and Ukrainians – they had tiny pre-war numbers in Latvia
as they only came during the Soviet period; as a consequence, few of
them could claim citizenship dating back to 1940. By contrast, at present
over three quarters of the Russians in Latvia have chosen to become
citizens, constituting the largest group, proportionately, to go through
naturalization.

In eastern Europe generally and in the Baltic States, nationality has

always been distinguished from citizenship, and censuses (going back
to Tsarist times and continuing through Soviet or independent periods)
have categorized all people by nationality. ‘Non-territorial’ groups
such as the Jews or Roma have been classed as nationalities along with
Russians, Ukrainians, etc. The ‘citizenship’ figures in the Table 2.1
include both those whose citizenship dates from 1940, and those who
have been naturalized in recent years.

One factor which will continue to increase the proportion of citizens

is the various coordinating measures that are being taken to align
citizenship language tests with other language teaching and testing. In
particular, when the secondary school reform that started in 2004 is
complete, those students who are not citizens will be exempt from the
language component of the citizenship test if they successfully complete
their secondary education including passing the final year Latvian lan-
guage subject.

2.6 The public discourse on citizenship in Latvia

It must be borne in mind that in post-totalitarian contexts, issues of
citizenship and language are often connected with existential notions
of nationhood and collective self – and the Baltic case is no exception.
Particularly in states that prior to their independence have undergone
major demographic changes the legacy of such shifts and their manage-
ment can become a core matter of identity politics. The media discourse
in Latvia is particularly virulent in this respect that is exacerbated
because of the existence of separate (Russian and Latvian-medium)
information spaces (see also Hogan-Brun 2009). A review of recent press
coverage

shows that the discourse on citizenship has primarily focused

on the stagnating naturalization rate of Latvia’s numerous non-citizens,
(dealing with permits for) guest workers, on amending the citizenship
law to ease naturalization procedures for all children born to non-
Latvian parents on Latvian soil since 1991, and on plans to reorganize
the overall institutional structures in charge of naturalization. We shall
now explore how Latvia’s divided Russian- and Latvian-medium press
has exposed these issues up to the time of writing (27 November 2007)
from 1 May 2007 (three years onwards after EU accession).

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

A highly emotive matter that has widely figured in the press is the

rights of Latvia’s numerous non-citizens. According to

and

(in Reports, 13 November 2007), the Ministry of Regional Development
and Local Government has instructed all local governments in Latvia to
stop discrimination of these people. As was reported, the political party
for Human Rights in United Latvia had appealed to the Ministry asking
to explain why in several local governments non-citizens are forbidden
to work in local committees and take part in public surveys. Debates,
often reflected in party politics, mainly revolve around these people’s
voting rights.

(in Reports, 30 October 2007) published news on a

conference on ‘Participation of Latvia’s Non-citizens in Municipal Elec-
tions as a Stimulus for Integration and Naturalisation, held by NGOs
and the Union of Citizens and Non-citizens and the Humanitarian
Perspective’, whose aim it was to form a delegation who would forward
to the President of Latvia, Valdis Zatlers, draft amendments to Latvian
legal acts stipulating the granting of voting rights to non-citizens in
municipal elections (this appeal had previously been forecast in

, , Latvijas Avze, in Reports, 2 June 2007). Accord-
ing to the Director of the Humanitarian Perspective Elizabete Krivcova,
naturalization in Latvia would move forward only once the government
acknowledges those rights of non-citizens (

, in Reports, 30 October

2007). Connecting the current situation with what had gone on before,

the political scientist Valts Kalnins was reported to have stated in an
interview on integration issues with

(in Reports, 30 July 2007)

that

Latvian society would not be segregated now if non-citizens had been
granted voting rights already ten years ago, and that speeding-up the
naturalization process would be a step towards an integrated society (in
Reports, 4 June 2007

Controversies around this issue were building up

in the summer as Latvijas Avize printed various opinions on a proposal
of Latvia’s First Party to grant non-citizens voting rights in municipal
elections. According to MP and Ex-Judge of the Constitutional Court
Ilma Cepane, this proposal was politically motivated because according
to international documents and experience of other countries, lacking
voting rights for non-citizens was not a violation of human rights. Yet,
the Head of the University of Latvia’s Human Rights Institute Arturs
Kucs was reported to have commented that granting voting rights to non-
citizens would promote their involvement in political and social life. Of
those who did not agree with the proposition was Ex-Chairman of the
Constitutional Court Aivars Endzins, who felt that if non-citizens were
granted voting rights they would be without an incentive to naturalize.
The Head of Saeima’s faction ‘Union of Greens and Farmers’ MP Augusts
Brigmanis also made it clear that the union did not support granting all
non-citizens Latvian citizenship or voting rights in municipal elections

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

(

, in Reports, 30 October 2007). MP Peteris Tabuns, the

Head of the Citizenship Law Implementation Committee, added in an
interview with

(in Reports, 4 October 2007) that those

non-citizens who had received citizenship to gain benefits were dis-
loyal towards Latvia.

As is often the case with minority related issues in the Baltic, the non-

citizen plea resonated beyond Latvia, with partially reciprocal effects.
News was published (

, in Reports, 10 October 2007) of a picket held

at a representation office of the European Commission when the 200
strong participants handed over a petition. This contained an appeal to
control implementation of recommendations made by various interna-
tional organizations regarding elimination of mass-scale non-citizenship
in Latvia and granting non-citizens voting rights in municipal elections.

, and Latvijas Avize (Reports, 21 November 2007) duly
reported that the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the
Council of Europe was planning to send six weeks later a mission to
Latvia to examine the situation regarding the rights of ethnic minorities
and non-citizens in the country. In the same autumn, Doudou Diene,
UN’s Special Envoy on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimi-
nation and xenophobia, following meetings in Latvia with state offi-
cials and NGO representatives, criticized the concept of citizenship in
national legal acts as well as the criteria for receiving citizenship.
Among his stated recommendations to the Latvian government was to
provide for a reduction of the large number of non-citizens, to ease
naturalization requirements, to automatically grant citizenship to all
children who were born in Latvia after 1991 as well as to elder people
who had become residents of Latvia due to the historical circumstances,
and also to grant non-citizens voting rights in municipal elections (

, Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 25 September 2007). Such
Western recommendations can at times come up against barriers as
was the case when President of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary
Assembly’s Rene van der Linden’s criticisms about the lacking voting
rights of non-citizens were deemed as unacceptable because of ‘inter-
ference [sic] [with] Latvian internal affairs’ (Latvijas Avize, Diena, in
Reports, 25 September 2007). However, there are voices, such as that of
the director of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights Ilze Brands Kehris,
who have argued that citizenship was an ethnic [sic] and political issue,
and that meeting up with foreign experts and people representing a
variety of opinions was essential (Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 26 October
2007).

The promotion of naturalization among non-citizens is clearly con-

sidered a delicate yet central matter, and it is, as voiced by the Special
Assignments Minister for Social Integration Oskars Kastens, also seen

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

as connected with promotion of the teaching of the Latvian language
(

, in Reports, 21 November 2007). The figures of non-citizens

who are naturalized are regularly published in newspapers. By July 2007,
this had risen to 125,000 in total (

, Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 5 July

2007).

The case of a woman aged 92 years, Latvia’s second oldest person

who has been granted citizenship through naturalization, was also high-
lighted (

, in Reports, 6 June 2007). This directly followed widely

publicized recommendations made by the Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, that naturaliza-
tion requirements for elderly people be eased and that parents be
allowed to choose the citizenship status of their children during regis-
tration of their birth (

, , , Diena, Latvijas Avize,

in Reports, 5 June 2007).

A relatively recent topic widely aired in the press is dual citizenship.

This issue was tackled with an announcement published in Diena (in
Reports, 6 July 2007) that discussions on the rights to grant double citi-
zenship (not only to children) would be launched soon. The historian
Aivars Strangs was quoted on the same day for having said that grant-
ing dual citizenship with EU countries or the United States would not
constitute a threat [sic] for Latvia (Diena, in Reports, 6 July 2007). In a
subsequent article in the same newspaper (in Reports, 13 November
2007), it was suggested that dual citizenship should be granted to chil-
dren of parents with mixed Latvian and foreign citizenships in order to
maintain their connection between Latvia and these children. Accord-
ing to the same author, this should also be offered to those individuals
and their descendants who had departed from Latvia when the country
was occupied in 1940 and who subsequently became citizens of other
states (Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 16 October 2007), and to children
born abroad to Latvian citizens (widely published also through

, Latvijas Avize, Diena, in Reports, 24 July 2007). This view
was subsequently reiterated by the Head of the Naturalization Board
Eizenija Aldermane (Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 27 July 2007) following
consultation with Estonia’s and Lithuania’s counterparts (Latvijas
Avize, in Reports, 2 July 2007).

Developments to enable a greater range of people to become eligible

to apply for naturalization are partly connected with events in May
2007, when according to widely published news from the Minister of
Justice Gaidis Berzins the Naturalization Board had to dismiss 24
staff members and to postpone examinations several times due to the
decreased number of applicants for naturalization. According to him,
there was a need to revise the Naturalization Board structure (

, Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 17 May 2007), and he later proposed
a merger with the State Language Centre into one institution under the

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

name ‘Board of State Language and Citizenship Affairs’ (Latvijas Avize,
in Reports, 15 August 2007). In his view, the new institution would
need to put more accent on Latvian because [sic] ‘the state language
and citizenship [were] inseparable issues’ (Latvijas Avize, in Reports,
15 August 2007).

The Saeima’s (Parliament) faction For Human Rights

in United Latvia had meanwhile called upon the Prime Minister of
Latvia Aigars Kalvitis to reject the merger proposal with the reasoning
that such an initiative would hinder naturalization even more. They
also asked that the Naturalization Board be moved from subordination
to the Ministry of Justice to that of the Ministry of Interior (

, in

Reports, 3 August 2007).

This (new merger) institution will also be in charge of issuing entry

documents for guest workers, a relatively recent phenomenon in Latvia
and across the Baltic generally, which

fields a range of public opinions.

Labour migration is, according to Special Assignments Minister for
Social Integration Oskars Kastens, the most topical problem for all the
Baltic States (Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 2 July 2007). In an interview
with

(in Reports, 27 July 2007), he in fact cautioned that Latvia

was not ready for liberalization of its labour market, and that the coun-
try should open its borders only for professions with greatest shortage
of labour and for workers from certain countries. In

, it was claimed

that lacking effective national policy concerning incoming labour force
to Latvia meant that the influx of guest workers was not controlled
enough (in Reports, 15 August 2007). Backing such concerns, stories
are at times released such as that of a Belorussian guest worker who
was detained for an attack and robbery of a taxi driver in Riga (

, , in Reports, 15 August 2007). Later on, the Head
of the Citizenship Law Implementation Committee MP Peteris Tabuns
joined the debate by stating that Latvia must not attract guest workers
because there was no lack of labourers in the country and because
influx of foreign labour force would [sic] ‘endanger Latvians as a nation’
(as quoted in

, in Reports, 10 October 2007). The Minister of

Justice Gaidis Berzins later added his support airing his concerns in an
interview with the same newspaper that an uncontrolled influx of guest
workers might occur if Latvia opened its labour market for nationals of
non-EU countries (in Reports, 21 November 2007).

However, fears about an uncontrolled influx of guest workers were

allayed in Diena (in Reports, 4 October 2007) on the basis of the fact
that wages in Latvia were low and society’s attitude (towards immigra-
tion) reserved. This was subsequently supported with further informa-
tion that according to a ranking based on the Migrant Integration Policy
Index (MIPEX) conducted by the British Council and Migration Policy
Group in Brussels, Latvia is the least welcoming country for immigrants

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

among other European countries, while the most welcoming is Sweden.
MIPEX reflects how European countries integrate immigrants using
140 indicators including such factors as immigrants’ rights in the work-
place, opportunities for permanent settlement, permission for family to
join them, laws to combat racism and prejudice (

, ,

, Neatkarga¯, in Reports, 16 October 2007).

Yet, there appears to be a need for guest workers, and, as was sug-

gested in Diena (in Reports, 4 October 2007), work permits might attract
to Latvia specialists from other Eastern European countries. A press
release in this newspaper featured an interview with Juris Jaunzems
(director of an enterprise which employs five guest workers from
Mongolia and four from Ukraine) who stated that the guest workers did
in fact have no problems communicating with local people and that all
of them were willing to learn the Latvian language. He thought that
procedures to invite foreign workers were too complicated, and that the
influx of guest workers to Latvia would continue to grow due to lack of
domestic labour force (in Reports, 31 July 2007). A spokesperson from
the transportation company Rigas Satiksme subsequently confirmed
this (

, , in Reports, 14 August 2007).

In addressing these needs and to liberalize migration policy, the

Interior Minister Ivars Godmanis had earlier on proposed reviewing a
draft framework for elaboration by the government to include provi-
sions that would simplify the procedure for granting work permits to
foreigners (

, Diena, Latvijas Avize, in Reports, 19 June 2007).

The Ministry of Welfare headed by Iveta Purne subsequently prepared
a draft law which stipulated that work permits in Latvia be cancelled
for guest workers who are already in possession of such documents
in other EU member-states (

, in Reports, 3 August 2007), and

that the procedure for obtaining such documents be eased for those
from non-EU countries. The Citizenship and Migration Affairs Office,
a supervisory body (headed by Vilnis Jekabsons) of Latvia’s Interior
Ministry responsible for state migration policy implementation, issues
such (identity) documents. According to its official figures, a total of
1,512 foreigners had been offered work permits in Latvia during the
time period from 1 January to 31 May 2007. The majority of guest work-
ers are from Russia (383) and Moldova (226) (

, Diena, Latvijas

Avize, in Reports, 19 June 2007). About 2,000 foreigners were issued
temporary residence permits for the first time, while 136,000 persons
were granted visas to Latvia during the first six months of 2007. As
boundaries of gatekeeping continue to be consolidated,

(in Reports, 24 September 2007) released news on measures that are
being taken by the Office to improve preventive activities to ‘uncover
fictive marriages’ [sic] that are concluded with the aim to receive a

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

permanent residence permit in Latvia by foreigners. This trend is
starting to preoccupy officials, particularly as many Latvia’s marriages
are in fact mixed.

Further, as published in

(in Reports, 2 July 2007),

the Office has identified 5,800 persons with denied entrance to
Latvia is denied, and 780 individuals who were included in a ‘black’
list in 2006.

As this palette shows of pros and cons of opinions surrounding the

delicate issue of granting people citizenship, or long-term residence
permission, several of Latvia’s political actors emerge in positioning
themselves on this matter. While Interior Minister Ivars Godmanis and
Welfare Minister Iveta Purne both support the easing of entry regula-
tions for job seekers, Justice Minister Gaidis Berzins on the other hand,
keen to push naturalization rates forward, opposes such a move fearing
about an uncontrolled influx of guest workers. Concerned with these
diverging opinions about the domestic management of the status of
non-Latvians in the country, the parliamentary faction For Human
Rights called upon PM Aigars Kalvitis to move the institution in charge
of naturalization from subordination to the Ministry of Justice to that of
the Ministry of Interior. This institution, under the new name Board of
State Language and Citizenship Affairs will clearly be in charge to also
promote the teaching of the Latvian language since, in the words of
Gaidis Berzins, the state language and citizenship are considered insep-
arable issues.

2.7 Outlook

This study has attempted to illustrate how in countries that have
regained their independence from totalitarian regimes language and
citizenship can function as a set of core existential issues. Perhaps not
surprisingly, essentialist notions of nationhood and collective self tend
to surface in the struggle to consolidate the reversal of power relations
in changed political settings such as the Baltic Republics. Particularly
where people transfer policies were deployed (by the formerly domi-
nant group) to dilute (and assimilate) local populations, it is likely that
gatekeeping measures will be employed in the securitization of rights
to deal with the legacy of demographic shifts that will have occurred as
a result.

While Lithuania has adopted a more inclusive approach to citizen-

ship, there is a greater sense of urgency in the tightening of organiza-
tional and functional borders in Estonia, and especially in Latvia. In
the latter, clearly the mass scale of non-citizens (and their persistent
reluctance to be naturalized) is a major issue to be contended with.

Politics of language and citizenship in the Baltic States

In the words of the former Latvian Minister for Integration Affairs, Nils
Muižnieks, there was hope that the problem would resolve itself, but
over a third of non-citizens are under 30 years of age. Alluding to their
alienation from the State, he mentioned that they need opportunities to
participate in the process of decision making and to actively contribute
to public life (Portal 14/10, 2003). MP Boriss Cilevicˇs further claimed
that many young people were not interested in becoming citizens as for
them ‘naturalization under the suggested conditions would mean a kind
of acceptance of the rules of a game they do not accept’ (Portal 25/11,
2003). Pointing to their ‘inherited bitterness from their parents’ (Portal
25/11, 2003), he claims that these people would never vote for the par-
ties that kept them without citizenship.

These views, aired during the run-up to EU accession, came up against

another challenge after the 2004 round of eastward enlargement. Now,
with opportunities for work in Western Europe opening up for citizens
(non-citizens have to apply for a work permit),

the issue has arisen in

all three countries as to how to retain people in the face of a growing
rate of emigration,

and how to deal with the relatively recent phenom-

enon of incoming guest workers. As reflected in our analysis of the
public discourse that is taking place in this respect, Latvia’s official
position on this matter is far from clear with key political actors pulling
in different directions along the security/rights/territorial axes. How-
ever, there seems to be an emerging consensus Baltic-wide on the need
to provide dual citizenship to a greater range of people, such as the eld-
erly, children born abroad to Latvian parents or in Latvia to non-Latvian
parents and persons who had emigrated for political reasons and
acquired citizenship elsewhere.

Given the currently negative migration rate in this region

statements

that an increased influx of immigrant workers would harm the nation
perhaps reflect the vulnerability of local mentalities that is historically
conditioned and embedded in social memory. But, as Wodak (2001)
shows, every discourse that imposes history as a dead weight rather
than a story of becoming on the leading generation needs to evolve
constructively. It must seek to embrace the challenge that is now
increasingly also engulfing the West as the old EU member-states are
grappling with how to come to terms with increasing heterogeneous
populations.

Acknowledgement

This chapter was written while on a Visiting Fellowship offered by the
National Europe Centre at ANU Canberra.

Gabrielle Hogan-Brun

Notes

1 This covers the period between 1 May–27 November 2007 and has been

extracted from the online version of the ‘Integration and Minority Information
Service Reports’, which is produced by the Latvian Centre for Human Rights
& Ethnic Studies. These reports are compiled from three Latvian-medium
newspapers (Diena, Neatkar

ga¯ and Latvijas Avze) and three additional

Russian-medium newspapers (

: Telegraf; : Vesti Sego-

dnya and

: as), which are all published in Latvia. According to the World

Wide Media Guide, neither the content politics nor credibility of any of these
newspapers have been rated yet (http://www.mondotimes.com/1/world/lv).

2 A saying circulated at the time of the adoption of the citizenship law ‘that

Latvian citizenship spreads like AIDS – it is mostly transmitted sexually’.

3 Latvian non-citizens cannot obtain employment in the West without a work

permit. Whether they are allowed to work is determined by each country’s
own employment rules. For all other purposes, non-citizens can now travel
to all EU/European area countries without visa (except for UK and Ireland).
However, some certainly have jobs in the West, on an individual work permit
(or in some cases illegal) basis. EU mobility laws and work laws are generally
for citizens only. Non-citizens are given a ‘non-citizens’ passport for travel –
whether any other country misrecognizes these as citizens passports is a
matter for conjecture (726,000 such passes have been issued). (Personal com-
munication by Uldis Ozolins, 3 December 2007).

4 As of 1 January 2007 there were 9,656 immigrants to Latvia, half for family

reunion (4560), more or less half for work, study or other reasons. Of those
who come for family reasons, more than half have also received work permits
(Immigration Ministry – Office of Citizenship & Migration Affairs). By con-
trast, it is estimated that some 86,000 Latvian residents are working or study-
ing abroad (personal communication by Uldis Ozolins, 3 December 2007).

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la citoyenneté et occuper un emploi en Estonie’ (Language postulations for
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Meyer (eds), Methods of critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage, pp. 63–94.

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3.1 Early patterns of immigration

The focus of this chapter is on early and recent patterns of immigration
to Sweden (Sections 3.1 and 3.2), on regimes of immigration in Sweden
(Section 3.3) and on language testing for citizenship (Section 3.4).
Conclusions are offered in Section 3.5.

A common view among Swedes today is that Sweden has only been

experiencing an influx of immigrants in modern times, more precisely
since the end of the Second World War. This perception is, however,
flawed. Since Sweden gained its independence from Denmark in 1523,
each century has been characterized by its own group of immigrants
from certain parts of Europe, most of whom in today’s terminology
would be classified as labour market immigration, and they have all left
their mark on the Swedish language.

The sixteenth century brought the Reformation and Lutheran Protes-

tantism from Germany to Sweden and with that came German educa-
tors and craftsmen to, in particular, the Stockholm region, where the
capital and the royal residences were located, thus providing important
cultural and linguistic influences. In this era, it was also a common
practice for Swedish scholars to study at German universities, with the
result that the returning graduates brought with them terminology and
expressions borrowed from the German language. Military campaigns
in the seventeenth century, notably the Thirty-year War, added more
German vocabulary to the Swedish language in areas associated with
the army and warfare. At this time, German would frequently be heard
in the streets of Stockholm and at Uppsala University, Sweden’s only
site of higher learning at the time, founded in 1477, where the use of
Latin as the language of academic activities and education was gradu-
ally becoming abandoned as a result of the Reformation.

Also in the seventeenth century, the town of Gothenburg was founded

and built as a canal city, inspired by the Dutch model of, for example,
Amsterdam, and Dutch workers were invited to come in order to design

Language, migration and
citizenship in Sweden:
still a test-free zone

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

and construct this port city on the Swedish west coast. Many of them
remained and settled in this new place, and as a result, Gothenburg in
the seventeenth century was in practice a bilingual town where both
Swedish and Dutch were spoken and both languages were equally well
understood by the inhabitants. Still to this day, certain aspects of the
Gothenburg dialect can be traced back to influences from the Dutch
language, such as the throaty ‘ach-Laut’ that is a frequent phoneme in
both Dutch and German but not a sound traditionally found in Swedish
varieties other than the dialect spoken in Gothenburg, and then only at
the beginning of a word – as used in Dutch but not in German. These
days, in urban multiethnic youth varieties of Swedish, this phoneme
occurs frequently also inside a word, a result of influences from immi-
grant minority languages such as Arabic, and it is often heard in ‘bro-
ken Swedish’ as a substitute for a sound that is hard for many non-native
speakers of Swedish to produce.

The eighteenth century brought a strong influence of French culture

and language to Sweden, especially to the Stockholm area where French
was the prescribed language of the court at this time, and French educa-
tors and cultural workers were invited to come and ply their trades in
this Northern European outpost (Statisitiska Centralbyrån [SCB] 1999).
The Swedish upper classes followed the royal example, and many a
Swedish word of French origin – typically dealing with cultural or
architectural notions – found its way into the language during this
period. An interesting written image of how verbal exchanges of that
time could sound in Stockholm is preserved in some texts by the still
popular Swedish poet Carl Michael Bellman, showing an at times trilin-
gual blend with French and German words and expressions regularly
used in Swedish utterances.

In the nineteenth century, the industrial revolution, including early

versions of modern technology and modes of transportation, was brought
to Sweden by skilled professionals, businessmen and tradesmen from
Great Britain (SCB 1999). With them came many English vocabulary
items, some of which are recognizable through the Swedish spelling,
for example, vajer for ‘wire’, while others underwent a more thorough
adaptation to the Swedish language as in keps for ‘cap’ (= worker’s hat),
where the Swedish singular form includes the plural ending of the
English original, a change that is also present in a number of other
English loan words in Swedish and usually makes the word easier to
inflect as a Swedish noun. The present-day complaint that the Swedish
language is ‘threatened’ by influences from English is thus actually
referring to a more than century-long process that is still ongoing.

However, Swedish is not being overtaken by English when, on the one

hand, English vocabulary replaces Swedish words unnecessarily – there

Language, migration and citizenship in Sweden

is already a perfectly usable Swedish word but the English equivalent
is preferred, for example, the word ‘sale’ is today commonly used instead
of the Swedish expression rea to indicate that a store is selling goods at
lower prices than usual – and, on the other hand, English words are
used without any attempt to find or create a Swedish word for some new
concept or object such as skate board or break dance. More serious, in
contrast, is the fact that Swedish is losing certain linguistic domains as
English becomes the language of international business and multina-
tional companies, even used when only Swedes are present, as well as
the language that is chosen in academic contexts to present and spread
Swedish research in both spoken and written form. This was the conclu-
sion of a government commission report (Statens Offentliga Utredningar
[SOU] 2002b: 27) entitled Mål i mun (a Swedish idiom meaning approx-
imately ‘the ability to speak’) that investigated the status and future of
the Swedish language in Sweden. Not the presence of many immigrant
languages in Swedish society but the domain loss from the growing
use of English instead of Swedish as a means of communication, con-
cluded the report, should be seen as a having a potentially undermining
effect on the Swedish language. In order to secure the status and use of
Swedish, the commission recommended that Swedish be legally estab-
lished as Sweden’s official (majority) language, but a motion in parlia-
ment to initiate this process was defeated. (For a discussion of this report
and some of the reactions to it, see Johnson and Milani 2007.)

Since the mid-1990s, however, five minority languages have gained

the legal status as official ‘historical’ minority languages in Sweden –
Finnish, Meänkieli, Saami, Romani and Yiddish (Hyltenstam 1999) –
while Swedish is not legally defined as the country’s official majority
language. With English having been a compulsory subject in the Swedish
national school system since the early 1960s, every Swede (except for
the elderly) has grown up to become more or less bilingual Swedish-
English. Without official language status, Swedish may not be perceived
by all newcomers to Sweden as necessary for them or their children to
learn although they are, for the time being, living in Sweden. However,
like English, Swedish is a compulsory core subject in all Swedish
schools, so immigrant children will eventually develop the trilingual
skills – mother tongue, majority language and English/a foreign language –
held up as desirable by both the report Mål i mun and EU language policy.

3.2 Immigration to Sweden in modern times

Immigration to Sweden in modern times shows a varied pattern. The
first half of the twentieth century saw very little immigration – indeed,
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

were a period of significant emigration from Sweden, mostly to North
America. Close to a fifth of the Swedish population left for a better
future overseas. This period of emigration was followed by two world
wars, with the Depression in between, which were not factors that facil-
itated migration of any kind (SCB 1999). An exception was immigration
from neighbouring Nordic countries during the latter part of World War
Two, when Finland was at war while Denmark and Norway had been
occupied by Nazi Germany. In contrast, the period beginning with the
end of World War Two, in 1945, resulted in an increasing number of
immigrants coming to Sweden from non-Nordic countries such as the
Baltic States, Poland and Germany. Many of these came to Sweden ‘in
transit’, leaving their war-torn countries behind and later moving on to,
primarily, North America, but some settled in Sweden (SCB 2004a).

The post-war industrial boom that occurred in Sweden, a country

untouched by the destruction caused by war activities, starting in the
late 1940s and reaching its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, created a need
for imported workers, and this labour immigration resulted in hun-
dreds of thousands of men and women moving to Sweden from other
Nordic countries and from Southern Europe. From Turkey, Greece,
Yugoslavia and Italy, young men were recruited by Swedish companies
to work in Sweden on the assembly lines in the car, steel and ship-
building industries, and from Denmark, Norway and Finland, especially
in the late 1960s, came both men and women to work in textile and
mining as well as the other manufacturing industries. Political events
in Hungary 1956, Greece 1967 and Czechoslovakia 1968 added refugees
to the labour immigration (SCB 2004a).

In 1967, the Swedish government passed a law that severely restricted

the immigration of non-Nordic workers. The net effect was that immi-
gration levels decreased in the 1970s and the immigrant population
changed character. The result became a switch from labour to refugee
and family reunification immigration, initially mostly from South
America and Asia. In the 1980s, countries in the Middle East and the
crumbling Yugoslavia/the Balkans were added to the list of areas from
which people came to seek refuge in Sweden, settled and, eventually,
brought their families. Immigration from Africa only became significant
in the 1990s, and it is countries in Northern Africa and the Horn of
Africa that these immigrants are mainly coming from. The Somali group
especially stands out among refugee immigrants to Sweden (Samuelsson
1993; SCB 2004b).

From the above emerges a picture of what the dominant immigrant

languages in Sweden currently are. Due to immigration from the Middle
East and Northern Africa, the Arabic-speaking group is the largest, and
there are also many Kurdish-speakers. The languages of the former

Language, migration and citizenship in Sweden

Yugoslavia are also represented by many speakers, as are some of the
Chinese languages (primarily Mandarin, Cantonese and Hakka). Spanish
and Finnish are immigrant languages still spoken by many people in
Sweden, as is Farsi and the relatively recently arrived Somali-speaking
group (Nygren-Junkin and Extra 2003). Because of intra-EU immigra-
tion, there are also German- and French-speakers represented among
the larger immigrant language groups in Sweden. Thanks to the long-
standing open labour market within Scandinavia, many speakers of
Danish and Norwegian can also be found in Sweden (SOU 2002a: 116).

Present-day Sweden has become one of the European countries that

have the highest proportion of immigrants. In 2004, around 12 per cent
of those living in Sweden were born in another country, which is the
same as for Germany and Austria. Higher levels are only found in
Luxemburg (33 per cent) and Switzerland (22 per cent), unless we look
at countries outside Europe such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand,
all with around 20 per cent. Countries like the Netherlands, France and
Great Britain as well as the other Nordic countries have lower percent-
ages of residents born elsewhere than does Sweden. If those born in
Sweden whose parents were both born abroad are added, the propor-
tion increases to 16 per cent, and if those with one parent born else-
where are included, over one fifth (22 per cent) of the Swedish
population were in 2004 part of the group referred to as residents with
immigrant background (SCB 2004a).

3.3 Immigration regimes in Sweden

From the onset of the new millennium, Swedish immigration authori-
ties have become more restrictive about granting refugee status to asy-
lum seekers as well as narrowing the definition of ‘family member’ for
reunification immigration. For instance, aging parents (typically grand-
mothers), or children who have turned 18 years of age while waiting for
their permits, are no longer admitted (SCB 2002; SOU 2002c: 13). Being
granted asylum on humanitarian grounds has also become more difficult.
From an approval rate of over 50 per cent in the mid-1990s, the propor-
tion of successful applicants in 2004 had dropped to approximately
10 per cent. The handling time for each application also increased (SCB
2004c). In 2006–2007, though, Sweden has given exceptional treatment
to refugees from Iraq, who according to recent reports were allowed to
stay in Sweden in more than half of the cases. Asylum seekers from other
countries, however, are still more often sent back to where they came
from than given refugee status in Sweden (www.migrationsverket.se).

Obtaining immigrant status in Sweden, with residence and work

permits, is difficult if there is no family connection to Sweden and

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

there is no apparent danger to one’s life or safety that can be satisfacto-
rily proven to the immigration authorities, Migrationsverket in Swedish
(www.migrationsverket.se). Labour immigration is to date very limited
and consists mostly of citizens from other EU countries or Scandinavia
(SCB 2002; SOU 2002a: 116). However, qualifying for Swedish citizen-
ship is still quite easy, even though Sweden embraces jus sanguinis
(through the mother) as the basic principle for determining who is a
Swedish citizen at birth. The only requirement to become a naturalized
Swede is five years of uninterrupted residence in Sweden with no
criminal record and no lengthy stays abroad (www.migrationsverket.
se). The definition of a ‘lengthy’ stay outside Sweden is, however,
unclear. Migrationsverket’s information service states that how long
such a stay can be ‘depends’ and may vary from case to case (personal
communication). There is no test of Swedish language proficiency or
knowledge of Swedish society that must be passed in order to qualify
for Swedish citizenship, and since 1 July 2001, Sweden allows dual
citizenship, so there is no longer a requirement to renounce the citizen-
ship already held by the applicant (Milani 2008).

This relatively undemanding nature of the process to obtain Swedish

citizenship is reflected in the statistics on naturalized Swedes. Among
immigrants born abroad, over 60 per cent have become Swedish citi-
zens, and of those whose parents were both born in another country,
85 per cent have acquired Swedish citizenship (SCB 2003).

3.4 Language testing for citizenship

In recent years, at the initiative of the Swedish Liberal party, suggestions
have been made that passing a Swedish language test be made manda-
tory for being granted citizenship but not for asylum or permanent resi-
dent status. The language test issue was one of the main issues of the
Liberal party’s election platform in 2002, and it was seen as one of the
reasons the Liberals won unusually many seats in that election. It also
made some liberal supporters believe that their party was turning into
a populist anti-immigrant party rather than the Liberal party they knew.
As a result, in the 2006 election campaign, this issue of language testing
became considerably toned down in the pre-election rhetoric, but it did
nonetheless remain on the party agenda. As the Liberals are now one
in a four-party non-socialist coalition government in Sweden, they are
in a position to bring the question up in government negotiations.

Language testing for citizenship has become a somewhat ‘hot potato’

in Sweden, both in the political debate and among people who work in
immigration-related contexts. This is due to the fact that the interpreta-
tions of what constitutes a language test vary considerably. Also, in this

Language, migration and citizenship in Sweden

debate, the distinction between refugee/residency status and citizen-
ship has at times not been kept clear. The opponents see a possible
future test as a formal evaluation of grammatical knowledge and vocab-
ulary at a level that perhaps even native speakers of Swedish would
have difficulty passing. As such, the language test is seen as a gate-
keeper in the extreme, intended to ‘keep immigrants out’. Comparisons
have been made with the tests on Dutch language and life-style given to
immigrants to the Netherlands since 2002, which have come under
critical scrutiny (see chapter in this Volume by Extra and Spotti).

The proponents of Swedish language testing, on the other hand, view

it as an examination of the applicants’ communicative skills in Swedish,
carried out in an informal setting. The rationale for this requirement is
that it is all but impossible to follow what goes on in a country without
knowing the language, and without an awareness of the public debate
and political issues, it is not fair to expect a person to make informed
decisions at the time of elections and referenda, a key privilege granted
by citizenship being the right to vote in national elections. Integration
with the majority population is also made more difficult without rea-
sonable knowledge of the majority language, as is the potential for suc-
cess in the labour market.

To date, neither the current nor the past government in Sweden has

made any serious attempts to put language testing for Swedish citizen-
ship at the top of the political agenda. It is perceived as potentially too
divisive, both within the current coalition government and inside the
social-democratic party and its two support parties, the Left (formerly
Communist) party and the Environment (=Green) party. Furthermore,
as was mentioned in the debate following the publication of the Mål i
mun report, there appears to be a perception that such testing would
be a threat to linguistic diversity within Sweden. It could be used as
an argument against preserving and developing other mother tongues.
A test would also refer to some standard norm of correctness that may
be inappropriate for speakers of both regional varieties and Swedish
with a second language accent (Boyd and Huss 2003).

Another observation made in the aftermath of Mål i mun was that the

Swedish language had a culturally defining role in making Sweden
Swedish (Melander 2002). Such arguments have in Sweden been asso-
ciated with nationalistic, anti-immigrant right-wing parties and the
introduction of a Swedish language test for immigrants to become citi-
zens could be seen as giving in to demands by this political movement.
To date, these parties are too small to be represented in the national
parliament, but they have won seats at the local government level,
and one of them, Sverigedemokraterna (‘the Sweden Democrats’), is
expected to also win seats in the national election in 2010. By that time,

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

another parliamentary vote on Mål i mun, currently scheduled for
January 2009, will have taken place.

3.5 Conclusions

Recent suggestions by the minister of immigration, Tobials Billström,
and the minister of integration, Nyamko Sabuni, to place more stringent
demands on newcomers to Sweden focus not on language but on limit-
ing their right to choose where to live in Sweden and facilitating their
entry into the labour force. There is nonetheless a concomitant rationale
that these policies will have a favourable impact on the development of
Swedish language skills by new settlers, but formalized testing of their
language acquisition results has not yet been proposed, not even at the
time of applying for Swedish citizenship. At the time of writing, the
gatekeeping by the Swedish government, through the immigration
authorities, is taking place at the asylum-seeking level, in the definition
of what a justified claim for refugee status is and of what kind of family
member will be allowed to be reunited with the rest of the family in
Sweden. After qualifying as an immigrant to Sweden and securing per-
manent resident status, it is still simply a matter of staying in the coun-
try for five consecutive years, without a criminal record, before filing the
citizenship application. To put it briefly, once you are in, you are in!

References

Boyd, S. and Huss, L. (2003), ‘Mål i mun och språklig mångfald’, Språkvård,

1: 28–34.

Hyltenstam, K. (ed.) (1999), Sveriges sju inhemska språk. Lund:

Studentlitteratur.

Johnson, S. and Milani, T. (2007), ‘To legislate or not to legislate? Language

politics and legitimation crises in Germany and Sweden’. Leeds Working
Papers in Linguistics 2/07.

Melander, B. (2002), ‘Språkpolitik för sverige’, Språkvård, 2: 4–9.
Milani, T. M. (2008), ‘Language testing and citizenship: A language ideological

debate in Sweden’. Language in Society, 37: 27–59.

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2002:3. Stockholm: Statistiska Centralbyrån.

Language, migration and citizenship in Sweden

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ålder, födelseland och medborgarskap mm. Tidigare utgåvor samt dess
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http://www.migrationsverket.se

4.1 Introduction

Until recently, debates about language and languages were relatively rare
in the United Kingdom. However, in recent times debates about language
have come to represent debates about immigration, as the discourse of
elites has engaged with the role of the English language in relation to
minority languages associated with immigrants. This discourse persist-
ently proposes that universal proficiency in English for all residents of
the United Kingdom is essential for social cohesion and national unity,
and that the means by which government can effect universal proficiency
is through a regime of language testing. To this end, government has
introduced legislative measures which require immigrants to demon-
strate not only proficiency in English but also knowledge of ‘life in the
United Kingdom’, before they are granted citizenship. Furthermore, the
testing regime has recently been extended to those applying for indefinite
leave to remain and, in the most recently proposed legislation, entry to
the United Kingdom. This legislation treats testing as synonymous with
learning and fails to acknowledge that insisting on a test is a different
matter from providing high-quality, accessible English classes. It is also a
discourse which makes no explicit reference to the linguistic resources
with which immigrants arrive in the United Kingdom, instead treating
them as homogeneous and problematic, and often deleting them from the
debate. In this chapter, I introduce the recent history of debates about
language testing for citizenship applicants in the United Kingdom, before
developing a more detailed analysis of some of the more recent discourse
in the debate about language testing for immigrants to the United King-
dom. First, though, I situate the discussion in previous research relating
to language and national identity in multilingual contexts.

4.2 Inventing the national

Castles (2005) points out that more than 100 million people reside
outside the country of their birth. He asks what nationalism means for

Inventing English as convenient
ﬁ ction: language testing regimes
in the United Kingdom

Adrian Blackledge

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

people who settle in one country without abandoning their cultural
belonging to another. Castles suggests that the nation-state ‘is based on
the obliteration of minority cultures’ (2005: 312), and that immigrant
groups are often caught between an urge to maintain ‘immigrant cul-
tures and languages’ and a pragmatic acceptance of assimilation which
can lead to marginalization and loss of community solidarity. He con-
cludes that ‘the nation-state model . . . cannot offer an adequate basis
for societal belonging in the age of globalisation and migration’ (2005:
314), and he argues that continuing attempts to base citizenship on
membership of an imagined cultural community leads to political and
social exclusion and the racialization of differences. Fenton and May
(2002) point out that most states are multinational, comprising a number
of national minorities, and/or polyethnic, comprising a range of immi-
grant groups.

If nations are people who see themselves as those already

‘in place’, ethnic minorities are people who may be seen, however
begrudgingly, as being in situ, but who still remain, by the exclusivist
definitions of nation so often applied, invariably ‘out of place’ (Fenton
and May 2002: 14). Held (2005) argues more positively that multi-
culturalism, rather than ‘national culture’, is increasingly the norm.
Acknowledging that individuals increasingly have complex loyalties
and multi-layered identities, Held argues for ‘cosmopolitanism’, which
‘reflects the multiplicity of issues, questions, processes and problems
that affect and bind people together, irrespective of where they were
born or reside’ (2005: 326). In this view, the notion of national belong-
ing as dependent on the country of birth or origin is no longer salient.

Hobsbawm stressed the ‘element of artefact, invention and social

engineering which enters into the making of nations . . . Nations do not
make states but the other way round’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). Hobsbawm
proposed that national traditions which appear or claim to be old are
often quite recent in origin, and sometimes invented. His notion of
‘invented tradition’ was defined as ‘a set of practices . . . which seek to
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which
automatically implies continuity with a suitable historic past’
(Hobsbawm 1983: 1). For Hobsbawm, the phenomena of the nation and
nationalism cannot be adequately investigated without attention to the
invention of tradition. Anderson (1991: 6) influentially proposed that
the nation is ‘an imagined political community – and imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign’. Anderson argued that nationality
and nationalism are cultural artefacts, and in order to understand
nations we need to understand how they came into being. He asks what
it is people imagine themselves belonging to, and what it is that per-
suades ‘so many people willingly to die for such limited imaginings’
(Anderson 1991: 7). Makoni and Pennycook (2007: 7) argue that there

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are substantial similarities between Hobsbawm’s (1983) notion of the
‘invention of tradition’ and Anderson’s (1991) notion of ‘imagined com-
munities’. Unlike Anderson, they regard both languages and nations as
‘dialectically co-constructed’ and propose that the invention of tradi-
tion is about ‘the creation of a past into which the present is inserted’
(Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 8). They further argue that the notion of
‘the invention of tradition’ implies an essential continuity in the devel-
opment of nations (and history more generally), which may not be
sustainable. Third, they suggest that others’ languages, histories and
nations are co-constructed, and that ‘many structures, systems and con-
structs such as tradition, history or ethnicity, which are often thought
of as natural parts of society, are inventions of a very specific ideologi-
cal apparatus’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 9). Billig suggests that ‘the
issue of immigration, more than any other, shows that the state has not
withered away in the age of late capitalism’ (Billig 1995: 142). Pujolar
(2007) further argues that describing the contemporary world as ‘post-
national’ does not mean that nationality, nationalism or nation-states
are no longer relevant or are receding in favour of an international,
transnational or cosmopolitan era. In fact there are ‘strong arguments to
contend that nationalism is on the increase’ (Pujolar 2007: 90).

4.3 Language and nation

One of the frequently heard criteria for nation and/or state formation
has been commonality of language. Hobsbawm demonstrates that in
nineteenth century Europe, language was regarded as ‘the only adequate
indicator of nationality’ (1990: 21). However, it is not sufficient to say
that speakers of the same language belong to the same nation-state. Billig
(1995: 29) argues that the creation of a national hegemony often involves
a hegemony of language. A common-sense understanding of the rela-
tionship between language and nation ignores the diversity and variety
of the language(s) spoken within many states. As Rampton’s (1995,
1999, 2006) work has made clear, even the notion of a single ‘English’
language is an over-simplification, as new varieties emerge from differ-
ent cultural and social contexts. Pujolar (2007) demonstrates that multi-
lingual practices and skills have had an uneasy fit in the national and
linguistic order. Bilingual communities have often been seen as a threat
to cultural unification. Heller (1999) argues that the concept of a ‘lin-
guistic minority’ only makes sense within an ideological framework of
nationalism in which language is central to the construction of the
nation. She further proposes that ‘linguistic minorities are created by
nationalisms which exclude them’ (Heller 1999: 7). At the same time,
Moyer and Martin Rojo (2007) point out that migrants are the new social

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

actors challenging the hegemonic linguistic construction of the nation-
state from below in different ways. They argue that migrants from dif-
ferent language backgrounds constitute a challenge for traditional
nationalist discourses and ideologies in the institutions of multilingual
democratic states, as ‘multilingual reality comes up against national
ideologies of monolingualism and homogeneity’ (Moyer and Martin
Rojo 2007: 156). Linguistic minorities are ‘invented’ by, and in relation
to, the linguistic majority.

While national identities can be negotiated in a variety of ways, cur-

rent research privileges language and literacy policies as increasingly
important means of social control which allow nation-states to define
‘who is in’ and ‘who is out’. Bourdieu argues that the official language
is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses: ‘It
is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for
constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official
language’ (1991: 45). In order for one language to impose itself as the
only legitimate one, the linguistic market has to be unified and the dif-
ferent languages (and dialects) of the people measured practically
against the legitimate language:

Integration into a single ‘linguistic community’, which is a product
of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institu-
tions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant
language, is the condition for the establishment of relations of lin-
guistic domination. (Bourdieu 1991: 46)

This linking of language, literacy and national identity occurs in a

number of sites which include language planning, standardization,
educational policy, citizenship testing and language instruction for
immigrants. One way to link language and national identity is through
language policy, planning and standardization practices which legitimize
particular language varieties and link them to specific identities. May
(2001) notes that the suppression of minority languages continues to be
a common feature of modern nation-state policy. In multilingual, liberal
democratic states, those who either refuse or are unable to conform to
the dominant ideology may be marginalized, denied access to symbolic
resources and, often, excluded (Bourdieu 1998a; Heller 1999). This
process can be made visible through analysis of the creation and repro-
duction of language ideologies:

Cultural and linguistic unification is accompanied by the imposi-
tion of the dominant language and culture as legitimate and by the
rejection of all other languages into indignity. (Bourdieu 1998b: 46)

Bourdieu further characterizes the unification of the cultural and lin-

guistic market as contributing to the construction of ‘national identity’,

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or ‘legitimate national culture’ (1998b: 46). Thus, in asking questions
about who has access to symbolic and material resources in Britain,
about who is ‘in’ the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) of the
nation and who is ‘out’, we need to take account not only of localized
linguistic behaviours, attitudes and beliefs; we must also locate them in
the context of legislation relating to immigration and citizenship.

Makoni and Pennycook (2007) argue for a critical historical account

which demonstrates that, alongside the invention of nations, languages
were ‘invented’ through the process of their classification and naming
(2007: 1). They add that, in direct relation with the invention of lan-
guages, ‘an ideology of languages as separate and enumerable categories
was also created’ (2007: 2). Makoni and Pennycook point, for example,
to the colonial naming of languages such as ‘Bengali’ and ‘Assamese’ as
the construction of ‘new objects’ (2007: 10). Thus languages cannot be
viewed as discrete, bounded, impermeable, autonomous systems. Makoni
and Pennycook (2007: 27) further argue that if languages are invented
there is a need for their ‘disinvention’, and then for their ‘reconstitution’.
They propose that it is necessary to overcome existing ideas about lan-
guage if we are to imagine alternative ways of conceptualizing the role
and status of individuals in the world, and that ‘a world in which plu-
rality is preferred over singularity requires rethinking concepts founded
on notions of uniformity over those predicated on diversity’ (2007: 27).
Ideologies of nation, and of language, are founded on ideologies of
homogeneity. Makoni and Pennycook call for a disinvention of such
ideologies, and a reinvention which acknowledges heterogeneity.

4.4 Migration and citizenship

In the period since the end of Second World War, the extent and rapid-
ity of Britain’s transformation from a largely homogeneous nation into
a multicultural society was remarkable (Hansen 2000). The British
Government’s free entry policy on immigration from Commonwealth
countries during the 14 years to 1962 meant that there was an influx of
around 500,000 primary migrants, mainly from the Caribbean, Pakistan
and India. Immigration controls were introduced in the 1962 Common-
wealth Immigrants Act, and strengthened in the 1981 British Nationality
Act. The latter legislation meant that in less than 20 years Britain
had moved from a policy of no immigration restrictions to ‘one of the
strictest migration policies in the Western world’ (Hansen 2000: 20).
The 2001 UK Census found that the majority of the population were
‘White’ (92.1 per cent). Among the remaining 7.9 per cent (4.6 million),
‘Indians’ were the largest ethnic group (1,053,411), followed by ‘Paki-
stanis’ (747,285), ‘Black Caribbean’ (565,876), ‘Black African’ (485,277),

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

‘Bangladeshis’ (283,063), ‘Chinese’ (247,403) and ‘other Asian’ groups
(247,664). A further 677,117 self-identified their ethnicity as ‘Mixed’
(Office for National Statistics 2004).

During the late 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis in immigration con-

trol shifted from workers, whose entry was by then tightly controlled,
to the family members of those who had already entered Britain: ‘Provi-
sion for family reunion, involving dubious medical techniques and
intrusive questioning, even of small children, were interpreted so as to
cast doubt on the paternity of Asian children and the validity of Asian
marriages’ (Parekh 2000: 208). One of the clearest examples of these
measures was the ‘primary purpose’ marriage rule. Originally, this
applied to women settled in the United Kingdom whose right to live in
the United Kingdom with a foreign husband was qualified by the need
to show that the marriage was not one of convenience, for immigration
reasons. The immediate target of the ‘primary purpose’ rule was to
exclude young men from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. By 1990, the
initial refusal rate for such men had reached 60 per cent of applica-
tions. In 1988, the Immigration Act removed the right of Britons to bring
spouses to the country of their citizenship. The new requirements to be
met before spouses would be allowed to join their husbands or wives
in Britain included economic status, home ownership and intention to
live together permanently. Although the current (1997 – present) Labour
Government liberalized the previous legislation in respect of the entry
of spouses of British citizens by abolishing the primary purpose rule,
Britain remains the only European country not to recognize the right of a
citizen to have his or her spouse join him or her in the country of his or
her citizenship (Hansen 2000: 233). The Parekh Report found that even
following the abolition of the primary purpose rule there are continuing
problems, as ‘The marriage rules are still leading to disproportionate
refusals of black and Asian spouses’ (Parekh 2000: 220).

Hansen (2003: 101) points out that in Britain recently there has been

a ‘liberal, but thin, definition of citizenship’, which dates back to 1981.
Until 1948, British people were ‘subjects’ of the monarch, rather than
citizens. From 1948 until 1981, Britons shared an imperial citizenship
with citizens of Britain’s colonies. Hansen suggests that this history
has led to uncertainty about the rights and obligations associated with
British citizenship. As we will see later in this chapter, this concern has
recently been addressed by the British Government, as part of the drive
to improve social cohesion which includes an extension of citizenship
language testing. Hansen argues that in current political discourse
‘debates about immigration and integration have become debates about
citizenship’ (2003: 102). In Britain, there has in recent times been a
revaluation of the notion of citizenship, and an active effort on the part

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of Government to link citizenship with specific values and obligations.
The Parekh Report (2000) found that citizenship does not automatically
indicate a sense of belonging to the political/national community. It is
not unusual for someone to be a citizen, yet feel that they are not
accepted and do not belong. The experience of being a full citizen yet
also a relative outsider can damage the quality of someone’s citizenship
and the depth of their commitment to the political community:

Full acceptance is a deeper notion than inclusion. Such inclusion
is offered on terms already set by the wider society, it involves
assimilation, sharing current norms of what it means to be a British
or a good citizen, and demands a heavy cultural entrance fee. Full
acceptance, however, involves renegotiating the terms and redefin-
ing the current norms of Britishness so as to create secure spaces
within them for each person’s individual qualities. (Parekh 2000: 55)

In this chapter, we will see how the revaluation of citizenship has

played out in public discourse relating to ideologies of multilingualism
and minority Asian languages, as a liberalization of the general require-
ments for acquisition of citizenship has been accompanied by a tighten-
ing of the language requirements (Joppke and Morawska 2003).

4.5 Language testing for citizenship

In Britain, there has been in existence a language requirement for citi-
zenship applicants since it was introduced in the British Nationality
Act 1981. This legislation required that applicants for naturalization as
a British citizen be ‘of good character’ and that they had ‘sufficient
knowledge of the English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic language’. The Act
did not expand on what was meant by ‘sufficient knowledge’. However,
Home Office leaflets explained ‘sufficient knowledge’ in terms of the
language of ‘everyday situations’, the ‘duties of citizenship’ and of ‘the
workplace’. In the 1981 legislation, citizenship applicants who applied
as the spouse of an existing British citizen were exempt from the
requirement to demonstrate their English language proficiency.

The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (Home Office 2002b)

extended the requirement to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of Eng-
lish (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic) to those applying for naturalization
on the basis of marriage. That is, following the passing into law of the
Act language testing requirements extended to the spouses of appli-
cants who are married to British citizens. For all applicants, including
spouses of British citizens, the Act added a requirement that applicants
should demonstrate ‘sufficient knowledge about life in the United
Kingdom’ (Section 1, Paragraph 1). The Act further legislates to extend
the powers of the Secretary of State to test applicants’ knowledge of

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic), and their knowledge of life in the
United Kingdom. These are set out in terms of new regulations which
refer to:

possession of a specified qualification
possession of a qualification of a specified kind
attendance on a specified course
attendance on a course of a specified kind
a specified level of achievement
a person designated by the Secretary of State to determine sufficiency
of knowledge in specified circumstances
enable the Secretary of State to accept a qualification of a specified
kind as evidence of sufficient knowledge of a language

The Home Office Summary of Contents of the Act (Home Office

2002c) explains that it places more emphasis on applicants having
a knowledge of the language (English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic). The
Explanatory Notes to the Act offer the following gloss:

The provisions require those who apply for naturalisation as a
British citizen to have sufficient knowledge about life in the United
Kingdom; allow for regulations to be made which would specify
how this requirement – and the existing requirement in relation to
knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic – is to be met;
extend the language requirement to those applying for naturalisa-
tion as the spouse of a British citizen or a British overseas territories
citizen. (Home Office 2002a: 2)

The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act further required there to

be a citizenship ceremony for those granted citizenship, at which the long-
standing Oath of Allegiance to the Crown is either sworn or affirmed:

I, [name], swear by Almighty God / do solemnly and sincerely
affirm that, on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth the Second, her
heirs and successors according to law.

While the Oath itself was not changed in the 2002 legislation, the

new requirement was for it to be stated aloud in a public place. At a
time of diminishing enthusiasm for the monarchy in Britain, many
existing British citizens may not be prepared to promise to bear true
allegiance to the Queen. Here the State is, in Bourdieu’s terms, the ‘site
par excellence of the official and effective principle of the construction
of the world’ (2000: 186), raising the status of the award of citizenship
so that it is more visible. The ceremony acts as a symbolic form of the
power of the State, a performative utterance that states what is, and
what is not, in a recognizable form. In addition to swearing or affirming

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the Oath, those granted citizenship are required by the Act to make a
pledge at the ceremony:

I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and
freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws
faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen.

The pledge, like the Oath, acts as a symbol of obedience to the State.

The legitimation in this non-negotiable form of a version of citizenship
which presupposes consensus allows no room for manoeuvre on the
part of the new citizen. The message is clear: either make the pledge in
its current form, or do not become a citizen. Thus yet another gatekeep-
ing device is awarded authority and legitimacy, establishing what
Bourdieu (1998b: 54) terms the ‘definite differences between those who
submitted to the rite and those who did not’.

In the wake of the 2002 legislation, the government set up the ‘Life

in the United Kingdom’ Advisory Group, chaired by Sir Bernard Crick,
to advise on the implementation of extended provisions of language
testing for citizenship. The group published its report The New and the
Old (2003), which recommended making English language testing for
citizenship part of an integrated programme, in which there are several
routes to successful fulfilment of the assessment criteria. In 2004, the
Government implemented the new legislation and changed the lan-
guage requirements for those seeking naturalization as British citizens.
The required level of English proficiency was set at ESOL Entry 3 (the
Government argued that this was equivalent to the Common European
Framework of Reference level B1):

The standard of language ability expected of those who want natu-
ralisation has now been set at ESOL Entry 3. The Home Office
requires confirmation of ability at this level or above from those
applying for British citizenship. (Home Office 2004a: 3)

Home Office Guidance summarizes the required standard as follows:

‘A person at ESOL Entry 3 is able to follow straightforward spoken
explanations and instructions and hold a conversation on a familiar
topic’. The Guidance suggests several different ways in which appli-
cants can satisfy the language requirements:

Applicants who have an ESOL Entry 3 certificate, or an equivalent
language certificate
Those who have the fluency of a native speaker but none of the
certificates or qualifications mentioned above can ask a notary to
verify their fluency.
Those applicants working towards a full ESOL Entry 3 certificate,
who have met the criteria at Entry 3 for the speaking and listening

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

mode, can ask a teacher qualified, or working towards qualification,
to verify this.
Those who do not have fluency in English, or any of the certificates
or qualifications mentioned above, will need to take a Skills for Life
ESOL Initial Assessment in Speaking and Listening in order to
demonstrate ability at Entry 3 or above.

(Home Office 2004a: emphasis in original)

In the guidance for implementation of the legislation the contested

terms ‘fluency’ and ‘native speaker’ appear to be used unproblematically.
In this guidance either notaries or unqualified teachers are given the
authority to decide whether an applicant has sufficient ‘fluency’ in
English to be granted citizenship. At this time, the Home Office issued
further guidance to notaries in relation to ‘fluency’. This guidance was
confused and contradictory and was scrapped in 2005 in favour of a
computer-based multiple-choice test.

In 2005, the Home Office introduced the ‘Life in the UK Test’ as a

requirement for anyone applying for British citizenship. Applicants
were required to read and learn the ‘Life in the United Kingdom –
A Journey to Citizenship’ (Home Office 2004b) handbook, which in
145 pages provided a version of knowledge about living in the United
Kingdom. Chapter headings include ‘The Making of the United Kingdom’,
‘How the United Kingdom is Governed’, and ‘Everyday Needs’, while
the second edition (2007) added a chapter on ‘Building Better Commu-
nities’. The testable materials within the revised second edition hand-
book total 21,400 words, nearly 10,000 words longer than the original
materials. The test is taken on a computer at designated testing centres.
The test lasts for 45 minutes, and candidates are required to answer 24
multiple-choice questions based on the materials in the revised hand-
book. Candidates must answer at least 18 of the 24 questions correctly
in order to pass the test. Candidates take the test if they are applying for
naturalization as a British citizen and their level of English is ‘ESOL
Entry 3 or above’. If their level of English is lower than ESOL Entry 3
and they wish to apply for naturalization, they are required to attend
combined English language (ESOL) and citizenship classes instead.

4.6 Implementing language testing for citizenship

The Introduction to the ‘Life in the United Kingdom – A Journey to
Citizenship’ handbook states that ‘Learning the main language of a
country is for immigrants anywhere the main priority for integration’
(Home Office 2004b: 10), and that:

Some history is essential for understanding the culture of any
new country, and can also help in following references in ordinary

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conversation by British people who themselves may not think
they know much history but whose sense of national identity none-
theless echoes past events and beliefs. We British are very fond, for
instance, of ‘the Dunkirk spirit’, ‘the Nelson touch’, or ‘she’s a real
Florence Nightingale’. (Home Office 2004b: 13)

The provision of ‘essential’ knowledge possessed by ‘we British’ per-

vades the text. The idea that such arcane phrases as ‘the Dunkirk spirit’,
‘the Nelson touch’, or ‘she’s a real Florence Nightingale’ are crucial
requirements for immigrants in their journey towards a sense of belong-
ing in the United Kingdom is one which exemplifies the invention of
an essential link between English history and the English language, ‘the
creation of a past into which the present is inserted’ (Makoni and Pen-
nycook 2007: 8).

It would be possible to pick out almost any paragraph from the

‘Life in the United Kingdom – A Journey to Citizenship’ handbook to
further exemplify the discursive invention of the nation. The Home
Office Border and Immigration Agency website carries 12 pages of ques-
tions dedicated to ‘what you need to know’ in preparing for the know-
ledge of language and life in the UK test. The preparatory questions
are not in multiple-choice format as they are in the test itself. These
pages carry the rider: ‘You can find the answers to all the questions in
the handbook’. Some of the questions are as follows:

1. Do women have equal rights in voting, education and work, and has

this always been the case?

2. Do many children live in single parent families or step-families?
3. What languages other than English are spoken in Northern Ireland,

Scotland and Wales?

4. What and when are the main Christian festivals? What other tradi-

tional days are celebrated?

5. What are the powers of the devolved administrations? Which areas

of policy remain under the control of the UK government?

6. What are quangos and non-departmental public bodies?
7. What do estate agents do? What do solicitors and surveyors do?
8. What is the National Trust?

(http://www.lifeintheU.K.test.gov.U.K./htmlsite/

self2_130.html: retrieved 07-02-2008)

It would be possible to have some fun with the questions – what

exactly do estate agents do? What is the answer to the question ‘Do
women have equal rights?’ And aren’t there almost innumerable lan-
guages other than English spoken in Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, just as there are in England? It is not the intention of this chapter

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

to lay out all the ideological underpinnings of the ‘Language and Life
in the UK’ materials. A particular and partial version of life in the
United Kingdom is presented in the handbook, and whichever account
was provided would be controversial and contestable, as it would
almost inevitably be fraught with lacunae and infelicities (in fact the
first edition in 2004 contained at least six historical and other factual
inaccuracies). Every inclusion, like every omission, is ideologically
oriented, as it tells its own story of ‘life in the United Kingdom’. That
is, the body of knowledge presented as ‘life in the United Kingdom’ is
an invention of the nation, a construction of identity which is imposed
rather than negotiated. This is inevitable, and is acknowledged in the
materials themselves. However, the notion that a version of knowledge
about life in the United Kingdom can be tested, and that test answers
can be scored as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, proposes that such knowledge
is fixed, immutable and agreed upon. In this process life in the United
Kingdom is reified, the better to contribute to the invention of the
nation.

4.7 Extending the testing regime

In April 2007, the computer-based test of language and life in the United
Kingdom was extended as a requirement for applicants for indefinite
leave to remain in the United Kingdom. That is, whereas previously
the test was only a requirement for applicants for citizenship, now the
larger number of those who wished to remain in the United Kingdom,
but did not necessarily wish to become citizens, would be subject to
the same requirement. This measure was introduced by (then) Prime
Minister Tony Blair in a Downing Street speech. The speech was given
in December 2006, and was titled The Duty to Integrate: Shared British
Values. It engaged with the notion of ‘multicultural Britain’ and the
integration of immigrant groups. In this major speech on the nature of
multiculturalism in Britain, Tony Blair contextualized the debate as a
response to ‘the terrorist attacks in London . . . carried out by British-
born suicide bombers who had lived and been brought up in this coun-
try, who had received all its many advantages and yet who ultimately
took their own lives and the lives of the wholly innocent’. The speech
argued that integration was about ‘shared, common, unifying British
values’, and that ‘we need to reassert the duty to integrate’. The Prime
Minister set out six ‘elements in policy’ which underscored what the
‘duty to integrate’ entailed. In brief, these were as follows:

i. to give grant-aid only to those who will promote community cohe-

sion and integration

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ii. to stand for equality of respect and treatment for all citizens, espe-

cially where the cultural practices of some groups contradict this,
for example in the treatment of women

iii.  to demand allegiance to the rule of law
iv.  to require visiting preachers to have a proper command of English
  v.  to encourage faith schools to make links with schools from other

faiths, and insist that madrassahs meet their legal requirements

vi. to include a requirement to pass an English test before permanent

residency is granted to those seeking leave to remain

Not all of these policy elements refer to debates about languages.

However, point (vi) in particular does so, and it is here that my discus-
sion will focus. The announcement by the Prime Minister in his speech
of new legislation focused explicitly on the importance of the English
language for social cohesion:

We should share a common language. Equal opportunity for all
groups requires that they be conversant in that common language.
It is a matter both of cohesion and of justice that we should set the
use of English as a condition of citizenship. In addition, for those
who wish to take up residence permanently in the U.K., we will
include a requirement to pass an English test before such perma-
nent residency is granted.

Here the modality of the opening sentence is emphatic but appar-

ently inclusive. The phrase ‘common language’, repeated in the follow-
ing sentence, has a democratic sense which is consistent with ‘equal
opportunity for all groups’, and ‘cohesion’ and ‘justice’. The passive
construction creates ambiguity: it is not clear who will be the recipient
of ‘justice’ when all groups are conversant in the common language.
This is liberal framing of illiberal policy, a familiar feature of political
discourse. Equal opportunity, cohesion and justice are unimpeachable
values, which can hardly be argued with. They set a tone of liberal egali-
tarianism, and whatever follows is now expected to be in the same vein.
However, what follows is firstly a reiteration of existing legislation
about English language testing for applicants for British citizenship
(Home Office 2002b), then a planned extension to that legislation. In fact
the Prime Minister’s statement here is incorrect: the 2002 Act provides
that citizenship applicants must demonstrate their proficiency in English,
but not that they actually ‘use’ the language. In the final sentence here,
the phrase ‘in addition’, and the word ‘include’ imply a liberal tone
once more, but the extension to the existing provisions is illiberal, in
that those who previously were not subject to the language testing
requirements (those not seeking citizenship, but seeking indefinite
leave to remain) now become subject to the English test. Here equality

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

of opportunity for all groups, cohesion and justice are dependent on
everyone living permanently in Britain being able to demonstrate their
proficiency in English. The Government argues that the testing regime
for those seeking indefinite leave to remain will eventually supersede
language testing for citizenship, as the settlement requirements are
identical to the citizenship requirements.

The debate continues, and the Government, apparently convinced

that testing English proficiency and knowledge of life in the United
Kingdom is a key means of assuring social cohesion and national unity,
proposes further measures. In 2008, the Government introduced a con-
sultation paper, ‘Marriage visas: Pre-entry English requirement for
spouses’ (Home Office 2007b). This document adds a further extension
to the language testing regime, proposing to introduce a ‘pre-entry
English requirement’ for those applying for visas to join their spouses
in United Kingdom. The Foreword to the document, presented by Liam
Byrne MP, Minister of State for Borders and Immigration, makes the
case as follows:

The immigration system is undergoing the most sweeping changes
for 30 years. Part of our overall strategy for reform includes the
measures set out in Securing the U.K. Border – Our vision and strat-
egy for the future, published in March 2007. In this document I indi-
cated our intention to examine the case for introducing a pre-entry
language requirement for those applying for a spouse visa and plan-
ning to settle in the U.K.

When a spouse applies for a visa to join their loved ones in the

U.K., it is most commonly with the intention of making the U.K.
a permanent home. We want newcomers who come here with the
intention to settle to make a meaningful contribution to our society
and to our economy. It is therefore right that we should consider
ways to assist a foreign spouse’s integration into life here right from
day one.

In April this year we introduced the Life in the U.K. test for all

migrants applying to settle in the U.K. With this requirement comes
a growing need to promote the development of English language
skills at an early stage. Having a pre-entry English requirement
would send a clear signal to the spouse that they will be expected to
acquire English language skills in order to remain with their loved
ones in the U.K. on a permanent basis. (Home Office 2007b)

In the first sentence here a passive construction implies that the

immigration system is independently undergoing sweeping changes, as
if this were not Government policy but a natural process. Reference to
a previous policy document from earlier in 2007 claims authority for
the present proposal. In the second paragraph, the phrase ‘loved ones’

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is interdiscursive, apparently introducing a lightness of touch and a
conversationalized (Fowler 1991: 47) tone to a text which had hitherto
adhered to the order of discourse (Fairclough 1995) usually associated
with Government policy documents. The informality of the phrase per-
haps creates consensus, setting a liberal tone to frame the illiberalism
of what is to come. In the next sentence ‘we’, and the repeated ‘our’
claim the homogeneity of those who already belong to ‘our society’,
in opposition to the foreign spouses of the subsequent sentence. In a
construction typical of New Labour discourse, the modality of ‘It is
therefore right’ asserts its argument with self-confidence, and brooks no
negotiation. In this sentence the verb ‘assist’ again adopts a liberal argu-
ment, as if the effect of the extension of the English language testing
regime to marriage visa applicants would necessarily provide support
to new immigrants. The word ‘foreign’ is particularly oppositional to
‘we’, ‘our’ and the deictic ‘life here’, positioning visa applicants as alien
‘Others’. In a further instance of interdiscursivity, the informal phrase
‘from day one’ (like ‘loved ones’) seeks consensus through conversa-
tionalization. The next paragraph refers to recent Government policy
and makes the argument that because there is now an English language
testing requirement for applicants for indefinite leave to remain, there
‘comes a growing need to promote the development of English language
skills at an early stage’. The passive construction implies that this is not
the result of Government policy, but that it is an inevitable process. The
verb ‘promote’, like ‘assist’, has a positive orientation and seems to
assume that the proposed extension to the testing regime will offer
English language support for newly arrived migrants. The following
sentence continues the hybrid nature of the discourse, juxtaposing the
relatively hard-edged and formal ‘clear signal’ and ‘expected to acquire’
with the relatively liberal sense of ‘loved ones’.

The consultation document continues in four relatively short chapters,

and invites readers to answer questions such as: ‘Do you think there
should be a requirement for spouses to demonstrate knowledge of English
before they enter the United Kingdom?’ and ‘Would a written, speaking,
listening or other test be most appropriate for spouses to demonstrate
English ability?’. Given the limitations of space, this chapter will not
attempt a detailed analysis of the whole text. However, some of the
points in the text are worthy of mention. Paragraph 1.2 is as follows:

The Commission on Integration and Cohesion Report, published in
June 2007, set out that a common language is fundamental to inte-
gration and cohesion for communities. We do believe there is a case
for examining whether an English requirement for spouses before
they arrive in the U.K., with the aim of long-term stay here, would
help spouses integrate more quickly into the community, boost

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

confidence in participating in employment, and make clear that, as
a country, we do expect those intending to make the U.K. their long
term home to recognise the importance of speaking English. We
know, for example, that fluency in English increases a migrant’s
chances of being employed by about 22% and increases a migrant’s
likely earnings by 18-20%. The importance of language is also
recognised in other countries. For example, the Netherlands has
introduced a requirement for all migrants seeking to remain for
more than 3 months to pass a civic integration exam.

In the first sentence here, the text refers to a Government-

commissioned report to claim legitimacy. The phrase ‘common language’
is a recontextualization of the same term used in Tony Blair’s speech and
further claims authority here. The modality of this sentence is strong,
given that the document is a consultation paper rather than a policy
document, offering a particular view in robust terms. The next sentence,
70 words long, combines liberalism with illiberalism to assert the
Government’s beliefs (‘we do believe’) about these questions. A liberal
frame is developed through ‘help spouses integrate’, and ‘boost confi-
dence’, while illiberal ideology emerges through ‘an English require-
ment’, ‘we do expect’ and ‘the importance of speaking English’. The
assertive use of the auxiliary verb in ‘do believe’ and ‘do expect’ seems
to clash with an implied other view, in double-voiced discourse which
is shaped by an unheard but nevertheless present voice in opposition
(Bakhtin 1994). The phrase ‘as a country’ assumes the right to speak for
a wider group. Although it is not clear who is included in ‘country’
here (all British citizens? all U.K. residents?), the inclusiveness of ‘we’
has shifted in the course of the sentence from the Government to the
nation. Two pieces of evidence are produced at this point to claim legit-
imacy for the stated view of the consultation paper. First, an academic
study by two economists is cited as evidence that ‘fluency in English’
increases employment opportunities. Second, the case of the Netherlands
is cited as a good example of another country which has successfully
introduced a similar language requirement for new migrants. Both
these argumentation strategies are familiar in public discourses about
migration (Wodak et al. 1999; van Dijk 2000), and had been used in
other Government documents during similar debates between 2001 and
2005 (Blackledge 2005).

Chapter 2 of the paper seeks views on the most appropriate means of

implementing a language testing regime in migrants’ countries of origin.
Acknowledging potential practical difficulties, the document refers to
computer testing as the ‘most objective way to test that the language
requirement had been met’, but proposes that setting up a system simi-
lar to that in United Kingdom may be prohibitively costly. A written

Adrian Blackledge

test is proposed as an alternative, but ‘A listening and/or speaking test
might also be more appropriate’. The consultation paper proposes that
the principal focus of the test would be on knowledge of ‘key phrases a
migrant might be likely to need on arrival in the United Kingdom’. The
proposed language level of the test would be Common European Frame-
work of Reference (CEFR) level A1 (the test for applicants for citizen-
ship or indefinite leave to remain are set at level B1, notionally at least).
The consultation paper argues that ‘This level, which is the lowest in
the CEFR scale, should be achievable for the vast majority of appli-
cants’. Paragraph 3.1 opens Chapter 3 with the following statement:

The aim in requiring spouses to demonstrate some ability in the
English language is not to deter people from joining their loved
ones; it is to help facilitate their integration and contribute to the
cohesion of the community they will join.

The phrase ‘loved ones’ recurs here, again claiming consensus through

informality, while clashing with and dismissing an argument in oppo-
sition (Bakhtin 1973, 1994). The statement (‘it is . . . will join’) in
response to the assumed argument is at the heart of the matter. If a test
of ‘ability in the English language’ will really facilitate migrants’ inte-
gration, and contribute to community cohesion, all well and good. But
the argument is founded on the presupposition that problems of ‘cohe-
sion’ in the United Kingdom are caused by ‘spouses’ who are unable to
demonstrate their proficiency in English. This apparently ‘common-
sense’ argument can be traced at least as far back as political commen-
tary on the so-called ‘race-riots’ in England in 2001 (Blackledge 2004,
2005, 2006) and no doubt beyond. The argument has such status and
authority in the consultation paper that it is not even asserted. It has
become a universal point of view, a doxa (Bourdieu 1998b: 57), an argu-
ment which does not need to be stated because it is accepted to be
true. Despite the assertion of the consultation paper, the introduction of
a new language testing regime for those seeking entry to the United
Kingdom, like the regimes established for citizenship applicants and
those applying for indefinite leave to remain, is not designed to facili-
tate integration of new migrants, but appears to be very much a deter-
rent to people who would join their families, and as such is a means of
controlling the perceived threat to social cohesion.

4.8 Testing regimes: invention and indignity

I have demonstrated previously (Blackledge 2004, 2005, 2006) that in
recent times Asian languages in United Kingdom have been viewed
negatively in the public discourses of elites. Often the public and even

Inventing English as convenient ﬁ ction in the UK

private use of these languages has been associated with civil disorder,
as they are held to bring about segregated societies and school undera-
chievement of linguistic minority children. These languages, and there-
fore their speakers, have been regarded as a burden on society, as a
threat to democracy, citizenship and nationhood, and as a threat to the
cohesion of the communities in which they are spoken. It is this associ-
ation between minority Asian languages that lies behind the extension
of the British Government’s English language testing regime to include
not only applicants for citizenship, but also applicants for indefinite
leave to remain, and applicants for marriage visas to gain entry. The
argument is a simple one: Speakers of minority languages who are una-
ble or unwilling to learn English are a threat to our society. In order to
deal with this threat we will require them to take an English language
test. This will persuade them that they must take steps to learn English.
A three-tier system will ensure that no-one slips through the net, as
they must take a language test before they arrive, and when they apply
to stay, and (if they have not yet passed) when they apply for British
citizenship. Anyone who is not able or willing to demonstrate their
English proficiency will not be allowed to stay in the United Kingdom.
But there is a difference between coercing people to learn a language
and giving them access to an environment where learning can take place.
There are questions of how speakers of languages other than English
activate their social and linguistic capital to gain entry to a place of
learning which may be perceived as ‘white’, middle-class and academic.
Learning English will not remove other barriers to participation in soci-
ety for linguistic minority groups whose language is racialized in the
ideological debate. The coercive nature of a policy which requires
applicants to learn English or be refused access to the community of
citizens, or denied the right to remain in the United Kingdom, or to be
with their ‘loved ones’, strengthens the existing gate-keeping mecha-
nism so that it is more socially exclusive than before. In almost all of
the discourse surrounding these policy developments there is a tension
between political argument that the policy and legislation is liberal and
egalitarian, and the implementation of the law itself, which is illiberal
and discriminatory.

What we see in these discourses are processes of the ‘invention’

(Makoni and Pennycook 2007) of belonging, and of nationality, through
coercion. The standard which applicants are required to meet are
invented in the language testing process. CEFR level B1 becomes
‘English’ in one context (language testing for citizenship and indefinite
leave to remain), while CEFR level A1 becomes ‘English’ in another
(application for a marriage visa). To set these ‘levels’ as requirements
for belonging is to invent ‘English’ as a homogeneous set of linguistic

Adrian Blackledge

practices. Recent research has demonstrated that linguistic practices used
in the name of ‘English’ are very far from what might be termed ‘Standard
English’ (Garcia 2007; Makoni and Pennycook 2007; Pennycook 2007),
as ‘English’ is used differently in different world contexts (Pennycook
2007). Structures such as language testing regimes, which construct
‘English’ as a standard, rather than as a set of linguistic practices, are
themselves the inventions of a very specific ideological apparatus
(Makoni and Pennycook 2007: 9). To impose ‘English’ as a means of
establishing whether someone is a suitable person to be awarded citi-
zenship, or to remain in the United Kingdom or to gain entry to the
United Kingdom is to invent ‘English’ as a convenient fiction.

The English language testing regime which has been so rapidly

extended by the British Government acts in the name of ‘cultural and
linguistic unification’ (Bourdieu 1998b). It is a regime based on the
notion that when we are all able to demonstrate our English language
proficiency, we will be able to achieve national unity and a sense of
common belonging. The coercive legislation which requires immigrants
to demonstrate such proficiency imposes the dominant language and
culture as legitimate and rejects all other languages into indignity
(Bourdieu 1998b). Moreover, in doing so, this legislation rejects the
speakers of all other languages into indignity. The invention of English
as a standard which must be demonstrated by those least well-placed to
do so is at the same time the invention of the United Kingdom as a
nation. This invented English is a powerful device with which to control
immigration and insist that those who do make it to the United Kingdom
are prepared to privilege one set of linguistic resources above others.

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5.1 Introduction: historical and

demographic context

In 2005, the German Historical Museum in Berlin mounted a major
exhibition entitled ‘Germany: Country of Immigration (Zuwanderungs-
land Deutschland) 1500–2005’. In that year, there were 6.75 million
foreigners living in Germany, who accounted for 8.2 per cent of the
total population of 82.44 million; of these, well over half had lived in
Germany for at least ten years and many for over 30 years. If all those
in the general category of people ‘with a migration background’ are
included – a category encompassing ethnic Germans from the former
Soviet Union and migrants and their children both with and without
German citizenship – the full number is approximately 15 million
(Statistisches Bundesamt). In terms of both absolute and relative num-
bers, therefore, Germany was – and had been for decades – if not a ‘clas-
sical’ country of immigration like the United States, Australia or Israel,
then certainly in Klaus Bade’s phrase a ‘modern’ country of immigra-
tion, with a declining and ageing population relying increasingly on
migrants to sustain existing social and economic structures (Bade, n.d.;
Bade and Oltmer 2004)

Both predecessor states of the post-1990 ‘Berlin Republic’, the

German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the pre-1990 Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG), had actively recruited foreign workers, principally
in order to fill significant gaps in their respective labour markets, and
in both cases the policy was intended as a short- to medium-term
measure. In the FRG, so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers) were hired
mainly from Mediterranean countries between 1955 and 1973 (when
recruitment formally ended, although many elected to stay rather than
return to their countries of origin), while in the GDR bilateral agree-
ments were signed with other members of the COMECON (Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance), such as Poland and Hungary, and with

Language, migration and
citizenship in Germany: discourses
on integration and belonging

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

socialist states in the developing world (especially Mozambique, Angola,
Vietnam and Cuba). While the number of contract workers in the GDR
had risen to over 90,000 in 1989 (by that time overwhelmingly from
Vietnam), most were repatriated after unification in 1990 (Krüger-
Potratz 1991), but the proportion of Germany’s post-1990 population
classified as foreign has remained more or less stable at between 8 and
9 per cent.

Apart from the massive problems of rebuilding the economy and

infrastructure of the new federal states in the east of the country, the
greatest challenge confronting the German government was the task of
overcoming the twin social divisions between westerners and eastern-
ers on the one hand and between what were perceived in the dominant
discourse as indigenous and non-indigenous ‘minority’ populations
on the other. Constructing possibilities of ‘belonging’ in the new state
would require major shifts in the political culture and fundamental
questions would have to be addressed: what does it mean to be German
at the beginning of the twenty-first century? What should German citi-
zenship entail? How can social inclusion be achieved with a highly
diverse and constantly changing population?

In this chapter, we aim to explore one particular aspect of the conse-

quences of German unification by charting ways in which knowledge
of German as the ‘national language’ has been invoked in the course
of debates on migration and citizenship since 1990 (for a historical
problematization of the idea of ‘the German language’, see Stevenson
2002; for a comparative critique of policies on language and citizenship
in Germany and Austria, see Piller 2001, Stevenson 2006, Hansen-
Thomas 2007). We shall begin with an account of the decisive mile-
stones in the reform of legislation on migration and naturalization
in the past decade (from 1997 to 2007). This will be followed by a dis-
cussion of the emerging ‘integration agenda’ and the development of
national curricula for language and citizenship testing. The final section
will illustrate some of the continuing tensions to be overcome at grass-
roots level through a short case study of language policy in a multi-
lingual school in Berlin.

5.2 Political change and the discursive turn

The late 1990s were a period of transition in the politically newly uni-
fied Germany, with the long-standing Christian Democrat-led coalition
under Chancellor Helmut Kohl giving way in 1998 after 16 years in
power to a new coalition of Social Democrats and Greens led by Gerhard
Schröder. One of the most contentious political issues straddling this

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

turning point in recent German history was the reform of the law gov-
erning foreigners. After heated debates, a revised version of the 1991
Ausländergesetz (Foreigners Act) was passed in the summer of 1997,
introducing tighter controls on migration and in particular strengthen-
ing powers of deportation of illegal migrants and those convicted of
criminal offences. In subsequent debates, conservative politicians
increased the pressure for a further tightening of the law in this respect
but also emphasized economic issues, attributing the rise in unemploy-
ment in Germany principally to migration (see, for example, Redman
1997: 4).

This controversy and the shift in political climate that brought in

the new left of centre government marked the beginning of a process
of change in German policies on migration that culminated with the
passage in 2004 of a new Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz, see
Bundesministerium des Innern 2002). The decisive break with the past
came with the formal acknowledgement for the first time that the tacit
political consensus of previous decades denying the status of Germany
as a country of immigration misrepresented the actual condition of the
country and threatened to undermine its ability to manage the conse-
quences of radical social and demographic change at the beginning of
the new century. Conservative politicians nevertheless continued to
press for tighter restrictions and insisted on resisting the tide of change.
For example, Jörg Schönbohm (at that time a leading Christian Democrat
in the Berlin Senate) vehemently rejected the new discursive trend

Ideological maxims – Germany is there for all! – are inflated into
demands that are imbued with the irresistible appearance of human-
ist ideals . . . One of these maxims is the oft-repeated mantra that
Germany is a country of immigration and that it should develop its
policies accordingly. It is claimed that we are obliged to do this for
historical reasons and because we live in a prosperous region. Since
the numbers of foreigners coming to Germany have been high for
decades, so the argument goes, Germany is de facto already a coun-
try of immigration. But this very argumentation is not only prob-
lematic but superficial and simply wrong. (Schönbohm 1998)

Schönbohm and his then party leader in the Bundestag (the lower

house of the Federal Parliament) Friedrich Merz were also key protago-
nists in the notorious debates between 2000 and 2002 on the so-called
German Leitkultur (‘leading’ or ‘guiding culture’), arguing against multi-
culturalism in Germany and demanding that migrants accept the sup-
posedly homogeneous cultural traditions and norms of the ‘indigenous’
majority in return for the social and political benefits of residence in
the country (Manz 2004).

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

However, this previously dominant discourse came under increasing

pressure following the publication in 2001 of the highly influential
report of the Independent Commission on Migration chaired by Rita
Süssmuth (a leading Christian Democrat and former president, or
speaker, of the Bundestag), Zuwanderung gestalten – Integration fördern
(Structuring Immigration, Fostering Integration). The report asserts
emphatically that

It is a fact that Germany has been a country of immigration for a
long time . . . The assertion that ‘Germany is not a country of immi-
gration’ used to be a defining political principle but has become
untenable as the cornerstone of migration and integration policy.
(Zuwanderung gestalten – Integration fördern 2001: 1)

and presents a series of recommendations for the development of migra-
tion policy in Germany based on an analysis of historical and contem-
porary social and economic conditions and in the context of emerging
European policies and processes on migration and asylum. Although
the report failed to silence the critics of a more open stance on migra-
tion, its analysis and recommendations were widely welcomed as a
fresh and innovative contribution to the debate and established new
parameters for the development of a migration policy no longer focus-
ing exclusively on the limitation of inward migration but taking seri-
ously the need to develop detailed and deliverable measures for the
integration of migrants, both ‘old’ and ‘new’. What exactly this integra-
tion programme should entail has remained the principal challenge for
German governments and we shall return to this in the next section
after tracing the tortuous process of legislative reforms on naturaliza-
tion and migration, in the course of which the concept of integration is
frequently invoked but rarely defined (Gould 1998).

The new Immigration Act – which came into effect on 1 January

2005 with the full title of Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der
Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration
von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Act on the Control and Limitation
of Migration and on the Regulation of Residence and the Integration of
EU Citizens and Foreigners) – was preceded in 2000 by the reform
of the law on citizenship rights, which introduced a qualified version
of the jus soli (principle based on place of birth) in addition to the more
restrictive jus sanguinis (principle based on descent). According to the
new law, children of foreign parents born in Germany after 1 January
2000 automatically qualify for German citizenship as long as at least
one of their parents has been living legally in the country for eight years
or more. Adults are now entitled to apply for citizenship after eight
years’ residence in Germany, instead of after 15 years as had previously

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

been the case, but they must have an ‘adequate knowledge of German’
and declare their allegiance to the German constitution. Following
debates at the drafting stage on the possibility of dual citizenship, a
compromise formula was established, according to which anyone hold-
ing citizenship of another state in addition to German citizenship must
choose one or the other by their 23rd birthday. The liberalization of
the law was intended not to facilitate, let alone encourage, further
immigration, but rather – in the words of the then Interior Minister Otto
Schily – as ‘a contribution to internal peace in Germany’, since ‘for us,
it is above all about integration’ (quoted in Fietz 1999).

There were repeated calls at the time from the conservative opposi-

tion parties not to relax the conditions for entry into Germany but
rather, on the contrary, to restrict further immigration and at the same
time to develop a clear integration policy for those foreigners already in
the country. Jürgen Rüttgers (Christian Democrat), for example, insisted
in an article in the national daily Die Welt:

We must ensure that those who live here speak German. We must
make sure that there are no classes in schools in which more than
50% of the children are foreigners. We must see to it that young for-
eigners in Germany receive training. We must make sure that there
are no ghettoes in our cities, which lead to social conflicts. (cited in
Fietz 1998)

A report on the position of families of foreign origin, prepared by an

independent commission and delivered to the government in October
2000, stressed the same themes but emphasized what its authors saw as
the positive contributions of the families to the process of integration.
The government’s commentary on the report concludes with the fol-
lowing declaration:

The Federal Government considers the targeted support of language
learning an important means of achieving integration. It is planning
for all immigrants who hope to attain the right to stay here a pro-
gramme of language learning that is suited to their needs . . . Inte-
gration is a long-term task and its success also depends on whether
the German population helps foreign families to identify with
the country and to find a new homeland here. (Bundesregierung
2002c)

In later statements relating to the planning of the new immigration

law, the principal objective of improving integration continues to be
stressed and language proficiency identified as a major issue. For exam-
ple, the Minister responsible for Aussiedler (ethnic Germans migrating
to Germany from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), Jochen
Welt, identified the key problems affecting the integration of Aussiedler

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

as ‘insufficient or no knowledge of German amongst accompanying
family members (in the case of more than 75% of new arrivals), cultural
distance from the indigenous population, and the difficult job market
situation’ (Bundesregierung 2002e), and set out a four-point plan to
tackle the causes of these problems, the first of which was the provision
of substantial financial support for language learning (859 million
DM in 2001). However, the new policy included a stick as well as a
carrot: the new immigration law was to specify a language test for
the families of Aussiedler, and Welt made it clear that he anticipated
this would act not only as a means of improving integration for those
already in Germany, but also as a deterrent for those who might be con-
templating applying for entry to the country (see also Bundesregierung
2002d). Language proficiency was therefore to be at the heart of the
twin-track policy: ‘Whoever demands better integration of Aussiedler
must say yes to immigration control and to the support of integration’
(Bundesregierung 2002e).

The original version of the law was not entirely new, but rather a

radical rewriting of existing law, introduced according to government
statements to address three main aims:

to control and restrict immigration in relation to the integration
capacity of the Federal Republic;

to meet Germany’s economic and job market interests but also to
meet our humanitarian commitments and our obligations under
international law;

to recruit highly qualified personnel for jobs that in spite of high
domestic unemployment cannot be filled at the moment; this will
create new jobs and increase the competitiveness of the German
economy and German science. (Bundesregierung 2002d)

The decisive factors guiding the new policy were the concept of the

‘capacity for integration’ (Integrationsfähigkeit) on the one hand, and
Germany’s economic interests and the demands of the labour market on
the other. The overall aims were to reduce the absolute number of
immigrants while giving priority to highly skilled personnel required
to plug the skills gap in the German job market.

Language was again

identified as one of the key issues in the current circumstances; among
the problems the law was expected to address were these:

young foreigners up to the age of 16 join their family members in
Germany without linguistic knowledge or useable training;

many foreigners have little or no knowledge of German;

supporting measures for integration, such as language learning, are
neither sought nor adequately provided. (Bundesregierung 2002d)

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

The Immigration Law was passed by the Bundestag and ratified by

the second chamber, the Bundesrat, in March 2002. It was due to come
into effect on 1 January 2003, but on 18 December 2002 the Constitu-
tional Court declared it null and void due to incorrect voting proce-
dures in the Bundesrat. It was only after protracted negotiations in the
Mediation Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss) of the Bundestag that
a revised version was finally agreed and re-presented to parliament
in July 2004. It was announced as Interior Minister Schily’s ‘flagship
project’, which he hailed as representing ‘the most modern immigra-
tion law in Europe’ (Bundesregierung 2002b) and which he declared to
be ‘a historic turning point’ because ‘we recognise that we have, and
will continue to have, immigration’ (Schily 2004).

One of the most contentious issues in the negotiations over the

redrafting of the new law concerned questions of national security in
the wake of the Iraq War and terrorist attacks in Spain and elsewhere in
the early months of 2004. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Government
came under increasing pressure from the opposition parties to impose
tighter constraints on migration into and through Germany. Although
in this context the question of language proficiency may seem marginal,
its potential as an instrument of social control brought it back to promi-
nence in the negotiations. One clear consequence of this, for example,
was the extension of the requirement to take the language and orienta-
tion courses to migrants who had been living in Germany for some time
already (so-called Bestandsausländer or langjährig Geduldete) if they
were deemed to be ‘in particular need of integration’.

Even having reached an apparent consensus on the Act, members of

the German parliament clearly disagreed in the closing debate on what
they were giving their approval to. On the one hand, Volker Beck, a
Green MP, declared categorically:

Germany is a country of immigration. With the passage of this
Immigration Act this fact is now recognized and will be given the
official seal of approval today in the Bundestag and next week in
the Bundesrat. (Deutscher Bundestag 2004: 10707)

On the other hand, Peter Müller, a leading Christian Democrat who had
worked on the final compromise, insisted:

This act is an act for restricting immigration. It puts an end to the
idea that Germany can be transformed into a multicultural immi-
gration society. (Deutscher Bundestag 2004: 10723)

Two years after the introduction of the Act, and following the replace-

ment of Schröder’s ‘red-green’ coalition with a ‘grand coalition’ of
Christian and Social Democrats (CDU and CSU) and Social Democrats

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

(SPD) under Chancellor Angela Merkel, a review was announced in
July 2007, introducing tighter rules on the ‘right to remain’ and on inte-
gration, naturalization and the rights of spouses to join their marriage
partners in Germany (Schneider 2007).

5.3 Defining integration: the Migration Act

and the National Integration Plan

Despite the political consensus that finally enabled the passage of
the Zuwanderungsgesetz, the underlying tensions remained between
social movements embracing multiculturalism on the one hand and a
retrenchment into monoculture on the other. While the new legislation
laid down core principles on the requirements for granting residence
rights and citizenship, the implementation of these processes continued
to be a matter for individual Länder. Various procedures were devised
for determining applicants’ suitability, some of which contained highly
controversial questions that were widely ridiculed and condemned in
public discussion. For example, among the ‘guide questions’ that inter-
viewers could draw on in Baden-Württemberg was as follows: ‘Imagine
your adult son came to you and said that he was homosexual and would
like to live with another man: how would you react?’ This was aban-
doned but other questions evidently aimed at determining the political
orientation of the applicant were added, for instance: ‘Some people hold
the Jews responsible for everything bad in the world and even claim
they were behind the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York: what
do you think about that?’ In its original guidance notes on ‘becoming a
German’, the interior ministry of Hessen, in the midst of innocuous if
rather random questions on ‘German culture’, such as ‘Name three
German philosophers’ or ‘In one of his best known pictures, the German
artist Caspar David Friedrich painted a landscape on the island of Rügen
in the Baltic Sea: what image does this picture show?’, posed more
overtly political challenges, such as: ‘If someone said “free media are an
indispensable part of a democratic society”, would you agree or not?’

At the same time, however, the federal government took steps to

develop a more profound and robust engagement with the key issues,
giving the newly renamed Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
(previously the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees)
responsibility for launching a new integration agenda and developing a
national framework for promoting integration. The political importance
of this initiative was underscored by the fact that Chancellor Merkel
herself hosted two ‘integration summits’, attended by national, regional
and local politicians and by many non-governmental organizations
representing diverse sectors of civil society. The second summit, held

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

in July 2007, despite being boycotted by several migrant organizations
in protest at new restrictions in the reformed migration legislation (see
below), approved a ‘National Integration Plan’, which incorporates a
wide range of measures and commitments covering different aspects of
social life from education, training and employment to culture, media
and sport.

In her report on the situation of foreigners in Germany (Bericht 2007:

35, 38), the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration,
Maria Böhmer, declared a ‘paradigm shift in integration policy’, driven
on the one hand by demographic change resulting in a growing and
very substantial number of young people ‘with a migration background’
and on the other hand by structural changes in the German economy
from an industrial to a knowledge economy. In this context, the National
Integration Plan is portrayed as heralding the government’s departure
on a ‘new road towards a mobilizing and sustainable integration policy,
which recognizes and strengthens the potential of migrants and does
not focus solely on their deficits’. While ‘insufficient knowledge of
German’ is identified first among the deficits (followed by low levels
of educational attainment, high unemployment and ‘in some cases a
failure to accept the basic rules of living together’), language knowledge
(implicitly referring to languages other than German) and ‘intercultural
competence’ are acknowledged as ‘important social and economic
resources’ (Bericht 2007: 37).

The preamble to the Plan declares that ‘our country can look back on

a long, formative tradition of migration with many examples of success-
ful integration’. After enumerating these, the text anchors the need for
a sustainable integration policy in the consequences of demographic
change and the global competition for ‘the best brains: we must con-
tinue to use migration specifically for Germany’s economic and social
interests’. It then goes on to warn against the risks of alienation among
parts of the migrant population and of allowing a ‘lost generation’ to
develop through insufficient knowledge of German, low levels of edu-
cational achievement and high unemployment. To forestall this, the
Plan proposes a kind of social contract according to which the host
society guarantees tolerance and acceptance in return for a willingness
on the part of migrants ‘to get involved in life in our society, to accept
without condition our constitution and our whole legal system and
in particular by learning the German language to give a clear sign of
belonging to Germany’.

One of the key commitments in the Plan is the provision of high-

quality ‘integration courses’ consisting of a language and a so-called
orientation component. These had been available since the Zuwan-
derungsgesetz had come into effect (see Bundesregierung 2002c), but

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

they were now to be improved and enhanced through the introduction
of binding national curricula (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
2007a, b). The integration course as a whole normally lasts 645 hours
(or more precisely classes, each of 45 minutes), of which 600 are
reserved for the language course and 45 for the orientation course. The
language course is divided into two levels (foundation and further) of
equal duration. It is based on an assumption of no previous knowledge
of the language, but on the basis of an initial diagnostic test developed
by the Goethe Institute participants can be exempted from certain
modules. A significant improvement on the previous regime is the
recognition (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007c) that the
category of people ‘without sufficient knowledge of German’ is far from
homogeneous, in terms both of existing knowledge and of personal
background (level of education, motivation, age, gender, linguistic skills
in the first language including literacy, preferred methods of learning,
experience of migration, living circumstances and so forth).

Evidence of this new understanding of the complexity of learners’

needs can be seen in further measures of flexibility introduced follow-
ing the review of the programme in 2006–2007, which include on the
one hand an accelerated intensive course of just 400 hours and on the
other hand longer, more specialized courses of up to 900 hours to meet
particular needs (for example, for young people up to the age of 27 who
have left school but require language support to prepare for further or
higher education; for parents, especially women, who may not be able
to take part in the regular courses ‘for family or cultural reasons’ and
for people who need basic literacy education). Courses can be taken
either full-time or part-time and may be available as evening courses.
Successful completion of the integration course is defined by the achieve-
ment of a pass mark in a language test at the B1 level of the CEFR (see
introductory chapter)

and in a test on the content of the orientation

course. The bulk of the costs for the courses (including the tests) are
met by the state, although a nominal fee of €1 per hour is charged
(50 per cent of this contribution is reimbursed if the participant com-
pletes the course successfully within two years).

The aims of the integration course are specified in the Verordnung

(2007) as the successful acquisition of (1) ‘sufficient knowledge of
the German language’ and (2) ‘everyday knowledge and knowledge
of Germany’s legal system, culture and history, especially of the values
of the democratic state of the Federal Republic of Germany and of
the principles of the rule of law, equal rights, tolerance and religious
freedom’.

Sufficient knowledge of the German language is defined in

accordance with level B1 of the CEFR as the ability ‘independently to
cope linguistically in everyday life in one’s environment, to conduct

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

a conversation according to one’s age and level of education and to
express oneself in writing’. The Programme for a National Integration
Plan (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [BMF] 2007c) elabo-
rates on the purpose of the orientation course by asserting that knowl-
edge of social values, of the legal system, history, culture and political
institutions ‘makes it easier to come to terms with the new society and
creates opportunities for identification’. The obligatory national curric-
ulum (BMF 2007c) in turn spells out the specific objectives of this
learning process:

to encourage an understanding of the German state system
to develop a positive evaluation of the German state
to transmit knowledge of the rights and duties of inhabitants and
citizens
to develop the ability for further learning (‘method competence’)
to enable participation in the life of the society (‘action competence’)
to acquire intercultural competence.

These ambitious objectives – to be achieved in 45 classes using mate-

rials based on a linguistic level between CEFR A2 and B1 and assessed
by a test written at level A2 (BMF 2007c: 11, 13) – are subsumed within
the overarching aim of developing the capacity and motivation for
active social engagement. The Curriculum explicitly requires learning
and teaching methods that guard against ‘political indoctrination’,
stressing that the ‘knowledge component’ of the course should provide
basic ‘facts’ and contextual information of relevance to the everyday
life of the participants not as end in itself but rather as a foundation
on which they can build skills of continuous reflection, ‘a constant pro-
gression from knowledge to action’. The emphasis throughout is on
personal responsibility and participation. Thus, for example, history ‘is
not to be taught in the form of a compendium of dates and facts. Instead,
starting from the present and from their own actions and behaviour,
participants should be trained in historical thinking and their historical
awareness should be developed’ (BMF 2007c: 10). While acknowledg-
ing the time constraints, the document nevertheless expects the course
to promote ‘the first steps towards developing the ability to make per-
sonal judgements and insights’ and establishes as a key aim ‘the devel-
opment of the ability to orientate oneself in a complex and heterogeneous
society’ (BMF 2007c: 10).

The integration agenda has been developed according to what is now

routinely referred to both by the government and in media discourses
as ‘the principle of support and obligation’, and participation in the
integration courses is determined correspondingly in terms of entitle-
ment and requirement. Migrants who have received a residence permit

z
z
z

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

since 1 January 2005 and who do not yet have ‘sufficient knowledge of
German’ are eligible for the course, as are Spätaussiedler and their
spouses and children (except for those of school age). Migrants who
obtained a residence permit before 2005, however, do not have an enti-
tlement to participate in a course, nor do European Union (EU) citizens
or German nationals. The integration course is normally compulsory for
migrants who were granted their residence permit before 2005 if they
receive unemployment benefit or are considered to have ‘special inte-
gration needs’. Since 2005, this obligation applies to all new migrants
who have a residence permit but ‘cannot make themselves understood
in simple or adequate German’, although this requirement can be
waived in certain circumstances (for example, for those attending train-
ing programmes or further education). Furthermore, under the revision
of migration law announced in August 2007 (Schneider 2007), sanc-
tions now apply if regular attendance at integration courses is not main-
tained: for example, unemployment benefit may be reduced by 30 per
cent and so-called Integrationsverweigerer (people refusing to integrate,
that is, by not participating in the course) may be fined up to €1,000.

Stricter requirements have also been introduced for naturalization

following the review of the law. In addition to a tightening of regula-
tions on guarantees of economic self-sufficiency and on criminal records,
the specification of necessary linguistic competence has been brought
into line with that applying to new migrants as described above. Previ-
ously it was largely left up to individual authorities in each Bundesland
to interpret the law on the meaning of ‘sufficient knowledge of German’,
following the rather vaguely specified principle that an applicant should
be able to ‘cope with everyday life, including the usual contacts with
official bodies, conduct a conversation in German [and] understand
texts on everyday topics and summarise them orally’ (Einbürgerung
2007; see also Bericht 2007: 209–210). The new regulation requires
evidence of oral and written proficiency at CEFR B1 level and applies
both for individual applicants under the so-called Anspruchseinbür-
gerung (naturalization by entitlement) and for the naturalization of
spouses. Spouses are permitted to join their marriage partners only if
both are at least 18 years old (a measure explicitly intended to prevent
the migration of girls and young women who have been the subject
of ‘forced marriages’), and evidence of ‘basic knowledge of German’ is
required even before entry ‘in order to facilitate integration in Germany
especially for women joining their husbands’. At the same time, excep-
tions continue to be made for those who ‘clearly have little need of inte-
gration’, such as university graduates, as well as for recognized refugees,
EU citizens and spouses of citizens of other states who do not require a
visa to enter the country – spouses from, for example, South Korea,

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

Japan, Australia or the United States will therefore not be required to
demonstrate knowledge of German, while those from Turkey, Thailand
or African states, for example, will. From September 2008, again in
line with the general introduction of integration courses, applicants for
naturalization have had to take a ‘citizenship test’ (Einbürgerungstest)
covering knowledge of legal and social aspects of life in Germany.

5.4 Local-level politics: the Herbert-Hoover-

Oberschule controversy

The policies and policy discourses discussed in the previous sections
operate at national level and in a top-down fashion in relation to every-
day practice. However, language policy and what might be called ‘inte-
gration politics’ are also devised, debated and implemented at the local
level. A spectacularly controversial example of this occurred at the
Herbert-Hoover-Oberschule (HHO), an inner-city secondary school in
Berlin, in 2006 (for a detailed discussion, see Schanze, forthcoming).

The HHO is in the Berlin sub-district Wedding, which is one of the

poorest areas of the city and is characterized by a high unemployment
rate of 25.7 per cent (Linde 2004), low rents and a highly multicultural
population: approximately 30 per cent of the inhabitants do not have
a German passport (Statistisches Landesamt Berlin). According to the
school’s own statistics for the academic year 2006–2007, 96 per cent of
all students in the school have a migration background and according
to Berlin’s Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung
the proportion of the student population with a Herkunftssprache
(language of origin spoken within the family) other than German is
almost the same (91.6 per cent) (http://www.bildungsstatistik2-berlin.
de/portrait/schuelerschaft.asp). These languages include Turkish and
Arabic, the most frequently spoken in students’ homes, as well as Kurdish,
Albanian, Bosnian, Urdu, Vietnamese, Polish, Czech and Armenian. How-
ever, on the basis of interviews and observations of interactions between
the students, it is clear that their linguistic repertoires typically include
at least elements of several languages in addition to their main ‘home
language’ and German, and ‘crossing’ (Rampton 1995, 2006) is common-
place in the playground and other communal locations outside the
classroom.

As part of a process of organizational reform intended to improve

working conditions and relationships within the school, the governing
board met together with the teaching staff and student representatives
and agreed a set of ‘rules of acceptable behaviour’ which was then
incorporated in the Hausordnung (school regulations) and published in
February 2005. Paragraph 1 (Grundsätze or Basic Principles) deals with

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

100

a variety of issues including equality, tolerance, language, the right to
learn and several other points which are aimed at regulating student
behaviour during school hours (for example, attendance, drug abuse
and cleanliness). On language use, the rules stipulate: ‘The school lan-
guage at our school is German, the official language of the Federal
Republic of Germany; within the area in which these regulations apply,
every student is obliged to communicate only in this language’. In fact,
constitutionally the German language does not have ‘official’ status
other than in legal processes. However, despite the fact that the regula-
tion was determined by an internal process within the school involving
both students and teachers and that its rationale was the perceived
need to improve communication and mediation in the event of dis-
putes or disruptive behaviour between students, the publication of this
particular regulation was criticized by the local education authority on
the grounds of potential discrimination and provoked hostile reactions
from representatives of minority groups, both locally and in the Berlin
Senate. The ensuing controversy became absorbed into the national
debates on migration and integration.

The policy had been in place for some months before it entered the

public domain outside the school, but once launched the debate esca-
lated rapidly. On 19 January 2006, under the headline ‘At this school
one may only speak German’, the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet published
an article stating that the school’s head teacher had decided to forbid all
languages other than German at the HHO. On the same day, the Green
party Senate member Öczan Mutlu summoned a meeting of the educa-
tion committee in the Berlin House of Representatives and on the day
after that the first article in a German newspaper, Der Tagesspiegel,
appeared under the headline: ‘Berliner Schule verbietet ausländische
Sprachen’ (Berlin school forbids foreign languages). Within a week, the
story featured throughout the national press as well as on television
news and talk shows.

The most vehement criticism came from representatives of the Turk-

ish community, by far the largest ethnic minority group in Germany.
For example, the leader of the Türkischer Bund, Kenan Kolat, is quoted
in the Berliner Zeitung on 25 January 2006:

Strong criticisms were uttered by the Turkish community in Germany.
President Kenan Kolat referred to the naturalisation tests in Baden-
Württemberg as well as a planned tightening up of the naturalisa-
tion law – and to the more recent discussion around German as
an obligatory language. ‘Many Turks think that this is all part of
a system’, says Kolat, arguing that this gives rise to a climate of fear.
‘I am very, very outraged’, says Kolat. The Turkish community
would not accept such discussions without resistance.

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

101

Similarly, in a letter to the school the Association of Turkish Teachers
(TÜLEB) interpreted the local policy as symptomatic of wider social
trends:

A ban of one’s own mother-tongue outside of school lessons has a
dimension which goes far beyond the realm of educational policy.
In this particular case basic rights are being violated, and hence we
appeal to all democratic forces to protest against such endeavours.

These responses are characteristic of many contributions to the

debate in that they appear to be predicated on an assumption that the
specific language policy of the HHO is inseparable from the broader
thrust of integration politics in Germany. The Greens initially shared
this hostile stance but also situated the growing cause célèbre of
the HHO in the context of democratic educational practice on the one
hand and the promotion of multilingualism as a social resource on the
other:

In the regional parliament the Greens, however, warned against
making German the compulsory language in schools. It should be
left to the school to decide which language should be spoken on
their playground, said Mathias Wagner, education representative of
the Greens. Throughout the debate about the German language as a
precondition for educational and professional success, the opportu-
nities offered by multilingualism should not be forgotten – for
young people, on the one hand, but also for society in general.
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11. 2. 2006)

Conservative voices in politics and the media, however, took the

local debate as an opportunity to reiterate and reinforce their view of an
axiomatic link between knowledge of German and successful social
integration. Christean Wagner, chair of the Christian Democrats in
Hessen, argued for example:

[ . . . ] the language proficiency of foreign students could only be
improved by speaking German in the playgrounds. This would lead
to integration into society. ‘We want to have such an agreement, as
it is a fundamental prerequisite for integration.’ This should also
ultimately be in the interests of foreign students and their parents.
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11. 2. 2006)

This argument echoed a commentary published earlier in the same

newspaper:

Nobody is being forced to become a German citizen. However,
German citizenship should only be awarded to someone who
clearly shows that it matters to them. This desire includes at least
the acquisition of the German language. Germany must not abandon

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

102

this minimal requirement if it does not want to disintegrate further
into ghettos. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28. 1. 2006)

And this position in turn accords with the albeit more muted asser-

tion of Maria Böhmer, the Federal Government’s Commissioner for
Migration:

Through the commitment of each student to speak no language
other than German, their linguistic environment would be widened
and German would be more firmly rooted in everyday life. Saying
‘yes’ to German in the context of life in the school would mean ‘yes’
to integration. (Berliner Zeitung, 25. 1. 2006)

The suggestion that there is a more or less direct link between an insuf-

ficient command of the German language and the decay of Germany’s
social fabric is a common topos in the debate. An article in Der
Tagesspiegel (28. 2. 2006), for example, reiterates the assertion that ‘the
German majority population and the Turkish community are drifting
apart: the Turks feel discriminated against and the Germans want to
exert more pressure’.

In the same vein, Die Welt (30. 1. 2006) explicitly imputes this social

fragmentation to linguistic causes: ‘One in four Turkish teenagers in
Berlin leaves school without qualifications and at least one in four is
unemployed; drug trafficking and violent crimes are often the result of
this linguistic parallel universe.’ There are therefore strong echoes in
such discourses of those identified by Blackledge (2004) in the British
context (see also Blackledge, this Volume). In his analysis of language
ideological debates following the so-called ‘race-riots’ in the north of
England in 2001, he shows that ‘in the linguistic ideology emerging
in these discourses, “good English” has become a precondition for
social cohesion’ and that ‘proficiency in Asian languages [. . .] is iconi-
cally linked with a predisposition to violence and social disorder.’
(Blackledge 2004: 89)

In the wake of the national media furore, the language policy of the

HHO was reformulated for the Schulprogramm (prospectus) in 2006:
‘German is our mandatory language of communication. On this basis,
our students communicate inside and outside of the classroom. In this
way, they also acquire a comprehensive, linguistically grounded knowl-
edge.’ The term Amtssprache (official language) was thus replaced by
the term Verkehrssprache (lingua franca, or language of communica-
tion) in the prospectus, and the imperative ‘every student is obliged to
communicate . . . ’ has been replaced by the declarative ‘our students
communicate . . . ’ This mitigated formulation of the school’s policy
thus articulates the German-only policy in less stringent terms, although

Language, migration and citizenship in Germany

103

the policy itself remains intact. And while the immediate conflict
arising from the publication of the policy appears to have been resolved,
the case shows in a graphic way the interaction between public policy
discourses at local and national levels and how discourses on language
become subsumed in broader discourses on citizenship and belonging
and in conceptions of ‘appropriate and acceptable behaviour’ of the
‘good citizen’.

5.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have tried to show how language (in particular dis-
courses on the idea of German as a ‘national language’) has been invoked
at different stages and by different participants in the debates on migra-
tion and citizenship in Germany since unification in 1990. There are
signs that, in spite of what some would see as (increasingly) illiberal
developments in migration legislation and a framing of the debates on
migration and integration in terms of discourses emphasizing security
and control rather than openness and plurality, the political culture in
Germany is changing to the extent that the complexity of concepts
such as integration and of achieving an inclusive sense of citizenship
is being recognized and addressed. Evidence of this can be seen in
the significantly more differentiated and sophisticated approach to lan-
guage learning which is the cornerstone of the new integration strategy.
However, it is too early to say whether the government’s Integration
Plan will be adequate to meet its ambitious aims. For all its positive
and optimistic tone, it still implicitly focuses more on what migrants
purportedly lack as potential citizens than on what they might be able
to contribute to a genuinely more diverse and ‘modern’ conception of
citizenship.

Notes

1 Due to lack of space, all quotations from German texts are given here only in

English (our own translations).

2 Following the American model, about 18,000 highly qualified IT specialists

were recruited from non-EU states and granted residence permits for up to
five years under a ‘Green Card’ programme which ran from 2000–2004.

3 The Goethe Institute and a private company, TELC GmbH, are currently

developing a test designed specifically for migrants at levels A2 and B1,
which will replace the existing more general tests from 2009.

4 These aims are expressed in the Konzept für einen bundesweiten Integration-

skurs (Programme for a National Integration Plan: Bundesamt für Migration
und Flüchtlinge 2007c), following the wording in the Residence Act

Patrick Stevenson and Livia Schanze

104

(Aufenthaltsgesetz), with a very small but significant difference by referring
not to ‘Germany’s legal system, history and culture’ but rather to knowledge
of ‘the legal system, history and culture in Germany’.

References

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Bade, K. and Oltmer, J. (2004), Normalfall Migration. Bonn: Bundeszentrale

für politische Bildung.

Bericht (2007), Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration,

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6.1 Introduction

Belgium for many reasons is an interesting case when it comes to ana-
lysing integration policies for immigrants. The country is seen as the
symbolic borderline between an Anglo-Saxon differentialistic model of
multiculturalism in Northern Europe and a Latin universalistic model
of integration and the making of a multicultural society in Southern
Europe (Verlot 2001). The differences in policy between the southern
French-speaking part of Belgium and the northern Dutch-speaking part
exemplify the different approaches and views.

Belgium is a federal country consisting of three regions: Flanders,

Wallonia and the Brussels Capital Region. The three official languages
are Dutch, French and German. The federal state of Belgium is respon-
sible for certain types of law-making. These concern foreign affairs and
home affairs such as defence and justice. Nationality laws and policies
relating to citizenship, naturalization and residence are also decided
upon by the Belgian Government. Education, language and culture,
however, are the political responsibility of the Belgian regions. The
Dutch-speaking and French-speaking communities each are responsi-
ble for their own education and language policies. ‘The integration of
immigrants’ also is a responsibility of the regions. For a number of years
now, the Flemish government has had a minister for integration and an
official integration policy.

In this chapter, the specific federal context of Belgium and its regions

will be discussed in relation to language and language testing for inte-
gration and citizenship of immigrants.

One nation, two policies:
language requirements for
citizenship and integration
in Belgium

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

108

6.2 The political context of Belgium

6.2.1 A federalized and multilingual country

Within the federal context of Belgium, four communities can be distin-
guished: the Dutch-speaking community, the French-speaking commu-
nity, the German-speaking community and Brussels (Figure 6.1). The
capital of Brussels consists of two separate communities: the Dutch-
speaking and the French-speaking community of Brussels.

Each of the communities has its own parliament and government

and its own specific authorities. Education and culture are just two
examples of political responsibilities that rest with the different com-
munities in Belgium and not with the federal state. Each of the commu-
nities develops its own educational policies.

The Belgian constitution is based on the principle of one commu-

nity, one language. This principle was established in 1961. Until 1947,
the relationship between the communities and matters of relative pro-
portion were derived from the outcomes of language censuses held

Flanders/Flemish Community/Flemish region

Dutch-speaking

Wallonia/Walloon Community/Walloon region

French-speaking

German Community

German-speaking

Brussels-Capital region

Bilingual (Dutch/French)

Figure 6.1

Linguistic and political communities of Belgium

One nation, two policies in Belgium

109

every ten years. These census data, however, led to enormous tensions.
In order to avoid destabilization of the country, it was decided in 1961
to define the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking regions of Belgium
through a language border (Figure 6.1). Since then, official language
censuses are no longer allowed in Belgium. Since 1970, the language
communities as described in Figure 6.1 have gained increased auton-
omy, and political federal authorities have been transferred to the lan-
guage communities.

The above-described political context has a great many consequences.

Belgium is officially trilingual (Figure 6.1). However, the one commu-
nity, one language principle implies that the majority language in each
of the communities is the only official language for communication
between citizens and the regional government. Another consequence is
that the only language of instruction that is allowed in education is the
official language of the community. The language of the region is also
the only official language to be used in enterprises and businesses on
the shop floor and in communication with clients. The main aim is to
strive for linguistically homogeneous regions. The only official bilin-
gual region in Belgium is the Brussels-Capital region. Here, communi-
cation between government and citizens has to be conducted in both
Dutch and French, and street names and signs are bilingual. For a more
detailed discussion of the language legislation, the establishment of
the language border in Belgium and its political consequences, we refer
to Verlot et al. (2003), Witte et al. (1998) and Witte and Van Velthoven
(1998).

As a result of this context, Belgium is a country with a high level of

linguistic consciousness. Language and politics are strongly intertwined.
In this context, the public and political discourses on language, on the
use of other languages or language varieties, on the multilingual reality
in education or on language and integration in society at large are highly
ideological.

6.2.2 Immigration in Belgium: a brief history

Grimmeau (1993) distinguishes four major migration patterns in
twentieth-century Belgium. A first pattern occurred after the First World
War, when a greater workforce was needed. It came to a halt during
the economic crisis of the 1920s. Shortly after the Second World War a
second phase of economic migration started (Claes 1962; Aubert 1985;
Morelli 1993; Martiniello 2003) (Figure 6.2).

Mainly Italian immigrants came to Belgium to work in the coalmines.

A third round of extra labour forces was required during the economic

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

110

boom in the 1960s, when European governments and employers negoti-
ated contracts with Southern European, Northern African and Turkish
governments for the recruitment of young male workers. A fourth pat-
tern could be observed in the early 1970s. This pattern emerged mainly
through processes of family reunion as men who had migrated in the
1950s and 1960s were joined by their wives and children. An official
migration stop was introduced in Belgium in 1974, when the economy
started to falter as a result of the oil crisis. Immigration then dropped
until the mid-1980s. Although the Belgian government still adheres to
the official policy of a migration stop, immigration into Belgium from
1984 started rising steadily. Since 2002, this growth has been rather
steep (Figure 6.2).

Since the early 1980s, the number of immigrants in Belgium has been

going up and down. On average, the numbers have more or less remained
the same. In 1981, Belgium had 904,000 immigrants and in 2005 their
number was 870,862. On a total population of 10,445,852 in January
2005, this amounts to 8.3 per cent. The majority of the immigrant popu-
lation in Belgium have a European background and come from the former
15 European Union (EU) member-states. With 64 per cent, Belgium has
twice the number of European immigrants compared to the average of
32 per cent in the more recent 27 EU member-states (FOD 2005). The
seven largest immigrant groups in 2005 were Italians (179,015), French

90000

80000

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Figure 6.2

Immigration in Belgium 1948–2004 (Koning Boudewijnstichting

2008)

One nation, two policies in Belgium

111

(117,349), Dutch (104,978), Moroccans (81,287), Spaniards (43,203),
Turks (40,403) and Germans (36,330) (FOD 2005).

6.2.3 Integration and participation in Belgian society

As a consequence of the complex political structure of Belgium, the
immigration and integration policy in Belgium is multileveled, and
discordances between legal and ideological perspectives can often be
observed. We will restrict ourselves to a brief description of the differ-
ent responsibilities at the different political levels of Belgium and to the
variation in views on integration policy between the French-speaking
community and the Dutch-speaking community.

As mentioned before, Belgium has different government bodies

responsible for various affairs. Entry into the country or immigration is
regulated at the federal level and the communities have no power when
it comes to regulating immigration. The same holds for matters of natu-
ralization and citizenship. The integration of immigrants, however, is
the responsibility of the three communities. We will focus on the inte-
gration policies of the two larger one: Flanders and Wallonia. Different
ideological traditions and views on integration of immigrants and the
multicultural society can be observed between the two communities.
The policy of the administrative elites of each of the communities is
historically based on a number of beliefs or opinions that systematically
recur through time. These beliefs can be defined as ‘basic intuitions’
(Verlot 2001: 197). According to Verlot (2001), government policy in
the French-speaking community of Belgium can be characterized by
the following three basic intuitions:

– The egalitarian-civil postulate: society is seen as a civil society, where

all citizens meet in the public forum. This public space is character-
ized as neutral. Government strives for equal treatment of all citizens.
Their ethnic or cultural background or specific features are not taken
into consideration. What happens outside the public space is seen as
irrelevant for civil society and is not translated in the organization of
society.

– The majority perspective: society tolerates cultural differences, but

minority groups, and in particular ethnic minority groups, are sup-
posed to assimilate over time and to be swallowed-up in the public
space by the majority culture.

– An introverted-defensive attitude: diversity is seen as a complication

and a threat to the social cohesion of society. Society has to stand up
against this threat.

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

112

The dominant rationality of the Flemish administrative elites can

historically also be characterized by three basic intuitions:

– The ethnocultural postulate: society is seen as a compilation of

ethnic groups with specific cultural features.

– The minority perspective: society is based on the cultural features of

the indigenous majority. Although these characteristics are strongly
emphasized, the administrative elites do not present them as having
universal value. Other groups are supposed to recognize and respect
these characteristics, but they do not have to incorporate them. The
administrative elites allow space and encourage other groups to
develop their own identity and act accordingly.

– An open attitude: diversity in society is seen as a challenge and as an

asset that society will have to learn from and from which in the end
society will benefit.

These fundamentally different perspectives on the integration of immi-

grant minority groups are generally labelled as the Latin universalistic
approach, of which France is seen as a typical example, and the Anglo-
Saxon differentialistic approach, which has its origins in the United
Kingdom. According to Cesarini and Fulbrook (1996), divergent opinions
on citizenship can be explained by these different approaches. Belgium
is at the crossroad of these approaches, with the French-speaking com-
munity as an example of the Latin universalistic approach and the Dutch-
speaking community as an example of the Anglo-Saxon differentialistic
approach (Martiniello 1998). To what extent this is reflected in actual
integration policies in the two communities will be discussed below.

6.3 Linguistic and cultural requirements for

civic integration and/or citizenship

6.3.1 Immigration policy in Belgium

Because Belgium is a federal country with authorities at different polit-
ical levels, the policy on civic integration and citizenship needs to be
discussed at different levels as well. Justice and internal affairs, which
cover asylum, migration and nationality and naturalization issues, are
a federal matter. Integration is dealt with regionally; both Flanders and
Wallonia have the autonomy to develop their own integration policy.

In the 1930s, the Belgian government restricted immigration after the

economic crisis of the 1920s and introduced a law on immigration,
which is the basis for the country’s current immigration policy. Until
today, the stop on immigration of 1974 remains in force, at least officially;
the only reasons for residence in Belgium that are still accepted are

One nation, two policies in Belgium

113

international refugee protection (asylum), family reunion, study and
work. Over the last few years, Belgium has admitted around 70,000
migrants yearly. Family reunion constitutes the most important motive.
In fact, Belgium has never ceased to be a country of immigration.

As other European countries that are faced with relatively large

immigration, Belgium developed its own policies to encourage immi-
grants to settle in Belgium and to foster their inclusion in society. In
December 1980, a law on the entrance, residence, settlement and return
of foreigners was passed unanimously in parliament and is still in force
today. This law provides more legal security with respect to residence
than was the case previously. In general, a common response from gov-
ernments to the migration issue is to introduce a policy relating to lan-
guage requirements in the national language(s). When we bear in mind
that language policy has historically been a major issue in Belgium and
that there are three official Belgian state languages, it is an interesting
question how the issue of language proficiency in the national languages
is dealt with at different stages in the immigration process (entrance,
residence and citizenship) and within the different language communi-
ties in Belgium.

6.3.1.1 Entrance

Prior to arrival in Belgium no language conditions apply. Refugees, asy-
lum seekers and other individuals who seek permanent or temporary
residence in Belgium need to apply for international protection or a visa.
Proficiency in one of the three official state languages does not play a
role as a requirement for legal resident status. However, the documents
and forms accompanying the application need to be phrased in one of
the official languages. The translation is to be carried out by an official
translator, which obviously entails reasonable costs. However, in the
asylum procedure the applicant has the right to appeal free of costs to
an interpreter/translator who will be responsible for access to all the
documents and hearings relating to the asylum procedure in a language
the applicant will be able to understand.

Citizens from a member-state of the EU are not subjected to a visa

obligation, and they are allowed to move freely around the whole terri-
tory of the EU. However, they can only settle for a long-term period in
Belgium on condition that they are financially supported or have suffi-
cient income.

6.3.1.2 Residence

The next stage, legal residence in Belgium, has been tied in to the issue
of integration policies treating these matters at the regional level. For a

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

114

number of years now, the Flemish Government has had an official
integration policy for newcomers and even oldcomers in Flanders. In
Wallonia, a decree from July 1996 provides for an integration pro-
gramme for foreigners and people with foreign roots. Residence and
integration will be discussed below for the Flemish and Walloon regions
separately.

6.3.1.3 Citizenship

The gradual loosening of the conditions for acquiring Belgian citizen-
ship reached its peak in the Act of 1 March 2000, allowing any foreigner
legally residing in Belgium to become Belgian with a simple declara-
tion, without his or her desire to integrate being checked (Martiniello
and Rea 2003). In fact, the legislator intended to promote integration
into Belgian society by granting Belgian nationality. The citizenship
procedures – nationality declaration and naturalization – are regarded
as some of the most lenient in all of Europe: basic demands, such as
years of residence and required documents, have been relaxed, proce-
dures are free of charge and no language conditions at all have been
set. The reason why Belgium has no language conditions and thus no
language tests for citizenship may be well grounded in the political
disagreement between and the different perspective taken by the French-
speaking community and the Dutch-speaking community. With the cre-
ation of the Snel Belg Wet (Belgian fast law) in 2000, some political
parties also tried to prevent the Belgian Parliament from allowing immi-
grants the right to vote at the municipal level. Since 2005, EU citizens
have in fact been allowed to vote for local elections. Meanwhile, this
right has been extended to non-EU citizens with a legal and permanent
residency of at least five years in Belgium.

Recent investigation, however, reveals that the interpretation of the

nationality law has become more and more restrictive and decisions to
grant or refuse nationality have become more arbitrary. Through a legal
decision of 10 February 2004, which stated that an applicant’s inability
to speak or understand one of the official state languages could be
interpreted as a ground for the denial of Belgian nationality, a language
condition for Belgian citizenship has even crept into the citizenship
regulations, against the original intention of the legislator. In that same
year, only 43 per cent of the citizenship applications (5,918 out of 13,711)
were actually approved.

As a result of the national election debates in 2007, there appears

to be political willingness now to review the law of 2000 in order to
reverse the unfairness and reinstall good government and also to incorpo-
rate a sort of integration or naturalization exam in which the proficiency

One nation, two policies in Belgium

115

in one of the three official state languages will be tested. In this proposal
from Flemish politicians, the integration ideas behind the Flemish
policy have become clearly apparent.

6.3.2 Integration policy in Flanders

Until 2003, the immigration policy in Flanders could best be described
as a policy of reception that aimed at familiarizing newcomers with
Flemish society and at promoting their (work-related) participation in
society. In February 2003, the Flemish Parliament approved the Act on
Flemish Integration policy, which went a step further in the expecta-
tions and obligations Flemish society placed on the shoulders of its
immigrants. In April 2004, Flanders introduced its own integration
policy in terms of integration as an interactive process and an active
shared citizenship. This policy was referred to as inburgering policy,
a concept and term Flanders copied from The Netherlands (see quote
from www.binnenland.vlaanderen.be/inburgering, own translation):

When seeking residence in our country on a permanent and legiti-
mate basis, one should not behave as a ‘receiving spectator/
observer’. The individual responsibility of the migrant is crucial
here. To take part in our society one must take efforts oneself to
provide a basis upon which one can expect to be accepted fully by
society.

One of the cornerstones of the integration policy is an integration

course which is obligatory for newcomers and for those who conduct
recognized religious services (e.g., priests, rabbis, imams). Newcomers
are defined as people under 65, who reside in Belgium for no longer
than one year with legal residence status and who are seeking long or
permanent residence in Flanders or Brussels. People coming from a
country of the European Economic Area (EEA) or newcomers to the
Brussels Capital Region are not obliged to go through the integration
course but they are encouraged to do so.

The integration course has a strong focus on proficiency in Dutch,

the official language in Flanders, and starts with an intake at the Wel-
come Office and the House of the Dutch Language during which learn-
ing capacities and proficiency in Dutch are tested. The intake results
are used to tailor an integration course for each foreigner individually.
The course itself is a training programme, still free of charge, which
generally but not necessarily consists of three parts:

– Dutch as a second language course aimed at CEFR level A1 (Council

of Europe 2001; see introductory chapter) if this level has not yet
been achieved;

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

116

– a course on socio-cultural orientation in the mother tongue of the

immigrant which focuses on both practical knowledge and important
values and norms in Flemish/Belgian society, such as pluralism,
democracy, respect, solidarity;

– career guidance.

Those who refuse to go through an integration programme or end

it prematurely without valid reason are sanctioned with an admini-
strative fine of between 50 and 5000 euros from September 2008
onwards.

Although the Flemish integration policy sees it as the immigrant’s

duty to meet the conditions (basic proficiency in the official language
of the region and societal knowledge) for successful integration, within
the current procedure no official standardized tests are as yet used to
evaluate the immigrant’s output level after the integration programme
and thus it cannot be established whether the conditions have actually
been met. An integration certificate is awarded to all those who attend
the whole programme on a regular basis. In 2007, around 5500 people,
that is, about 20 per cent of the newcomers, obtained this certificate.

Since 2006, the integration policy has been expanded. More catego-

ries of newcomers have become obliged to take part in an integration
programme, for example, Belgians who were not born in Belgium and
who have at least one parent born elsewhere. Also oldcomers and EU
citizens have become target groups. However, the obligation for old-
comers holds only for those living on social welfare or unemployment
benefits. EU citizens have the right, not the obligation, to take part in an
integration programme. People who are integrating will also need to
pay for the integration course. In addition, the Flemish Government
introduced a secondary integration course, though not an obligatory
one, in which the proficiency in Dutch can be further developed towards
the A2 level of the CEFR (Council of Europe 2001). Once more, profi-
ciency in the official language of the region becomes to be regarded as
a crucial prerequisite for full participation in society.

Recent developments show that not meeting the conditions, in par-

ticular the language criterion, is actually becoming sanctioned by such
decisions as denial of access to the social housing market in Flanders
if one cannot prove that one has a basic proficiency level in Dutch. The
Flemish Government is also planning to change the integration contract
of attending a programme into a result commitment, for example passing
a test at the end of a programme. On top of this, a proposal by a Flemish
Member of Parliament in early 2008, echoing Dutch policies, requires
newcomers to attend a basic preparation course in their home country
before arriving in Flanders. In the long term, policy makers are even

One nation, two policies in Belgium

117

thinking about the introduction of an integration test administered in
the home country as well.

Over the years, Flemish policies dealing with immigration have

evolved from a selective and voluntary reception policy into a more
general and obligatory integration policy. Learning the language and
learning about society, even passing a test, are seen and required as
tokens of an immigrant’s desire to integrate.

6.3.3 Integration policy in Wallonia

The first forms of integration policy in Wallonia in the 1970s aimed at
a purely socio-economic inclusion of foreigners. It was only years later
that social and cultural aspects became part of the integration policy
(Dauw 2002). In 1994, a first real autonomous Walloon integration policy,
orientated towards the French assimilation policy (Geets et al. 2003),
was introduced and became concretized in the 1996 Décret du Conseil
régional wallon sur l’intégration des personnes étrangères et d’origine
étrangère. Its objective is to assure that the efforts regarding integration
deployed by the Walloon authorities are effective, while taking account
of the variety and specific problems of foreign population groups. The
decree needs to be seen against the background of a fight against social
exclusion which is also targeted at indigenous socio-economically dis-
advantaged population groups. This shows the Walloon government’s
striving for equal treatment of all citizens (cf. Section 6.1) and has led
to a remarkable difference with the Flemish integration policy, that is,
the absence of a categorization of the target groups of the policy. The
Walloon policy only refers to the target groups as foreign people or
people with a foreign background who have legal residence status in
Belgium.

One important dimension of the 1996 decree relates to the promotion

of literacy, education and socio-economic insertion of foreign people or
people with a foreign background. For this purpose, seven regional
integration centres have been established. Their aim is to increase the
participation of immigrants in the cultural, social and professional life
of the French-speaking community and to encourage intercultural
exchange and respect for diversity. Via these centres or via a central
organization in Brussels, Carrefour Formation, immigrants are directed
to a professional and a non-professional training programme, both of
which are optional. The non-professional course consists of literacy
courses, courses in French as a second language and courses on knowl-
edge of the Walloon society.

As yet, Wallonia has not introduced any form of assessment or

standardized testing of the French language nor of societal knowledge.

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

118

Language proficiency and knowledge of society are seen as enhancing
participation in society, primarily to prevent social exclusion, but cur-
rently they do not function as prerequisites for admission and integra-
tion to the same degree as is the case in Flanders.

6.3.4 Integration policy in other regions and

communities of Belgium

The Region of Brussels-Capital which numbers the most foreigners has
not installed a policy of coordinated integration. The actual course
of affairs is of a hybrid kind and is influenced by the policies of the
Flemish and Walloon Regions.

The German-speaking community in Belgium has not developed

a real integration policy either, although an office for the integration of
asylum seekers (Asylbüro) has been established. The community also
participates in the Euroregional Meuse-Rhin project, which aims to
promote efficient integration of foreigners.

6.3.5 Conclusion

It is not possible to speak of one Belgian model for integration; rather,
we are dealing with different approaches which evolved parallel to
each other and which are in tune with the political balance of the
moment. The difference in integration policies between the two major
regions clearly reflects an overall difference, with the French-speaking
community seen as an example of the Latin universalistic approach
and the Dutch-speaking community as an example of the Anglo-Saxon
differentialistic approach (Section 6.1).

The tendency to view language proficiency in particular as a prereq-

uisite for successful integration has been more prominent in Flanders
than in Wallonia. Also at the level of the national government, for access
to and residence on the national territory and for citizenship, the idea
of proficiency in a state language as a sign for the willingness to inte-
grate is reviving. Both nationally and in Flanders, a shift can be observed
from language learning as a right towards language learning as an obli-
gation or a condition for something else. The responsibility in this rests
on the shoulders of the immigrant.

6.4 What motivates Flanders to have language

conditions for integration?

What motivates Flanders and by extension many European countries
for having language skills and language tests as a condition for entering

One nation, two policies in Belgium

119

the country, to get a residence permit or to obtain citizenship? The offi-
cial discourse seems to imply that obliging immigrants to learn the stan-
dard language and the cultural values of the host country (often called
‘knowledge of society’), and to take a language and/or knowledge-of-
society test, will guarantee that the fundamental values of the host coun-
try are shared by everyone. For many, this seems reasonable, but it starts
from the assumption that Flemish society is homogeneous in its linguis-
tic and cultural norms and values. However, many indigenous people in
Flanders use the dialect of the area or town in which they were born and/
or live and have only a limited proficiency in standard Dutch. And yet,
they function in Flemish society. In addition, it is very difficult to obtain
a clear picture if one were to ask 100 Flemish inhabitants to mention one
cultural value that is typical of Flanders and which they all share.

According to some, knowing the language of the host country will

increase security in certain neighbourhoods, preventing riots such as
those in the banlieus in Paris a few years ago. However, social workers
in these neighbourhoods confirm that most of the young people who
were involved in the riots were actually very proficient in French.
These riots were socially determined and knowledge of French would
not have had any influence on what happened. The current Flemish
Minister of Integration, Marino Keulen (De Morgen, 1 February, 2008),
when referring to the new social housing legislation in Flanders in
which the proof of a basic proficiency level in Dutch is required to get
access to the social housing market, argued that people who do not
speak ‘our’ language a priori can be responsible for all kinds of incon-
venience. Another frequently used argument is that knowledge of the
(standard) language of the host country is a sign of people’s willingness
to integrate. Knowledge of this language is also supposed to give immi-
grants the opportunity to participate and function in a given society.
This line of reasoning is based on three assumptions:

1. Knowing the standard language increases someone’s opportunities

for work, education and upward social mobility. Knowledge of the
standard language, however, does not by definition solve the problems
faced by immigrants since they are structurally discriminated. Their
language use is an effect of this rather than a cause. As long as socio-
economic marginalization continues, access to the standard language
(status language) will remain restricted. As long as the poor perform-
ance of immigrant children at school can be explained as systematic
and structural, upward social mobility and access to the standard
language (which often go hand in hand) will remain restricted.

2. Only the standard language guarantees these opportunities and it

serves as the only efficient and necessary means of communication.

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

120

Although all European countries are plurilingual, the language of
schooling in most countries is the national standard language. How-
ever, teachers in Flanders often use another variant of the Dutch
standard language in the playground. For more and more academic
and professional work people need English or French. But also in
daily social life, when using the Internet or reading job vacancies in
newspapers, people make use of other languages, language varieties
or different modes of communication. Participation in any society
and opportunities for increased social upward mobility presupposes
plurilingualism, including knowledge of the standard language. This
needs to be reflected in education, teaching and assessment.

3. We assume that immigrants have no or unsuitable language tools to

function successfully in a new country or region. Many immigrants
are plurilingual, having mastered various languages and language
varieties, including the standard language of their country of origin.
They are often proficient in more languages than the average Flemish
individual. This functional plurilingualism often enables them to
integrate into their neighbourhood fairly easily. When policies for
entrance, integration and citizenship are made and language is an
issue in these policies, one of the main questions that need to be
answered is in which areas a particular language is needed for suc-
cessful functioning. Is a Moroccan immigrant who has been living in
Flanders for more than 30 years integrated and can he call himself a
citizen of Belgium when he speaks Berber with his family and friends,
Arabic in the mosque, French that he learned at home and/or school
and put to use in Brussels, some Dutch to function at work and some
Ghent dialect to do the shopping?

6.5 To what extent does a policy of mandatory

language courses and/or tests have a positive
effect on integration?

From a linguistic point of view, Belgium is an intriguing country, not
only because of its plurilingual context, but also because of the symbolic
meaning that is attached to language in this country. A neutral discourse
on language is almost impossible. Most debates are emotional and
ideologically biased because language and politics are strongly inter-
twined in the Belgian political arena and in society at large. Language
is politics in Belgium and it is a central policy instrument (Blommaert
and Van Avermaet 2008). For the Flemish government, the standard
variety of Dutch in the last few years has become one of the most visible
instruments in policy making. In some schools in Flanders, students
using another language at school, for instance in the playground, can

One nation, two policies in Belgium

121

be punished. Someone who is interested in getting a house on the social
housing market first has to prove that he knows standard Dutch. In
Zaventem, a city in the periphery of Brussels, the city council has
decided that the purchase of a piece of land in the city is subject to
the same language condition. The United Nations – more specifically
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) –
recently was very critical of Belgium in relation to the new housing
code of the Flemish government and the decision of the city council of
Zaventem. The Committee expressed its concern to Belgium that lan-
guage conditions may lead to discrimination on the basis of ethnic or
national background (CERD 2008). Flemish politicians, not unexpect-
edly, resented this criticism. The Flemish Minister of Integration, Marino
Keulen, argued that the UN-CERD should actually congratulate Flanders
on its new housing code. According to the Minister, the introduction of
a language condition – what he euphemistically called taalbereidheid
(language willingness) – to get access to the social housing market

contains an extension of the basic rights for non-Dutch speaking
social tenants, which is unique in the world . . . It is disgraceful
that a Committee under the flag of the United Nations should put
Flanders in the pillory instead of holding it up as an example of
good practice. (De Morgen, 14 March 2008: 18)

6.6 Conclusions

In Belgium, as in many other European countries, a shift towards stricter
conditions for people wanting to enter, reside or apply for citizenship
in the host country can be observed. In the French-speaking part of
Belgium, language is no condition for integration. There is hardly any
political debate on this issue in the Walloon part of Belgium. In Flanders,
on the other hand, the lubricant for integration is language, that is,
standard Dutch. Flemish integration policy is obligatory for some ‘new-
comers’ and ‘oldcomers’. The required level of language proficiency in
Dutch is low; in CEFR terms (Council of Europe 2001) the level is indi-
cated as A1. The inburgering policy creates the impression that integra-
tion is not a reciprocal process and that it can be realized in a fairly short
time. This may strengthen the impression among the Dutch-speaking
majority in Flanders that after a language course of a couple of hundred
hours, speakers of a language other than Dutch, without distinction in
educational background, will be integrated in society and will be able
to use sufficient Dutch in a variety of contexts. An indigenous Fleming
who is of the opinion that his non-indigenous neighbour speaks ‘bad’
or insufficient Dutch, will probably maintain this impression after a
language course at A1 level.

Piet Van Avermaet and Sara Gysen

122

Processes of language acquisition are slightly more complex than

providing a language course of 180 hours to reach the A1 level and then
assuming that a person can be seen as integrated. Language acquisition
does not take place in a vacuum but it develops in context. This reality
is in contradiction to the actual policy and the assumption that profi-
ciency in the official language and knowledge of society are no longer
seen as products of a process of integration but as conditions for inte-
gration and successful participation in society. Moreover, language
acquisition takes time. A research project looking at the acquisition of
Hebrew among Russian and Ethiopian children in Israel (Shohamy
2006) revealed that it takes at least nine years before Russian children
have reached a level more or less comparable to that of the average
Hebrew-speaking child. Ethiopian children did not even reach that
level of proficiency in Hebrew after nine years.

A policy of obliging immigrants to first learn the language of the host

country as an initial step to integration calls for critical reflection.
Immigrants are seen as having a language deficiency. This deficiency is
seen as an obstacle to integration and as a cause of violence and social
conflicts. This argument is selective in the sense that it may only apply
to a certain category of immigrants. Those ‘migrants’ belonging to the
‘globalized’ elite (and to a large extent unacquainted with Dutch) com-
municate with the indigenous multilingual elite in French, German,
English or Spanish. The ‘globalized’ elite can be seen as partners of the
local elite, while the ‘real immigrant’ is not seen as a partner but as a
competitor of the local man in the street. The selectiveness of the argu-
ment of ‘language deficiency’ is astounding and it undermines the
theory behind it, where knowledge of Dutch is seen as an absolute con-
dition for societal participation (Blommaert and Van Avermaet 2008).
Those who belong to the ‘globalized’ elite are to a large extent being
relieved of every obligation to learn the language and to engage in social
inte gration, even when they live in a ghetto of the wealthy and hardly
have any contact with indigenous inhabitants.

Research into patterns of language choice among Italian immigrants

in Flanders (Van Avermaet 2008) has shown that, rather than conditions
of formality, the public nature of a societal domain is an important fea-
ture of language shift to the dominant majority language. The choice in
favour of using Dutch with other Italians begins in those domains where
Italians come into contact with indigenous people. When a domain
evolves from an intralinguistic to an interlinguistic market (Bourdieu
1991; Jaspaert and Kroon 1991; Van Avermaet 2008) where one meets
members of the majority, a process of unification of markets can be
observed. On a unified linguistic market, other price-determining laws
apply than on the intralinguistic market. A policy which first aims at

One nation, two policies in Belgium

123

integration in certain societal domains will lead to the use of Dutch in
those domains. That the use of Dutch by immigrants can be realized
through an opposite policy, which sees the choice of Dutch as a condi-
tion for integration, and for that reason obliges the immigrant to learn
Dutch, is not supported by the results of Van Avermaet’s research (2008).
In making language a condition for integration, one refuses immigrants
the opportunity to be active in domains where the intra- and interlin-
guistic markets (e.g., school, work, housing market) come into contact
with each other. One actually excludes people from domains that make
the realization of what one aims for possible. By maintaining a policy
of having language as a condition for social participation and obliging
immigrants to take language courses, one runs the risk of actually rein-
forcing the structural discrimination of minority groups that one wants
to counteract.

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Blommaert, J. and P. Van Avermaet (2008), Taal, Onderwijs, en de

Samenleving: De Kloof Tussen Beleid en Realiteit. Berchem: EPO.

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125

7.1 The Dutch discourse on newcomers

The emergence and the current status of testing regimes for ‘newcomers’
(nieuwkomers) to the Netherlands can only be understood against a
phenomenological context of ‘othering’. A widely used distinction in
the Netherlands is that between autochtonen versus allochtonen, refer-
ring to native Dutch people and those who (and/or whose parents)
come from abroad, respectively. It is not uncommon either to refer to
them as Dutch people and allochtonen, respectively, although alloch-
tonen are often Dutch nationals, that is, Dutch people as well. A second
widespread distinction in the Netherlands is made between ‘new-
comers’ and ‘oldcomers’ (oudkomers), referring to recent and long-term
residents, respectively. A third common concept in the Netherlands is
inburgering, whose closest English equivalent could be ‘civic integra-
tion’. Inburgering programmes have been developed for allochtone
inhabitants of the Netherlands, that is, both for newcomers and for
oldcomers, even in those cases where oldcomers are already Dutch citi-
zens in possession of a Dutch passport, that is, burgers to whom the
concept of inburgering by definition does not apply.

In a political climate of increasing demands on those who come from

abroad, newcomers to the Netherlands have to pass three stages of
testing regimes. These three regimes relate to admission to the country
before arrival (toelating), to civic integration in the country of arrival
(inburgering) and to the granting of citizenship (naturalisatie). These
regimes will be outlined, analysed and evaluated. In doing so, both the
historical context and the phenomenology of the regimes will be taken
into account. The testing regimes on Dutch for adult non-native speak-
ers of Dutch and the recent abolition of languages of instruction other
than Dutch at primary schools should be evaluated against an ideologi-
cal background of demanded cultural and linguistic homogenization at
the national level (Extra and Yag˘mur 2006; Spotti 2007). This national
discourse stands in a paradoxical contrast to the European discourse in
which linguistic diversity is conceived of as a constituent property of

Testing regimes for newcomers
to the Netherlands

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

126

a European identity and its recognition as a prerequisite for European
integration, as can be derived from such devices as Celebrating Linguis-
tic Diversity in the European Year of Languages (2001) or Diversity
Within Unity for European policies at large (Extra and Gorter 2008).

The enterprise of nineteenth-century nationalism, along with the

claim for the existence of homogeneous national languages, led to the
creation of European nation-states and to the national identities
of their inhabitants (Heller 1999). Consequently, the major difference
between the people who fall within the nation, language and identity
equation and those who fall outside it, is that the former are legally
recognized citizens of an ‘imagined community’ of people, that is, the
nation (Anderson 1991). These community members – even though
they do not know each other – rely on the assumption that they share
cultural, linguistic and religious norms, values and practices not adhered
to by those outside the community boundaries. In this respect, the
Netherlands constitutes no exception.

The current Dutch political and public discourse on newcomers, in

fact, contains a wide variety of jargon related to othering. The first con-
cept from the Dutch jargon on immigrant minority groups that we will
discuss is that of allochtoon. This concept was officially introduced by
the Scientific Council for Government Policies (Wetenschappelijke
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid or WRR 1989) and it refers to a person
born abroad and/or whose parents (or at least one of them) were born
abroad. A further distinction is made by the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS) between Western and non-Western allochtonen. In statis-
tical data, the former also include Indonesians and Japanese. The latter
include two large Mediterranean communities originating from Turkey
and Morocco, and two large (previously) colonized communities origi-
nating from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. The intention of the WWR
in introducing the concept of allochtonen, in line with government
policies, was to abandon a group-oriented approach to immigrant
minorities and to focus on individuals. Over the years, the term has
become fossilized, failing as it does to keep track of the evolution that
takes place in an increasingly heterogeneous society. To begin with, third-
generation groups who, like their parents, were born in the Netherlands,
are still referred to as allochtonen. Second, the other-reference term
allochtonen is often used in public discourse by Dutch people in contrast
with the self-reference term autochtonen or Dutch. This othering even
takes place when allochtonen hold the Dutch nationality and are in fact
Dutch. And third, the covering concept of allochtonen fails to appreciate
the diversity and specificity of particular ethno-cultural groups. Table 7.1
gives an overview of recent population figures on the Netherlands,
based on the criterion of non-Western allochtoon versus autochtoon.

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

127

Two-thirds of all non-Western allochtonen belong to the traditional

immigrant minority groups of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and
Antilleans in the Netherlands, although their proportion is decreasing
over time. These four groups clearly emerge in Table 7.1, also where the
largest second-generation proportions are concerned. The spatial distri-
bution across the Netherlands is very unequal. Most immigrant minor-
ity groups live in the four largest cities of the Netherlands, that is,
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In these cities, one
in three inhabitants had a non-Western origin in 2007. Over the last
15 years, the Netherlands had higher figures for immigration than for
emigration. This trend was broken in 2003. Since then, the pattern of
emigration has been increasing, in particular that of non-Western first-
generation immigrants returning to their country of birth. Most recently,
however, new groups of immigrants have been arriving, in particular
from Poland, one of the new Eastern-European countries that have
joined the European Union (EU) and whose citizens are now free to
move across EU countries.

A second widely-used concept in the Dutch discourse is inburgering,

the closest English translation of which could be civic integration (De
Heer 2004). The concept spelt out in the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers
(WIN 1998) refers to becoming an integrated citizen (burger), and it is
widely used in the context of integration of newcomers. This concept,

Table 7.1

Non-Western allochtoon vs. autochtoon population of the

Netherlands on January 1, 2007

Non-Western

allochtonen

N persons x

1,000

Proportion in

total population

Proportion of

second generation

Turks

368.6

2.3

47.1

Moroccans

329.5

2.0

49.0

Surinamese

333.5

2.0

44.2

Antilleans

130.0

0.8

39.3

Iraqi

43.9

0.3

20.9

Afghans

37.2

0.2

15.8

Iranians

29.0

0.2

18.8

Somali

18.9

0.1

31.5

Total non-Western

allochtonen

1,738.5

10.6

41.6

Autochtonen

13,187.6

80.6

–

Total population

16,358.0

–

Source: CBS: Population Statistics

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

128

however, not only deals with newcomers but also with low-educated
oldcomers, who are already legal residents in the Netherlands and who
in many cases already have a Dutch passport. The extension of the
inburgering concept to oldcomers has led to a paradoxical discourse in
which inburgering programmes and tests are being discussed for people
who already are burgers. By entering the process of inburgering, both
newcomers and oldcomers become residents faced by successive testing
regimes. The first regime, aimed at newcomers who are not qualified as
refugees or asylum seekers, takes place in their own country of origin
once newcomers have asked to be admitted to the Netherlands. The
second regime, called inburgering, starts for both categories on Dutch
territory. The completion of this trajectory grants a newcomer the pos-
sibility of being made eligible for a renewable residence permit, while
it certifies that the oldcomer is now an integrated citizen. Finally, it is
through a third testing regime, the one on naturalisatie (citizenship),
that the now integrated newcomer can be made eligible to apply for
Dutch citizenship. Newcomers who have passed the inburgering exam
can apply directly for citizenship without being examined on their
knowledge of Dutch society and Dutch language skills.

The naturalization regime grants eligibility to Dutch citizenship and,

at least on paper, it seals the newcomer’s belonging to the Netherlands.
At the level of the nation-state, therefore, the concept of naturalization
presupposes that becoming a citizen of the nation-state where one
resides is the ‘natural’ condition that a newcomer should strive for.
However, the internal inconsistencies between the requirements set by
the naturalization procedure and the concept of transnational identity
leads to yet another paradox (Lucassen 2006). The concept of naturali-
zation stems from an ideology of single nationality. In spite of the
European rhetoric on transnational identity and dual citizenship, many
European nation-states, including the Netherlands, have become reluc-
tant to accept dual citizenship (De Hart 2004).

Non-Dutch citizens who want to acquire Dutch citizenship are sup-

posed to give up their original nationality, the only exceptions being
recognized refugees and persons who are legally not allowed to give up
the nationality of their country of origin (e.g., Greeks or Moroccans).
The former Dutch policy on dual citizenship in terms of ‘yes, provided
that’ has shifted to ‘no, unless’. In the current political and public dis-
course, dual citizenship is conceived of as constituting a lack of integra-
tion or even a lack of ‘loyalty’ towards the nation-state of residence (cf.
De Hart 2005 for a critical analysis of this discourse in the Netherlands).
In principle, few members of the Dutch parliament take a benevolent
attitude towards the acceptance of dual citizenship, in which they are
also led by a largely declining acceptance among the general public in

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

129

the Netherlands. In the public and political discourse, little reference
is made to the many residents in the Netherlands with at least dual
citizenship. According to CBS (2006), more than one million out of
16 million Dutch citizens held at least one additional citizenship in
January 2006, which is two-and-a-half times as many as in January
1995; more than half of them were not only Dutch citizens but also
Turkish or Moroccan citizens. Moreover, more than half a million Dutch
living abroad, that is, within Europe or in non-European countries, held
dual citizenship. Not much reference either is made to the fact that
dual citizenship is accepted in more than 100 nation-states across the
world, in particular in English-dominant immigration countries. It is
also strongly favoured by many immigrant minority groups in Europe
who do not want to be equated with one European nation-state and
who cherish a transnational identity. What is advocated by national
leadership at the European level, however, is commonly declined at the
national level (Extra and Gorter 2008).

As already mentioned, newcomers to the Netherlands have to pass

three stages of testing regimes, en route from admission (toelating)
through integration (inburgering) to citizenship (naturalisatie). As from
April 2007 onwards, the integration test takes the place of the citizen-
ship test, at least in terms of knowledge of Dutch society and Dutch
language skills, in order to reduce complexities; however, additional
requirements have to be fulfilled in order to obtain Dutch citizenship.
Table 7.2 gives an overview of these successive testing regimes.

At all stages, the requirements set for Dutch language skills are based

on the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR), adopted
by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and intended to function as a
European standard for six levels of language skills, A1 being the lowest
and C2 the highest (see www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/CADRE_EN.asp
for specifications). The responsibilities for each of the above-mentioned
testing regimes are spread over different agencies, that is, the Centre for
Innovation of Educational Programmes (Centrum voor Innovatie van
Opleidingen, CINOP), the Intercultural Evaluation Bureau (Bureau
Interculturele Evaluatie, ICE) plus the National Institute for Educational
Measurement (Centraal Instituut voor Toetsontwikkeling, CITO) and
the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisa-
tiedienst, IND). CINOP, ICE and CITO are (semi-)private institutions in
the Netherlands, whereas the IND is a division of the Dutch Ministry of
Justice. No specific rationale is given for this division of tasks, nor is
any mutual fine-tuning among these agencies demanded by law. The
calculus regime for passing and failing shows remarkable peculiarities,
as is shown in Table 7.3. The maximum score per test ranges from 30 to
80, and the pass norm from 20 to 78 per cent. No explicit rationale for

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130

Table 7.2

Successive testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

Stage

Knowledge of

Dutch society

Dutch language skills

Admission to NL
(Toelating)
(resp: CINOP)

Audiovisual phone

test on the
Netherlands*

Computerized phone test on

oral skills

(CEFR level A1 minus)

Integration in NL
(Inburgering)
(resp: Bureau ICE/

CITO)

Multiple-choice

test in seven
domains*

Newcomers:

CEFR level A2 for oral plus

written skills
Low-educated oldcomers:

A2 level for oral skills
A1 level for written skills

Citizenship in NL
(Naturalisatie)
(resp:

municipality of
residence plus
IND)

Multiple-choice
test in 7 domains
(as in stage 2)*
Additional
requirements

CEFR level A2 for oral plus

written skills (as for
newcomers in stage 2)

*passing this test is required for admission to the language test.

Table 7.3

The calculus regime for newcomers (n.a. = not available)

Type of test

Max. score

Pass norm

In %

Admission test (Toelating)

knowledge of Dutch society

oral skills in Dutch

Integration test (Inburgering)

knowledge of Dutch society

oral skills in Dutch

written skills in Dutch

n.a.

these norms and ranges is given either, although they are related to the
CEFR levels referred to in Table 7.2. At the time of writing, no test
norms were available for written skills. Furthermore, plans were being
prepared by the Ministry of Integration to raise the pass norms for oral
skills in Dutch for both the admission test and the integration test
because these norms were considered too low. Proposals to raise the

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

131

norms were prepared by the Dutch Research Centre for Examination
and Certification (RCEC).

In the next section, we go through the development of each of the

testing regimes referred to in Table 7.2, following the trajectory that
the newcomer has to follow, exploring these tests and teasing out their
peculiarities.

7.2 Dutch testing regimes for admission,

integration and citizenship

7.2.1 Admission

Admission to the Netherlands is spelled out in a unique type of legis-
lation, that is, the Wet Inburgering in het Buitenland (2006) (Law on
‘Integration Abroad’). The law is meant to prepare people abroad for
their future settlement in the Netherlands through a computerized
admission test. This test can be taken at about 140 Dutch embassies
or consulates abroad and in this sense is a unique phenomenon. Infor-
mation on the test is available on a website in Dutch and English (www.
naarnederland.nl). The test consists of two parts (see Table 7.2). The
first part, on knowledge of Dutch society, consists of a series of photos
based on a video film about the Netherlands and is accompanied by
30 questions. The film, called Coming to the Netherlands, is available
in 14 different languages as a tool for preparation to the test, and deals
with living in the Netherlands, Dutch politics, work, education, health
care and history. There is an uncensored version of the film and a cen-
sored one for Islamic countries, in which pictures of sunbathing women
and gay people are replaced by other scenes. Preparing for this first
part of the test is possible by buying and studying a photo album and
an audio CD. The photo album contains 100 photos, the audio CD 100
questions. All questions are in Dutch and all answers have to be given
in Dutch. In this sense, this first part of the test is actually a hidden lan-
guage test (for this reason, Franssen 2004 proposed in vain to leave this
part out in the admission test). During the computerized admission
examination in a phone cell at a Dutch embassy, 30 questions from the
photo album are presented and have to be answered through a headset.
Preparation for the test resembles preparation for a Dutch driving
licence, although in the latter case questions on driving in the Nether-
lands may be answered in Dutch, English or other languages; interpreter
support is provided if paid for. Leaving aside that some knowledge of
Dutch is a prerequisite for answering the admission test questions on
knowledge of Dutch society, it is highly questionable whether the imple-
mented test actually measures such knowledge in an appropriate way.

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132

The second part of the admission test is a computerized phone test

that requires both listening and speaking skills at the CEFR A1 minus
level (Table 7.2). It consists of five sections that deal with repeating
sentences, answering short questions, indicating opposites, repeating
sentences and repeating two different short stories, respectively. Each
section includes four exercises. All 20 exercises are given on the phone
and the answers are then assessed automatically by a speech computer,
also with respect to the quality of the speaker’s Dutch pronunciation.
The maximum score is 80 points and the pass norm until 2008 was 16
(20 per cent).

This computerized phone test was originally developed by Ordinate

Company in California as an L2 English test for L1 Spanish and other
adult respondents, and it was adapted for L2 Dutch by Language Test-
ing Services in Velp in cooperation with CINOP in Den Bosch. The
American test, however, discriminates between seven different lan-
guage levels on the basis of obtained scores (10–80 points), whereas the
Dutch test only distinguishes between passing and failing. The Dutch
Ministry of Integration asked for two external judgements from experts
on the quality of the test: a group of four experts in linguistics, testing,
speech technology (see report Verdonk 2005 to Parliament), and TNO
(Applied Science Research) experts in Delft (Kessens et al. 2005). The
first group came to the conclusion that there was not enough evidence
that the proposed phone test would be valid and reliable: pilot testing
was done with too highly skilled respondents, test norms for passing/
failing were too arbitrary, and current speech technology was consid-
ered too under-developed for the proposed type of testing (see also Strik
2005). The same group suggested that more pilot research be carried out
before implementing the test. TNO came to similar conclusions but was
less reluctant with respect to implementing the test.

Other critical comments on this testing regime are based on ethical

issues such as demanding these skills before arrival in the Netherlands
in the absence of conditions for learning and practising Dutch abroad,
and demanding these skills in the artificial context of a computerized
phone test in a phone booth at a foreign embassy. Groenendijk (2006)
considers the introduction of the test unlawful because it has led to
selective exemptions for citizens of particular countries (see also the
regime on integration, below) and to barriers for family reunion (i.e.,
both for partners and children). Legal constraints are spelled out in the
Association Treaty between Turkey and the Netherlands, in the Euro-
pean Treaty on the Protection of Human Rights and in the European
Directive on the Right to Family Unification (1999) (Walter 2004).

As yet, nowhere else in the world are decisions on the admission of

immigrants based on computerized phone tests with such far-reaching

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

133

consequences as in the Netherlands. In spite of all this, the Dutch
Cabinet and Parliament agreed to the design and the procedures for
this admission test in the law Wet Inburgering Buitenland, passed in
January 2006. The first 1,580 candidates who took the dual test since its
implementation in early 2006 succeeded at their first attempt in almost
90 per cent of the cases; most of them were 25–36 years old and were
Turkish (21 per cent), Moroccan (19 per cent) or Chinese (10 per cent)
citizens. No exact information is available on their socio-biographical
backgrounds but most of them were highly educated. Since 2004, there
has been a deliberately intended decrease in the statistics on family
formation and family reunion in the Netherlands with source country
partners, which is in line with the ultimate goals of the admission
regime. In 2001, more than half of the Turkish and Moroccan adults in
the Netherlands married a partner from/in the respective source coun-
tries; in 2006, this was less than a fourth. Recently, a very critical report
on Dutch admission policies was published by Human Rights Watch
(2008). The admission regime was considered discriminatory because
it explicitly applies to particular ‘non-Western’ countries and because it
violates the qualified human right to marry and start a family. The HRW
report also mentions that the current admission regime runs the risks of
alienating particular immigrant communities in the Netherlands because
it creates the impression that their families (and hence they) are not
welcome in the country.

Apart from the testing regime for admission to the Netherlands

outlined so far, admission is further restricted by other prerequisites,
in particular by an income requirement of at least 120 per cent of the
Dutch minimum wage and an age requirement of marriage partners
having to be over 21. All three prerequisites are in violation of current
international and/or European laws. In July 2008, a court in Roermond,
the Netherlands, ruled in a case brought to the court by a Sri Lankan
woman, that the 120 per cent income norm was illegal. In the same year,
a Moroccan woman who failed to pass the admission test in Morocco filed
an official objection with a court in Amsterdam against non-admission
to the Netherlands. Like the court in Roermond, this court too, in July
2008, ruled in favour of the plaintive, concluding that migrants wishing
to come to the Netherlands in the context of marriage or family reunion
were not obliged by law to pass an admission test abroad before enter-
ing the country. Given the fact that, on a yearly basis, thousands of
migrants apply for admission to the Netherlands in this context (almost
19,000 in 2007), both the Amsterdam and the Roermond verdicts could
potentially have devastating effects for the current restrictive admis-
sion regime. At the time of writing, the Ministry of Justice had appealed
to a higher Dutch court against both local court verdicts. Most voices in

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

134

the public and political reactions to the two local court verdicts favoured
repairs to the present Dutch law over adhering to international or
European law, to make it possible for the existing admission regime to
be continued (but see Aantjes 2008).

7.2.2 Integration

The second stage of testing regimes for newcomers relates to integration
(inburgering) in Dutch society after successful admission (Table 7.2).
The inburgering exam consists of two parts. Part 1 concerns knowledge
of Dutch society; there are multiple-choice questions on various domains,
that is, work and income, living (life), health care, traffic and transport,
government and leisure time. Part 2 covers four skills in Dutch at CEFR
level A2. Items included in the test are taken from a database of pre-
tested items that guarantee a renewal of the test every six months. For
oral skills in Dutch, the same type of test is used as for admission to the
Netherlands, and the pass norm for both newcomers and oldcomers
until 2008 was determined at 37 out of 80 points (= 46 per cent). For
written skills, no test norms were available at the time of writing. The
knowledge test on Dutch society is administered in Dutch and, as in the
case of the admission regime, de facto functions as a hidden language
test. The knowledge test has to be passed before applicants are allowed
to do the four subparts of the language test (see Table 7.3 for maximum
scores and pass norms). Failure on one of the (sub)tests leads to a wait-
ing time of at least six months before a new attempt can be made. As
yet, no official training packages have been made available for prepar-
ing for the test. However, several Dutch publishing houses have entered
this field as a new market. Apart from L2 Dutch training methods, pro-
grammes on preparing for the knowledge test on Dutch society are
available, that is, Gathier (2008) and Koot (2007) for low- and highly
educated adults, respectively.

In the Netherlands, extensive attention has been paid to inburgering,

both in the media (Hielkema 2003) and at government level. Fermin
(2001) goes into the ethical and moral dimensions of obligatory integra-
tion for newcomers and has asked for a more profound justification
from the government. Gowricharn and Nolen (2004) have conducted
a case study in a Dutch municipality on the abilities and needs of
both newcomers and oldcomers with respect to inburgering and on the
municipal policy process. Spijkerboer (2007) offers an overview of
the viewpoints of Dutch political parties on integration and addresses
the current public and political discourse, which has moved from mul-
ticulturalism to assimilationism. Since 2000, inburgering regulations

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

135

have become so vast and complex that a detailed handbook on these
regulations has been made available (Den Uyl et al. 2003). Statistical
information on those enrolled in inburgering programmes is provided
in the first yearly report that appeared on this theme in 2005 (SCP/
WODC/CBS 2005: 28–43). In order to make sense of this gamut
of regulations, we take a critical governmental report on inburgering,
presented to the Dutch Parliament by then Minister of Integration Rita
Verdonk (2004), as our point of departure and as a ‘landmark’ whose
effects still reverberate in Dutch political discourse. Verdonk’s report
contained the following guiding principles for inburgering:

Both newcomers and low-educated oldcomers will be obliged by law
to demonstrate inburgering in Dutch society.
Residents’ own responsibilities in choosing and financing their own
programmes are key elements in the inburgering obligation.
The inburgering obligation can only be fulfilled by passing a dual
inburgering exam (Table 7.2).
Municipalities have special obligations for particular target groups.

In terms of target groups, newcomers were considered as first priority

group and their number was estimated at 18,000 per year. Oldcomers
who were unemployed and received unemployment benefits were seen
as second priority group and their number was estimated at 44,000 per
year (see Pluymen 2004 for a critical review of the legislative link
between residential status and social benefits). A last priority group
was that of already settled oldcomers who would act on their own initi-
ative and whose numbers were estimated at 23,000 per year. A total
annual budget of €270 million was allocated for these 85,000 non-native
residents whose responsibilities were summed up as follows:

Attending an intake session at the municipal level to begin their inte-
gration trajectory.
Self-financing of their attendance at integration courses.
Choosing from available programmes – for which a certification system
and quality checks would be developed by government.
A time limit, that is, three-and-a-half years for newcomers and five
years for oldcomers.

The regulations just outlined result in a complex, restrictive and

sanction-oriented set of measures. Financial and/or even residential
sanctions were to be enforced if the intake session or lessons were not
attended, and if time limits for passing the tests were exceeded. What
is feasible, however, in terms of second language acquisition within a
fixed allocated number of hours in a classroom remains an open question,

z
z

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

136

given the enormous variation in background characteristics of those
who take part in the lessons. The critical reception of Verdonk’s pro-
posals can be grouped into five main categories:

The enormous size of the target groups versus severe ministerial
budget constraints.
The violation of the non-discrimination principle by including
oldcomers/Dutch nationals (inburgering for burgers, that is, for those
who are already citizens, is against the legal principle of equal treat-
ment in equal cases), and by exempting citizens from EU/EEA coun-
tries, Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Japan.
The demands on programme participants in terms of
– financial costs, in particular for asylum seekers and for partici-

pants with the lowest skills and income levels, estimated at more
than €5,000 (minus a €3,000 reimbursement on passing the test);

– financial sanctions in spite of absence of guilt;
– the obligation to participate without job guarantees;
The dismantling of existing expertise in regional educational centres
(ROCs) with their expert L2 Dutch teachers, as a consequence of the
free-market principle for programmes on offer.
The absence, as yet, of a certification system and quality assurance
for such programmes.

In June 2006, Verdonk’s last ministerial proposals for a new law on

inburgering, to be enforced on January 1st, 2007, were discussed in Par-
liament and encountered similar objections. A majority of the Members
of Parliament remained against the unequal treatment of ‘native’ and
‘naturalized’ Dutch nationals, most of them out of fear of legal objec-
tions brought to Dutch courts rather than out of principle (inburgering
of those who are already legally recognised citizens is a contradiction
in terms). Verdonk’s appeal to Parliament, asking for ‘political courage’,
did not succeed, not even with her own party members in Parliament
and led to a halving of the original target group numbers. Moreover,
many amendments made the proposed law even more detailed and
complex, and therefore even more difficult to handle in practice. It
should, however, be kept in mind that the Dutch Parliament and Cabi-
net over a number of years had urged the then Minister of Integration
several times to propose ‘tough’ measures. In Dutch society and abroad,
many protests were raised against what has been referred to as a dis-
criminatory and repressive integration policy, for example, by a collec-
tive of concerned citizens in the national media (De Volkskrant, 21 June
2004), in recent manifests by Dutch minority organizations and by such
international organizations as Amnesty International, Human Rights

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

137

Watch and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
(2008).

In order to cope with the difficulties encountered, Verdonk in accord-

ance with the wishes of a majority in Parliament decided to introduce
the new law in 2007 only partially, that is, for newcomers without
Dutch citizenship. At the same time, the Raad van State (Council of
State) was asked to advise on how to deal with low-educated oldcomers
who are already Dutch citizens (referred to in the public discourse
as ‘allochtonen with a Dutch passport’ rather than as Dutch people). In
June 2006, the Dutch Cabinet fell after its refusal, in spite of a favoura-
ble narrow majority in Parliament, to approve a general pardon for
those asylum seekers without a legal residence status who had entered
the Netherlands before April 2001. In August 2006, the Council of State
took the legal position that no obligations could be enforced on any
Dutch citizen on the basis of the principle of equal treatment.

7.2.3 Citizenship

The most important pitfall of ‘naturalization’ in order to obtain Dutch
citizenship is that immigrants and their children lose the nationality
of their country of origin, with all its legal, emotional and financial
implications. The positive consequences are the loss of a weaker resi-
dent status (or an even weaker refugee status) and the acquisition of the
same rights as Dutch citizens (including active and passive franchise)
and EU citizens (including free movement and settlement across EU
countries). Dutch citizenship can be granted by the Ministry of Justice;
its Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (IND) is charged with this task
(www.ind.nl). The IND decides on some 30,000–40,000 applications
every year. Candidates must have resided legally and without interrup-
tion in the Netherlands on the basis of a non-temporary residence per-
mit for at least five years (three years, if married to a Dutch national),
they must renounce their previous nationality (unless this is not per-
mitted in their source country, as, for example, for Moroccan or Greek
citizens), they must have no criminal record and they must have
competence in Dutch. For the latter, as from January 2007, candidates
must have passed the inburgering exam to be outlined below. Exemption
from this test is possible, if the candidate has a certified record of Dutch
education and/or competence in Dutch, or a testified handicap that
makes test participation too demanding. Having acquired the certificate
for this exam, candidates can apply for Dutch citizenship for which the
above-mentioned conditions have to be fulfilled additionally. Verification
of all conditions by the IND and by municipal authorities may take
up to one year. The IND (2005) brochure refers to existing inburgering

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138

programmes for acquiring the required knowledge and skills and
stresses that these demands cannot be learnt from textbooks only but
should be learnt in practice. For an illuminating study on the political
discourse and effects of the testing regime for citizenship, we refer to
Van Oers (2006).

On 24 August 2006 (i.e., the day on which in 1815 the first Dutch Con-

stitution was passed in Parliament), the first municipal ceremonies took
place in order to pay tribute to those who passed the citizenship test. The
officially prescribed ceremony for this Naturalisatiedag includes the
Dutch national anthem and flag, although in many municipalities both
were considered too ‘patriotic’ or ‘nationalistic’. The turnout of new
Dutch citizens for the planned gatherings was rather low (in The Hague,
for instance, only 215 out of 900 invited). From 2007 on, attendance at
this yearly ceremony is compulsory, following ministerial guidelines
for the mayors of all Dutch municipalities. In order to promote partici-
pation, from 2008 on, the yearly date is fixed outside the summer holi-
day season, on 15 December, that is, the day on which in 1954 the
Dutch Kingdom’s Statute was signed. At the time of writing, legislation
was prepared as a result of which new Dutch citizens on this day will
be requested to declare that they will respect Dutch law and liberty, and
will fulfil their rights and duties as Dutch citizens.

7.3 Recent changes in the integration regime

As mentioned before, in June 2006, the Dutch Cabinet fell after its refusal,
in spite of a favourable narrow majority in Parliament, to approve a
general pardon for those asylum seekers without a legal residence status
who entered the Netherlands before April 2001. A new centre-left Cabinet
was installed in November 2006. The new Cabinet approved this pardon
as one of its first activities. One year later, the newly appointed Minister
of ‘Integration, Housing and Communities’, Ella Vogelaar, released a
press statement on 13 November 2007, from which the following pas-
sages are quoted in English translation:

The Cabinet wants to stop the increasing polarisation in the
Netherlands. (. . .) Integration can only succeed when both non-
native and native Dutch inhabitants accept Dutch society as their
society. They have to support the liberties, rights and duties con-
nected with the Dutch civic state. (. . .) The Cabinet appeals to all
citizens to participate actively in society on the basis of mutual
acceptance and equality. [our translation]

Although this statement announced a change in the tone of the debate

on integration, so far little has changed in the complex and bureaucratic

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

139

demands on inburgering for both newcomers and oldcomers. An over-
view of developments over time is given by Klaver and Odé (2007).
They also present longitudinal quantitative data on the estimated size
of potential target groups and on actual participation: the former was
estimated at 60,000 per year, the latter was less than 10 per cent in
2007, that is, far below expectations.

Minister Vogelaar spelled out her first intentions on integration in

the Deltaplan Inburgering (September 2007) and the Integratienota
2007–2011 (November 2007). Deltaplan refers to the plan drawn up
after the catastrophic flood of 1953, in which large areas of land in the
Netherlands were flooded and many people were killed, which led to
large-scale dam-building and all kinds of other protective measures.
The Deltaplan is aimed at a higher quality and output of inburgering for
both newcomers and oldcomers in order to promote their social and
economic participation. This aim was to be achieved through four types
of measures: by taking into account individual needs in intake proce-
dures, by linking inburgering courses to actual participation in society
through jobs and/or education (referred to in Dutch as ‘dual learning’),
by improving the competences of course providers through training
programmes and, from 2008 on, by simplifying legislation. The Inte-
gratienota 2007–2011 is based on the outcomes of the yearly report on
integration by SCP (Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007) and refers to the mutual
discomfort among native and non-native Dutch inhabitants of the
Netherlands. The issues of the above-mentioned press statement (2007)
are outlined and so is Vogelaar’s ambition to transform mutual separa-
tion and alienation into cooperation and participation.

For the short term, two policy initiatives were taken in 2007: a new

law on inburgering and a new voluntary inburgering arrangement. The
new law entails obligations for both newcomers and oldcomers in the
age range from 16–65 who are no Dutch nationals and who do not origi-
nate from EU countries. EU regulations stipulate the right of free move-
ment between all EU countries for all EU citizens. The new voluntary
inburgering arrangement is meant for those residents in the Netherlands
for whom no obligations can be enforced, in particular Dutch nationals
from former Dutch colonies (Antilleans), naturalized Dutchmen (part
of the oldcomers) and EU citizens (e.g., an increasing group of Polish
residents in the Netherlands). The two priority groups at the municipal
level are unemployment benefit recipients and religious ministers (in
particular imams).

New elements in the latest inburgering law (2007) relate both to those

taking courses and to those providing them. For those taking courses,
there is a strong political shift from taking courses to taking exams: the
former is voluntary, the latter compulsory. Target groups themselves are

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140

made responsible for the selection and payment of courses and for their
own learning progress, whereas outcome obligations are enforced by
the State. For course providers, there is a political shift from the role of
public institutions, in particular regional educational centres (ROC’s),
to a competitive mixed system of public and private/commercial pro-
viders, based on free-market principles, in order ‘to achieve a better
balance between quality and price’.

According to the new law of 2007, the inburgering exam has to be

passed at CEFR level A2 within five years of residence in the Netherlands
and within three-and-a-half years if the admission test abroad has been
passed (Table 7.2). Already one year later, these two terms were equal-
ized and reduced to three and half years in a revised law (2008). The
‘new’ exam is made up of two parts. Part 1 deals with ‘language skills’
and Part 2 deals with ‘language in practice’. Part 1 consists of three
different tests. The first test is an oral language test taken by telephone.
A candidate telephones a computerized system that asks questions and
gives assignments. The second test has to be taken on a computer and
poses questions regarding situations that might occur in practice. The
third test checks the candidate’s knowledge of how things work in
Dutch society (see Van Oers 2008: 23 for a comprehensive description).
Part 2 of the integration test examines whether a candidate has enough
knowledge of the Dutch language to get by in everyday situations. This
test can be passed by taking part in six separately assessed modules
that are embedded in a role play where the candidate has to show suffi-
cient knowledge of Dutch to cope in a situation that might occur in
daily life. Instead of sitting for Part 2 of the new integration test, candi-
dates can also opt for the use of portfolios to prove that they have suffi-
cient knowledge of the Dutch language in practice. A portfolio consists
of 30 pieces of evidence that a candidate has dealt with specific every-
day situations through Dutch for both verbal and written communica-
tive exchanges. To complete a portfolio, candidates can use different
items. These range from a cover letter written for a job application to a
certificate that testifies that candidates have spoken Dutch to a teacher
at the school where their children are enrolled.

In all, four different tests are involved, partially at different levels for

different target groups, as spelled out in Table 7.2. The introduction of
the new integration test has also led to two consequences. On the one
hand, it has resulted in a loosening of regulations for immigrants who
have a Belgian or Surinamese school diploma showing they have ade-
quate knowledge of the Dutch language. Furthermore, immigrants who
have spent at least eight years of their schooling in the Netherlands are
exempted from taking the test. This is based on the immigrants’ presumed
ability to speak enough Dutch to get by in everyday situations and on

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141

the immigrant being thought to have sufficient knowledge of Dutch
society, its norms and its values. The content of the new integration test
is largely kept secret and continuously modified on the basis of a data-
bank of questions randomly selected by the computer system when the
candidate starts the test.

Applying for each of the spelled-out tests has to be done in different

ways, that is, through registered regional examination offices (www.
inburgeren.nl) and through the national Informatie Beheer Groep (www.
ib-groep.nl). The costs for taking each of the tests are spelled out in
detail, including how, what and where to pay; how and where to apply
for which loan; and how and where to apply for which exemption for
some or all exams. The Inburgering certificate will only be granted if
candidates have passed all the tests. Failure to obtain the certificate
within the required period of 3.5 or five years will lead to financial or
even residential sanctions. Although the intentions of the new Minister
of Integration, Ella Vogelaar, were to simplify the heritage of former
Minister Verdonk in this domain of policy making, the actual regulations
remain very complex, not only for those who have to oversee these
regulations at the municipal level but also for the candidates who have
to digest this information and who have to go through these testing
regimes.

Unfortunately, bureaucratic complexity also holds for other aspects

of the new inburgering regime. Three actors play a key role: participants
in the courses, local/municipal authorities and course providers. People
taking the courses have been made responsible for funding their own
entry to course provisions. Municipal authorities are to inform course
participants about municipal intake procedures, to facilitate particular
groups (in particular those who participate on a voluntary basis) and to
impose sanctions when needed. Free-market principles have finally
been introduced for the course providers. As a result, public regional
educational centres (ROC’s) that used to be the only or main course
providers under the former law now have to compete with a growing
number of private/commercial providers. Both public and private
course providers are contracted for this task by municipalities through
municipal selection and evaluation committees on the basis of a system
of licence criteria, certificates and interim quality checks which lead to
a termination or continuation of awarded contracts. This complex and
bureaucratic system of provisions, based on free-market principles, in
its initial stages has led to the following consequences (e.g., Kersten
2007):

The given rationale for free-market principles, that is, to achieve
a better balance between quality and price, more than anything else

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

142

has led to a huge and expensive increase of people involved in judg-
ing the quality of an increasing variety of providers and provisions at
the level of municipalities before any type of municipal intake of
course participants can start and be monitored over time.
The traditional ROC providers have been losing more and more
market share (currently down to less than one third) and are forced to
dismiss a growing number of qualified L2 Dutch teachers who have
to compete with less expensive but also less skilled flex workers
employed by private providers; as a result, the available ROC infra-
structure and expertise is falling apart.
The commercialization of provisions has in many attested cases also
led to less qualified course accommodations, course materials and
less well-considered compositions of the groups taking the courses.
Last but not least, free-market principles presuppose well-informed
consumers; however, participants in the courses are confronted with
such a complex system of providers, intake procedures and course
fees that many of them do not know where to go; this holds in partic-
ular for participants with little education and low proficiency in
Dutch.

The paradoxical outcome of all of this is that in 2008 the demand for

inburgering courses remained far below expectations. Many course
providers struggled with expensive empty seats in their classrooms, for
which they tried to get financial compensation from municipalities
and/or the Ministry (see Kersten 2008 for details). Some municipalities,
for example that of Rotterdam, decided to offer all inburgering courses
in 2008 free of charge in order to promote participation and in order to
prevent massive dismissals of L2 Dutch teachers. At the time of writing,
the effects of these decisions could not yet be evaluated. One of the
problems was to reach the intended low-educated target group with
easy-to-understand information on a complex topic in the language
they were supposed to learn. In response to the low demand for inbur-
gering courses, the Ministry proposed a change in the law as a result of
which course participation will be enforced in those cases where this
would be feasible. At the time of writing, this proposal was being evalu-
ated by the Council of State. In November 2008, the newly appointed
Minister of Integration, Ella Vogelaar, was already forced to resign by
her own Labour Party because of a lack of ‘effective leadership’ in this
sensitive policy domain.

7.4 Conclusions and discussion

Striking paradoxes in the public and political discourses on the link
between cultural diversity and social cohesion can be found at the

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

143

global, European and national levels. At the global level, obligatory
integration of newcomers has been referred to by the United Nations as
a false remedy for avoiding tensions between population groups in any
multicultural society, and cultural freedom as an indispensable ingredi-
ent for economic development. According to the United Nations Human
Development Report (2006), the current debate on immigration provokes
nationalistic and even xenophobic reactions. A multicultural approach
would recognize diversity within the boundaries of equality and unity –
not sameness (see Etzioni 2005 for a similar perspective). At the
European level, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity are seen as
prerequisites for achieving integration, whereas at the level of European
nation-states such diversity is commonly conceived of as an obstacle to
integration. Related to this paradox is the European focus on multiple,
transnational identities and affiliations of citizens in the twenty-first
century, whereas at the national level newcomers are expected to become
‘integrated’ residents in a single nation-state and eventually be ‘natural-
ized’ as citizens with a new and single passport. In this context, it
should also be noted that the CEFR to different language skills at differ-
ent levels of language competence has been introduced and intended as
an instrument for valuing competences, not as an alibi for exclusion
(see also Introduction to this Volume).

Multicultural self-definitions and multicultural policies of nation-

states, including the acceptance of dual citizenship, have been pro-
moted in English-dominant immigration countries across the world, in
which former European citizens played a dominant role. What Europe-
ans found self-evident in going abroad, they find hard to accept at
home. Also in Europe, however, immigrant minority groups cannot be
seen as passive inheritors of idealized monocultural and monolingual
nation-states. Anachronistic monocultural and monolingual norms
actually discredit the multicultural and multilingual realities and
resources that immigrant minority groups have created. In the long run,
these groups will contribute to a remade self-definition of European
nation-states, as a result of their demographic, cultural and ultimately
their electoral impact (Extra and Gorter 2008).

What is demanded from Dutch newcomers in terms of knowledge

about Dutch society is certainly not common knowledge for the average
Dutch citizen (cf. Extra and Spotti 2008 for empirical data on such
knowledge). Seen from this perspective, recent initiatives put forward
by the Dutch government to develop a Dutch Historical Canon of what
all Dutch people should know, should also be evaluated (www.dened-
erlandsecanon.nl). The appropriateness of current testing regimes in
the Netherlands should be seriously questioned on ethical, legal and
linguistic grounds. A striking aspect of these testing regimes is the

Guus Extra and Massimiliano Spotti

144

anonymity of their actual designers. In spite of what is publicly and
institutionally available on the Internet, it is by no means easy to point
out who is actually responsible for the rationale, the goals, the designs
and the outcomes of these testing regimes. It remains unclear how
knowledge of Dutch society can be tested separately from knowledge of
the Dutch language in successive testing regimes, given the fact that
both types of tests are administered in Dutch. No rationale or explana-
tion for the interdependencies in these procedures is given, nor for the
floating norms for passing or failing. What is missing is a conceptual
basis and a rationale for newcomers’ programmes that would be accepted
in society at large, both by Dutch citizens and by those who strive for
this status, in taking diversity within unity as a starting point.

It remains to be seen whether the latest Minister of Integration

will succeed not only in changing the tone of the public and political
debate on integration in the Netherlands but also in changing the com-
plexity and the harsh reality of testing regimes for integration and their
legislation. The report Identificatie met Nederland (Identification with
the Netherlands), issued by the Scientific Council for Government
Policy (WRR 2007), conveys a perspective of mutual inclusion, instead
of presenting integration as the sole duty of immigrants. All inhabitants
of the Netherlands are facing challenges and tasks in dealing with cul-
tural diversity and social cohesion.

As a consequence of tough national policies, the Netherlands is losing

its international image of a cosmopolitan and tolerant society. Although
many Dutch people would subscribe to such characteristics as part of
their national identity, foreign observers are surprised about the recent
critical Dutch tone towards Europe (as a result of which the EU Consti-
tution was rejected in a national referendum) and about the current
restrictive testing regimes for newcomers to the country. In its third
report on the Netherlands, the European Commission against Racism
and Intolerance (2008) made a range of recommendations from which
we quote the following ones:

Recommendation 61 is as follows:

ECRI recommends that the Dutch authorities genuinely reflect in
their policies the idea of integration as a two-way process. To this
end, ECRI strongly recommends that the Dutch authorities develop
a credible policy at central government level to address the inte-
gration deficit among the majority population, by promoting genu-
ine respect for diversity and knowledge of different cultures or
traditions and eradicating deep-rooted stereotypes on cultures and
values. To the same end, it recommends that the Dutch authorities
make their work against racial discrimination an integral part of

Testing regimes for newcomers to the Netherlands

145

their integration policy and that they consistently present it as such
to the public. (p. 20)

Recommendation 133:

ECRI considers that there is an urgent need for those taking part in
public debate in the Netherlands, especially political parties and
the media, to recognise that a responsible exercise of freedom of
expression, including on integration and other issues relevant to
ethnic minority groups, is a sign of respect for this fundamental
freedom, which ultimately reinforces, not undermines, democracy.
(p. 36)

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Regimenting language, mobility
and citizenship in Luxembourg

Kristine Horner

8.1 Language policies and practices

in Luxembourg

Situated between Belgium, France and Germany and one of the six
founding member-states of the European Union (EU), the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg has a geographical size of 2,586 square kilometres
and a population of 476,200 (Statec 2007). The language situation in
Luxembourg is frequently referred to as triglossic in reference to the
three languages recognized by the 1984 language law: Luxembourgish,
French and German. The spoken/written distinction has been pivotal
to understanding long-standing norms and patterns of language use
in Luxembourg, with most spoken communication taking place in
Luxembourgish and written functions carried out primarily in standard
French and/or German. Luxembourgish language varieties are Germanic
and bear similarities to Moselle Franconian varieties spoken in parts of
Germany, Belgium and France; this relationship provides the rationale
underpinning the decision for basic literacy to be taught via standard
German in state schools. French is introduced as a subject in the second
year of primary school, becomes a full subject in the third year and
gradually replaces German as the main medium of instruction, particu-
larly in the framework of the lycée classique or college preparatory
secondary school. Based on the Education Act of 1843, state schooling
institutions and practices have perpetuated elite bilingualism, or the
valorization of standard written German plus French (Davis 1994).

The addition of Luxembourgish to the curriculum as part of the

Education Act of 1912 is often regarded as marking the official recogni-
tion of a trilingual paradigm (Spizzo 1995). In relation to this point,
parallel identification strategies with Luxembourgish and trilingualism –
discursively linking two interrelated forms of linguistic identification
with national group membership – date back to the early twentieth
century, although it is the Nazi-German occupation of Luxembourg
(1940–1944) that is frequently constructed as the key historical moment

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

149

solidifying the significance of Luxembourgish as the national language.
While sometimes positioned in a complementary relationship to one
another, identification with Luxembourgish and trilingualism also stand
in conflict in certain contexts, with the conflictual scenario gaining
momentum since the 1970s (Horner 2007a). It is the 1970s rather than
the Second World War period that constitutes a more significant histor-
ical moment in relation to the active promotion of Luxembourgish
(Horner and Weber 2008: 4ff.), which in turn coincides with the timing
of initial attempts to foster a sense of collective European identity
(Stråth 2006: 433–436) and with the transition from modernity to late
modernity (Harvey 1989).

In response to pressure for more support of Luxembourgish in the

1970s – together with lobbying efforts by members of the non-profit
organization Actioun Lëtzebuergesch (AL) whose goal it is ‘to promote
the cause of everything that is Luxembourgish, especially the language’
(AL 1978: 63) – a language law was passed in 1984, which for the first
time officially recognized Luxembourgish as the national language and,
in theory, as an administrative language. However, the law simultane-
ously reinforced the status quo by designating French and/or German
as legal, judicial and administrative languages, precisely the state of
affairs prior to the ratification of the law even if it was de facto rather
than de jure policy. As Spolsky (2004: 26) points out, the use of the
terms ‘national language’ and ‘official language’ is embedded in localized
practices that must be considered when interpreting what they represent.
The ratification of the 1984 law signals a shift towards explicit language
policy, thus imparting on Luxembourgish a higher position in the hier-
archy of languages. With Luxembourgish in position number one as the
‘national language’ as stated in Article 1 and no explicitly designated
‘official language’ in the text of the law, the wording provides a flexible
springboard for language ideological debates (Blommaert 1999), which
frequently revolve around the status and use of Luxembourgish, with
the exception of language-in-education debates where the focus tends
to be on trilingualism (Horner 2004).

In line with the 1912 Education Act, Luxembourgish continues to be

taught as a subject for one hour a week in primary school and the first
year of secondary school, with the goal of the latter being to teach stu-
dents that ‘the country of Luxembourg has its own language and litera-
ture’ (MENFP 2007–2008). In relation to the fact that Luxembourgish
is not used for a wide range of written functions by a large segment of
its speakers, it is not fully bound up with the processes of standardiza-
tion. In fact, the Ministry of Education conceptualizes the instruction
of Luxembourgish as a subject – taught to people who use it as their

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150

(primary) home language – as being incompatible with the standard
language ideology:

This introduction [to spelling] is meant to help the children under-
stand the Luxembourgish language better, to be able to read it better
and also maybe to improve their writing. Spelling may not, how-
ever, lead to the discrimination of individual language practices
linked to the many dialects that children in various schools speak
and therefore should only count rather minimally for the mark.
(MENFP 2007–2008, translation from Luxembourgish)

This declaration of tolerance towards linguistic variation potentially

stands in tension with the recent organization of training programmes
for teachers of Luxembourgish as a foreign language, together with a
qualitative and quantitative increase in production of pedagogical
materials and dictionaries as well as on-going debates as to what con-
stitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Luxembourgish (Horner 2005). Whether or not
Luxembourgish should be widely propagated as a written medium is a
point of national controversy, especially suggestions that this be made
compulsory in the framework of the educational system.

There are no officially recognized regional or immigrant minority

languages in Luxembourg and people are often expected to fit into the
mould of the prescribed ‘trilingual ideal’ (Horner 2004: 209ff.), which
entails mastery of the standardized, written varieties of German plus
French in school and also presupposes the (consistent) use of spoken
Luxembourgish in most other environments, especially in the home.
Stigma is not attached to speaking Luxembourgish; furthermore, the
acquisition of the standard varieties of additional languages, particu-
larly English, is often regarded as an asset. However, the rich diversity
of ‘other’ linguistic repertoires and practices, such as the use of varie-
ties significantly diverging from written standards and/or speaking
multiple languages in the home, is either stigmatized or simply ‘made
invisible’ in official Ministry documents (Weber 2009). However, it is
precisely this linguistic heterogeneity that is frequently foregrounded
in mainstream media discourse, representing the increasing number of
foreign residents and multiple language practices in the Grand Duchy
as a threat to the continuity of the nation and as a problem in relation
to the state educational system (Horner 2007b).

Luxembourg is home to the highest proportion of resident foreigners

in the EU (41.6 per cent), the majority of whom are passport holders of
other EU member-states (Statec 2007). The number of resident foreigners
has been climbing steadily since the post-Second World War period and
increasing dramatically from the 1970s onward. In the interest of foster-
ing growth in the steel industry, the pre-Second World War practice of
recruiting workers from Italy resumed in the 1950s and 1960s (Gallo 1987).

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

151

Portuguese passport holders began accepting employment offers in
Luxembourg in large numbers – especially in the newly flourishing area
of construction – after a bilateral agreement was signed by the respec-
tive state governments in 1970 (Kollwelter 2005: 5). With 15.5 per cent
of the total population (Statec 2007), Portuguese passport holders cur-
rently make up the largest number of resident foreigners, followed by
French (5.3 per cent), Italian (4 per cent), Belgian (3.5 per cent), other
EU (7.6 per cent) and non-EU (5.7 per cent) residents. Leaving the
national economy relatively unscathed following the steel crisis of
the 1970s, Luxembourg’s niche for international banking and special
tax schemes has propelled economic prosperity since the late 1960s
and has simultaneously contributed to a partial division of the labour
market, which Kollwelter (2007: 4) describes as follows: ‘Luxembourg-
ers [. . .] work mainly in the civil service, leaving most of the produc-
tion and innovation sector work to immigrants and commuters from
border areas.’ In relation to its small geographical size together with
EU regulations facilitating free movement of (certain members of) the
EU workforce, 126,800 frontaliers ‘border-crossing commuters’ make up
39.8 per cent of the workforce in the Grand Duchy. About 80 per cent of
the frontaliers come from France and Belgium and are (primarily)
French-speaking, nearly 20 per cent come from Germany and are (pri-
marily) German-speaking (Statec 2006).

In addition to its widespread use among and with many frontaliers,

French is used as a (supplemental) home language – as opposed to a
(mere) school language – by a larger segment of the resident population
than ever before. In the course of everyday life, individuals living or
working in Luxembourg use the three officially recognized languages to
varying degrees, with one or more sometimes being virtually absent
(e.g., German or Luxembourgish) and others potentially being highly
central (e.g., English or Portuguese). There exists no extensive, empiri-
cal data on language use in Luxembourg because the national census
does not include questions about language. The Baleine survey (Fehlen
et al. 1998), which is based on a sample of 2002 Luxembourgish and
non-Luxembourgish passport holders living in the Grand Duchy, pro-
vides a glimpse of some of this present-day linguistic heterogeneity,
though broad generalizations for the entire population cannot be
derived on the basis of this data.

8.2 Legislating mobility and naturalization:

from state borders to EU borders

While the Education Acts of 1843 and 1912 together with the 1984
language law are central to the negotiation of language policies and

Kristine Horner

152

practices, the Immigration Law of 1972 has been the (most recent) key
legislation concerning individuals wishing to establish temporary or
permanent residence in Luxembourg as well as employers seeking their
labour. Ratified to regulate the movement of workers from non-European
Economic Community member-states (i.e., the founding six), the 1972
law stipulates that the responsibility for obtaining an autorisation
de séjour ‘residency permit’ lies in the hands of the employer as it is
dependent on the work permit. Legal provisions for family reunification
do not figure in the law, and government officials have maintained the
practice of dealing with each case on an individual basis (Kollwelter
2005: 4–5). Due in large part to economic prosperity and the related
need for foreign labour to propel the boom, Luxembourgish government
officials have often allowed for family-based migration, although mini-
mal adjustments have been made in the framework of the state educa-
tional system to provide children of diverse linguistic backgrounds with
an optimal learning environment. In spite of some pioneering efforts
undertaken by Actioun Lëtzebuergesch and other groups in the 1970s,
the possibilities of obtaining instruction in Luxembourgish as a foreign
language were fairly limited until the 1990s, which coincides with the
recognition of the Centre de Langues Luxembourg as a state institution
in 1991. In relation to this point – and in combination with multiple
other factors – some newcomers opted to focus on learning French,
though the situation regarding language use is by no means homoge-
neous and members of the second generation have often also acquired
Luxembourgish (Beirão 1999). With the accession of Portugal to the EU
in 1986, the 1972 Immigration Law was no longer applicable to Portu-
guese passport holders and has affected a relatively small number of
people since that time. Although the number of non-EU resident for-
eigners has increased significantly over the past decade, it remains the
case that the majority of non-Luxembourgish passport holders living in
the Grand Duchy hail from other EU member-states (Statec 2007).

With the present-day designation of European Union replacing

European Economic Community, the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 paved
the way towards eroding ‘internal’ borders between EU member-states
further and hardening ‘external’ borders between the EU and the states
situated beyond its confines. Ratified in the wake of the Bosnian War,
the Treaty of Maastricht also includes provisions for harmonizing asy-
lum procedures across EU member-states. It was not until 1996 that a
law regulating asylum procedures was introduced in Luxembourg, with
further legislation being implemented in 2000. In relation to this matrix
of events, the discourse on immigration in Luxembourg took on an
overtly negative turn in the mainstream press over the course of the
1990s (Kollwelter 2005), which has continued into the twenty-first

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

153

century and is bound up with the on-going debate concerning ‘the effect
on national identity if foreign nationals outnumber Luxembourgers, as
they are expected to do within the next few decades’ (Nickels 2007: 37).
In relation to transformations at the EU level, an Integration Law was
ratified in 1993, which recognized certain rights of EU citizens living
and/or working in Luxembourg; however, voting rights were not
extended to non-Luxembourgish passport holders directly at that time
because Luxembourg received an exemption from this EU provision.
The 1993 Integration Law makes reference to the 1972 amendment to
the Immigration Law replacing the word immigrant by étranger ‘for-
eigner’, which is legally defined as a non-Luxembourgish passport
holder thus pre-empting the potential interpretation of a non-EU pass-
port holder. This discursive move may be read as oppositional to cer-
tain aspects of EU consolidation, especially as the Treaty of Maastricht
had explicitly introduced European citizenship in legal terms, a trans-
formation which was signalled by the subsequent introduction of bur-
gundy coloured passports in all EU member-states.

At the level of the Luxembourgish state, legal citizenship is denoted

as nationalité, which refracts the ways in which national group mem-
bership based on shared ethnicity is intertwined with legal ties to the
state (see May 2001: 75). When the 1968 loi sur la nationalité luxem-
bourgeoise ‘law on Luxembourgish nationality’ – amended in 1975,
1977 and 1986 – was modified once again in 2001, a language clause
was introduced in the text of the law for the first time (Scuto 2006:
92–94), resonating with parallel forms of legislation in several other EU
member-states during the same time frame. Although it was not until
2001 that language requirements were explicitly stipulated by law, pro-
cedures for dealing with applicants for legal citizenship had involved
the foregrounding of applicants’ proficiency to varying degrees; the
1940 clause requiring the applicant to demonstrate ‘sufficient assimi-
lation’ – which was retained in the law of 1968 – served as a means to
justify this practice. The recent move to legislate language requirements
explicitly as part of the naturalization procedure is central to under-
standing the dynamics of language policy, particularly in relation to the
processes of accelerated globalization marking the late modern period.
This happened alongside attempts to introduce language testing for cer-
tain professions (e.g., teaching, medical and legal) in Luxembourg,
in relation to EU requirements to open the employment market and
fully recognize qualifications obtained by job seekers in other EU
member-states.

The 2001 amendments to the loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise

simultaneously entail the opening and closing of the nation (Anderson
1991 [1983]). On the one hand, the procedures were relaxed in light of

Kristine Horner

154

the fact that the residency period was reduced from ten to five years
(and to three years for the option, for example, in the case of marriage
to a Luxembourgish passport holder). On the other hand, a language
clause was introduced stipulating that applicants must demonstrate
that they have a ‘basic knowledge’ of Luxembourgish, the national lan-
guage, regardless of their proficiency in French and/or German, the other
languages officially recognized by the 1984 language law. Article 7,
Paragraph 3 of the 1968 law remained unchanged in the 1986 series of
amendments: ‘Naturalisation will be refused to the foreigner [. . .] if he
[sic] does not demonstrate sufficient assimilation’ (Mémorial 1986). As
part of the 2001 modifications to the 1968 law, Article 7, Paragraph 4
explicitly stipulates language requirements and, notably, the word
‘assimilation’ has been replaced with the word ‘integration’:

Naturalisation will be refused to the foreigner [. . .] if he [sic] does
not demonstrate sufficient integration, in particular if he [sic] does
not demonstrate sufficient active and passive knowledge of at least
one of the languages stipulated by the language law of February
24th 1984 and, if he [sic] does not have at least a basic knowledge
of the Luxembourgish language, accompanied by certificates or by
official documents. (Mémorial 2001, translation from French)

Scuto (2006: 94) underlines the controversial nature of this clause

by emphasizing that previous amendments to the 1968 loi sur la nation-
alité luxembourgeoise were passed unanimously by the Parliament.
Representatives of left of centre parties (i.e., the Socialists and the
Greens) voiced opposition to the language clause of 2001, but they were
defeated by the 1999–2004 coalition of the Conservatives and the
Democrats. Although reactions to the 2001 language clause varied,
proponents of diverse political agendas tended to agree on prioritizing
the ideal of social cohesion, an objective frequently mapped out onto
the related ideal of linguistic homogeneity and propagated via the dis-
course of integration (Horner 2009).

8.3 Localized language ideologies and

the

loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise

Kroskrity’s (2000: 7ff.) discussion of language ideologies as ‘a cluster
concept consisting of a number of converging dimensions’ provides a
useful lens through which to explore the debate on the 2001 amend-
ments to the loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise. As a point of depar-
ture, he maintains that language ideologies ‘represent the perception of
language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

155

social or cultural group’ (2000: 8). Informing shared beliefs about the
properties of language as well as the ways in which linguistic practices
index group boundaries and social difference, the standard language
ideology and the one nation, one language ideology constitute highly
entrenched language ideologies bound up with European nationalisms
(Woolard 1998: 16ff.), which are related to the ‘dogma of homogeneism’,
that is, ‘a view of society in which differences are seen as dangerous
and centrifugal and in which the “best” society is suggested to be
one without intergroup differences’ (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998:
194–5). In relation to language testing and citizenship legislation,
Stevenson (2006: 147) maintains that ‘[s]tandard languages, in particu-
lar, are seen as both a vehicle for articulating and achieving common
political goals and a manifestation of a common purpose and singular
identity.’

Unpacking the relationship between the standard language ideology

and the one nation, one language ideology challenges certain distinc-
tions that are sometimes rigidly posited between civic and ethnic
nations (see Giesen 2001; May 2001), as well as the contention that
instrumental and symbolic dimensions of language can be completely
separated (Gal 1993). Kroskrity (2000: 28) suggests that language ideo-
logical approaches provide us with the means to grapple with the
nuances of language politics and, more specifically, with the paradox
that standard languages are ‘embodiments of both national identity and
state-endorsed social inequality’. The latter point is usually erased or
‘rendered invisible’ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38) in debates on language
testing and citizenship legislation. Named languages lie at the heart of
nationalist ideologies but are, in fact, double-edged swords: while they
are depicted as iconic of all-inclusive membership in the nation-state,
they may also be exploited to recursively split their speakers in terms
of those who do and those who do not conform to norms of standardiza-
tion and related literacy practices (Milroy and Milroy 1999). In the
case of Luxembourg, it is the Luxembourgish language or the trilingual
ideal rather a single named language that is positioned as iconic of
or ‘depict[ing] or display[ing]’ the national group’s ‘inherent nature or
essence’ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). Because Luxembourgish is not fully
bound up with the processes of standardization, it is the non-mastery
of the standard, written varieties of German and French that recursively
splits the population, at least that part which uses Luxembourgish as
the (main) language of the home (Horner 2007b). With regard to debates
on language testing and legal citizenship, the unifying nature of named
languages is often foregrounded, and their divisive nature tends to be
backgrounded.

Kristine Horner

156

Sensitivity to the semiotic processes of iconicity, recursivity and

erasure allows us to lay bare the ways that language ideologies ‘mediate
between social structures and forms of talk’ (Kroskrity 2000: 21) and
enables us to locate instances of ‘multiple indexicality’ (Kroskrity
2000: 28), which in this case entails observing that the Luxembourgish
language and/or the trilingual ideal may be indexical – and even iconic –
of ‘Luxembourgishness’. While the two strategies of linguistic identifi-
cation with Luxembourgish and the trilingual ideal are sometimes
complementary, tension between the two is central to the debate over
the 2001 language clause, as is the on-going, related controversy con-
cerning the standardization of Luxembourgish (Horner 2005). Moreover,
Kroskrity’s (2000: 18) assertion that people ‘may display varying degrees
of awareness of local language ideologies’ is borne out by the fact that
the overarching decision to introduce a language clause received very
little coverage in the mainstream press in comparison to the near satu-
ration of discourse on the importance of Luxembourgish, especially in
relation to the so-called process of ‘integration’. The print media plays
a dual role in the flow of language ideological processes. First, it is a
forum where selected positions about language and society are perpetu-
ated or contested, which often reproduce the one nation, one language
ideology. Second, the production of written texts reinforces the stand-
ard language ideology as it inherently involves ideologies of ‘orthogra-
phy, syntax and usage’ (DiGiacomo 1999: 105).

8.3.1 Arguments against the language clause of 2001

In addition to Socialist and Green politicians, spokespersons for for-
eigners’ associations argued against the language clause and, further-
more, they also pleaded for changing the current policy on nationalité
based predominantly on jus sanguinis (blood rights, that is, the rights
of the parents are transferred to offspring) to one embracing the princi-
ple of jus soli (rights of the soil, that is, based on place of birth), but this
issue did not receive much discussion and no related modifications
were made at the time. Challenges to the 2001 language requirements
were informed by the argument that naturalization should be made
more accessible to a larger number of people, especially in light of the
fact that non-Luxembourgish passport holders make up nearly half of
the current population. The Association de soutien aux travailleurs
immigrés (ASTI) and the Comité de liaison et d’action des étrangers
(CLAE) are the main organizations representing the rights and interests
of resident foreigners in Luxembourg and both expressed opposition
to the 2001 language clause. The following excerpts are from a letter to

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

157

the editor written by ASTI representatives, Laura Zuccoli and Serge
Kollwelter, and from a CLAE press release:

It [the question on linguistic knowledge] certainly has importance.
Nevertheless, it should not be the case that multilingualism is used
as an instrument of control or exclusion. Let us work on increasing
opportunities for language training, including during working hours.
(Luxemburger Wort 14 June 2001: 23, translation from French)

With respect to the linguistic knowledge required for naturali

sation,

CLAE declares being in favour of maintaining the format stipulated
by the law of 24 February 1984, that is to say the sufficient knowl-
edge of one of the three languages of the country (Luxembourgish,
French or German). According to CLAE, it is obvious that the
authors of the law wish the Luxembourgish language to be valor-
ised as a factor of integration. It would indeed be undeniable that
knowledge of Luxembourgish facilitates integration into the social,
cultural, economic and political fabric of the country. It must nev-
ertheless be pointed out that the Grand Duchy does not have one
single official language but three languages used to different degrees
according to function and circumstances. (Luxemburger Wort, 30
June 2001: 4, translation from French)

Diverging from much of the discourse circulated via the Luxemburger

Wort, the dominant newspaper on the national market with close ties to
the Conservative Party and the Catholic Church (Horner and Weber
2008: 32–35), the Luxembourgish language is not foregrounded in the
former excerpt. On the contrary, opposition to language requirements is
expressed by rejecting the (ab)use of multilingualism as ‘an instrument
of control or exclusion’ and furthermore, the constructive suggestion of
offering more opportunities for language learning is brought forward.
Most of the oppositional moves to the language requirement bear simi-
larities to the above mentioned first excerpt in that they often underline
the need for greater availability of courses; however, they differ in the
sense that they usually topicalize the requirement of ‘basic knowledge’
of Luxembourgish rather than the explicit introduction of a language
clause itself. In the second excerpt, for example, an argument is made
for the choice between French, German or Luxembourgish, attempting
to legitimate this proposal on the basis of the 1984 language law, in
which no ‘official language’ is explicitly stipulated. By challenging the
specific requirement of ‘basic knowledge’ of Luxembourgish, the over-
arching introduction of language requirements remains unchallenged
in this excerpt. Furthermore, the one nation, one language ideology is
reproduced by positioning the Luxembourgish language as central to
the process of ‘integration’, thus constituting an attempt to balance the

Kristine Horner

158

parallel strategies of linguistic identification with Luxembourgish and
with the trilingual ideal.

In a page-length article printed in the independent newspaper

d’Lëtzebuerger Land, Socialist representative Ben Fayot also based the
crux of his argument against the language clause on the (presupposed)
pivotal role of the three officially recognized languages in the Grand
Duchy. Despite raising critical questions concerning the language clause,
for example, the testing criteria and procedures, there exists ambiguity
as to whether ‘integration’ is or is not conceived as a non-assimilationist
process:

In order to participate in political life, it is necessary to master the
entire linguistic system in its specific functions: French for official
communication, German and French in the press, Luxembourgish
in political discourse, on the radio and on television. It is a matter of
level of education, for the Luxembourgers and for the new citizens
[. . .] language policy must not be exclusive, but rather inclusive,
that is to say that it must create the optimal conditions to allow each
resident on our territory to master the linguistic system in use in our
country as well as possible [. . .] Language policy has to become a
means of integrating a maximum number of people, Luxembourgers
and non-Luxembourgers, into the collectivity. But to remain coher-
ent language policy cannot on the other hand accept for example the
teaching of basic literacy in French, alongside that in German, there-
with creating two categories of children, and hence adults with
fundamentally different linguistic repertoires that will only rarely
converge. With that we risk forming two linguistic communities!
(Lëtzebuerger Land, 6 June 2001: 11, translation from French)

Fayot argues that everyone equally needs to be integrated ‘into the

collectivity’, yet he distinguishes between ethnic Luxembourgers and
‘others’ by using the labels ‘Luxembourgers’ and ‘the new citizens’.
Although he argues for creating ‘optimal conditions [. . .] to master the
linguistic system’, he firmly rules out any structural reform of the edu-
cational system, including the introduction of French language literacy
programmes. Thus, he is arguing for an assimilationist policy but pro-
poses this process should take place through the state educational
system rather than naturalization procedures. Therefore, while Fayot
argues in favour of extending nationalité to larger numbers of people,
he supports maintaining an educational system that strives for homoge-
neity and perpetuates linguistic discrimination (Horner and Weber
2008: 27–30; Weber 2009). Consequently, this argumentative strategy
differs from that of proponents of the 2001 language clause in terms of
time frame rather than final outcome.

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

159

8.3.2 Arguments for the language clause of 2001

The Conservatives – the dominant party in Parliament from the post-
First World War period to the present (Spizzo 1995) – brought forth
arguments in support of the language clause by positioning the
Luxembourgish language as central to the process of ‘integration’ and
portraying it as the key to full participation in social and political life.
By positioning Luxembourgish as an instrument or a resource, cultural
criteria tend to remain implicit both in the text of the loi sur la nation-
alité luxembourgeoise and in widely circulating political discourse.
Although the Luxembourgish language is often directly associated with
Luxembougish (national) identity in other contexts, there is no overt
reference of this kind in an article covering a press conference with the
Conservative Party:

Laurent Mosar did not agree with the opposition parties who
wanted to delete the language requirement, according to which the
naturalisation candidate has to prove [that he [sic] possesses a]
basic knowledge of Luxembourgish from now on (up until now,
mastery of either Luxembourgish, German or French was suffi-
cient). ‘Language is an essential, though not the only element of
integration,’ said the parliamentary representative, and he pointed
out that political participation presupposes an ability to communi-
cate in Luxembourgish. (Luxemburger Wort, 14 June 2001: 3, trans-
lation from German)

In an editorial focused on the 2001 language clause, Léon Zeches

(editor in chief of the Luxemburger Wort) echoes the position of the
Conservative Party and foregrounds the Luxembourgish language, but
the discourse diverges from that of most politicians because he explic-
itly links language to culture and identity, thus reinforcing its symbolic
value:

As far as the language requirements are concerned, they are not a
question of nationalist exclusion or anachronistic fears but above
all a sociological and cultural topic of discussion that is very impor-
tant and therefore has to be approached matter-of-factly and with-
out polemic [. . .] As an example, we had asked the question whether
it is possible to imagine that a Luxembourger who decides to live
his [sic] life in Sweden as a naturalised Swede could forever refuse
to learn the language of his [sic] new nationality (= identity). Indeed
a rhetorical question . . . (Luxemburger Wort, 9 June 2001: 3, origi-
nal emphasis, translation from German)

Zeches positions opponents of the language clause as insensitive to

the importance that some social actors attach to the link between

Kristine Horner

160

national group membership based on shared ethnicity and the legal
dimensions of citizenship; this link is indexed by the reference to
‘nationality (= identity)’. In the context of a rapidly changing EU coupled
with demographic transformations dramatically impacting on social
life in a small state, both Luxembourgish (national) identity and the
Luxembourgish language are frequently constructed and perceived as
endangered (see Duchêne and Heller 2007). Drawing on the one nation,
one language ideology, a comparison is made with Sweden suggesting
that it is unthinkable for a person to be naturalized in Sweden without
knowing any Swedish. The example of Sweden is somewhat ironic in
light of the fact that it is one of the EU member-states in which language
requirements have not been stipulated as part of citizenship legislation
(Milani 2008; Nygren-Junkin, this Volume). Thus, the editorial consti-
tutes an attempt to legitimate the 2001 language clause by constructing
an iconic link between the Luxembourgish language – rather than
German and/or French – and legal ties to the Luxembourgish state.

Letters to the editor published in the Luxemburger Wort frequently

construct the link between Luxembourgish, national group member-
ship based on shared ethnicity and legal citizenship as inseparable; this
framework recurrently informs arguments made by non-politicians in
favour of the language requirements. In this manner, questions regard-
ing the nature of language testing are positioned differently than those
raised by opponents of the requirement because the authors of many
such letters do not challenge the validity of the procedure but rather
pave the way for the implementation of language requirements and
testing:

The CSV [Conservative Party] who drafted the new nationality law
proposes a Luxembourgish language test. That is to be taken seri-
ously because if one wants to acquire a new nationality, then one
must be able to identify with it and that is only possible if one can
understand and speak the language of the country. What form
should the language test take? [. . .] Because as René Kartheiser also
says in his poem Our Language: ‘You may like French and German,
but what you must honour is our language because it is the [bone]
marrow of the little country of Luxembourg.’ (Luxemburger Wort,
30 June 2001: 38, translation from Luxembourgish)

The reference to Luxembourgish as ‘[bone] marrow’ indexes multi-

layered identification with Luxembourgish and the trilingual ideal,
with Luxembourgish constituting the inner layer, closer to the core of
national group membership and legitimated by its status as the national
language, with the trilingual ideal constituting the outer layer and viewed
as essential for certain functions (Horner 2007b: 138–139). Although
this identification strategy may resolve the question regarding which

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

161

language/s to foreground in relation to legal citizenship, the question as
to ‘what form should the language test take’ becomes more salient in
light of the fact that Luxembourgish is not fully bound up with the
processes of standardization. Issues related to the non-standardization
of Luxembourgish – which receive ‘high levels of discursive conscious-
ness’ (Kroskrity 2000: 19ff.) in certain sites – have contributed to the
lengthy negotiation of the new loi sur la nationalité luxembourgoise,
which is likely to be ratified in late 2008. Issues concerning double
nationalité and the consolidation of the EU have also prolonged these
deliberations.

8.4 Language, mobility and citizenship in late

modernity: towards the new

loi sur la

nationalité luxembourgeoise

The projet de loi for the new loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise
(#5620) was submitted to Parliament on 13 October 2006. It includes
the provision that naturalized Luxembourgers may retain their original
passport, thus extending the right of double nationalité, which previously
(since 1986) was only possible in the case of children born to one parent
with and the other without the Luxembourgish passport. However, the
residency period is to be increased from five to seven years and the
option, for example, in the case of marriage to a Luxembourgish pass-
port holder, will cease to exist. In addition, applicants will be obliged
to complete a ‘civic instruction’ course and pass an oral language test in
Luxembourgish, thus taking the 2001 amendments a step further and
refracting the one nation, one language ideology. The decision to require
an oral rather than a written test constitutes an attempt to negotiate the
perceived incompatibility of Luxembourgish with the standard language
ideology. At the same time, the Université du Luxembourg launched
a training programme for teachers of Luxembourgish as a foreign lan-
guage in the 2007–2008 academic year, which includes modules on the
structure of the language and on foreign language teaching methodo-
logy; a third module on culture, literature and media is to be added.
Upon completion of the programme, participants receive a certificate
from the University, though it is not (yet) obligatory to be in possession
of this certificate to teach Luxembourgish.

Concerning the new loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise, a point

of contention between the Conservatives and the Socialists – forming a
coalition in the 2004–2009 period – has been the required level of
achievement based on the Common European Framework of Reference
(CEFR) (see introductory chapter to this Volume). Based on a recent
compromise (March 2008), candidates for nationalité will be required

Kristine Horner

162

to demonstrate A2-level active (i.e., spoken interaction and production)
and B1-level passive (i.e., listening comprehension) proficiency in
spoken Luxembourgish. The precise testing procedures as well as the
properties and contents of the tests need to be adapted to the CEFR,
which has not yet been fully developed in relation to Luxembourgish;
however, CEFR levels have been assigned to the existing testing struc-
ture, that is, Zertifikat ‘Certificate’ = A2, 1. Diplom ‘1st Diploma’ = B1,
2. Diplom ‘2nd Diploma’ = B2 and Ieweschten Diplom ‘Highest Diploma’
= C2. Because the testing of Luxembourgish as a foreign language has
an albeit brief history of being organized by the Centre de Langues
Luxembourg (CLL), the CLL is to be charged with developing the CEFR
for Luxembourgish together with the administration of the tests. In
spite of the additional site in Mersch, just north of the headquarters in
Luxembourg City, the number of language courses on offer does not
meet the current demand, although additional courses are on offer at
the town and commune level. CLL also offers courses such as Réalités
luxembourgeoises ‘The Luxembourgish world’ and Vivre la culture au
Luxembourg ‘Experiencing cultural life in Luxembourg’ which consti-
tute a potential springboard for the organization of a ‘civic instruction’
course as stipulated in the proposed law.

After the Parliament received the written assent of the Syndicat des

villes et communes luxembourgeoises ‘Syndicate of Luxembourgish
Towns and Communes’ on 31 July 2007, the projets de loi for two
interrelated laws on immigration (#5802) to replace the law of 1972
and integration (#5825) to replace the law of 1993 were submitted on
7 November 2007 and 31 December 2007, respectively. The proposed
Integration Law stipulates the creation of the Office luxembourgeois de
l’accueil et de l’intégration ‘Luxembourgish Office of Welcome and
Integration’ (OLAI). New arrivals in Luxembourg will have the option
of signing a contract with OLAI who will then advise the newcomers on
various matters, including language training. Residents later applying
for nationalité will be looked upon more favourably if they have signed
the contract and fulfilled related criteria. The move to introduce lan-
guage requirements and testing for naturalization together with infra-
structures such as OLAI at this juncture – especially in Luxembourg
and other EU member-states where there is increased mobility (see
Bauman 1998) – is best understood in relation to social, political and
economic fluctuations posing ‘a challenge to modern citizenship’ (Isin
and Wood 1999: 6). As Stevenson (2006: 147) suggests, debates and
policies on language, national identity and citizenship are not just
about ‘political “management” but part of a larger ideological process’.

Central to the politicization of language requirements and testing in

relation to nationhood and citizenship is the conflation of two different

Language, mobility and citizenship in Luxembourg

163

issues: access to language learning in a new sociolinguistic milieu
(i.e., language as inclusive) versus the (ab)use of mechanisms such as
language testing as part of naturalization procedures (i.e., language as
exclusive). Underpinned by the one nation, one language ideology and
in tandem with the standard language ideology, language testing is
often portrayed as a fair and objective procedure in multiple EU mem-
ber-states, which people may theoretically complete successfully if
they strive hard enough to reach this goal. Rationalist discourse of this
kind portrays the national language as the means to homogeneity,
ensuring the ‘integration of others’ and the related ideal of ‘social cohe-
sion’ at the level of the state; societal divisions in relation to class-based
stratification, gender inequality and intergenerational gaps are erased
in this discourse. Taking a language ideological approach to language
politics allows us to locate such contradictions as well as multiple
indexicalities, which in the case of Luxembourg involves exploring the
tensions bound up with moves to shift away from the trilingual ideal
towards the national language as the sole icon of ‘Luxembourgishness’.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jean-Paul Junck (Centre de Langues Luxembourg)
for responding to my query regarding the role of CLL in connection
with planned language testing procedures, Serge Kollwelter (ASTI)
for clarifying points concerning pending legislation on immigration
and nationalité, Melanie Wagner (Université du Luxembourg) for shar-
ing insights regarding the new training programme for teachers of
Luxembourgish as a foreign language and Jean-Jacques Weber (Univer-
sité du Luxembourg) for providing constructive comments on a draft
version of this text. I remain fully responsible for any errors or short-
comings in the final version of this text. All translations from the
Luxembourgish, French and German texts are my own.

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167

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we analyse the current situation in Spain as regards
recent immigration and the impact this is having on Spain’s linguistic
landscape. As a very new phenomenon in a country that had previ-
ously only known emigration, this challenge to the coexistence of the
different languages spoken in Spain is considerable. Spain’s multi-
lingualism has throughout its history produced tensions and outright
conflict in the struggle for state- and nation-building, and it has been
a much-acclaimed aim of the post-Franco democratic Spanish state to
address these claims and counter-claims with explicit language poli-
cies enshrined in the new Constitution drawn up in 1978, a marvel of
consensual rights and duties. The arrival of the recent immigrants,
many bringing new languages to the Spanish linguistic mosaic, is in
danger of upsetting this careful balance of language rights and their
relationship with national identity.

We argue that it is for these reasons that the Spanish state has pre-

ferred to avoid engaging too overtly in the issues that have been taken
up more readily in other parts of Europe regarding eligibility for citizen-
ship and above all requirements for learning the so-called ‘national’
language. Concepts such as ‘nation’ and ‘national language’ provoke
strong reactions from Spain’s linguistic minorities, and state-imposed
tests to award membership of these run the risk of opening wounds and
bringing to the surface once more the debates about what is understood
by the term Spanish ‘nation’, who decides this and how and what lan-
guages should be spoken and learned.

To obtain full Spanish citizenship is a very long process and is han-

dled in a delicate and discreet way without any overt language tests.
However, the rights offered to those recognized as official residents
are remarkably generous and serve to lessen the need or desire to seek
naturalization as a Spanish citizen. As much of the concentration of

Spanish language ideologies
in managing immigration and
citizenship

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

168

settled migrants in Spain is precisely in regions where the issues of
national identity are sensitive, and languages other than Castilian are
recognized and widely spoken, this unspoken compromise towards
the legal recognition of rights and status may prevent the reopening of
disputes never fully resolved through centuries of Spanish history.

In the following sections, we will explore the current profile of

immigration in Spain and how it is impacting on the existing multilin-
gualism. We will examine some of the legislation that has developed
language policies to cope with both the linguistic needs and the arrival
of so many immigrants. We will also seek to illustrate the challenges
that arise when such new migrant groups compete for linguistic space
among communities where the dominant language has always been
something other than Castilian.

A great deal has been written about the Catalan region and its suc-

cessful so-called ‘normalization’ since the death of Franco. The Galician
and Basque experiences have also been well-documented. For this rea-
son, our example in this chapter has been selected from the Valencian
autonomous community where we have chosen to highlight some of
the issues of this chapter with the particular example of the recent sig-
nificant Romanian migration. The latter community offers both typical
characteristics of modern twenty-first century immigration and specific
unique features of what may be called Latinity. We hope to show that
the study of immigration in Spain offers both similar and contrastive
insights into the broader issues of this Volume.

9.2 Immigration, demographic development

and trends

Immigration is a major contributory factor in recent population growth
in southern Europe, particularly in Spain, where the population has
grown so rapidly that the National Institute of Statistics (INE) has pre-
dicted that it will reach 54 million by 2050. This is in stark contrast
with a United Nations estimate made in 1996 that predicted a decline
of ten million over the same period (Oficina Económica del Presidente
2006: 4). In 2007, according to the latest updating of the Padrón Munic-
ipal,

Spain’s population comprised 44.7 million inhabitants of whom

4.1 million were foreigners (9.3 per cent) (INE 2007). Among the coun-
tries of the OECD, Spain’s ranking in terms of the proportion of the total
population made up of migrants has risen from 21st in 2000 to 11th in
2005 (Oficina Económica del Presidente 2006: 5). This rapid growth in
migration has had a transformational impact on Spanish society requir-
ing profound adjustments not least in the role of language in society.

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

169

From the early 1990s, the number of foreigners in Spain has out-

stripped the numbers of Spanish citizens living abroad as Spain evolved
from being a lugar de paso to a país de destino, from a staging post
to a final destination for migrants. In the past, Spanish citizens had
looked abroad for opportunities to improve living standards; now their
descendants find that their country is the goal of similar aspirants for
the good life. The presence of immigrants is a current reality of Spanish
society as the government emphasized in its Strategic Plan for Citizen-
ship and Integration: ‘they have already become part of the communal
us that is Spanish society’

(Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales

[MTAS] 2007: 7). This acknowledges that the challenges and opportu-
nities that face Spain with respect to immigration are similar to those of
the countries around it ‘but here the phenomenon has taken place with
much greater rapidity . . . and with some specific elements that must be
taken into consideration’ (MTAS 2007: 7). Besides the magnitude and
rapidity, most immigrants to Spain enter without the necessary docu-
ments, and they concentrate heavily in specific areas (Serra 2005: 2–3).
All of this has posed further challenges to a country that has been
engaged in a long period of social and political reinvention following
the end of one of Europe’s longest dictatorships and which hitherto
considered itself a very homogeneous nation.

Between 2000 and mid-2007, legally resident immigrants in Spain

had increased by 29.4 per cent. At the end of 2007, there were 3,979,014
foreigners with some permission to reside in Spain (an increase of 31.68
per cent on the previous year), of whom 38.87 per cent were nationals
of EU countries (OPI 2008: 1). The accession of Romania and Bulgaria
to the EU in 2007 meant that the Latin American collectivity is no
longer the largest overall by continent of origin (30.55 per cent, includ-
ing Ecuador 9.95 per cent, Colombia 6.39 per cent and Peru 2.92 per
cent). The largest single community of immigrants in Spain was that
from Morocco who made up 16.31 per cent of those with residence per-
mits (648,735). The Romanians at 15.18 per cent (603,889) represented
an increase of 185.76 per cent on the previous year. There were 198,638
British citizens, also 150,200 Germans and 132,400 Italians, respectively.
Chinese people resident in Spain now represent 3.01 per cent of the
total immigrant population which makes this community the eighth
largest. Other communities also increased rapidly, including Bulgarians
(115.15 per cent), Poles (47.51 per cent) and Brazilians (24 per cent)
(OPI 2008: 2). The official statistics for immigrant numbers in Spain fail
to reveal the number of those who have not registered. In 2008, a report
by the CCOO union

estimated that there were over a million non-EU

illegal immigrants of working age in Spain in the first quarter of 2007

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

170

far more than the 700,000 claimed by the government (El Mundo
21/1/08).

In 1995, 50 per cent of the 498,773 foreigners resident in Spain were

from a state of the EU, but by 2006, when the total had reached 2,904,303,
this proportion had declined to 22 per cent and immigrants from Latin
America represented 35 per cent with 24 per cent from Africa. Thus
migration to Spain is characterized by two fairly distinct communities:
comparatively well-off retirement migration from northern Europe
(once the dominant form of ‘invisible’ migration) that is still growing
but whose citizens are from member countries of the EU (Dietz 2005).
On the other hand, there are very sizable flows from non-EU countries
of the unemployed, under-employed or low-paid and their families,
drawn to Spain by the employment and business opportunities it offers.
It is these communities for whom access to and choices about residence,
naturalization and citizenship present the greatest challenge. It has
proved attractive to unauthorized immigrants not only because of the
demand for low-skilled labour but also because Spain has ‘a poorly man-
aged and financed administrative bureaucracy for the management of
immigration, well-developed migration networks and geographic or cul-
tural proximity to dynamic source countries’ (Arango and Jachimowicz
2005). One response to this has been a number of extraordinary ‘regulari-
zations’ or ‘normalizations’ – five since 2000 – that have endeavoured to
bring large numbers of un- or insufficiently documented immigrants
into the legal and social ambit of the state. The most recent naturaliza-
tion, completed in 2005, involved over 690,000 people (Serra 2005: 13).

According to the Strategic Plan, the challenges specific to the migrant

community are the provision of sufficient services and improving
knowledge of lenguas oficiales y normas sociales (official languages
and social standards) which are indispensable for achieving a cohesive
society and for the integration of the migrants themselves. Other prob-
lems are those of racial discrimination and gender issues arising from
the feminization of immigration. Thus questions of language, cohesion
and integration are placed at the centre of what is Spain’s vision of citi-
zenship and integration for the future – the ciudadanía and integración
of the title, Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración. The Plan
refers to ciudadanos inmigrantes (immigrant citizens) and other gov-
ernment documents mention ciudadanos extranjeros (foreign citizens)
emphasizing their place in Spanish civic society. However, the role of
formal citizenship, becoming Spanish in name as well as by adaptation
or conformity with custom and behaviour, in the integration process is
less clear.

Unlike many modern nation-states where rights for minority language

users have been gained in a piecemeal fashion, reluctantly conceded by

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

171

highly centralized governments, Spain, in drawing up a new democratic,
decentralized constitution after the end of the Franco regime, was able
to acknowledge the plurilingual nature of its territory and incorporated
provisions for it in a holistic and structured manner although it could
be argued that this, in itself, reflected the playing out of sociocultural
struggles and divisions, articulated in language ideologies, that existed
prior to the Civil War. The role of these languages, particularly in
the administrative and cultural lives of the autonomous regions, has
expanded greatly although not to the same degree in each community.
Moreover, this is an ongoing process that often transforms education,
media, and public administration into fiercely contested linguistic
spaces. The irruption of another set of language practices in these
spaces – and in ones not hitherto contested as in Castilian monolingual
areas – has brought about further introspection, even reassessment of
what the implications of diversity and multilingualism are for the Spain
of the future.

Spanish is the official language with a number of other ‘Spanish’

languages co-official within specific territorial ambits: Catalan, spoken
in the north-eastern region of Catalunya and the eastern fringe of Aragon,
with its varieties, Valencian, spoken in the contiguous region of the
Comunitat Valenciana and Balear spoken on the Balearic islands; Basque
used in Euskadi and Navarra and Galician in the four north-western
provinces. There are a number of other regional languages, including
Asturian and Aragonese. These enjoy some statutory recognition as
lenguas propias (home languages) but do not, as yet, have the same co-
official status as the former, despite vigorous campaigns for recognition
(Ley Orgánica 5/2007, 20 abril, Gobierno de Aragón). Aranese, a variety
of Gascon Occitan, has an official role in the Vall d’Arán in the central
Pyrenees, rights which are enshrined in the statute and language laws
of Catalunya (Art. 6, LO 6/2006, 19 julio). There are also Arabic and
Berber mother tongue speakers in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and
Melilla on the North African coast (est. 80,000 Linguamón).

Castilian is commonly considered as the language of Spain and iden-

tified with the whole of the territory of the nation-state although the
name refers, historically, to only one part of that territory, and varieties
of that language are spoken worldwide, notably in central and southern
America and the United States. Castilian is identified by name in the
Spanish constitution as the official ‘Spanish’ language and as an ine-
luctable element of being Spanish. The Spanish Constitution affirms
that,

1. Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spaniards

have the duty to know it and the right to use it.

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

172

2. The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective

Autonomous Communities in accordance with their Statutes.

3. The richness of the different linguistic varieties of Spain is a

cultural heritage which shall be specially respected and protected.
(Preliminary Title, Section 3, Spanish Constitution)

In Catalunya, out of a total population of 6,176,751 (aged 2 and above)

that includes Spain’s second city, Barcelona, a very high proportion of
the population affirm that they can understand Catalan (94.48 per cent),
although percentages are less for speaking 74.46 per cent and writing,
49.70 per cent (IDESCAT 2001). Similarly, high percentages were also
registered in Galicia where 67.92 per cent of the population over five
years of age claimed to speak Galician well, with 21.55 per cent claim-
ing some knowledge in 2003 (IGE 2003). In Euskadi, with a total popu-
lation of 2,083,587, 55.4 per cent claimed some knowledge of the Basque
language of whom 32.3 per cent declared that they understood and
spoke it well; however, only 20 per cent of the population said that they
spoke Euskera (Basque) habitually at home (EUSTAT 2006: 21). The
deficits between total population and speakers, between those under-
standing and those speaking, reading and writing languages and
between those with knowledge and those using the language on a regu-
lar basis, are challenges that the recognition, protection and promotion
of regional and minority languages in the statutes of autonomy seek to
address. One of the contributory factors of language shift within regional
language communities has been migratory flows from and within Spain
itself. Emigration, from Euskadi to North America and from Galicia, in
particular, to South America over a long period, coupled with rural
depopulation confronted minority language speakers with complex
sociolinguistic structures that favoured shift to majority languages.
Conversely, population movements from economically stagnant areas
within Spain to expanding industrial centres, particularly migrations
from Andalucía to Catalunya and Barcelona from the 1950s, altered
demographic structures and language practices and sensitized local
regionalist elites to the challenges inherent in integrating economic
migrants within a bicultural society where some language practices
were not perceived as economically relevant. These flows also moved
local varieties like Galician around Spain, and in particular in Catalunya
where Andalucians were associated with the derogatory term xarnegos,
those who refused to assimilate to a Catalan-speaking environment.
Thus, Castilian has been seen in the past both as a common bond
between the communities of Spain that articulated equality for all citi-
zens and as a threat to the survival of diversity. The constant renegotia-
tion of this relationship that has characterized Spain’s history has been

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

173

further complicated by the emergence of immigration as a dynamic
additional factor in language policy and planning.

Unusually in the context of European migration, a large proportion

of the immigrant community in Spain comprises people who already
speak varieties of the official national language, Castilian, namely the
communities from South and Central America, principally Ecuador
and Colombia (Alien population registered on 1/1/2006, INE, in MTAS
2007: 8). This group also includes Quechua and Aymará bilinguals.
However, since the most numerous immigrant group in Spain is that
received from Morocco (13.6 per cent of 2006 total, INE 2007) there are
significant numbers of Arabic speakers, (Ethnologue estimate c. 200,000)
who include Berber variety bilinguals. Eastern European languages spo-
ken are Romanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Polish and Russian. Northern
European languages, such as English and German, are spoken by large
numbers of people who have moved to Spain, often to retire (INE 2007).
Other linguistic communities include Portuguese, Brazilians, Italians,
Chinese speakers and speakers of languages found in Pakistan such as
Punjabi and Urdu (Turell 2001).

Although overall migrants make up fewer than 10 per cent of the

total population of Spain, immigration has been particularly intense
in some of the autonomous communities with lenguas propias, for
example, the Balearic Islands where they represent 16.8 per cent of
the population, the Comunitat Valenciana (13.9 per cent) and Catalunya
(11.42 per cent). (Oficina Económica del Presidente 2006: 6). Other
autonomous regions with co-official languages, however, such as
Euskadi and Galicia, have not proved so attractive and show so far per-
centages well below the average, namely 3.43 and 2.51 per cent, respec-
tively. The challenges that this presents for notions of linguistic plurality
will be explored later in this chapter.

9.3 Citizenship and immigration policies

Spain was for centuries a country of emigration, in the past to its former
colonies and in the twentieth century to the more dynamic economies
of northern Europe. Spanish citizenship was derived from the jus
sanguinis model (by descent) that seemed appropriate for countries of
emigration like Spain that wished to retain the allegiance of its nation-
als who settled abroad. This has developed through the incorporation
of elements of jus soli (place of birth) as well. There are currently five
ways of becoming a Spanish citizen: by origin (natural or adopted chil-
dren of Spanish parents); by option (foreigners who are the children of
Spanish nationals can opt for Spanish citizenship); by letter of natural-
ization, that is, by royal decree, granted in exceptional circumstances

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

174

where national interest is at stake; by residency and by posesión del
estado (active exercise and use of rights and duties of a Spanish citizen
for at least ten years). For most foreigners wishing to settle in Spain and
acquire citizenship, however, residency is the usual channel.

The Strategic Plan takes as one of its three guiding principles, ‘The

principle of citizenship, entailing the recognition of full civic, social,
economic, cultural and political participation of immigrant men and
women’ (MTAS 2007: 21), but it does not include a goal to increase the
number of naturalizations from within the immigrant communities
among its ten objectives. Indeed, Spanish citizenship is considered by
some to be one of the most difficult to obtain in Europe because of the
extended period of legal residency required (Dilday 2006: 1). This asser-
tion may be borne out by the fact that Spain is one of the countries in
the EU in which fewest migrants naturalize every year (about 2 per cent
of the immigrant population compared to Netherlands and Sweden
where it is between 7 and 10 per cent) (Pajares 2005: 22). Nevertheless,
naturalizations based on residence are increasing, from 8,433 in 1996
to 62,399 in 2006. Latin Americans represented over 81 per cent of
these in 2006, a growth of 60 per cent on the previous year, and Moroc-
cans were the most represented African community at 9.13 per cent.
Two autonomous communities represented over half of the total natu-
ralizations, Madrid and Catalunya (OPI 2006: Capítulo XII). However, it
appears that Eastern European migrants were reluctant to apply despite
higher overall numbers: in 2005 fewer Romanians were granted nation-
ality than Uruguayans, Chinese or Indians (Barómetro noviembre 2005,
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 2005).

Nevertheless, conservative opinion believes that Spanish citizenship

is easy to acquire, hence the view of the right-wing ‘think tank’ Grupo
de Estudios Estratégicos (Strategic Studies Group), ‘Becoming Spanish
is easy’ (Ortiz 2007: 3). Ortiz argues that the lack of a citizenship test
in the Spanish nationalization process is bucking the current trend in
other European countries and that tests should be adopted as part of the
normalization of EU immigration policy. Ortiz also points out a demo-
cratic deficit inherent in the situation where nearly two million legal,
tax-paying, registered residents (i.e., non-EU empadronados) cannot
vote in the municipal elections because the Spanish government has
not signed or cannot yet sign reciprocal agreements with their sending
countries (Ortiz 2007: 5).

The regulations governing the acquisition of Spanish nationality

through residence evoke a certain imperialist nostalgia as they are less
onerous for applicants from Latin American countries, Equatorial
Guinea and the Philippines, that is, the countries of Spain’s former
empire and formerly the focus of emigration from Spain. (However, this

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

175

also applies to Portuguese and Andorran nationals.) It is with these
same states that, according to the Constitution, ‘The State may negotiate
dual nationality treaties . . . even if those countries do not grant a recip-
rocal right to their own citizens’ (Cap. 1, Art. 11.3).

This list of coun-

tries with special dispensations also includes paises sefardíes although
these ‘Sephardic countries’ are not specified by name, and the term
appears to refer to Sephardic Jews as members of a diasporic community,
who may be Ladino/Judezmo (Judaeo-Spanish) speakers. For example,
a Ministry of Justice press release announced the naturalization of indi-
viduals from Turkey, Venezuela and Israel, all of whom had demon-
strated special links with Spain by their membership of the Sephardic
community ‘with its related cultural expression in their customs and
the maintenance of the Spanish language’

(Nota de prensa, Ministerio

de Justicia, 7/12/2008). Applicants from these communities need to
demonstrate only two years of residence as opposed to ten years required
for others (Ley 36/2002, 8 octubre, Modificación del Código Civil). In
effect, the current legislation on citizenship means that Spanish speak-
ers are treated differently to other applicants, which, it could be argued,
reflects an ideology of Hispanism, articulated as an ongoing collective
responsibility towards its former colonies. However, the ‘Sephardic
lands’ were never colonies and former territories like Spanish Sahara
and Spanish Morocco are not included.

It can be concluded that it is

the presumption of familiarity with Spanish that entitles those seeking
naturalization as Spaniards to a much reduced residency requirement.
This is consonant with the requirements for foreigners from outside the
former Spanish empire for whom speaking a ‘Spanish’ language is cited
as a factor that can reduce the time required to acquire citizenship by
residence, along with other evidence of adaptation such as study or
voluntary work (Ministry of Justice website). Serra et al. (2005) argue
that a concept of ‘cultural proximity’ operates within the structure of
bilateral agreements Spain has signed to control migrant labour quotas
where there is ‘a preference for immigrants who are easier to assimilate’
(Serra 2005: 11). In 2006, 73.41 per cent of naturalizations were granted
on a residency of two years and 7.96 per cent on one of ten; of those
acquiring Spanish nationality by two years residence, 87 per cent were
Latin Americans.

These issues throw into relief the centrality of notions of language

competence within the discourse on citizenship in Spain. This reflects
current public opinion that not acquiring the language of residency is
an obstacle to successful integration. A broad sociological study in 2005
revealed that acquiring Castilian or another official Spanish language
was ranked as the third most important issue in relation to permitting a
foreigner live in Spain after having a good standard of education, and

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

176

having close relatives already resident (Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas, 15/11/2005). In the same study, while 71 per cent of
Spaniards said that immigrants should keep their own languages and
customs, having learned Spanish, as many as 22.4 per cent believed
they should forget them. A study conducted in the Madrid region
showed that native Madrileños were most favourably disposed towards
Argentineans (the most ‘Spanish’ of South American countries) followed
by Chinese, then Bolivians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians and Colombians,
while Moroccans and Romanians came last. 54 per cent of Madrileños
also believed that Latin Americans integrated best (Barómetro de la
Inmigración, Comunidad de Madrid, 15/1/2008: 21). In the same study,
22 per cent of the Spanish citizens replied that they were worried that
the presence of immigrants would bring about a loss of cultural identity
(Barómetro de la Inmigración, Comunidad de Madrid, 15/1/2008: 22).

The rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain as well as the condi-

tions for their integration are defined by what is known as the Ley de
Extranjería or Aliens’ Law (Ley Orgánica 4/2000) and its subsequent
revisions. Spanish legislation concerning immigration was piecemeal
until the mid 1980s as hitherto it had been focused on the status of
Spanish persons leaving Spain. Comprehensive attempts to produce a
coherent body of law regarding the rights of foreigners in Spain date
from Spain’s entry into the EU and a growing awareness of the volumes
of migration to the country in the 1990s. Reforms of previous laws
resulted in the legislation of Ley Orgánica 4/2000, which gave wide
recognition to the rights of immigrant people and, in addition, gave
prominence to promoting integration. It acknowledged that illegal
migrants also had rights and extended full health care, not only emer-
gency cover, to them; the right to compulsory and non-compulsory edu-
cation and grants for study; social assistance; free legal representation
in cases of need as well as the right to association, meeting, unions etc.
(Pajares 2005: 56). These rights were consequent on registering with a
local authority (possible for any migrant on entering Spain regardless of
their administrative position). The law has undergone further modifi-
cations but basically distinguishes between a temporary residence of
up to five years that can be reduced for reasons of arraigo (establish-
ment or implantation), either social (proof of integration), familiar
(family ties) or laboral (work contract) and permanent residence allow-
ing a person to stay indefinitely for those who can show legal and con-
tinuous presence in Spain for five years.

The Spanish law on the status of foreigners (extranjería) differenti-

ates between the rights of a migrant and those of a Spanish citizen as for
immigrants the right to work is not universal; even with a permit to
reside in Spain they cannot work unless they have permission to do so.

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

177

Getting and keeping this authorization is subject to the condition that
they have a contract or an offer of work, which as globalizing markets
pressure employment practices towards increased casualization means
that there are many opportunities for losing it (Pajares 2005: 18). Health
and education rights are secure for those with residency but, for exam-
ple, the right to travel freely in the EU does not extend to resident for-
eigners nor does the right to vote in municipal elections. For those
without residency permits rights are more severely restricted. The
situation of legal inferiority continues throughout the life of the indi-
vidual unless he or she can acquire Spanish citizenship. Naturalization
means gaining full equality but the acquisition itself has difficulties
that mean that it is not a sufficient solution to overcome legal inferior-
ity (Pajares 2005: 18). Thus, in order to acquire nationality through resi-
dence, the most accessible form, the residence in Spain must be both
legal and continuous which for many can be very problematic. Another
major impediment for those seeking naturalization is that in many cases
it requires the renunciation of the original nationality, which is not
acceptable. Citizens of Latin American countries, however, are not obliged
to renounce their previous allegiance before taking up that of Spain.

Since Spain’s entry into the European Union in 1986, the country

has been a major point of entry for migrants from Africa, Latin America
and Eastern Europe. Since legal immigrants have the same rights as
Spanish nationals, except for the right to vote and to hold public office,
and illegal migrants have rights to basic social assistance and public
health care, providing they have registered in a municipality (Santolaya
2005: 275), obtaining Spanish citizenship is far less important than it
might once have been since basic human needs are provided for within
the current system. With ever-increasing fluidity in settlement patterns
and willingness to follow expanding markets and the subsequent
demand for labour and skills, the momentous decision to settle perma-
nently in another country can be deferred indefinitely.

Responding to the ever-increasing volumes of migration to Spain, the

Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs devised a new policy, the
Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Integración 2007–2010 (The Strategic
Plan for Citizenship and Integration 2007–2010) approved in February
2007, that set out the goals and objectives for a model of Spanish soci-
ety that would be able to react positively to immigration and maximize
its benefits for both receiving and migrant communities. It is

a key element in governing the process of mutual adaptation of
immigrants and the autochthonous population because . . . it aims
to contribute to a two-way process by fostering social, economic,
cultural and institutional development that is advanced, plural and
lasting for all residents in Spain. (MTAS 2007: 15)

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

178

Within this, the promotion of improvements in immigrants’ knowl-

edge of the official languages and the social norms in Spain are seen as
prerequisites for a cohesive society and social integration (MTAS 2007:
13). This is elaborated in a similar way in another context as ‘To foster
knowledge among immigrant men and women of the EU’s basic values,
the rights and obligations of persons living in Spain, the official lan-
guages in the country’s different autonomous regions, and the social
norms and habits in Spanish society’ (MTAS 2007: 22). Knowledge of
official languages (Castilian, Catalan, Basque and Galician) is repre-
sented as being as fundamentally important as knowledge of the rights,
values and norms of Europe and Spain and the juxtaposition of the two
suggests that the acquisition of the former will inevitably entail the
absorption of the knowledge of European and Spanish norms.

While reflecting on the view that European policies on immigration

appear to be polarized between those that derive from rejection and
xenophobia and those favouring integration, Pajares points out that
although no different in this respect from other countries, until 2005
the Spanish government had provided little to promote integration and
it was the municipalities and autonomous governments who had done
what they could with few resources (Pajares 2006: 9). The autonomous
regional authorities have assumed important roles through their statutes.
Although in Spain, ‘the State has sole responsibility for matters relating
to nationality, immigration, emigration, alien/immigration law and rights
of asylum’

(Constitution Art. 149.1.2

), integration policies and the sec-

tors in which they operate, for example, housing, education, health, are
the responsibility of the comunidades autónomas. Moreover, the auto-
nomous regions have introduced a concept of civic citizenship (not
‘nationality’) of their respective communities, parallel to Spanish citi-
zenship that introduces an additional mode of belonging, vecindad
administrativa, the condition of being a citizen of an autonomous com-
munity with its associated political rights acquired by being on the
municipal register. Spanish citizens resident abroad can register their
wish to be considered as a citizen of an autonomous community.

9.4 The acquisition of citizenship and

testing regimes

Spanish law does not require knowledge of Spanish in order to obtain
either residence or Spanish nationality (Roth 2007). Nevertheless, the
process of acquiring Spanish nationality by residence can require an
interview with a judge whose purpose, apart from verifying the docu-
mentation, is ‘to ascertain the level of adaptation to Spanish culture
and lifestyles’ of the candidate for naturalization (Ministerio de Justicia

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

179

website). Citizenship applicants are required to supply a wide range of
personal information accompanied by documentary proof of their inte-
gration: whether they ‘speak Castilian or another Spanish language’
and evidence of relevant ‘study, voluntary or social activities’

(Minis-

terio de Justicia website). Claims made in this respect are then tested in
an interview: ‘Once the request (for naturalization) and the other neces-
sary documents have been submitted to the Civil Registry office of the
applicant’s place of residence, the application will be considered by the
Registrar. The applicant will be present at a hearing with the Registrar
who will ascertain, in particular, to what extent they have adapted to
the Spanish culture and way of life’

(Ministerio de Justicia website).

Whether the hearing can be held in any language other than Castilian is
not clear, possibly to avoid upsetting regional sensibilities.

Lack of knowledge of the language has been reported as the main

cause of the rejection of applications for citizenship, particularly for
Moroccans and Chinese (El País 09/11/2004). It is significant that here
at least it is the presumption of ignorance of the Spanish language, that
is Castilian, rather than any of the other co-official languages. The
Supreme Court upheld a decision in 2004 to refuse to grant citizenship
by residence to a Moroccan woman resident in Melilla for over ten
years on the grounds of lack of knowledge of Spanish, using as its justi-
fication Art.22.4 of the Civil Code that requires evidence of integration
in Spanish society.

The conservative Partido Popular was reported to have studied the

feasibility of including a ‘soft’ (i.e., not by formal examination) lan-
guage test in its 2008 electoral programme, that would demonstrate that
the candidate applying for citizenship ‘had sufficient knowledge of
Spanish in order to prove that the person seeking citizenship was inte-
grated in Spanish society’

(Sí, se puede 14/1/2008). However, the

issue seems to have been judged too sensitive to include in the party’s
manifesto, there is nevertheless a proposed ‘contract of integration’
through which immigrants will undertake to learn the language, respect
Spanish customs, pay taxes and obey the law. A new point system for
visas would give ‘priority to those immigrants who can integrate better
in our country’, in effect Spanish-speaking Latin Americans

(Partido

Popular 2008: 47). This differs little from the certificado de arraigo that
is required from foreigners who have lived for more than three years
in Spain, a stage necessary before they are able to obtain permanent
residence. From this part of the political spectrum in Spain, at least,
there appears to be an understanding that there is a direct correlation
between levels of Spanish language competency (Castilian by default)
and the degree of social integration of the immigrant person. By con-
trast, the left wing Izquierda Unida have proposed simplifying access

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

180

to Spanish nationality and the right to vote for legal immigrants who
have been resident for more than two years.

In general, the thrust of conservative politics in Spain is to reinforce

the control of the centre over the periphery and to prevent the deroga-
tion of further powers to autonomous regions, in language policy terms
the PP seems to want to re-establish the hegemony of Castilian in the
face of what it perceives as erosion of its position. In the PP’s 2008 elec-
toral manifesto, the party makes the commitment that ‘We will guaran-
tee by law the right to use and study in Castilian at all stages in the
education system’

(Partido Popular 2008: 27). There is already a con-

stitutional right to use Castilian throughout the national territory of
Spain but where autonomous administrations have promoted and val-
orized co-official languages, particularly in expanding regional language
medium education from primary to university level, this entitlement
appears to be compromised. A proposal by socialist parties (PSOE and
IU and ICV) made in Parliament in 2006 to extend the suffrage in muni-
cipal elections to non-EU residents (some citizens of Latin American
countries with whom Spain has signed reciprocal agreements already
have this) encouraged the government to enter into treaties with those
countries that shared the closest historical and cultural ties with Spain
without, however, explicit mention of any language requirements.
Some Catalan parties insisted that in order to qualify there should be
some proof of commitment to the receiving community that would
include knowledge of Catalan (Roth 2007). However, despite the exist-
ence of ‘regional’ citizenships, the relationship of local attachments
vis-à-vis national identity is contentious. Spanish nationality is not an
umbrella nationality that embraces others in the way that British citi-
zenship can include English, Welsh or other varieties. Measures that
entail unambiguous expression of a challenge to Spanish hegemony
jeopardize the ‘calculated vagueness’ and ‘ambiguous passages’ that
Harrington identifies at the heart of the Spanish Constitution (Harrington
2005: 108–10). We would argue that any attempt to include an explicit
and formalized language competence requirement, either as a measure
to control migration flows or as a necessary requirement to accession to
citizenship, powerful though it would be as an acknowledgement to
autochthonous Spaniards of the importance of maintaining a cohesive
society, would exacerbate internal political tensions between the centre
and regional governments with bilingual policies.

The apparent predisposition implicit in Spanish citizenship law

towards Spanish-speaking sending countries with its origin in Spain’s
imperial past and comparatively recent high levels of out-migration
may also appear to be beneficial for Spain as a receiving country, since,
in contemporary economic analyses of the impact of immigration,

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

181

a shared or very similar language reduces the cost of integration (as
fiscal and human capital expenditure) in education and cultural provi-
sion (Brettell and Hollifield 2000: 5). Nevertheless, it has little effect on
other fundamental challenges of immigration such as the ‘black’ economy,
the pressure on public services, public disquiet and marginalization.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether all of Spain’s needs in terms of supply
and flexibility in the labour market and skills could be met adequately
from any one source.

Although knowledge of the language can facilitate initial contacts

and subsequent integration, Roth (2007) does not consider language
and cultural similarities as the most important factors in the selection
of Spain as a destination for immigrants from Latin America. He gives
two reasons for this: Other countries that are not Spanish-speaking
(mainly the United States but also Canada, Japan, the Netherlands
and Italy) are more popular destinations and the recent growth of the
Spanish economy and increasing demand for workers coupled with its
image of stability and success. It also seems relevant that ease of entry
and staying and reception networks are important. A large proportion
of Latin Americans have taken advantage of the special terms for natu-
ralization that in addition give access to the whole of the EU. Arguing
that Spain still has not come to terms fully with the size and rapidity
of immigration, Roth asserts that it has yet to formulate clearly policies
of control and selection and that an explicit policy of selection by ori-
gin would be at odds with Spanish civic and legal practices. Since jus
sanguinis takes precedence over jus soli the children of Spaniards born
abroad are automatically granted citizenship, whereas children of for-
eign parents born in Spain have to fulfil a series of requirements.

The perception of the central role of sensitivity to language ideolo-

gies and attitudes in ensuring peace and cohesion in the Spanish state
is such that it features as a declared object of the Constitution ‘[to] pro-
tect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights,
of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions’ (Preamble,
Spanish Constitution).

This commitment to plurality and the recogni-

tion of its central role in the construction of a national Spanish identity
emerges clearly in the Plan Estratégico where the contribution that
immigration makes to the cultural diversity of the country is listed as
one of the four major benefits that it brings and that it is enriching for a
society that is already ‘plural’. Perhaps disingenuously, it does not
mention that accommodating this same plurality still subjects the coun-
try to considerable political and social strains.

The devolved nature of government in Spain means that the wide-

reaching powers of regional autonomies are involved in the operation-
alization of national policies and the Plan Estratégico notes that the

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

182

national political debate on immigration obscures the ongoing work by
local government in the integration of migrants. This recognition
derives from the fact that the regional governments of Spain have been
required to draw up their own plans to address the phenomenon of
immigration and this has been cascaded down throughout all levels
of government in Spain.

9.5 The

Comunitat Valenciana: a case study

The Valencian Region offers a useful illustration of how the integration
of new citizens is planned for at the same time as managing historic
sociolinguistic tensions. This region, as part of the Mediterranean arc,
has been one of the focal points of immigration in Spain, where the
booming construction industry, the tourist hospitality trade, domestic
care and horticulture, especially citrus production, has proved a pow-
erful attraction for potential immigrants. The migrant communities are
varied and include as already mentioned large numbers of northern
Europeans, Chinese, Moroccans and Africans. There are particularly
high concentrations of Romanians, especially in the province of
Castelló de la Plana. The region is administratively divided into nomi-
nally Valencian (Catalan) and Castilian-speaking areas. Within the former,
there are widely differing levels of competence, use and support.

As required by the national government, the Generalitat Valenciana

(Valencian government) drew up its Pla d’Immigració, approved in
April 2005.

While based on the national Plan Estratégico, it also

mentions a specific Valencian model for integration ‘that combines the
defence of diversity and difference as positive factors that enrich our
society with the universality of respect for human rights and democratic
freedoms as well as respect for the cultural values of the Valencians as
a people, in the interest of a mutual understanding of interculturality’

(Plan Valenciano de Inmigración 2004–2007: 137). The authors assert
that plans by the autonomous regional authorities are ‘more inclusive,
with a clearer statement of the comparability of rights’ than the national
one

(Plan Valenciano de Inmigración 2004–2007: 128). The cascading

down extends to city level, and in Valencia’s Plan Municipal para la
integración de la inmigración, approved in July 2002, the process of
incorporation is described as ‘a project of solidarity within the frame-
work of an intercultural society, in which is privileged respect for human
rights and, above all, beyond different ethnic, cultural or religious ori-
gins, access to citizenship’ (Plan Municipal para la integración de la
inmigración: Ajuntament de València 2002: 5)

[our emphasis]. The

aim of the planners is to enable the entry into a permanent status of
belonging within the Spanish state that transcends all other categories

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

183

however fundamental they might be to individual identity construc-
tion. Planning for immigration at all levels makes clear that the receiv-
ing society will need to adjust to new circumstances as well as the
migrants themselves. ‘[P]olicies of integration will require at the same
time responses and shifts from immigrants and from Valencian society
as a whole’

(Plan Municipal 2002: 5) but it is not clear to what extent

this adjustment will include greater tolerance for the use of other lan-
guages and the plan makes no specific reference to teaching Valencian as
a tool for integration. Nevertheless, public statements by ministers
envisage it in this role. Launching new conversation guides aimed at
immigrants, the Valencian Minister of Culture, Alejandro Font de Mora,
called the language a ‘tool for integration of migrants in the Valencian
Community’ (Levante 30/12/2006).

Migration from Romania to Spain increased rapidly after Spain and

Romania signed a bilateral agreement on migrant workers in 2002.
Sandu (2006) asserts that the choice of Spain was made as a collective
response to their experience as migrants in other countries: ‘What
counted as much in this decision was the kind of workforce that was
needed, the ease with which one could move from Romanian to the
language of the destination country and equally also the legislation
and the tolerance of arrivals and staying’

(Sandu 2006: 19). The

removal of the Schengen visa requirement in 2002 brought about a
‘sophisticated circular migration system . . . [that] replaces permanent
migration and can last for years depending on the project or motivation
for the migrant; it is a ‘life strategy’ (Sandu 2000: 65). Permanent
migrants from Romania are likely to be graduates heading for the United
States, Canada and Germany rather than Spain. The vast majority of
Romanians in Spain are thought to be temporary labour migrants
(Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 18). Where migration is a temporary response
to economic and social pressures, language competence is prioritized
differently and the role of language in integration more problematic
than among those who intend to settle permanently and naturalize.

9.6 Conclusions

Contemporary Spain illustrates Delanty’s (2000) identification of citi-
zenship as a site of conflict over identity and demands for recognition
of difference, but, also, more specifically, how it can no longer be located
exclusively on one level and is multi-levelled, cutting across the subna-
tional, the national and the transnational citizenship (Delanty 2000: 5).

Diversity and respect for difference in Spain’s official discourse

around citizenship acknowledges immigrants’ language rights. Autono-
mous communities with co-official languages can appear to be supportive

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

184

of language maintenance but may also wish to impose on migrant com-
munities additional language requirements, especially in the areas of
education and access to jobs in public administration.

The recent report Informe sobre la situación de la integración social

de los inmigrantes y refugiados en 2007, (Foro para la integración social
de los inmigrantes, Ministerio de trabajo y asuntos sociales 2007: 185)
emphasizes the importance of visibility of immigrants in the process of
integration, and that access to public posts such as teachers and police
should not be limited by nationality. Also, following the European
Commission’s concept of ‘civic citizenship’, the right to vote in local
elections should be independent of the acquisition of Spanish national-
ity but be based on criteria of residence status and length of stay.

Symbolic, perhaps, of the tensions and debates that surround discus-

sions of national identity, citizenship and their relationship with lan-
guage in Spain is the unusual absence of any words (in any language)
to accompany the music of Spain’s national anthem – until now, that is,
as tentative discussions have begun to take place to provide lyrics in
the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games in China. It could be that the
pressure of an event that epitomizes patriotic fervour and nationalistic
competition produces further linguistic compromise and, arguably,
inclusivity across multilingual Spain.

Notes

1 The padrón is the Municipal Register, ‘the administrative record featuring

the residents in a munipicality, constituting proof of residence in the munici-
pality and habitual abode therein’ INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística)
(2008), INEbase / Demography and population / Population figures and
Demographic Censuses. Retrieved 25 January 2008 from http://www.ine.es/
en/inebmenu/indice_en.htm.

2 Han pasado ya a formar parte del nosotros común que es la sociedad española
3 Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, ‘Situación de la Economía

Española, Presupuestos Generales del Estado 2008’.

4 Ceuta and Melilla are ‘autonomous cities’ with their own statutes and a spe-

cial status between municipalities and autonomous communities. They do
not have legislative powers.

5 El castellano es la lengua española oficial del Estado. Todos los españoles

tienen el deber de conocerla y el derecho a usarla. 2. Las demás lenguas
españolas serán también oficiales en las respectivas Comunidades Autóno-
mas de acuerdo con sus Estatutos. 3. La riqueza de las distintas modalidades
lingüísticas de España es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial
respeto y protección (Título Preliminar, Artículo 3).

6 El Estado podrá concertar tratados de doble nacionalidad con los países

iberoamericanos o con aquellos que hayan tenido o tengan una particular
vinculación con España. En estos mismos países, aún cuando no reconozcan

Spanish language ideologies in managing immigration

185

a sus ciudadanos un derecho recíproco, podrán naturalizarse los españoles
sin perder su nacionalidad de origen (Capítulo Primero, Artículo 11.3).

7 Con el consiguiente reflejo cultural en sus costumbres y el mantenimiento

del idioma español.

8 The Islamic Organization of Spain (Junta Islámica), has endorsed the Xauen

Declaration, that asks for Spanish nationality to be given to the descendents
of the Moriscos expelled between 1502 and 1610 under the same conditions
as the Sephardic Jews (‘Los andalusíes reclaman “una reparación moral”
a España’, Madridpress.com, 19/03/2007).

9 El Estado tiene competencia exclusiva sobre las materias de ‘nacionalidad,

inmigración, emigración, extranjería y derecho de asilo.

10 ‘Las circunstancias que reducen el tiempo exigido; si habla castellano u otra

lengua española; cualquier circunstancia de adaptación a la cultura y estilo
de vida españoles, como estudios, actividades benéficas o sociales, y las
demás que estime conveniente.’

11 Una vez presentada la solicitud y el resto de los documentos requeridos

ante el Registro Civil del domicilio del interesado, tal solicitud será tramit-
ada por el Juez encargado de ese Registro. Asimismo, el Juez encargado del
Registro, oirá al peticionario, especialmente para comprobar el grado de
adaptación a la cultura y estilo de vida españoles.

12 De demostrar conocimientos de español suficientes como para atestiguar

que la persona que solicita la ciudadanía está integrada en la sociedad
española.

13 Prioridad a los inmigrantes que mejor se puedan integrar en nuestro país.
14 Garantizaremos por ley el derecho a utilizar y a estudiar en castellano en

todas las etapas del sistema educativo.

15 Proteger a todos los españoles y pueblos de España en el ejercicio de los

derechos humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e instituciones.

16 A dedicated Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Conselleria de

Inmigración y Ciudadanía) was not established by the regional government
until 13/7/2007 (Decreto 101/2007).

17 Que combina la defensa de la diversidad y la diferencia como factores

enriquecedores y positivos para nuestra sociedad, con la universalidad
del respeto a los derechos humanos y las libertades democráticas, así como
el respeto hacia los valores culturales de los valencianos como pueblo, en
aras de una regulación transversal de la interculturalidad.

18 Los Planes Autonómicos se presentan como más inclusivos, con una afirma-

ción más nítida de la equiparación de derechos.

19 Como un proyecto solidario en el marco de una sociedad intercultural, en la

que prime el respeto de los derechos humanos y, por encima de todo, más
allá de orígenes étnicos, culturales o religiosos diferentes, el acceso a la
ciudadanía.

20 Las políticas de integración supondrán simultáneamente respuestas y ajustes

de las personas inmigrantes y del conjunto de la sociedad valenciana.

21 Cât a contat în ceasta˘ decizie tipul de cerere de for

a˘ de munca˘, facilitatea de

trecere de la româna˘ la limba

a˘rii de destinaie s¸i cât legislaia s¸i tolerana

locului de sosire, ra˘mâne de stabilit.

Dick Vigers and Clare Mar-Molinero

186

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Roth, J. O. (2007), ‘Lengua y migraciones: aspectos culturales de la

inmigración latinoamericana en España (ARI)’ ARI N

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from http://www.estudios.lacaixa.es

Sandu, D. (2000), ‘Circulatory migration as a life strategy’, Sociologie

Româneasca˘/Romanian Sociology, 2: 65–92.

191

10.1 Introduction

Being a citizen of the United States comes with many benefits. A citizen
has the right to vote, to run for public office, to travel or live abroad for
extended periods of time, to receive financial and health-related aid
from federal organizations and to sponsor family members who are
applying for immigration visas (United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services [USCIS] 2007). According to USCIS, ‘citizenship is one
of the most coveted gifts that the US government can bestow’ (USCIS
2007: para 2), and since the 1868 ratification of the 14th amendment
to the US Constitution, this ‘gift’ has been granted to ‘all persons born
or naturalised in the United States’ (United States Code 1868: para 1).
At the time of the 2000 census, this amounted to an approximate 250
million native-born and 12.5 million foreign-born or ‘naturalised’ US
citizens (US Census Bureau 2007).

With some minor exceptions, since the late nineteenth century the

path to becoming a naturalized citizen for those not born in the United
States has remained fairly consistent. In addition to such requirements
as having a good moral character, which can be demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by maintaining a clean criminal record for at least five years prior
to application and refraining from illegal activities such as gambling,
prostitution and polygamy, and possessing a favourable attitude towards
the country, which is confirmed by taking an oath of allegiance to the
United States that renounces foreign allegiances and swears obedience
to the US Constitution and laws, everyone seeking citizenship status
must have a basic ability to read, write and speak the English language
(USCIS 2007). During the naturalization process, applicants must demon-
strate their knowledge of the English language by being able to read por-
tions of their application form aloud, write one or two simple sentences
upon request and verbally answer personal questions. Furthermore,
applicants must be able to correctly answer six out of ten questions about
US history and government. Out of the published list of 100 prepared

The language barrier between
immigration and citizenship
in the United States

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topics, applicants could be asked to respond to such questions as
follows: What are two rights in the Declaration of Independence? What
do the stars on our flag mean? Who is ‘the Father of Our Country’?
(USCIS 2007). Finally, in order to increase the number of applicants
who successfully pass the interview, USCIS recommends that those
who have limited English language skills enrol in a basic-level English
course before scheduling their interview.

While this language testing process seems to be in line with the dom-

inant position English has acquired in the United States, the fact remains
that the United States does not have an officially declared national lan-
guage – much to the ire of many. As far back as the American Revolution,
public figures such as John Adams rallied towards English as an official
language. As the second president of the United States, who firmly
believed that American English would become the next world language,
Adams recommended that all citizens learn English (Baron 1990). He
further predicted that in ‘a democracy like the United States, excellence
in the use of the English language, rather than accidents of birth and
class, would serve to distinguish merit’ and that the eloquent use of
the English language ‘will become the instrument for recommending
men to their fellow-citizens, and the principle means of advancement
through the various ranks and offices in American society’ (Baron 1990:
28–29). Today, that sentiment is perfectly mirrored in federal ballot
proposals advocating English-only legislation such as the Official Eng-
lish Act (S.1335), the National Language Act (HR 769) and the English
Language Unity Act (HR 997), each of which clearly calls for English to
be designated as the official language of the United States (ProEnglish
2007). According to Representative Steve King, Republican sponsor of
the English Language Unity Act,

the English language is the carrier of liberty and freedom through-
out history and the world. For centuries, our common tongue –
English – has been the uniting force in this great nation, knocking
down ethnic and cultural barriers to make us truly one nation.’ He
goes on to equate this ‘common means of communication’ with
national ‘unity and patriotism,’ making it appear pointedly unpat-
riotic to disagree with his stance. (ProEnglish 2007: para 2)

But despite what have come to be called the ‘pro-English’ campaigns

of those seeking to officially recognize English as the dominant language
of the United States, ‘the founding fathers believed the individual’s
freedom to make language choices and changes represented a far more
valuable political asset to the new nation than did a state decision to
remove these freedoms from the individual’ (Heath 1977: 10), and this
ideology has, on a federal legislative level, so far remained unchanged.

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193

So even though English is required of those seeking US citizenship, the
freedoms protected in the original Bill of Rights have guided federal
legislators, making it so that no language test has ever been required of
those wishing to immigrate to and live in the United States. This discrep-
ancy has resulted in an estimated 18.5 million non-English-dominant
immigrants living permanently in the United States, who, for one rea-
son or another, choose not to apply for citizenship (US Census Bureau
2007). But this statistic is not what is problematic; the real problem lies
in the state-sponsored English-only tests to which this group of perma-
nent residents is continually subjected. Through the guise of monolin-
gual policies such as English-only, Pro-English and English for the
Children (Wiley 2004), these language tests have taken the form of overt
discrimination in schools, at work and even at home against the very
immigrants who continue to build this great nation.

10.2 US immigration policy

According to Kloss (1977), the United States is generally one of the most
linguistically-tolerant countries in the world (Schiffman 2001). This
sentiment is further supported by the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Immigration, who claims that ‘America is the most generous country
in the world’ when it comes to cultural and linguistic diversity in immi-
gration (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 12). Indeed, in the early
days before the American Revolution, multilingual schools, church
services and political pamphlets were found in abundance in languages
such as English, German, French and Dutch (Crawford 2000a; Schiffman
2001). As time passed, however, local and state policies were introduced
to limit public languages to English and perhaps German or French
(Crawford 2000a). These policies were quickly intermixed with more
federally restrictive uses of other languages, allowing them only to be
used in situations of national import such as increasing military espio-
nage and recruitment, selling War Bonds and creating special linguistic
military units such as the WWII Navajo Code Talkers (Kloss 1977;
Schiffman 2001). Most recently, policies have restricted the use of lan-
guages other than English to the most private domains where they are
‘non-threatening to Anglo-Americans’ (Schiffman 2001: para 4). What
Kloss’ (1977) view of linguistic tolerance fails to consider is ‘that toler-
ance can and did diminish and lessen over time’ and, in situations of
national nativism or xenophobia, it has virtually been ‘eliminated by a
rise in intolerance’ (Schiffman 2001: para 11–12). The ideology of mono-
lingual superiority that has resulted upholds the belief that ‘English is
tantamount to Americanization’ (Baron 1990: 28). So even though the
xenophobia of Otherness has historically referred to the uneducated,

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the poor, the savage and the primitive (Bauman and Briggs 2003), those
who have truly been deemed unworthy of citizenship in the eyes of the
English-speaking elite are those who have resisted English, and there-
fore, Americanization.

One of the most basic metaphors of Americanization is that of the

melting pot, which has implied an assimilation of language, culture
and identity and sought ‘to mould a rational, unified, or modern society
out of one perceived to be chaotic, pluralistic, or backward’ (Baron
1990: 27). In order to create this unified, modern society, then, linguis-
tic diversity has been seen as something that needs to be managed
through strict policies of limitation and containment (Blommaert and
Verschueren 1998). So while language has never directly been used as
a test in any US immigration policy, ‘derision was, and still is, in store
for those who master English imperfectly’ (Kloss 1977: 284) due to the
implicit ideology of English superiority that has been slowly, yet contin-
uously, constructed throughout the history of US immigration policy.

10.2.1 Immigration policy, late 1700s–1930

During the early years, the United States openly encouraged immigra-
tion with the intent of establishing settlements on its open lands (Center
for Immigration Studies 2006). However, due to famine, civil unrest and
a lack of economic opportunity in much of Europe in the mid-1800s,
the United States suddenly saw a rapid influx of immigrants. As early
as 1882, in an effort to control the large number of immigrants, the
Supreme Court declared that immigration needed to be federally regu-
lated, which prompted the drafting and passing of the Immigration Act
of 1882 and the establishment of the Office of Immigration in 1891.
Besides admitting and processing all new immigrants arriving in the
country, the Immigration Act also empowered authorities to deny entry
to ‘convicts, lunatics, idiots, and persons likely to become public
charges’ (Jenks and Lauck 1912: 43). Prostitutes were later added to
this list of those to exclude (American Immigration Law Foundation
1999). Further legislation limited who was granted admission to the
United States even more; the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and a for-
mal Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan in 1907 excluded citizens from
those countries from being granted entry into the United States for dec-
ades (American Immigration Law Foundation 1999). Finally, in 1917,
the first linguistically based legislation was passed that excluded any-
one who was not literate in at least one language from entering the
country (American Immigration Law Foundation 1999).

During this time period, the mixed use of German, French, Dutch

and English had been tolerated to a large degree, but with the increasing

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

195

numbers of non-English-speaking immigrants came a growing ideology
of nativism. Between the early 1800s and First World War, the nativists,
who were prominent Protestant leaders in the English-speaking com-
munity, declared that bilingualism was a threat to the country, and, in
order to promote patriotism, immigrants had to give up any language
other than English as a sign of allegiance (Baron 1990; Schiffman 2001).
These feelings only increased during the years surrounding the First
World War, when, due to the increased xenophobia caused by the war,
anti-German sentiment spread rapidly within the country, causing the
use of German to be banned in most public domains for almost six years.
Even though it was eventually declared unconstitutional, this ban
served to increase the position of English in society as many German-
speaking communities made the switch to English and thereafter aban-
doned German (Schiffman 2001).

Shortly after the war ended, immigration, which had drastically

fallen during the war, resumed again with full force and members
of Congress, whose ancestors came from mostly Northern European
countries, saw immigrants from what they deemed to be ‘inferior’ coun-
tries from Southern and Eastern Europe arriving by the thousands. In
response, they swiftly passed the Temporary Quota Act in 1921 and
called a special congressional session to discuss the matter in more
depth. During the hearings, the House Judiciary Committee consulted
the eugenic expertise of Dr Harry Laughlin, who claimed that ‘certain
races were simply inferior’. He went on to state that ‘we in this country
have been so imbued with the idea of democracy, or the equality of
all men, that we have left out of consideration the matter of blood or
natural born hereditary mental and moral differences’ (American Immi-
gration Law Foundation 1999, quoting House Judiciary Committee
1995: 585). As a result of the belief that some men are inherently more
superior than others, the Temporary Quota Act became the more per-
manent Immigration Act of 1924. With the ratification of the Immigra-
tion Act, congress’ need to exclude the more ‘inferior’ immigrants from
entering the United States created one of the strictest methods for rally-
ing against any kind of linguistic or ethnic diversity the country has
seen – the National Origin Quotas – what John F. Kennedy would go on
to call a system that has ‘strong overtones of an indefensible racial pref-
erence’ that is ‘strongly weighted toward so-called Anglo-Saxons . . . ’
(Kennedy 1964: 124). These quotas set a new level of criteria for immi-
grants seeking to enter the United States. The quotas set on immigrants
were the same as ‘the number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as
the number of inhabitants in the United States in 1920 having that
national origin bears to the number of white inhabitants of the United
States in 1920, with a minimum quota of 100 for each nationality’

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(American Immigration Law Foundation 1999: para 10). Essentially,
every country in the Eastern Hemisphere was assigned a limited quota
of allowable immigrants based on previous US census figures; interest-
ingly, they were not from the most recent census of 1910, but from
1890, and those countries with very few to no citizens included in
prior figures were not allowed to immigrate to the United States at all
(Aleinikoff and Martin 1991). With these strict guidelines based on the
earlier census data, the more ‘inferior’ immigrants from Southern and
Eastern European countries as well as those from most Asian countries
were almost completely barred, a ‘discriminatory policy’ which would
later be criticized for the idea that ‘Americans with English or Irish
names were better people and better citizens than Americans with
Italian or Greek or Polish names . . . ’ (Kennedy 1964: 125). One year
after the quotas took effect, the Commissioner of Immigration reported
that all immigrants now looked and spoke exactly like Americans
(Aleinikoff and Martin 1991), with English being the predominant
language of power. Yet, interestingly, while the new legislation man-
dated limits on the countries in the Eastern Hemisphere because of
what Roosevelt called the ‘Good Neighbour’ policy, it left the Western
Hemisphere relatively open for immigration based on the previous
qualitative requirements, a decision vaguely attributed to economic
and political motives (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991: 58).

10.2.2 Immigration policy, 1930–1965

In 1929, as the quantitatively based national origin quotas were being
fully utilized alongside the previous qualitatively based requirements,
the United States was feeling the first effects of the Great Depression.
In response to the imminent threat of economic collapse, the State
Department under the direction of the Hoover administration gave firm
orders to overseas consul members to strictly censor out any potential
immigration applicants who were ‘likely to become public charges’
(American Immigration Law Foundation 1999, quoting Fermi 1968:
26). This mandate resulted in the number of admitted immigrants being
decreased from 241,700 in 1930 to 23,068 in 1933 (American Immigra-
tion Law Foundation 1999). Furthermore, the strict interpretation of
the quota laws did not allow any room for refugees, who were admitted
under the same quotas as others seeking immigrant status. One of the
worst years on record was 1939, when, fearing that such a large number
of German-speaking children would put a strain on the nation, Congress
defeated a bill that would have allowed 20,000 children to be rescued
from Nazi Germany. Despite the fact that families within the United
States were willing to sponsor the children, congress firmly stated that

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

197

the children could not be admitted based on the claim that each was
likely to become a public charge and that the automatic admittance of
20,000 children would over-fill the annual quota of allowable German
immigrants (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991).

Over the next 20 years, there was little immigration to the United

States from Eastern Hemisphere countries due to the onset of Second
World War and the maintenance of the strict national origin quotas.
These quotas served their purpose and the ethnic and linguistic compo-
sition of the population remained relatively stable, only seeing increases
mostly from Northern European, English-speaking countries such as
Ireland and England. However, towards the end of the war, certain
political and economic conditions arose that softened the government’s
hard-handed rule against a diverse range of immigrant groups. For
example, in 1945, the War Brides Act allowed spouses and families
of returning US soldiers to be admitted to the United States, and the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the Refugee Relief Act of 1953
allowed for many of those seeking refugee status from war-torn coun-
tries to enter without having to fulfil requirements through the quota
system (US Customs and Border Protection 2006). Furthermore, due
to wartime shortages and a newly booming agricultural economy, the
US saw a need for temporary, seasonal labourers in order to increase
agricultural workflow and profits. In response, congress passed a for-
mal agreement with the Mexican government in 1951 to greatly increase
the size of the previously informal Bracero Program, which allowed
millions of seasonal workers to be employed temporarily in the United
States without officially needing to meet any of the requirements of the
quota system (Center for Immigration Studies 2006).

But almost as soon as the US started to loosen its policies with these

slightly more open-armed immigration programs, there was a xenopho-
bic outcry from the privileged classes as commonly happens when the
management of cultural and linguistic diversity is in the hands of the
powerful (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). First, there was concern
over the large number of temporary workers from Mexico who had
entered the country legally, but who, once in the United States, decided
to remain and work illegally (US Customs and Border Protection 2006);
second, those who were in positions of power saw the influx of thou-
sands of foreign-born immigrants, who they feared could be ‘criminal
aliens, communists, subversives, and organised crime figures’ (US Cus-
toms and Border Protection 2006: para 27). As happens with ideologies
of the elite, this mere current of ethnic and linguistic intolerance soon
became a widespread political movement as the concerns were put
forward by the dominant upper classes and recognized by the general
public (Bourdieu 1991: 188). The Truman administration reacted by

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passing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which not only
kept the quota system intact but also added to the list of previous
‘inferior’ qualities to exclude from immigration: those who supported
communism, anarchy or any other subversive ideology. At this same
time, those who were thought to be of the same description were under
attack within the United States as well under the federally authorized
McCarthy investigations. The first to be targeted were recent immigrants
who were suspected of being Communist party leaders or sympathizers.
Under the direction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), these foreign-born legal residents were rounded up, detained
without bail and scheduled for deportation without a legal hearing
(Schrecker 2002). This attack on foreigners increased the xenophobic
reaction of Anglicized Americans to the degree that nativism began
again to rise, and indeed, throughout the entire Red Scare beginning in
1917 with the First World War and picking up again in the 1940s and
50s during the height of the McCarthy trials, ‘linguistic uniformity was
seen as essential to rooting out alien conspiracies’ and ‘an ideological
link was established between speaking “good English” and being a
“good American”’ (Crawford 2000b: 21). By physically and ideologically
attacking supposed enemies of foreign and US birth alike, the Truman
administration, in effect, was able to censor and control the political
ideologies of the time (Bourdieu 1991). Therefore, by steering the polit-
ical discourse to align public sympathies with the self-deemed progres-
sive, ethnically and linguistically superior party goals, politicians and
law-makers ‘used language to construct and sustain an epochal gap
between pre-modern “others,” both internal and foreign, and modern
subjects, thereby legitimating the social and political ascendancy of the
latter’, which further supported their growing desire for social and lin-
guistic superiority (Bauman and Briggs 2003: 18).

10.2.3 Immigration policy, 1965–2008

At the start of the early 1960s, the US experienced a great shift in its
core ideologies as the civil rights movement swept the nation. In a con-
troversial article, the then Senator John F. Kennedy claimed that under
the previous immigration policy, Emma Lazarus’ famous words on the
pedestal of the Statue of Liberty should have been amended to read as
follows:

‘Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free’ – as long as they come from Northern Europe, are not
too tired or too poor or slightly ill, never stole a loaf of bread, never
joined any questionable organisation, and can document their
activities for the past two years. (Kennedy 1964: 124)

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

199

Championing this new publically promoted belief in equality that fol-
lowed in the wake of the McCarthy years, Kennedy carried the determi-
nation to fight for civil rights and to liberalize immigration policy with
him into the presidency (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991). After his assassi-
nation in 1963, the newly appointed President L. B. Johnson followed
in Kennedy’s path, and, in 1965, he overturned the old ways of blatant
discrimination and intolerance and passed the Civil Rights Act. With
the passage of this liberating law came hope for all those who had been
discriminated against, subverted and repressed ethnically, racially or
linguistically by previous legislation. Among the many changes towards
equality that rippled through the US Code of Law was a reform of the
existing discriminatory immigration policies, resulting in the Immigra-
tion Act of 1965 (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991) and the creation of the
federally funded Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (Garcia 1997; Wiley
2004).

In support of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, President

Johnson claimed that the Immigration Act of 1965 sought ‘to correct
the racially-based immigration system established in the 1920s that
favoured those from Northern Europe by abolishing the National Origin
Quotas’ (American Immigration Law Foundation 1999: para 18). The
new law set a limit of 20,000 immigrants per country per year with a
ceiling of 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere and gave preference to
family members of US citizens under the family sponsored category,
individuals with highly sought after skills under the employment-based
category and refugees (United States Code 2006). Furthermore, the
Bilingual Education Act was the first piece of federal legislature aimed
at promoting and protecting languages other than English in the schools
(Crawford 1992, 1995). However, while the decommissioning of the
national origin quotas opened up opportunities for those from under-
represented countries in the Eastern Hemisphere and the federal
government finally started encouraging a more positive attitude towards
multilingualism, the two changes to legislation did nothing to dissolve
the anti-foreigner sentiments – and, in fact, they seemed to have had
the opposite result, especially against the growing number of Spanish-
speaking residents, most particularly in the economic sector (Aleinikoff
and Martin 1991). In response to this residual prejudice, congress
decided to close the last open door to the United States and ended the
‘Good Neighbour’ policy with Central American countries by setting
a limit of 120,000 immigrant visas per year for all countries in the
Western Hemisphere, eventually combining the two hemispheres into
one category in 1978 with a total limit of 290,000 immigrants per year
with a ceiling of 20,000 immigrants per country per year (American
Immigration Law Foundation 1999).

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In 1982, anti-foreigner sentiment surfaced again when Congress

passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which gave amnesty to
special classes of non-documented immigrants already living in this
country, with one category specifically set aside for ‘Special Agricultural
Workers’ – immigrants who had previously performed agricultural
labour in the United States (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991). This gesture of
goodwill allowed thousands of previously temporary workers to remain
in the United States legally, but as seen with earlier goals aimed at equal-
ity and diversification, it caused what the mostly English-speaking
legislators saw as an unforeseen problem in the system. By allowing so
many temporary-status immigrants from Latin American countries to
stay, it had the effect of giving immigrants from these countries an even
bigger advantage in the family-based section of the preference system
(American Immigration Law Foundation 1999), causing federal analysts
claim that the new policies ‘were tampering with the American melting
pot’ (Wiley 2004: 327). The twofold reaction, which actually stemmed
from the passage of the Bilingual Education Act in 1968 and paralleled
the fear of the growing numbers of Spanish-speaking immigrants, had
the biggest effect on what would lead to the present-day monolingual
ideologies that promote English as essential for Americans. First, what
started in 1981 and has continued in various forms to the present day
was the constitutional amendment first proposed by Senator Hayakawa
that would legally make English the official language of the United States
(Wiley 2004: 327). Supporters of this amendment have claimed that

the most successful and dominant world language in history is
under siege in its strongest bastion and that in order to unify our
country and prevent the ethnic conflict, hostility, and separatism
that exist due to linguistic diversity, English must be made the
official language of the US. (Crawford 2000a: para 7)

Second, starting around the same time as the English-only Movement,

a discussion started to arise within congress about the inequity of the
statutes in the 1965 immigration law. Instead of allowing for more
ethnic and linguistic equality, as was the stated goal, several members
of congress, including the Honourable Glenn Anderson, claimed that
the Immigration Act of 1965 had exactly the opposite effect by creating
‘a system whereby most immigrants today are Asian and Hispanic,
while all but closing the door to more traditional groups of immigrants
like Europeans’ (Anderson 1990: para 7). Anderson went on to purport
that English and Irish immigrants, who were from ‘the proud ethnic
and cultural heritage of [our] forbearers’, had been discriminated against
when the National Origin Quotas were removed from the books, and
that a new law needed to be passed to amend this situation (Anderson

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

201

1990: para 7). While congress did not debate the validity of the prefer-
ence system, they did demand that another category be added to reverse
the wrongs committed against countries that had been adversely affected
by the 1965 law. The solution they came up with was a ‘diversity visa’
that would increase visa allowances across the board and allow immi-
grants into the country in the following order of preference: family,
employment and diversity immigrants (United States Code 2006). The
diversity lottery system would set aside 55,000 visas out of an approxi-
mate 400,000 to be ‘randomly’ chosen for immigrants from generally low-
admission countries. They claimed that this addition to the pre ference
system would allow for ethnic and linguistic diversity to be restored to
our immigration policy, and it soon became part of the amended Immi-
gration Act of 1990. Subtly keeping in line with the English-Only Move-
ment of the 1980s, though, was an obscure provision that was written into
the 1990 act – one in which 40,000 of the diversity visas each year for
three years would go to countries that had been the most adversely
affected by the removal of the national origin quotas. Of those 40,000
visas, 40 per cent were to be set aside for English-speaking natives of
Ireland (Aleinikoff and Martin 1991), and in all but two years since its
inception, out of the six geographic regions represented in this category,
the majority of the visas have been awarded to immigrants from European
countries (US Department of State 2007), demonstrating a clear prefer-
ence for those more similar to the founding fathers of the United States.

As yet, little has changed in US immigration laws, which still do not

use language as a direct test for immigration. However, after the cata-
strophic events of 11 September 2001, under the auspices of the Patriot
Act, Congress passed a variety of new laws that have directly affected
and limited immigration culturally, and thereby linguistically, once
again. In 2002, Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act, which drastically tightened border security and
added to the historic list of those to exclude from the country by first,
requiring all those entering the United States to have a machine-
readable passport that is tamper-resistant and includes acceptable
biometric identifiers such as digital photo, iris and/or fingerprint scans,
which are not yet available to all citizens around the world; second, by
imposing economic and political sanctions on countries supporting
terrorists such as North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, Iran and Libya,
which serves to drastically limit immigration from those countries (US
Department of State 2007). Furthermore, alongside an even stronger push
for English-only laws like English for the Children, which passed in 1998
and 2000 in California and Arizona, respectively, and Pro-English, which
has now passed in 30 states, making English their official language
(ProEnglish 2007), is the most recent debate on the laws directly relating

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to immigration. In May

2006, President Bush presented his proposal for

Comprehensive Immigration Reform, which was presented under the
guise of ‘improving [national] security’ (the White House 2006: para 2).
Within that concise title is ‘an issue-defining conceptual frame – the
Immigration Problem Frame – a frame that imposes a structure on the
current situation, defines a set of “problems” with that situation, and
circumscribes the possibility for “solutions”’ (Lakoff and Ferguson 2006:
para 2–3). In this case, ‘“Reform,” when used in politics, indicates there
is a pressing issue that needs to be addressed . . . The noun that is
attached to reform – “immigration” – points to where the problem lies’
(Lakoff and Ferguson 2006: para 2–3). By addressing the issue under the
global title of ‘immigration’, then, both illegal and legal immigration are
subtly encompassed within the ‘problem’ polemic, refocusing the atti-
tudes of those who might otherwise have considered legal immigration a
positive benefit to the United States.

Therefore, as has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout US immi-

gration history, the monolingual ideology maintained by those in power
has been solidified and passed down through discrimination-laden
nominalizations applied to immigrants and immigration such as ‘the
inferior’, ‘subversives’ and the ‘immigration problem’. As ‘no utterance
can be put together without value judgement’ (Vološinov 1929: 105),
with each successive legislative act that is passed against immigrants of
certain ethnic backgrounds, mental capacities or linguistic abilities, a
degree of evaluative judgement is maintained for the succeeding gener-
ations. And as the law is a venerated word that maintains control over
society (Vološinov 1929: 105), these evaluative judgments trickle-down,
mainly through the educational system, and become the underlying
ideologies that shape future laws and legislation, thereby creating a
continuous power differential between those in power and those who
remain controlled by it (Bourdieu 1991). In the case of language as an
official test for immigrants, by allowing English to become solidified
culturally and ethnically in immigration law and in English-only poli-
cies, it gains a level of control over society and the underlying ideology
of monolingual English superiority is passed along and tied to the con-
cept of ‘being a good American’ (Crawford 2000b: 21).

In the following excerpt from President Bush’s national address in

2006 (para 23), he carries this judgmental ideology forward by claiming
that the national immigration policy necessary for the success of this
country should be one of assimilation of language, culture and identity –
a true return to the monolingual melting pot:

(. . .) we must honour the great American tradition of the melting
pot, which has made us one nation out of many peoples. The success

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203

of our country depends upon helping newcomers assimilate into
our society, and embrace our common identity as Americans.
Americans are bound together by our shared ideals, an appreciation
of our history, respect for the flag we fly, and an ability to speak and
write the English language. English is also the key to unlocking the
opportunity of America. English allows newcomers to go from pick-
ing crops to opening a grocery, from cleaning offices to running
offices, from a life of low-paying jobs to a diploma, a career, and a
home of their own. When immigrants assimilate and advance in our
society, they realise their dreams, they renew our spirit, and they
add to the unity of America.

This underlying ideology of ethnic, cultural and linguistic intolerance

has led to the present situation in which speaking English, deemed to
be a superior and privileged ability, proffers the benefit of citizenship
in the United States.

10.3 The real language tests for immigrants

Behind each of the aforementioned immigration policies are what
researchers have found to be four main arguments supporting the ideo-
logy of English monolingualism (Kloss 1971; Wiley and Lukes 1996;
Wiley 2004), which directly enforce the policy of having English as
a test for citizenship but still encourage the learning of English for all
immigrants who wish to remain permanent residents. The first argument
for English monolingualism claims that all immigrant groups should
‘surrender their languages as compensation for the privilege of immi-
grating’ to the United States (Wiley 2004: 323). Closely tied to this eth-
nocentric perspective is the second argument, which holds that because
non-English-speaking immigrants will most likely do better economi-
cally than in their homeland, they should embrace English and give up
their ancestral language (Crawford 2000a; Wiley 2004). As demonstrated
through the previous comments from US presidents from Adams to
Bush, living in and becoming a citizen of the United States is one of the
greatest privileges granted by the US government, and those wishing to
fulfil the great American economic dream can only do so by completely
assimilating to the American culture and to the American language –
English (Mencken 2000). The third assumption is that by maintaining
a language other than English, immigrants will be subjected to what has
been called ghettoization in that they will be isolated from and fall behind
those in English-speaking environments (Kloss 1971; Wiley 2004). This
ideology is clearly expressed by advocates of recent English-only policies,
who have stated that ‘English should be promoted because it is an equal
opportunity language,’ which will help immigrants avoid the trap of

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204

ghettoization (Wiley 2004: 323). Finally, the most common argument in
support of a monolingual nation is that of national unity (Crawford
2000a; Wiley 2004). This argument stems from the supposition offered
by English-only campaigns, which believe ‘minority languages and eth-
nic, racial, and religious diversity pose a threat to national unity’ (Wiley
2004: 324). This perspective purports that only through assimilation of
culture, language and identity, as Bush so verbosely described, can the
United States truly become unified.

Despite the fact that there is virtually no evidence to support any of

these arguments (Crawford 2000a), they are still bandied about by those
wishing to pursue English monolingualism. In fact, excepting small
populations of immigrant groups, the majority of immigrants have his-
torically been found to lose their first languages by the third generation
and more recently as quickly as by the second generation (Crawford
2000a). This statistic even includes Spanish-speakers, who Crawford
points out have typically been the most stigmatized as not wanting to
learn English (2000a). However, due to the ‘semantic freewheeling’
(Bourdieu 1991: 41) performed by proponents of English-only laws,
30 out of the 50 states have now promoted English to the status of offi-
cial state language, and most state amendments, such as the following
from Iowa, include language outlining the goal: to assimilate non-English-
speaking residents into each states’ mainstream culture through the
‘common thread binding individuals of differing backgrounds’, which
‘has been the English language’ (ProEnglish 2007: para 3). So while
immigrants do not legally need to have a functional knowledge of the
English language to immigrate to and reside in the US according to the
federal government, this monolingual notion of English superiority –
unsupported by hard evidence (Crawford 2000a) – has led to language
tests of an increasingly overt nature for immigrants who do not speak
English as their primary language in schools, at work, and even at home.

10.3.1 English-only in schools

With the Bilingual Education Act of 1968, whose goal was to offer equal
access to education and to promote both maintenance of a first language
and the acquisition of English as a second language, came a backlash of
monolingual furore (Wiley 2004). Starting with the 1981 English-only
amendment and continuing fairly unabated through monolingual poli-
cies of today, the Pro-English movement has succeeded in 15 states in
abolishing languages other than English from being used as the primary
language of teaching in public schools. And while this statistic in itself
does not seem that alarming given the number of states that have pro-
moted English to official status, the 15 states that have banned bilingual

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

205

education account for 94 per cent of the students who speak a language
other than English at home with California, Arizona and Massachusetts
making up 50 per cent of that number (ProEnglish 2007).

Proponents against bilingual education claim that students in bilin-

gual programs are lingering too long and failing to transition out of those
programs, they are scoring lower on national standardized tests and they
are graduating without being taught the basic-level English skills they
need to succeed in mainstream society and explore their culture, all of
which puts them at a disadvantage (ProEnglish 2007). Senator Hayakawa,
the father of the modern English-only movement, summed up this ideo-
logy when quoting Theodore Roosevelt: ‘We have room for but one lan-
guage in this country, and that is the English language, for we intend to
see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, of American
nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boarding-house’ (quoted in
Crawford 2000b: 8) – an ideology that was proudly carried on by activists
like Ron Unz, the Silicon Valley millionaire who successfully sponsored
California’s Proposition 227, which severely limited bilingual education
in that state. But despite the precedent set forth in the 1974 ruling of Lau
v. Nichols, where the courts ruled that children who were not sufficiently
fluent in English had the right to linguistic help in the form of bilingual
education under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, states continue to pass legi-
slation that bans all forms of publically funded bilingual education. This
leaves children, who do not speak English as their primary language, in
a continual struggle to catch up to their English-speaking peers.

10.3.2 English-only at work

As English is linked by those who wish to pursue their monolingual
agenda with ‘patriotism and Americanization . . . that is, with what it
means to become an American’ (Wiley and Lukes 1996: 519), this ideo-
logy has spread not only through the laws governing the public school
system but to the laws governing the workplace as well. With the rights
and protection granted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which pro-
tects employees against discrimination due to their race, colour, reli-
gion, sex or national origin, many workplace laws looking to restrict or
ban the use of languages other than English were, for decades, prohib-
ited by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) – the
federal agency that was created in the early 1960s to monitor and pro-
tect against discrimination in the workplace (Crawford 1992). However,
in 1987 in the case of Prado v. L. Luria & Son, a district court in South-
ern Florida ruled that ‘an English-only rule by an employer does not
violate Title VII as applied to bilingual employees as long as there is a
legitimate business reason for the rule’ (quoted in Burns 1998: para 2).

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206

Due to rulings such as these, the EEOC has revised their directives, and,
in 2002, with 228 suits filed against English-only workplace laws, they
released an updated version of their compliance manual (EEOC 2002).
According to Section 13, employers are now allowed to implement Eng-
lish-only policies in order to operate a safe and efficient business (EEOC
2002). Circumstances that warrant such justification include the
following:

for communications with customers, co-workers or supervisors
who only speak English; in emergencies or other situations in which
workers must speak a common language to promote safety; for
cooperative work assignments in which the English-only rule is
needed to promote efficiency or to enable a supervisor who only
speaks English to monitor the performance of an employee whose
job duties require communication with co-workers or customers.
(EEOC 2002: Section 13,V.c.)

These special circumstances have allowed for a rather flexible inter-
pretation of the law and the number of English-only policies being man-
dated in workplaces around the United States for purposes of business
necessity are steadily rising (EEOC 2002: Section 13,V.c.). Increasingly,
however, cases such as Garcia v. Spun Steak (Valdés 2001) and EEOC v.
RD’s Drive In (EEOC 2002) are being brought to court where English-only
policies are instigated to protect the employer or other monolingual
employees from insulting remarks allegedly made by employees in
another language. These kinds of cases truly reflect the ideology of fear
and suspicion that monolingual speakers, who, as Valdés (2001) points
out, are in the minority with respect to the rest of the world, have of those
who have not assimilated to their ‘American’ way of life, and unfortu-
nately, this has lead to a limitation or loss of employment for countless
individuals who cannot or who choose not to acknowledge or accept this
discriminatory monolingual policy in their legal place of employment.

10.3.3 English-only at home

Finally, this monolingual belief has even been seen to preside over the
homes of those who speak languages other than English. According to
the public statements made by many pro-English organizations in the
United States, languages other than English are acceptable – even com-
mendable in the ‘foreign language’ sense – when spoken ‘at home, in
churches, at private schools,’ but they take a firm public stance against
‘Babel in the public square’ (Crawford 2000a: para 71). However, not all
who are pro-English follow this line of public discourse. In Amarillo,
Texas, in 1995, Judge Samuel C. Kiser declared to a predominantly
Spanish-speaking mother of a 5-year-old girl,

Language, immigration and citizenship in the US

207

you’re abusing that child and you’re relegating her to the position
of housemaid . . . Now, get this straight. You start speaking English
to this child because if she doesn’t do good in school, then I can
remove her because it’s not in her best interest to be ignorant. The
child will only hear English. (quoted in Verhovek 1995: para 2–3)

What followed these remarks was an outrage by both child’s rights
activists and immigrant communities across the United States, the lat-
ter of whom were especially fearful that the courts were now moving
towards a position of power where they could take away their children
if English wasn’t the main language spoken in the home (Verhovek
1995). In his later court order for the case, Judge Kiser did tone down
his comments to a small degree – by apologizing to the ‘profession of
housekeeping, since’, as he claimed, ‘we entrust our personal posses-
sions and our family’s welfare to these hard-working people, and I hold
them in the highest esteem’ (Verhovek 1995: para 11). His final com-
ments to Ms Laureano, the mother of the 5-year-old, were to the effect
of demanding that the girl must learn English. While this belief is unde-
niably extreme, it is, nonetheless, what continues to drive the ideology
of monolingual English superiority in the United States.

What rings true in each of the aforementioned claims by English-

only advocates is not what is in the best interest of those who speak
languages other than English, it is not what is protected by legislative
and constitutional rights and it is not what is best for the continued
diversity of the United States; it is what is best for those who continue
to hold the political and social power over those subjugated by the
system. As Crawford states, ‘who knows where the slippery slope might
lead – social equality? Fewer advantages for white Anglo-Americans?
Linguistic human rights for everyone? These are nightmarish prospects
for the privileged and the powerful, and for those who share their
worldview’ (2000a: para 80). Unfortunately, as evidenced by the increas-
ingly prominent ideology of monolingual superiority in the United
States, ‘truth may simply be a matter of what one can get the public to
believe’ (Donahue 1995: 117, quoted in Wiley 2004). In this case, the
majority of states now believe that English should and must be used as
a social, political and language test for all those who wish to participate –
whether as an immigrant or as a citizen – in this nation.

10.4 Conclusion: language as a test for immigration

and citizenship in the United States

As this previous discussion demonstrates, language has historically
and is currently used as a test for both citizenship and immigration in
the United States. As a test for citizenship, applicants are encouraged

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208

by the federal government well in advance of their official interview to
practise using English by answering the US government and civics
questions, by working on basic reading and writing skills and by enroll-
ing in a language class if they feel their skills are lacking. As a test for
immigration, however, there are other, more indirect tests at work under
the guise of official language policies that affect non-English-speaking
immigrants on an ongoing daily basis. In order to live and work legally
in the United States, immigrants do not technically need to speak English,
and indeed, to date the United States has not declared English to be its
federally mandated official language. However, permanent residents
who do not speak English are increasingly subjected to tests that limit
their education, their employment and even the privacy of their own
homes. Furthermore, to many of those in power, non-English-speaking
residents are viewed as un-American and unpatriotic, and the fact that
they resist assimilation means that their numbers are a threat to the
economic and political unity of the United States (Wiley 2004). Because
of these negative views towards cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diver-
sity held by many in the United States, the implicit ideology of English
superiority will continue to test those who find themselves in the lin-
guistic gap between immigration and citizenship in the United States.

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211

11.1 Early patterns of immigration

The focus of this chapter is on early patterns of immigration to Canada
(Section 11.1), on regimes for becoming a Canadian citizen (Section
11.2), on what immigrants should know about Canada, illustrated in
detail with an overview of what is found in the study booklet A Look at
Canada (Section 11.3), and on the representation of Canada as a bilin-
gual country.

Canada is one of those countries that are often defined as nations

of immigrants. Although in no way uninhabited before the arrival of
European explorers, fur traders and settlers, Canada was at the time
vast and sparsely populated. Canada’s native peoples – the different
North-American Indian tribes and the Inuit (formerly referred to as
Eskimo) – lived in all parts of what is today Canada, from the Atlantic
coast to the Pacific and up in the far north, while the white new-comers
began settling in the east and along what is today the border with the
United States. Gradually, migration across the continent moved the
European settlers further west, while fur traders travelled along the riv-
ers to the interior and the north of this enormous land to do business
with the native population groups and to explore the territory.

Even though Vikings from Iceland were probably the first Caucasians

to end up on the shores of the Atlantic coast in present-day Newfoundland
in eastern Canada, around the year

1000, traditionally French explor-

ers are considered the first Europeans to arrive in Canada. Soon there-
after, priests, monks, nuns, soldiers and deported prostitutes arrived
from France in the seventeenth century to bring people and Christianity,
as well as the French language, to the new colony, la Nouvelle France.
The territory that this colony covered consisted of roughly the same
area that is today known as the province of Québec, still a predomi-
nantly French-speaking part of Canada.

British explorers also found their way, through the Great Lakes and

along the rivers, into Canada and built settlements and forts both on the
Atlantic coast, south of the French colony, and further inland, to the
west of la Nouvelle France. Many so-called Loyalists came up to Canada
from the south, escaping from the War of Independence in what was to

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

212

be the United States of America, when it was becoming obvious that
the side in the conflict that wanted to remain a British colony (‘loyal’ to
the British crown) was about to be defeated. In English, these British
colonies on the Canadian side of the border became referred to as
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia (=New Scotland) and Upper Canada,
while Lower Canada was the English name for the French colony. These
names were not indicating perceived status but rather that the British
inland territory was ‘up’ the Saint Lawrence River and the French col-
ony ‘down’ the river.

When hostilities erupted between the French and the English, the

Europeans on both sides soon formed partnerships with native Indians
who were willing to fight alongside the white soldiers, against the white
enemy soldiers on the other side who had allied themselves with age-
old foes among the Indians. In this way, warring Indian tribes would
join in on opposing sides of the white man’s conflict and fight both
old and new enemies at the same time. Eventually, the English defeated
the French, and the ‘two Canadas’ were united under the British flag.
However, language, customs and way of life, including Catholicism,
remained much the same in the former French colony. The foundations
of modern-day bilingual Canada were laid already at the on-set of the
nineteenth century due to this relatively liberal and hands-off attitude
of the British in Lower Canada.

In 1867, Canada gained independence politically from Great Britain

through the British North America Act. The Act stipulated that although
the British monarch would rule over Canada as well, as (s)he did over
all nations in the British Commonwealth, Westminster no longer held
any political power over Canada, which was to have its own parliament
in its new capital, Ottawa, diplomatically located right on the border
between Upper and Lower Canada, now referred to as the provinces of
Ontario and Québec. Canada would have its own elections and run its
own internal and external affairs. However, a Canadian was by defini-
tion a British citizen and would remain so until 1947, when Canadian
citizenships were granted for the first time.

To many of the people who had come to and settled in Canada from

the late nineteenth century and onward, the idea that being a Canadian
meant you were actually British was not a reasonable or logical one.
They came from eastern, northern and southern Europe, from Asia and
Africa, from the Caribbean and South America, but they had no connec-
tion with England or Great Britain. British citizenship for Canadians
was even more unsatisfactory to the large French-speaking minority in
Canada. By the middle of the 1940s, being Canadian no longer meant
that one most likely had a British heritage in at least part of one’s ances-
try, as people from all over the world had made Canada their home for

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

213

decades, fleeing persecution or hunger, seeking adventure and fortune,
or simply looking for better opportunities than what the country of ori-
gin could offer.

During the two World Wars in the earlier half of the twentieth century,

Canada had been at war as soon as Britain officially entered the conflict,
as were the other Commonwealth countries around the world. The mon-
arch was the one who made that final decision, and in this regard the
countries of the British Commonwealth had to abide by decisions taken
in London. They were, after all, still loyal royal subjects. However, by the
end of the Second World War, Canadians began to define themselves as
Canadians and not as British subjects living in North America. The idea
of a separate Canadian citizenship, and a Canadian passport to go with it,
was born. As the parliamentary democratic process is designed to prevent
rash decisions and provide for ‘sober second thought’, it was not until
two years later, in 1947, that the first proud Canadians held the first docu-
ments ever issued stating that they were citizens of Canada, not the United
Kingdom. However, they did retain their British citizenship, as any other
new Canadian citizen was – and still is – allowed to remain a citizen of
another country (Toronto Star, 1 July 2007). Australian political scientist
Brian Galligan compares Canada and his own country in this respect:

Founded as colonies of European empires, both countries have long
histories of multiple citizenship identities that coexist and are not
mutually exclusive. Both were founded as nations without sover-
eignty and added national citizenship to existing membership of
imperial and provincial-state polities. (Galligan 2005: 288)

The principle upon which Canadian citizenship is based is the ius

soli model, meaning that anyone born on Canadian soil, or in Canadian
territorial waters, is automatically a Canadian citizen. As a conse-
quence, if Canadians give birth abroad, the child’s parents will have to
apply for their citizenship to be extended also to their offspring within
two years of the child’s birth. If the child remains abroad, (s)he must,
before turning 28 years of age, confirm that (s)he wishes to remain a
Canadian citizen and justify his/her connection with Canada. Having a
Canadian father or mother, or both, does thus not mean that a child will
be a Canadian citizen, unless the birth takes place in Canada. This very
closely mirrors the principles for determining who is a citizen of the
United States of America, Canada’s next-door neighbour and biggest
trading partner, and of course also a nation of immigrants.

11.2 On becoming a Canadian citizen

Becoming a Canadian citizen was seen as being granted a privilege, and
if you were not born to this privilege, you had to earn it. It was not

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

214

something money could buy – and it still is not, even though one way
of getting immigrant status is to have a certain amount of money to
invest in Canada – but you had to qualify by showing yourself worthy
of being a member of the Canadian national family. You had to know
something about this country that you were hoping to call your own, and
you had to be able to communicate in one of the two official languages,
English or French. The language requirement was and is still seen as
necessary for being able to inform oneself about what is happening in
Canada and how it relates to the rest of the world, a prerequisite for
making the informed decisions based upon which a Canadian citizen
can, after reaching the age of 18, participate in the democratic process,
from voting in elections to running for the office of Prime Minister. This
right to participate in the political process is still very much at the core
of the privilege of being a Canadian citizen. Canadian political scien-
tists Marc Hanvelt and Martin Papillon express this in the following
words: ‘To be a citizen is also to be an actor involved in creating and re-
creating the political community through political action, representation,
claims making, or simply voting’ (Hanvelt and Papillon 2005: 247).

What a Canadian citizen should know about Canada – whether you

were born and raised in Canada and learned it in school, or you have
come from somewhere else and chosen to make Canada your home – is
basic facts about Canadian history, Canadian geography and the
Canadian political system, including knowing who is in charge of the
nation, that is, the name of the Prime Minister, and who is the head of
the province where you live. The latter is as important as the former,
since Canadian provinces have a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis Ottawa,
the federal capital, which is not the capital of any province. Culturally,
there is no specific Canadian life-style that a citizenship applicant has to
account for and subscribe to, except for the realization and recognition
of Canada as a multicultural society; a definition of Canadian society
first formulated in a so-called white paper in 1971 and elevated to
legal status with the Multiculturalism Act in 1988 (Edwards 2001). The
Canadian Constitution, from 1982 (replacing the British North America
Act of 1867), includes a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a success-
ful citizenship applicant should know that Canadian society does not
permit discrimination based on race, gender, age, creed, political affili-
ation, sexual orientation or ethnic origin. These rights, entrenched in
the Constitution, override any claims to certain customs or behaviours
as pertaining to a particular cultural or religious tradition.

The Canadian Constitution, and in particular the Charter of Rights

and Freedoms, is even seen by Canadian scholar Alan Cairns as an
instrument for unification and identity-building in a federal state like

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

215

Canada, potentially fragmented by multiculturalism and a large French-
speaking minority concentrated in the province of Québec as well as by
the interests of Aboriginal population groups across the country. He
states that

the Charter was a nationalizing, Canadianizing constitutional
instrument intended to shape the psyches and identities of Canadi-
ans [. . .]. (It) constitutionalizes the Canadian people by tying all
diverse groups to its various clauses and [. . .] transforming them
into[. . .] a single constitutional unity. (Cairns 1995: 197)

In defining citizenship, he writes that ‘citizenship is a linking mecha-

nism, which in its perfect expression binds the citizenry to the state and
to each other and reinforces empathy and solidarity’ (Cairns 1999: 4).

In order to qualify for Canadian citizenship today, a person must

have been a landed immigrant, that is, a person who is legally entitled
to permanent residency in Canada and is living there, for at least three
years, a change from five years that came into effect in February 1977.
The applicant must also be at least 18 years old (younger persons apply
together with their parents.). Furthermore, a fee (200 dollars in 2008)
has to be paid, and the applicant must not have a criminal record in
Canada or have been found to provide fraudulent information to get
permanent residency status.

Canada has two official languages – English and French, as entrenched

in law by the Official Languages Act of 1967 – and the successful appli-
cant for citizenship needs to be able to speak at least one of these two
languages well enough to communicate with people. In other words,
one must know enough English or French to understand other people
and to make oneself understood. For those who, after having lived in
Canada for three or more years, have not managed to develop this
communicative competence in one of the official languages, there are
so-called Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada (LINC) classes
available free of charge in most urban areas. The definition of commu-
nicative competence is, as outlined above, very functional and prag-
matic with more of a focus on oral than written skills. The citizenship
test is actually not a language test per se but a test of knowledge about
Canada that is administered in either official language. Applicants
60 years or older do not have to take this test, and under exceptional
circumstances, including for example certain disabilities, an applicant
may be permitted to take the test with the help of a government-
approved interpreter (Jensen and Phillips 2001).

For applicants with learning disabilities, it is even possible to be

exempt from the testing requirements altogether. A precedent-setting

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

216

court ruling from July 2002 gave a 55-year-old woman of African origin
the right to get her Canadian citizenship without passing the test, after
she had failed it twice and seemingly was unable to learn English
despite years of free daily language instruction (Stock 2002: 23). This
decision has, however, been criticized for being too lenient. Quoted in
Stock’s article, immigration expert Charles Campbell, a former vice
chairman of the Immigration Appeals Board, offers these comments:

Surely citizenship means having an opportunity to contribute to
the development of this great country. But how can you do that if
you don’t understand even the most basic things about it? [ . . . ] The
ease with which new immigrants come to Canada and obtain citi-
zenship, even without speaking English or French, shows that
immigrants are taking advantage of the country. (Stock 2002: 23)

Stock concludes: ‘A lack of understanding of the test material, and a

lack of basic English or French comprehension, would appear to make
the ability to cast an informed vote an impossibility’ (Stock 2002: 23).

11.3 What immigrants should know about Canada

In addition to the above mentioned language requirement, to become a
citizen one must know the rights and responsibilities of citizens, such
as the right and responsibility to vote as well as be able to demonstrate
that one is informed about Canada’s history and geography, and about
the political system in Canada. The way to learn what is necessary to
pass the test that is with few exceptions administered to every citizen-
ship candidate is to study a booklet called A Look at Canada, which is
either available online through the website of Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada or will be sent to the applicant in hard copy after the citi-
zenship application has been received for processing. At the beginning
of this document, the following list summarizes what is required of
a successful applicant:

To become a Canadian citizen, you must

be 18 years old or older
be a permanent resident of Canada
have lived in Canada for at least three of the four years before apply-
ing for citizenship
speak either English or French
know Canada’s history and geography
know about Canada’s system of government and the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship

This booklet is available in both English and French, and several

ethnic associations have made translated versions available online in

z
z
z

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

217

a number of immigrant languages to facilitate learning the factual con-
tent before also dealing with it in one of the official languages. The
test that is administered as part of the application process is nowadays
usually a written multiple choice test, but applicants with poor literacy
skills can also request to do it as an interview in either official language.
(Until the 1980s, the test was as a rule administered in the form of an
interview.) A good idea of the kinds of questions that may be included
in the citizenship test is given by the following list of practice ques-
tions, which is found at the end of the government issued study booklet
A Look at Canada:

Section I: Questions about Canada

Aboriginal Peoples
1.  Who are the Aboriginal peoples of Canada?
2.  What are the three main groups of Aboriginal peoples?
3.  From whom are the Métis descended?
4. Which group of Aboriginal peoples make up more than half the

population of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut?

5. Why are the Aboriginal peoples of Canada working toward

self-government?

History (answers can be found in the sections on regions of Canada)
1.  Where did the first European settlers in Canada come from?
2.  Why did the early explorers first come to Atlantic Canada?
3.  What three industries helped the early settlers build communi-

ties in the Atlantic region?

4. Who were the United Empire Loyalists?
5. When did settlers from France first establish communities on the

St. Lawrence River?

6. Which trade spread across Canada, making it important to the

economy for over 300 years?

7. What form of transportation did Aboriginal peoples and fur trad-

ers use to create trading networks in North America?

8. What important trade did the Hudson’s Bay Company control?
9. What did the government do to make immigration to western

Canada much easier?

Confederation/Government
1.  What does Confederation mean?
2.  What is the Canadian Constitution?
3.  What year was Confederation?
4.  When did the British North America Act come into effect?
5. Why is the British North America Act important in Canadian

history?

6. Which four provinces first formed Confederation?
7. Which was the last province to join Canada?

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

218

  8.  When is Canada Day and what does it celebrate?
  9.  Who was the first Prime Minister of Canada?
10. Why is the Constitution Act,  1982 important in Canadian

history?

Rights and Responsibilities
1. What part of the Constitution legally protects the basic rights

and freedoms of all Canadians?

2. When did the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms become

part of the Canadian Constitution?

3. Name two fundamental freedoms protected by the Canadian

Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

4. Name three legal rights protected by the Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedoms.

  5.  List three ways in which you can protect the environment.
  6.  Who has the right to apply for a Canadian passport?
  7.  What does equality under the law mean?
  8.  Name six responsibilities of citizenship.
  9.  Give an example of how you can show responsibility by partici-

pating in your community.

10. List four rights Canadian citizens have.
11. What will you promise when you take the Oath of Citizenship?

Languages
1. What are the two official languages of Canada?
2. Give an example of where English and French have equal status

in Canada.

  3.  Where do most French-speaking Canadians live?
  4.  Which province has the most bilingual Canadians?
  5.  Which province is the only officially bilingual province?

Symbols
  1.  What does the Canadian flag look like?
  2.  What song is Canada’s national anthem?
  3.  Give the first two lines of Canada’s national anthem.
  4.  Where does the name ‘Canada’ come from?
  5.  Which animal is an official symbol of Canada?
6. What is the tower in the centre of the Parliament buildings

called?

Geography
  1.  What is the population of Canada?
  2.  What three oceans border on Canada?
  3.  What is the capital city of Canada?
  4.  Name all the provinces and territories and their capital cities.
  5.  Name the five regions of Canada.
  6.  Which region covers more than one-third of Canada?
  7.  In which region do more than half the people in Canada live?

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

219

  8.  One-third of all Canadians live in which province?
  9.  Where are the Canadian Rockies?
10.  Where are the Great Lakes?
11.  Which mountain range is on the border between Alberta and

British Columbia?

12.  Where are the Parliament buildings located?
13.  Which country borders Canada on the south?
14.  What are the Prairie provinces?
15.  Which province in Canada is the smallest in land size?
16.  What is a major river in Quebec?
17.  On what date did Nunavut become a territory?

Economy
  1.  What are the three main types of industries in Canada?
  2.  In what industry do most Canadians work?
  3.  What country is Canada’s largest trading partner?
4.  Which region is known as the industrial and manufacturing

heartland of Canada?

5. Which region of Canada is known for both its fertile agricultural

land and valuable energy resources?

Federal Government
  1.  Who is Canada’s Head of State?
  2.  Who is the Queen’s representative in Canada?
  3.  What is the name of the Governor General?
  4.  What do you call the Queen’s representative in the provinces?
  5.  What is Canada’s system of government called?
  6.  What are the three parts of Parliament?
  7.  Explain how the levels of government are different.
  8.  What do you call a law before it is passed?
  9.  How are members of Parliament chosen?
10.  Who do members of Parliament represent?
11.  How does a bill become law?
12.  What are the three levels of government in Canada?
13.  Name two responsibilities for each level of government.
14.  What is the government of all of Canada called?

Federal Elections
  1.  How many electoral districts are there in Canada?
  2.  In what electoral district do you live?
  3.  Who has the right to vote in federal elections?
  4.  What three requirements must you meet in order to vote in a

federal election?

  5.  What is written on a federal election ballot?
  6.  What do you mark on a federal election ballot?
  7.  How is the government formed after an election?
  8.  How is the Prime Minister chosen?

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220

9. When does an election have to be held according to the

Constitution?

10. Name all the federal political parties in the House of Commons

and their leaders.

11.  Which party becomes the official opposition?
12.  What is the role of the opposition parties?
13.  Which party is the official opposition at the federal level?
14.  Name the Prime Minister of Canada and his party.
15. Name your member of Parliament and the party he or she

belongs to.

16.  What is a voter information card?
17.  Who has the right to run as a candidate in federal elections?
18.  Who do Canadians vote for in a federal election?
19.  What do political parties do?
20.  Which federal political party is in power?
21.  How are senators chosen?
22.  What should you do if you do not receive a voter information

card telling you when and where to vote?

23. After a federal election, which party forms the new government?

Section II. Questions about your region

1. What is the capital city of the province or territory in which

you live?

2. List three natural resources important to your region’s economy

today.

3. Who is your city councillor, alderperson, reeve or regional

councillor?

4. What is the name of your mayor?
5. What is the name of your provincial representative (member of

the Legislative Assembly, member of the provincial Parliament,
member of the National Assembly or member of the House of
Assembly)?

6. What is the name of the premier of your province or territory?
7. Which political party is in power in your province or territory?
8. What is the name of the leader of the opposition in your

province?

9. What is the name of your lieutenant governor or commissioner?

11.4 The representation of Canada

as a bilingual country

These questions have been developed as a study guide. However,
Canadian Studies scholar Maggie Quirt (2003) claims that they also,
together with the application forms that are submitted by the applicant,
become a representation of Canada that is presented to aspiring citizens.

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

221

Through textual analysis of these documents, she arrives at the conclu-
sion that they provide an image of a bilingual Canada that still reflects
the paramount status afforded to the French and English Canadian iden-
tities, at the expense of Aboriginal or other cultural identities within the
Canadian ‘multicultural mosaic’. This bilingualism/biculturalism is
furthermore presented in the documents as an either/or choice between
the two languages, with no option to mark ‘both’ or ‘either one’ to indicate
the language in which the applicant wishes to go through the applica-
tion process. According to Quirt (2003: 2):

On one level, these alternatives represent the very real capacity of
the Canadian nation-state to provide service in English or French.
At a more ideological level, however, such categorization also
assumes that individuals will fit into one of these binaries or the
other – but not both. Thus, would-be citizens must straightaway
make a decision between English or French as their ‘official’ lan-
guage of communication. Bilingualism is not presented as an option
here, suggesting a resolute divide between the archetypal ‘two soli-
tudes’ of Canada’s colonizing cultures.

In addition, the use of French is strongly linked to the province of

Québec, which is treated separately from the rest of Canada in some
sections of the forms, and there is little indication that French-speakers
may be found in other provinces too (Quirt 2003: 2).

The presence of French-speakers in the English-speaking province of

Ontario is the reason there are French-language schools in a city like
Toronto, where Canadian sociologist Monica Heller (2006) carried out
an ethnographic study at a French-language high school in the early
1990s. The school saw its role as confirming a French identity in the
students and enhancing their French language skills. No use of English
was allowed in the school at any time, but this enforced school mono-
lingualism was resisted and rejected by the students, especially those
from French-speaking homes. Many students came from a variety of
language backgrounds, and for them French was an internationally
valuable language in a global economy. They associated not with French
Canadians but with the worldwide community of French-speakers, la
francophonie. Some of them were born elsewhere and had come to
Canada to get a good education and develop good French-English bilin-
gual skills. Among them, some had come to stay while others planned
to return to their countries of origin. Other non-Canadian-born students
had immigrated with their parents and had or would become Canadian
citizens (Heller 2006).

The test any would-be Canadian citizen (with the exceptions outlined

above) has to take is made up of 20 questions, similar to the ones listed
in the study guide, of which a minimum of 12 have to be correctly

Lilian Nygren-Junkin

222

answered. An applicant can attempt to take the test any number of
times – each time paying the required fee – and when (s)he has provided
a sufficient number of correct answers, the next step is to wait to be
called to the ceremony where the applicant will swear the citizenship
oath and officially be granted Canadian citizenship. The oath reads as
follows:

I swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her
Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of
Canada and fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen.

In recent years, there has been some debate concerning the place of

the British monarch in the phrasing of the oath, which is seen by some
groups as too prominent. It has even been suggested that it be elimi-
nated altogether. A parliamentary work group has been commissioned
to suggest suitable changes, but no bill has to date (September 2008)
been presented on this issue.

The citizenship oath is not said individually but together with the

other applicants who will become citizens at the same ceremony, and
similarly, the Canadian national anthem is sung in unison, in either
official language, by all those assembled. The Citizenship Judge who
presides over the ceremony, individually hands over a proof of citizen-
ship to each new Canadian. It is diploma-style paper document, but it
is soon after the ceremony replaced by a credit-card size plastic card
with the photo and signature of the new Canadian citizen, which then
becomes the only valid citizenship document. This card is, for example,
what has to be presented to the authorities in order to get a Canadian
passport. The citizenship card is only issued once and is valid for
the rest of the new citizen’s life. Canada permits its citizens to carry
multiple citizenships, and approximately 150,000 persons are every
year granted Canadian citizenship.

Canada’s definition of itself as a multicultural, bilingual country can

create different views as to what entity a Canadian is really a citizen of.
The separatist movement in Québec and Aboriginal demands for self-
government illustrate this dilemma of different nations within one
Canada. Hanvelt and Papillon (2005: 253) put it this way:

Canada is no a unitary state, nor a unitary nation. Citizenship in
this context of ‘democratic diversity’ takes on new significance, not
merely with regard to ensuring stability in a plural society, but also
with regard to giving a voice to that diversity.

They also claim that the meaning of citizenship as a concept must

evolve as the nature of the political community changes. A similar view

Canada: a multicultural mosaic

223

of the notion of citizenship as changing is expressed by Galligan, who
gets the last word with this quote from his comparison between Canada
and his native Australia: ‘The future will likely see increased weight
being given to both transnational and subnational associations. Because
of their imperial past and federal character, Canada and Australia enjoy
citizenship traditions and practices suitable for that future’ (Galligan
2005: 295).

References

Cairns, A. (1995), ‘Reﬂ ections on the political purpose of the Charter’, in

D. E. Williams (ed.), Reconﬁ gurations: Canadian Citizenship and
Constitutional Change. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Cairns, A. (1999), ‘Introduction’, in A. Cairns et al. (eds), Citizenship,

Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives.
Montreal: McGill University Press.

Edwards, J. (2001), ‘Multilingualism and multiculturalism in Canada’, in

G. Extra and D. Gorter (eds), The Other Languages of Europe. Clevedon:
Multilingual Matters, pp. 315–332.

Galligan, B. (2005), ‘Citizenship complexities in Canada and Australia’, in G.

Kernerman and P. Resnick (eds), Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and
the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship. Vancouver: UBC Press,
pp. 286–296.

Hanvelt, M. and Papillon, M. (2005), ‘Parallel or embedded? Aboriginal

self-government and the changing nature of citizenship in Canada’, in
G. Kernerman and P. Resnick (eds), Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and
the Reshaping of Canadian Citizenship. Vancouver: UBC Press, pp. 242–256.

Heller, M. (2006), Linguistic Minorities and Modernity; a Sociolinguistic

Ethnography (2nd edn). London: Continuum Publishing Group.

Jensen, J. and Phillips, S. D. (2001), ‘Redesigning the Canadian citizenship

regime: Remaking the institutions of representation’, in C. Crouch, K. Eder
and D. Tambini (eds), Citizenship, Markets and the State. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 69–89.

Quirt, M. (2003), ‘“Please check one”: metaphors of biculturalism in

Canadian citizenship applications’. Canadian Issues, June 2003. Montreal:
Association for Canadian Studies.

Stock, P. (2002), ‘Dumbing down Canadian citizenship’, in The REPORT

Newsmagazine 29, Issue 17. Edmonton: United Western Communications,
p. 23.

Toronto Star, 1 July 2007, ‘Sixty years of Canadian citizenship’.

Sources

http://www.canadaimmigrants.com/policies.asp
http://www.cic.gc.ca

224

12.1 Introduction: the context of immigration

Language testing as a means of control of immigration has a shameful
history in Australia, where the explicitly racist White Australia Policy
was enforced through a test of dictation in a language that the undesira-
ble immigrant did not speak, thereby ensuring failure on the test. This
carefully conducted ritual of humiliation is an extreme example of the
abuse of language testing in the context of immigration, and it is often
referred to in current discussions of language testing policy in relation
to immigration and citizenship in Australia. In fact, the history of lan-
guage testing for immigration in Australia has not been all negative,
and language assessment has played a constructive role in the organiza-
tion of the relatively generously funded English language programs for
immigrants. Internationally recognized innovative procedures such as
the Australian Second Language Proficiency Ratings (ASLPR) and the
Certificates in Spoken and Written English (CSWE) have played a key
role in the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) for 30 years. How-
ever, the use of tests to control the entry of immigrants and the resump-
tion of their professional practice (in the case of health professionals)
has been more mixed. While sophisticated tests have been introduced
and are defensible in certain contexts, for example, in ensuring the
quality of patient care, at other times language tests have been used to
exclude or to enforce in the public mind values which immigrants are
required to share. In particular, the recent change from an informal
assessment of basic communication in English as part of the granting
of citizenship to a very demanding knowledge of society test requiring
literacy and sophisticated English skills has aroused controversy, intro-
ducing as it does a literacy requirement that has dangerous precedents
in other times and other cultures. The spectre of the Dictation Test con-
tinues to hang over Australian policy and practice in this area.

The spectre of the Dictation
Test: language testing for
immigration and citizenship
in Australia

Tim McNamara

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

225

As a colonizing society, immigration is a central issue in Australian

social policy and has been virtually since the establishment of the first
British colony on the continent at Sydney Cove in 1788. The colony
was originally established as an open prison, but the inevitable growth
in the number of free settlers through immigration and the serving out
of time of convicts led to debates about its character and future. A strug-
gle lasting 50 years ended in the free settlers winning the debate, and
transportation to the colony was gradually ended, particularly follow-
ing the discovery of gold in 1850 – the incentive for committing a crime
resulting in transportation (a free trip to the gold fields) was too great.
But the gold rush of the 1850s and 1860s in Victoria and New South
Wales resulted in new problems of immigration, as numbers of Chinese
arrived in search of gold; there were significant riots on the gold fields.
While a period of great prosperity resulting from the gold discoveries
muted the underlying tensions, a serious economic crisis in 1890 and
the ensuing period of economic depression throughout the 1890s, coin-
ciding with the emergence of a sense of a distinctively Australian iden-
tity with distinctly racist elements in politics, literature and art, led to
renewed calls for strict controls on immigration from East Asia. It was
felt that a federation of the by now six different colonies on the conti-
nent could lead to a better coordination and enforcement of a restrictive
policy.

The implementation of the restrictive immigration policy, known

unashamedly as the White Australia Policy, was one of the first acts of
the federal parliament of the newly federated and independent Australia
in 1901. The method of implementation was through a language test,
the Dictation Test (Davies 1997; McNamara 2005). The idea for this test
had emerged in another colonial setting, Natal, in the 1890s, where it
was known as the Education Test. In the Australian version, a passage
was dictated to the intending but unwelcome immigrant at the port of
entry in a language that it had been established in advance the appli-
cant did not know. It was thus a test that the applicant was bound to
fail, and which provided the thinnest possible veneer of respectability
for the racist intent of the policy. The test was meticulously prepared
and executed; passages for dictation were changed every two weeks
and were available in a number of European languages. In the first
few years of administration, some people actually passed the test, either
because insufficient care was taken to establish which languages people
did or did not know, or more likely because it took some time for the
full perversity of the test to be understood – it must have been felt that,
even if the policy intention of use of the test was restrictive, people
should be given at least a chance of passing it, as with any other demand-
ing test. But after a few years, no one succeeded in passing the test.

Tim McNamara

226

The test gave barely a fig leaf of respectability to the explicitly racist
intention of the policy; it acted more as a ritual of exclusion (Foucault
1977 [1975] on the ritual function of tests as instruments of power). In
the 1920s, the function of the test was extended to exclude people from
entering Australia who were deemed undesirable on broader political
grounds. In a famous case in 1934, the Czech Jewish journalist Egon
Erwin Kisch, who was travelling to Melbourne as an international dele-
gate at a conference organized by Communist groups, was subjected to
the test but it was difficult to find a language that he did not speak.
Finally, a test in Scottish Gaelic appeared to do the trick, but on appeal
this was found to be an unreasonable choice and Kisch was able to
remain in Australia for six months and to complete a lecture tour where
attendances were considerably boosted by the notoriety of the case. The
test fell into disuse in the 1930s, although the policy was not officially
abolished until 1973, when a non-discriminatory immigration policy
was introduced.

Australia experienced a crisis in early 1942 that prompted a major

rethink of Australian immigration. With the defeat of the British forces
at Singapore, the absence of Australian troops in theatres of war far
removed from Australia, such as North Africa, and the late involvement
of the Americans in the war, Australia was virtually undefended against
the Japanese for six months until the deployment of US forces by
mid-1942, at a time when Japanese forces were on Australia’s doorstep
in New Guinea and what was later to be called Indonesia. Following
the trauma of the Second World War, Australia realized it needed to
substantially increase its population if it was to have any chance of
defending itself in a future war. This, together with commitment to a
policy of economic expansion, led in 1947 to the introduction of an
immigration program that had and continues to have the support of
both the major parties in Australian politics. Initially, it still reflected
racist attitudes – the immigration minister of the late 1940s, Arthur
Calwell, of the Australian Labour Party, was notorious for his remark
indicating his preference for European over Asian immigrants: ‘Two
Wongs don’t make a White’. At first, fair skinned immigrants from
Northern Europe were preferred; by the early 1950s, however, it had
been decided to accept immigrants from Southern Europe, particularly
Italy and Greece; this was extended in the early 1970s to include immi-
gration from the first non-Christian source country, Turkey, and within
a few years an immigration policy not based overtly on race or national
origin was adopted. Today, the main source countries for immigration
include many of the countries of East and South East Asia, and there
are increasing numbers from the Indian subcontinent and Sri Lanka. In
recent years, Government policy has favoured skilled and business

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

227

immigration. The annual intake for the fiscal year 2005, for instance,
was of 142,930 migrants, 68.1 per cent of whom were admitted in the
skill visa class and 31.9 per cent in the family visa class. In addition,
Australia takes an annual contingent of around 12,000 humanitarian
entrants. New Zealand citizens, who have a right to settle in Australia,
are not represented in these figures.

12.2 Assessment within the provision of English

language courses for immigrants

Despite the lingering racism in the immigration policy at the time of
its implementation, and to some extent as a reflection of the desire
for immigrants to assimilate, a bipartisan policy of support for English
language learning resulted. Written into the legislation implementing
the immigration program was a requirement that English language
classes be freely available to immigrants. With some modifications
introduced in the late 1980s, restricting the number of hours of instruc-
tion available to 400, and introducing some co-payment by the immi-
grants of the cost of the classes, this program, known as the AMEP, has
survived until the present and has made a notable contribution to prac-
tice and research on the language education of immigrants at an inter-
national level. Language assessment has played a significant role in this
program. This has occurred in two phases. First, in the late 1970s, a
need was felt to improve management of the program by the adoption
of a common scale for determining the proficiency level of students at
entry to and exit from the program, and also when students moved from
one provider of English language teaching services to another. David
Ingram and Elaine Wylie developed the ASLPR

and scale (Ingram and

Wylie 1984), an interview based procedure based on the Oral Profi-
ciency Interview (OPI) developed by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI)
of the United States Department of State. The main innovations intro-
duced in the ASLPR were the extension of the scale to provide descrip-
tions of levels of achievement in listening, reading and writing as well
as speaking, and the elaboration of descriptions of distinct levels of
achievement at the lower levels, which were more relevant to the immi-
grant context.

The ASLPR was used to guide curriculum development

and assessment in the AMEP until the early 1990s (Brindley 1989).

The ASLPR was not the only example of assessment playing a vital

role in the provision of English language training for immigrants. It was
ultimately replaced because of policy developments affecting govern-
ment funding for all areas of adult education and training other than
university education. In the 1980s, in response to changes in methods
of industrial production away from Taylorist methods, and the greater

Tim McNamara

228

competitiveness of Germany and Japan in particular, government policy
focused on workplace training. A desire for greater workforce flexibility
centred around the idea that workers needed to demonstrate practical
competence relevant to rapidly changing workplace demands, includ-
ing the challenges of new technology and a greater emphasis on colla-
boration and communication in the workplace. The Government as a
result embraced a model of training and assessment that emphasized
achievement of competencies that were defined in highly prescriptive
behavioural terms, with which the ASLPR was basically incompatible,
relying as it did on a notion of a developmental continuum of general
underlying proficiency. As the continued funding of the AMEP was at
stake, a new assessment system was urgently needed. As a result, a new
competency-based system known as the CSWE was adopted and
remains in use today. The CSWE fulfils the same roles as the ASLPR, of
establishing levels of competence at entry and exit from the program,
and when a student transfers from one place of instruction to another.
Changes in CSWE levels are available as an outcome measure for evalu-
ating the success of the program as a whole, a crucial factor in a climate
of far greater accountability for government investment.

It can be seen from this that assessment has played and continues

to play a crucial role in the provision and management of English lan-
guage education for immigrants in Australia.

12.3 Language assessment and immigrant

re-entry to professional practice

Another important role for language assessment in relation to immigra-
tion in Australia has been its use as part of the certification procedures
of health professionals wishing to resume professional practice in
Australia. As in many other countries, immigrant and refugee health
professionals need to pass a test in English in order to gain the right to
practise (this is in addition to tests of relevant clinical knowledge and
practical clinical skill). The implementation of such testing is largely
in the hands of resident health professional organizations who, in addi-
tion to being appropriately concerned about professional standards,
may be seen as having a vested interest in controlling the labour market
for health professionals to their advantage. Until the early 1980s, non-
English speaking background immigrant doctors entering Australia
faced such a bar to the resumption of professional practice in the form
of an English test, which only 2 per cent of them passed. The English
test constituted a form of labour market control on behalf of the local
members of the medical profession, which retained control over profes-
sional admission. (There is a parallel in the Dictation Test itself, which

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

229

at its introduction was strongly supported by the labour movement in
the interests of restricting the importation of Chinese labour.) One rea-
son why the test was so hard to pass was that it consisted of obscure lit-
erary passages, full of purple prose (rather in the style of the Dictation
Test materials, in fact) which had nothing to do with the communica-
tive demands facing doctors in the workplace. In the late 1980s, the
author was invited to attend a meeting of a committee of the Australian
Medical Council chaired by one Professor Black, and gained some
insight into the thinking behind the old test. The professor impatiently
interrupted the author’s presentation on the merits of the Occupational
English Test (OET: McNamara 1996), which had recently replaced the
old test and which reflected closely the communicative demands of the
workplace, with ‘ “The quality of mercy is not strain’d, It droppeth as
the gentle rain from heaven . . .”

Surely any educated doctor should be

able to recognize that quote?’

Fortunately, Professor Black’s objection did not prevail. The Occu-

pational English Test has been in operation since 1987 and is designed
to yield relevant and meaningful information about candidates’ readi-
ness to cope with the communicative demands of the clinical setting. It
has tests of speaking, listening and reading and writing in professional
contexts, and it is based on a careful needs analysis of the communica-
tion practices of each of the professions involved. Where commonali-
ties across the professions exist, this is exploited in the development of
materials (for example, in listening and in reading) which can be used
for each of the professions; where differences occur, for example, in the
substantive content expressed by each of the different professions in
speaking to clients or patients, or in referring patients or clients to other
professionals in the field, then profession-specific versions of the test
are prepared. The OET is the subject of ongoing rigorous validation
work, which can be seen as having the aim, among other things, of pro-
tecting the interests of patients, for whom inadequate communicative
competence on the part of the health professional may have serious
consequences. Yet this rational justification for the practice of testing
the communicative skills of immigrant professionals is subverted by
sudden developments. For example, a few years ago, a new, unvalidated
form of language assessment in the form of a score for communication
skills in the final clinical examination was introduced, without warning
or consultation. This score was awarded by clinical examiners, not by
language professionals, and the validity of criteria for awarding it has
never been formally discussed with applied linguists or language testers.
Similarly, recent acute shortages of health professionals, particularly in
the profession of nursing, and in rural areas generally for doctors, have
seen state intervention to bypass the testing regimes so as to remove

Tim McNamara

230

any barrier to employment. What now, one may ask, of the concern for
patient safety? In general, social policy, for example labour shortage,
or social competition over control of access to opportunities for work,
plays the determining role in the use of language tests for assessment
in such contexts, and not the reasoning of language testers as assumed
in validity theory, with its liberal assumptions (McNamara and Roever
2006).

12.4 The re-politicization of immigration and

its language policy context

The 1990s saw the political rise of a right wing populist movement led
by Pauline Hanson, which threatened the political position of the main-
stream conservative parties, led by John Howard, the Prime Minister
from 1996 to 2007. Howard’s strategy of disarming this movement by
appropriating many of its policies led to a new politicization of immi-
gration and refugee issues. This was exemplified by a dramatic harden-
ing of the policy on refugees. Two notorious incidents involving asylum
seekers in the period leading up to a tightly contested election in
November 2001 gave the at the time unpopular government the chance
to regain the political initiative. In an incident known as the Tampa
crisis, a Norwegian freighter by that name rescued approximately 2,000
Afghani asylum seekers from a leaking boat in the waters between
Indonesia and northern Australia. The Australian Government, how-
ever, was determined that the freighter and its human cargo should not
land at an Australian port, as the asylum seekers would then have to be
treated as refugees under international law; the Government preferred
to see them and for them to be seen as illegal immigrants against whom
the Government was maintaining a ‘tough’ position in defence of
Australia’s right to control its immigrant intake. The Tampa was boarded
by Australian defence force personnel and prevented from reaching
Australian soil; applicants were required to remain in detention, often
in harsh circumstances on small islands in the Pacific which were
dependent on Australian aid; their applications for asylum took years to
process. The true political character of this incident became clear when
it was finally established that all but a handful of the 2,000 people
involved were ultimately found to be true refugees and were granted
permanent residence in Australia. In a later incident, the so-called
Children Overboard affair, involving boatloads of asylum seekers who
had travelled in leaky boats from Indonesia and were intercepted by
Australian naval vessels as they sank, the Government accused the
people on the boats of deliberately throwing their children into the
water in order to trigger rescue by Australian authorities, a claim which

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

231

was subsequently shown to be false but which was politically very
effective in the general climate of ‘border security’ following the terror-
ist attacks in the United States in September 2001: the Government’s
actions could be sold to voters as appropriately tough. The threat of
terrorism was underlined by the targeting of Australian tourists in the
Bali bombings of 2002, and in the general climate of anxiety support for
the Government’s apparently hard line policies was easier to achieve.
A further development was a significant retreat from the policy of mul-
ticulturalism that had prevailed since the early 1970s to the stressing of
‘shared Australian values’, including (English) language. Disturbances
at Sydney beachside suburbs involving Anglo-Australians and Lebanese
Australians in 2005 served further to inflame feelings about national
values.

It was in the broad context of these developments that the Australian

Government’s proposals in 2006 for the introduction of new language
requirements for citizenship, planned for implementation in the lead-
up to the close election of 2007, need to be understood. But before
we outline these proposals, it is worth mentioning something about the
role of English and other languages in Australian language policy in
the period we have been considering.

The year 1972 was a watershed in Australian politics and in Australian

social attitudes. Following 23 unbroken years of conservative rule, the
election of the Whitlam Labour Government marked a profound change.
The comfortable Anglo-hegemony, prosperity and certainties of the
1950s and 1960s had gradually been challenged by the effects of immi-
gration, the social revolution of the 1960s and growing opposition to
Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. One of the lasting policies
of the new but short-lived Labour government was the introduction of
a policy of multiculturalism, which was maintained strongly into the
1980s by Whitlam’s conservative successor, Malcolm Fraser. The elec-
tion of the Hawke Labour Government in 1983 ushered in a further
13 years of Labour rule. One of the fruits of this Government’s policy
on multiculturalism was the adoption of the National Policy on Lan-
guages (Lo Bianco 1987), a high water mark of commitment to fostering
Australia’s multilingual identity, together with associated funding of
research on Australia’s indigenous and immigrant languages, and on
the learning of immigrant and other languages. A number of research
centres on aspects of second language learning and assessment were
established. However, within a short time the policy came under pressure.
A discourse of ‘economic rationalism’ led to moves to strengthen literacy
in English at the expense of research on languages other than English,
on the grounds that lack of literacy was hampering Australia’s micro-
economic reforms designed to make Australia a more modern and more

Tim McNamara

232

internationally competitive society in an increasingly globalized world.
The title of the new policy – the Australian Language and Literacy
Policy – marked a significant change in emphasis from ‘languages’ to
‘language’ (English). A renewed emphasis on foreign languages, partic-
ularly of trade, at the expense of the languages of immigrant communi-
ties (known in Australia as community languages or Languages Other
than English (LOTEs)) also reflected the growing influence of economic
rather than social considerations in language policy. Altered trading
patterns, with Asian markets emerging to rival or even replace Euro-
pean and North American ones, meant the adoption in 1994 of a strat-
egy for the promotion of the teaching of Asian languages in schools, the
National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools (NAL-
SAS) strategy. Recent accounts of Australian language policy can be
found in Clyne (2005) and Lo Bianco (2008).

12.5 The 2007 citizenship test

The conservative policies of the Howard era in the context of immigration
and language policy as set out above found a particularly clear expres-
sion in proposals advanced in a Discussion Paper in 2006 (Department
of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 2006), and implemented with
bipartisan support in legislation effective from July 2007, for the estab-
lishment of a formal testing regime for those wishing to gain citizenship.

The test represented a reversal of the previous practice. In the 60

years following the introduction of the immigration program in 1947,
few barriers were placed in the way of those seeking citizenship. In
fact, the rules became increasingly liberal over time: citizenship could
be applied for within two years of the granting of permanent residency;
other citizenships did not have to be surrendered, and the English
language requirement for citizenship was interpreted liberally. The
citizenship legislation that had been in force since 1948 stated that ‘the
person [seeking citizenship] possesses a basic knowledge of the English
language’ (Australian Citizenship Act 1948 – Section 13). But in the
words of the Discussion Paper:

Policy provides that the applicants may be assessed as meeting the
English language requirements if they are able to speak and under-
stand English sufficiently to respond in simple language during the
citizenship interview. Applicants must be able to answer questions
in simple English concerning personal particulars (such as, how
long have you lived in Australia? What are your children’s names?).
(Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 2006: §12)

In other words, there was no written test, and the proficiency level

required to pass was low, below A1 on the Common European Framework

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

233

of Reference ([CEFR] Council of Europe 2001; see also the Introduction
to this Volume).

The new citizenship test in contrast takes the form of 20 multiple

choice questions on Australian institutions, customs, history and values,
chosen from an undisclosed pool of 200 questions based on an informa-
tion booklet, Becoming an Australian Citizen, which is made available
to intending applicants. The test is administered, in English, by compu-
ter. In order to pass, applicants must get at least 12 of the items correct,
and the test can be taken on repeated occasions if the candidate does
not pass at a given attempt. Sample questions include the following:

1. Which one of these is a responsibility of every Australian citizen?

Renounce their citizenship of any other country
Serve in Australian Diplomatic Missions overseas
Join with Australians to defend Australia and its way of life,
should the need arise

2. Which one of these values is important in Australian society?

Everyone has the same religion
Everyone has equality of opportunity
Everyone belongs to the same political party

3. What is Australia’s national floral emblem

The banksia
The waratah
The golden wattle

4. Which one of these Australians is famous for playing cricket?

Rod Laver
Sir Donald Bradman
Sir Hubert Opperman

5. What is a Bill?

A decision by a government department
A proposed law that has not yet passed through parliament
A legal document that outlines the Australian system of
government

(Source: http://www.citizenship.gov.au/

test/preparing/index.htm#c, retrieved 5 May 2008)

The test additionally satisfies the legislative requirement that the

applicant must demonstrate a ‘basic knowledge’ of English. For those
without sufficient literacy in English, or who entirely lack computer
skills, the questions and possible answers are read aloud to the candi-
date by an administrator at the test centre. However, according to advice

z
z
z

Tim McNamara

234

on the Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizen-
ship website:

To be eligible for this assistance, you will need to have completed
at least 400 hours of English language tuition under the Adult
Migrant English Programme (AMEP), and be assessed by the AMEP
provider as not having the English language reading skills neces-
sary to complete the test unassisted.

The issue of the language and literacy demands of the test is a crucial

one, given that the test operates as the way of assessing whether the
applicant meets the legislative requirement of a knowledge of ‘basic
English’. In an analysis of the linguistic difficulty of the resource book-
let, Piller and McNamara (2007) carried out a number of analyses to
determine the language level of the materials. First, widely used defini-
tions of ‘basic English’ were considered, for example, the first two lev-
els of the CEFR, ‘A1 Basic user’ and ‘A2 Basic user’:

A1: Can understand and use familiar everyday expressions and very

basic phrases aimed at the satisfaction of needs of a concrete type.
Can introduce him/herself and others and can ask and answer
questions about personal details such as where he/she lives, peo-
ple he/she knows and things he/she has. Can interact in a simple
way provided the other person talks slowly and clearly and is
prepared to help.

A2: Can understand sentences and frequently used expressions related

to areas of most immediate relevance (e.g., very basic personal and
family information, shopping, local geography, employment). Can
communicate in simple and routine tasks requiring a simple and
direct exchange of information on familiar and routine matters.
Can describe in simple terms aspects of his/her background,
immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need.
(http://www.coe.int/T/DG4/Portfolio/?L=E&M=/main_pages/
levels.html)

It is also worth noting that the Dutch government has defined a level

below A1 as the proficiency requirement for certain visa categories
(De Jong 2007), although the Dutch Knowledge of Society test is, like
the Australian test, at a level well above this (see also Extra and Spotti,
this Volume).

A basic user of English in this definition is not someone who is nec-

essarily literate in English. In addition, the material in the resource
booklet, about Australian constitution, history and values, clearly does
not fit the limited domains of communication defined at the A1 level.

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

235

Within the English language education of immigrants in Australia

itself, specifically within the Adult Migrant English Program, levels of
communicative achievement as defined in the CSWE are used. Here, a
basic user of English could be considered as someone who achieves the
outcomes of CSWE Level 1. In terms of reading, these are ‘can read
short instructions’, ‘can read a short information text’ and/or ‘can read
a short recount or narrative’. ‘Short’ in the AMEP curriculum for this
level is defined as texts no longer than 100 words. Again, clearly the
resource booklet is extremely lengthy and its content is complex and
abstract.

In order to get a more exact measure of the linguistic difficulty of the

text in the Resource booklet, an analysis was conducted, using the web-
based lexical profiler Web VP (available at http://www.lextutor.ca/vp/
eng/). A ‘basic user’ of English may be defined as someone who knows
between 600–1,000 of the most frequently occurring words in English.
Basic English is sometimes used as a technical term for a basic list of
850 English words that was introduced by Charles K. Ogden in 1930
(Ogden 1930). Table 12.1 shows that while 76.6 per cent of all the words
used in the resource booklet are among the 1,000 most frequently used
words in English, more than half of these (43.37 per cent of the total)
are function words such as articles, pronouns and auxiliaries. If we
look at the content words used in the text, only 33.23 per cent are in the
top 1,000 most frequent words in English; approximately two-thirds of
the content words are beyond this level. Another indicator is the per-
centage of words of non-Anglo-Saxon origin, as words of Anglo-Saxon
origin in English tend to be more frequent and to occupy a more simple
register than those of Latin, Greek or French origin. Only 16.23 per cent
of the words in the resource booklet are of Anglo-Saxon origin; this again
suggests the relatively abstract and complex nature of the material.

Table 12.1

Lexical analysis of the August 2007 draft of the resource booklet

Becoming an Australian Citizen as calculated by Web VP

Words

Types

Tokens

Per cent

K1 Words (1–1000):

1,356

11,210

76.60%

Function

words

–

(6347)

(43.37%)

Content

words

–

(4863)

(33.23%)

Words not in the first 1000 words

1382

3424

23.40%

Words of Anglo-Saxon origin

16.23%

Source: McNamara and Piller (2007)

Tim McNamara

236

Finally, the lexical density of the text was calculated, defined as ‘the

relationship between words with lexical as opposed to grammatical
properties as a percentage of the total number of words in a text’
(O’Loughlin 1995: 221). Written texts, which are typically more lexi-
cally dense than spoken texts, range in lexical density from 36 to 57 per
cent (O’Loughlin 1995: 221). The lexical density of the resource booklet
is 57 per cent, at the very upper end of this range. It can safely be
assumed that it would present difficulties for many native speakers of
English with limited education and/or limited familiarity with texts
of this type. In summary, Piller and McNamara (2007: 1) argue that ‘ . . .
the resource booklet Becoming an Australian Citizen is certainly out of
the reach of a basic user of English and would present difficulties for
many native speakers of English with limited education and/or limited
familiarity with texts of this type’.

The new testing regime represents a change in a number of ways.
First, a new test of knowledge of Australian institutions, history, soci-

ety and values is required. The model for this is the longstanding use of
this kind of test in the United States and its recent introduction into
European countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom;
these precedents form an important part of the Government’s arguments
in favour of the legislation (see Gales; Blackledge; Extra and Spotti, this
Volume).

Second, there is no separate test of English proficiency, informal as

it may have been. Instead, the language requirement is satisfied by the
knowledge of society test, which thus effectively penalizes those with-
out literacy, and ‘naturalizes’ the language requirement in a way that
makes it harder to recognize and understand for ordinary speakers of
English without any insight into issues of language learning. In fact, the
language level required is far higher than the previous standard, of the
order of B1 or B2 on the CEFR, as the analysis in Piller and McNamara
(2007) has shown.

Third, while literacy is not technically required, those without liter-

acy skills have to invest a considerable effort in (unsuccessfully)
attempting to gain the necessary literacy skills in order to be allowed to
take the test in an oral form. Many new residents, particularly those
with low educational levels, find it difficult to forgo the chance to earn
a living and fulfilling their family responsibilities, particularly in the
case of women, that attendance at English classes for lengthy periods of
time requires.

Fourth, the application fee has been doubled, to AUD$240 (US$218),

an issue that is likely to impact most on those with low incomes.

Finally, citizenship can only be applied for after a minimum of four

years of permanent residency, rather than the previous two.

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

237

12.6 Reactions and impact

The introduction of the test was accompanied by controversy, despite
its bipartisan support from the two main political parties. Submissions
from interested parties were sought following the publication of the
Discussion Paper before the legislation was introduced, and submis-
sions, most of them critical of the proposals, were made by language
testers and applied linguists, immigrant lobby groups and organizations
representing teachers of English to immigrants. Following the introduc-
tion of the legislation to Parliament, an inquiry was set up by the Senate
(upper house), but again objections (40 per cent of all submissions
received), including several substantial submissions from applied lin-
guists, did little to modify the proposals. The ineffectiveness of this advo-
cacy, particularly from language testers expressing serious reservations
about the policy, raises important issues for language testers. A possible
exception is the submission from the Federation of Ethnic Communities’
Councils of Australia (FECCA) which drew attention to the linguistic and
conceptual complexity of the materials in the resource booklet, using the
analysis undertaken by Piller and McNamara (2007). The submission rec-
ommended that the material in the booklet be made available in the lan-
guages of immigrant communities. In response, the material is currently
available in translation in the following languages: Amharic, Arabic,
Bosnian, Chinese, Croatian, Dari, Farsi, French, German, Greek, Hindi,
Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Khmer, Korean, Macedonian, Portuguese,
Russian, Serbian, Sinhalese, Somali, Spanish, Tamil, Thai, Tigrinya,
Turkish and Vietnamese. But even here, this assumes literacy in the lan-
guages concerned, and for those who have been accepted on humanitar-
ian visas, literacy is known to be an issue for many; the test is conducted
solely in English, so that even if the conceptual content is mastered in the
translated documents, a version of this knowledge as expressed in English
is still required for successful completion of the test.

Ironically, one of the more widely reported sources of opposition

came from a senior member of the Government’s own ranks, the son of
Greek immigrants who, according to him, would have failed a language
test, despite the fact that they had settled successfully and productively
in Australia and were loyal Australian citizens. In general, in fact, the
test seems to have popular support, as its content is for the most part
uncontroversial, apart from a few questions personally dictated by the
previous prime minister, John Howard, referring to his sporting heroes
(see fourth sample question, above – Mr Howard was known as a cricket
fan, and the cricketer Sir Donald Bradman was his greatest sporting
hero). These questions are in the process of being reviewed by the new
Labour Government.

Tim McNamara

238

It is too early to judge the impact of the test. Reports on the operation

of the test are produced regularly by the Australian Government.

There

was initially a dramatic fall in the number of applicants for citizenship.
For example, in the nine months prior to the test’s introduction, the
lowest monthly number of applicants was 11,000, with a peak of 21,000
in the month prior to the test’s introduction. The figures for the first
three months of the test (October–December 2007) were around 3,000
each month, although this had increased to about 5,000 a month in the
following three months (January–March 2008). This drop can in part be
explained by the fact that people who were eligible under the old rules
wanted to take out citizenship before the new test (and its associated
costs and risks) came in; moreover, as the eligibility criteria included
the above-mentioned change from two to four years of permanent resi-
dency, the pool of potential applicants was significantly reduced. Of
more immediate concern has been the fact that failure rates for those
taking the test have been unacceptably high, some 20 per cent overall
for those making their first attempt; repeated attempts are allowed, with
the failure rate subsequently falling to between 5 per cent and 7 per cent.
These rates have varied greatly among different categories of applicants,
being low among highly educated and skilled immigrants but higher
among more marginal groups. Government figures distinguish three
categories of immigrants: those in the Skill stream (immigrants, mostly
younger and better educated, with good English skills, who are chosen
largely on the basis of the need to fill skilled labour shortages), those in
the Family stream (family reunion with existing residents, people who
have immigrated previously) and those in the Humanitarian program
(refugees). Table 12.2 shows recent figures for each category, in terms of
those taking the test and the number of attempts required to pass.

Table 12.2 gives some idea of the number of candidates for citizen-

ship taking the citizenship test, and the distribution of candidates across
the three immigrant streams. While approximately 95 per cent of all
candidates are passing the test, the number of those passing depends on
the stream they are in. Significantly, the number of attempts required to
pass the test in the humanitarian stream is considerably higher than in
the other streams; there are 70 per cent more tests than there are candi-
dates in this stream, with the average number of attempts for this group
closer to two than one (the actual figure is 1.7). Information from other
sources gives greater detail on the humanitarian groups: people (mostly
refugees) from Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq had failure rates of 29.6 per
cent, 24.9 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively.

Refugees from the

Horn of Africa, according to the Chair of the Ethnic Communities’
Council of Victoria (ECCV),

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

239

find the computerised test difficult because many of them have a
limited English language proficiency and are not familiar with com-
puterised tests. They may not have had formal schooling.

In response to the initial experience of implementing the test, and in

the face of criticism, the new Labour Government of Kevin Rudd, while
it was elected on a platform of supporting the test, and in fact still
maintaining support for it, has announced a review of the test.

The

review will consider the impact on citizenship applications, and its
role as establishing whether the candidate has met the requirement of a
knowledge of basic English. Significantly, no applied linguists or
experts in testing or language testing are members of the seven-person
committee of review who are required to report to the Minister on the
operation of the test.

12.7 Conclusion

The Australian experience of the introduction of new de facto language
tests for citizenship raises a number of issues for language testers, which
can be summarized as follows:

the problem of effective advocacy;
the implicit testing of English language proficiency including literacy
and computer literacy in a knowledge of society test;
the test construct as an expression of contested political and social
values;

z
z

Table 12.2

Program/
stream

Clients

% of all

clients

Tests

% of all

tests

Average

number of

tests per

client

Skill stream

11,546

46.1

12,569

41.6

1.1

Family stream

5,607

22.4

6,918

22.9

1.2

Humanitarian

program

3,255

12.9

5,384

17.8

1.7

Other

4,659

18.6

5,326

17.6

1.1

Total

25,067

100.0

30,197

100.0

1.2

Source: http://www.citizenship.gov.au/_pdf/citztest-snapshot-report-2008-april.pdf,

accessed 5 May 2008

Tim McNamara

240

the primary function of the test as an expression of conservative dis-
courses of immigration, security and national identity.

These issues occur at the interface of language tests and policy, an

interface which, it has been argued, language testers are particularly
ill-equipped to face, in terms of theory and training (McNamara 2009).
With a painful history of collusion in discriminatory policy by means
of language testing (see Davies 1997, on the role of the Professor of
Languages at the Australian National University in setting the passages
for the Dictation Test), Australian language testers have much soul
searching to do as to whether and how they can effectively participate
in the implementation of citizenship policies involving overt and cov-
ert language-based tests.

Notes

1 See

http://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/visa-grants/

index.htm, last accessed on 20 March 2008.

2 This survives until today and is known as the International Second

Language Proficiency Ratings (ISLPR) and scale (Wylie and Ingram 1996).

3 It has been suggested that these developments influenced the development

of the ACTFL scale, which similarly built on the OPI and which reported
achievement in all four skills and defined levels of achievement at the lower
end of the scale, where learners of foreign languages in the United States
were likely to be placed.

4 A speech from the final scene of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice.
5 http://www.citizenship.gov.au/test/eligibility/index.htm, accessed on 21

March 2008.

6 For example, http://www.citizenship.gov.au/_pdf/citztest-snapshot-report-

2008-april.pdf, accessed 5 May 2008.

7 http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/ bradman-out-for-duck-in-test/2008

/01/28/1201369038752.html

8 Cited at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41237
9 Details of the review can be found at http://www.citizenshiptestreview.gov.

au/ accessed on 5 May 2008.

References

Brindley, G. (1989), Assessing Achievement in the Learner-Centred

Curriculum. Sydney, NSW: National Centre for English Language Teaching
and Research, Macquarie University.

Clyne, M. (2005), Australia’s Language Potential. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Council of Europe (2001), Common European Framework of Reference for

Languages: Learning, Teaching and Assessment. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

The spectre of the Dictation Test in Australia

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Davies, A. (1997), ‘Australian immigrant gatekeeping through English

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242

13.1 Introduction

The chapter provides a description of the policy regarding the connec-
tion between citizenship, language and testing in Israel. Our main argu-
ment is that terms such as citizenship, language and tests need to be
understood within a broader socio-political context. In Israel, only two
groups can be granted citizenship: a) Jews and b) Arabs who were living
in Palestine in 1948 and their children. No other groups (e.g., foreign/
migrants workers) can obtain Israeli citizenship, with very rare excep-
tions; for these rare cases, some language proficiency in Hebrew serves
as a requirement, among others. Language is not a requirement for citi-
zenship for the main two groups; however, it is an implicit requirement
for civil participation. Thus, while the focus of this Volume is on lan-
guage citizenship tests, we argue that in Israel, language requirements
as well as types of language tests are implemented in alternative and
more subtle ways.

13.2 Background and context

For Israel, a state founded in 1948 with the aim of creating a homeland
for Jews, immigration has been a central ethos of its existence. The main
rationale for founding the state was to establish a place where Jews,
perceived as ‘dispersed’ and persecuted, would have a permanent home
where they would be able to exercise their own sovereignty. It was in
the Balfour declaration of 1917 that the commitment of the British
Mandate for Jewish homeland was established. Although this idea did
not resonate with all Jewish communities in the world, the events of
the Second World War and the killing of a large portion of European
Jews brought about a consensus that an independent Jewish state was
urgently needed.

The establishment of the state of Israel entailed a large number of

symbols for creating collective identity, the Hebrew language being a
major one. Although Hebrew is a vital, vibrant, dynamic and dominant

Citizenship, language and
nationality in Israel

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

243

language in Israel today and its hegemony is fully accepted and unchal-
lenged, this has not always been the case. Just a 100 years ago, Hebrew
was considered practically a dead language. While it has always been
used as a language of texts, prayer books and the Bible, there were very
few native speakers, and only a few people could use it as a spoken
vernacular. Hebrew is therefore referred to as a case of ‘successful
revival’ or of ‘reversing language shift’ (Fishman 1991; Harshav 1993).
Multiple narratives attempt to explain both the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of
Hebrew revival (Harshav 1993; Karmi 1997; Shohamy 2008). Some
view it as a natural phenomenon, when people came to Palestine from
many different countries seeking a common language and Hebrew was
familiar to many as a textual language and thus a ‘natural’ choice. Others
wonder whether it is in fact a case of ‘language revival’ or rather ‘re-
vernacularisation’ (Ben-Rafael 1994); after all, many Jews were already
reading Hebrew and reciting it in prayers. Scepticism persists regarding
how widespread the use of Hebrew was in different periods during the
revival process, the nature of the language, the varieties, the actual levels
of proficiency of those who claimed to have spoken it and whether it
was really subtractive (taking over home languages), additive (used in
bilingual ways, home languages and Hebrew) or a hybrid (home lan-
guages along with Hebrew in mixed ways) (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999;
Shohamy 2008).

Early steps of Hebrew revival as a vernacular began in Europe in

the nineteenth century as early as 1856 through the Haskalah, an
intellectual movement that sought to expand traditional Judaism to
a secular domain and to appropriate the use of Hebrew, considered a
sacred language until then, for the purposes of secular and national
ideologies (Ben-Rafael 1994). This movement gained force upon the
arrival of waves of Jewish immigrants in Palestine, along with strong
activism in the different Jewish congresses. The spoken languages of
the Jews who were living in Palestine at the time were local Arabic dia-
lects and a variety of Jewish languages, that is, Ladino, Judeo Arabic
and Yiddish.

The revival of Hebrew in what was later to be Israel was part of a

movement to create a nation for the Jews based on common history
and kinship. Initially, Hebrew was rivalled by Yiddish, but the Zionist
territorial ideology supported Hebrew and viewed Yiddish as a language
symbolizing the past. In the tenth and eleventh Zionist congresses
(1911, 1913), the exclusive use of Hebrew was affirmed. The term Hebrew,
rather than Jewish or Zionist, was adopted to signify detachment from
the past and the recreation of a new Jew, a Hebrew-man in a new home-
land. Hebrew went through a period of secularization of lexical items
symbolizing this new construct. Some time between 1906 and 1916, the

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

244

revival of Hebrew was declared to be completed although the validity
of these ideologically based claims remains a point of debate.

Questions often arise concerning the boundaries between language

revival and language protection. For some, language revival is never
completed, given ongoing immigration and a perceived need for language
support. By the end of the 1930s, there seemed to be a strong feeling that
aggressive measures were needed in order to protect the language, espe-
cially with the arrival of waves of German Jewish immigrants. The Yishuv,
the Jewish community in Palestine, had strong fears regarding the des-
tiny and vulnerability of Hebrew. Hebrew was deeply rooted within the
Zionist movement so that immigrants arriving in Palestine were expected
to learn the language and drop their home languages, as the latter were
perceived as threats to the revival of Hebrew. The main targets were
German, used by the immigrants arriving from Germany, and Yiddish,
widely used by Jews coming from Eastern Europe (Segev 1999). Accord-
ing to Zionist ideology, Hebrew needed to be made the dominant language
of the Zionist community of the Yishuv and to serve as a uniting force for
creating a homogenous nation; such aims could not be reached if Jews
continued to use foreign languages (Harshav 1993; Shohamy 1994).

In terms of language management (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999;

Spolsky 2004), three languages were considered official during these
years: English, the language of British mandate; Hebrew, recognized as
official since 1922 and accepted as one of the official languages of the
Yishuv and Arabic, considered official for the Arab population residing
in Palestine. Examples of the use of these three languages can be found
in many official documents of the time as well as in public signs.

In terms of language practices, a large number of languages were used

in Palestine in those years, reflecting the diverse countries of origin of
the Jews arriving in Palestine: Yiddish, German, Polish, Russian, among
many others. However, Hebrew was the only language imposed on the
Jewish population with a strong ideological backing (Ben-Rafael 1994;
Spolsky and Shohamy 1999). For immigrants, the message was clear
that they were required to switch to Hebrew and Hebrew only, as this
was the language associated with the creation of the new nation (see
Shohamy 2008, for a detailed description of the mechanisms and pro-
cedures used to impose Hebrew in that period). In later years, after the
official establishment of the state of Israel, a variety of mechanisms
were used such as intensive Hebrew classes, in the form of Ulpanim
offered free to all immigrants, the use of Hebrew as the only medium of
instruction in all Jewish schools and universities as well as a strong
language academy that continuously introduced new words and served
the various media in establishing Hebrew norms.

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

245

Hebrew in Israel today is a very vital language, its status is solid and

its use is broad. It is a dynamic language, as evident from its wide-
spread use in private and public places in terms of a large number of
Hebrew books, newspapers, media, theatre and art performances, or
in terms of its dominance as a language of instruction in most schools.
It is the main language of Israel and the one with highest prestige and
status within the multilingual and multicultural society of its seven
million people.

Most of the Arabs living in Israel (about 20 per cent of the total Israeli

population) use Arabic (Modern Standard and dialects) as their com-
munity language and the language of instruction in schools and learn
Hebrew in schools from a very early age (Amara and Mar’i 2002). Israel
is an immigration state to which large numbers of (almost all Jewish)
immigrants arrive; the last big group consisted of Jews from the former
Soviet Union who make up another 20 per cent of the total population;
they have been arriving in Israel mostly since the early 1990s and use
Russian and other languages of their region of origin. Upon their arrival,
they were quick to acquire Hebrew (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999). Other
immigrants use Amharic, Spanish, French and a variety of other lan-
guages, and they too learn Hebrew once in Israel. The Ashkenazi Ultra
Orthodox Jews use Yiddish as their main language but have high profi-
ciency in Hebrew. Further, the past two decades have witnessed the
arrival of a large number of non-Jewish foreign workers (few hundred
thousand) who use a variety of languages such as Spanish, Tagalog,
Chinese, Bulgarian, Romanian and Polish as well as a number of African
languages and acquire a basic variety of Hebrew. Hebrew in Israel today
is prominent, dominant and prestigious and serves as a lingua franca
for all of these different language groups.

A deeper examination of Israel’s language policy using the three

categories proposed by Spolsky (2004), that is, ideology, management
and practice, makes it clear that ideologically speaking, Hebrew is still
viewed as a central language associated with the Jewish state. Thus,
Jewish immigrants arriving in Israel are therefore expected to acquire
Hebrew as fast as possible so that they can integrate into the Jewish
state. Adults are expected to acquire Hebrew through Ulpanim (inten-
sive Hebrew schools) that teach both the Hebrew language and Israel-
nationalistic themes (Kuzar 2001). All immigrant children are submersed
into Hebrew in schools, as all schools in Jewish areas use Hebrew as the
only medium of instruction. Overall, Hebrew is still viewed as the main
language of Jews in Israel and as a symbol of national membership,
with some declared tolerance to maintaining other languages (Spolsky
and Shohamy 1999).

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

246

In terms of education, a new educational policy was introduced into

the Israeli educational system in 1996 that requires native Hebrew-
speaking Jews to learn Hebrew, English and Arabic in public schools as
well as community, heritage or world languages. For Arabic schools
this means – Arabic, Hebrew and English as well as encouragement of
additional languages (e.g., ‘three plus’). Immigrant children obtain help
in learning Hebrew and are expected to function in the languages as
soon as possible.

In conclusion, Hebrew is the most dominant language, used in all

domains of life and as a lingua franca for those for whom it is not the
first language. While English is very popular (e.g., in academics, com-
merce and the media), and Arabic and Russian are spoken by large
groups, it is Hebrew that has the highest practical value, currency and
visibility. Further evidence of the vitality of Hebrew and English in
relation to other languages can be drawn from a study documenting the
linguistic landscape of Israel that points to the dominance of Hebrew as
the main language of the public space in both Jewish and Arab loca-
tions in Israel. In Arabic-speaking communities Hebrew follows Arabic,
and in Jewish areas English follows Hebrew with little representation
to Arabic (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006).

13.3 Israeli citizenship

Obtaining citizenship in Israel is granted to all Jews based on the prin-
ciple of Jus Sanguinis whereby citizenship is being transferred from
one generation to the next regardless of place of birth. Israel’s popula-
tion consists of seven million people, 76 per cent of whom are Jews
(including one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union and
about 80,000 Jews from Ethiopia), 20 per cent Arabs (Christians and
Moslems) and the rest, 4 per cent, are mostly foreign workers/migrant,
most of them on temporary residence working visas.

13.3.1 Jews

It was on the 14 May 1948, at 4 p.m., eight hours before the end of the
British Mandate that the Hebrew leadership was assembled to declare
the founding of the state of Israel. The declaration was accompanied by
the reading of the Declaration of Independence by the first prime min-
ister, David Ben Gurion. The declaration begins by stating that ‘We
hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in the land of Israel,
which is the state of Israel’.

It is in this very spirit that the citizenship laws of the state of Israel

were formulated, stating that ‘every Jew is entitled to immigrate to Israel
and every immigrant is entitled to Israeli citizenship’ (Section 1 to the

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

247

Law of Return; Section 2 to the Citizenship Law). In that way, the state
of Israel since its establishment, anchored in the law the ideology of
‘Jewish state’. Aside from some limitations, no stipulations or provi-
sions are associated with this right of Jews to obtain Israeli citizenship.

Article 2 of the Law of Return explains that the title of ‘immigrant’

will be granted to every Jew who expresses a desire to reside in Israel
except when the Minister of Interior detects that the person ‘acts against
the Jewish nation’ or ‘can be viewed as someone who poses a risk to
the public health or the security of the state’ or ‘has past criminal record
and can be viewed as a risk to the public’. Aside from these stipulations,
there are no limits and conditions to the right of every Jew to be granted
Israeli citizenship.

In the past few years, there have been a number of contentions and

attempts against this automatic granting of citizenship, and there were
discussions in the judiciary parliamentary committee about changing
the law; yet, at present, it remained unchanged. Thus, the granting of
Israeli citizenship to Jews is automatic. An immigrant who is not inter-
ested in obtaining Israeli citizenship must declare so within three
months from the day of immigration, and as long as that person has a
different citizenship, the Minister of Interior will respect this request
and the person will be given a status of a permanent resident.

The granting of citizenship therefore provides a strong weight to

the question of ‘who is a Jew?’ and discussions about this issue over the
years brought about several major political crises for a number of Israeli
governments. There are three major definitions to the question ‘who is
a Jew?’ First is the religious Jewish definition that a Jew is a person born
to a Jewish mother (Korianaldi 2001). The second is a personal-subjective
definition that a Jew is a person who views himself as a Jew. The third
is a cultural-national definition viewing a Jew as a person belonging to
the Jewish nation and culture, a Jew is someone who is perceived by
the Zionist movement or by the international community as a Jew
(Rubinstein and Medina 2006: 1086). The sources of the last definition
are anchored in the current history of the Jewish nation, when Nazi
Germany viewed Jews as part of a broader definition that included also
family relatives of Jews. In the original Law of Return, no definition
of who is a Jew was included and the question was brought up to
the Supreme Court. In 1962 and 1968, two cases (HJC 72/62 Rofaizen,
HJC 58/68 Shalit) were argued at the Supreme Court that resulted in
an amendment to the Law of Return. In 1970, the amendment stipu-
lated that ‘A Jew is someone who was born to a Jewish mother or that
converted to Judaism and does not belong to another religion’. This
approach included both religious as well as cultural/national perspectives.
In addition, it included also the rights that should be granted to Jews,

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

248

and to the children and grandchildren of Jews, except to those who
were Jews but converted to another religion. These rights were also
granted to those who converted to Judaism. Yet, a debate also surrounds
the type of conversion that is recognized by the Law of Return, a point
that was argued on various occasions in the Israeli courts. Even today,
there is no final conclusion as to this question (Rubinstein and Medina
2006: 1081), yet one could say that the trend nowadays is to approve
the national-cultural definition, so that there will be approval of the
three Jewish conversion systems: Orthodox, Conservative and Reformed
(Rubinstein and Medina 2006: 1086).

13.3.2 Arabs who were citizens of the Mandatory Land of Israel

At the time of the end of the British Mandate and the abolishment of the
Mandatory status of Palestine in May 1948, and in an attempt to avoid
a situation whereby Arabs living in Palestine at the time would end up
with no citizenship at all, and under the pressure of the United Nations,
it was determined (article 3 to the Citizenship Law) that all non-Jews
residing in Palestine on the eve of the establishment of the state of Israel
(15 May 1948) were entitled to Israeli citizenship.

There were three conditions for obtaining citizenship in that way.

One is that in 1952 (the year in which the law was accepted), the person
who requested citizenship was registered as a resident according to the
Statute of resident registration – 1949. The second is that at that very
time the person was a resident of Israel, and the third is that at the date
of the establishment of the state of Israel, and until the beginning of the
implementation of the law, that person was physically present in Israel
or in an area that became part of the state of Israel after its establish-
ment, or that he or she entered Israel in a legal manner.

The law grants a solution to non-Jews, almost all of them Palestinian

Arabs who were residents of the British mandate in Palestine but after
the establishment of the state of Israel could have been left without any
citizenship. Along with that, the law states special conditions that
would guarantee that Arabs living in Israel during the War of Independ-
ence in 1948 are not allowed to go back to their villages, as they would
be considered illegal residents. It is important to note that this law
applied only to those who were living in Palestine in 1948 and was not
meant to grant citizenship to non-Jews who immigrated or intended to
immigrate to Israel in later years.

The question as to the status of non-Jews in Israel has become even

more relevant after the 1967 Six Day War with the occupation of the east
part of Jerusalem, the imposition of the Israeli law on the Palestinian
residents of East Jerusalem and the occupation of the Golan Heights

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

249

with its Druze residents. The citizenship law does not settle the status
of these residents and does not grant them Israeli citizenship (Rubinstein
and Medina 2006: 1102); yet in a Supreme Court decision from 1988
(HJC 282/88 Awad) it was decided that they are entitled to permanent
residence status automatically as long as they reside in these areas.

13.3.3 Citizenship as a result of marriage to an Israeli citizen

The state of Israel acknowledges the right of every citizen to select a
partner and establish a family in Israel (Rubinstein and Medina 2006:
1095), but in reality, there are strict limitations resulting from security
and demographic considerations. In 2003, the Citizenship and Entrance
to Israel law (temporary regulation) – 2003 was legislated. The law for-
bids Arabs from the occupied territories, who marry Israeli citizens to
get Israeli citizenship and even to obtain permit to reside in Israel as
part of family reunion.

An appeal to the Supreme Court (HCJ 7052/03, Adalah et al., v. Minister

of Interior and the Attorney General) was dealt with in a special assem-
bly of eleven judges. It was claimed that the new law breaches constitu-
tional rights and therefore the Supreme Court should abolish it. The
main claim was that the law breaches the right to have a family life
and the right to equality in that it prevents family unification of mixed
couples of Israeli Arabs with partners who reside in the occupied terri-
tories and therefore limits the connection between an Israeli parent
and his/her child who may be registered in the occupied territories.
The law also breaches the right to equality in that it is directed towards
the Israeli Arab citizens as these are the ones who marry Palestinians
from the territories. At the same time, the Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty – 1992 grants authority to the court to abolish a law that
limits and breaches the rights that it protects.

Adalah claimed that the goal of the new law is invalid as it is based

on demographic considerations and therefore violates constitutional
rights to family reunification and equality, and by law, breaching such
rights is possible only to people who are danger to the security of the
state. The Supreme Court rejected all these claims in May 2006, in a
majority rule of six against five judges. The five judges of the minority
headed by chief justice Aharon Barak thought that this law should be
abolished as it breaches constitutional rights. The other five judges
rejected the claim stating that the law does not breach constitutional
rights, and even if it does, it is in a very minor way. The 11th judge
thought that the law may breach constitutional rights, but the state
needs to be given nine months in order to formulate an alternative legal
arrangement. Thus, he joined the judges who rejected the appeal.

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

250

13.3.4 Others

Regarding all those who are not covered by the Law of Return or Arabs
living in Israel in 1948 and their children, Article 5 to the Citizenship
Law lists the conditions upon which they are entitled to citizenship as
follows:

a. 5.a. An adult who is not an Israeli citizen can be granted citizenship

if the following requirements were met: The person,
1. is present in Israel;
2. was living in Israel three years out of the five that preceded

the time of the request;

3. is eligible to reside in Israel permanently;
4. is living in Israel on a permanent basis or is planning to

reside permanently;

5. has some knowledge of the Hebrew language;
6. gave up his previous citizenship or announced that he will

cease holding the foreign citizenship when he will become a
citizen.

b. 5.b. A person who requests citizenship and has met all conditions

of section a. will be granted citizenship from the Minister of
Interior if the latter views the request as appropriate and will
issue a citizenship document.

One condition, then, is that those applying for citizenship should

have some knowledge of the Hebrew language. Another is that those
applying should have a permanent residence permit. The Minister of
Interior has the authority to grant permanent residence, but the law
does not specify any specifications or conditions and the Minister has
almost unlimited authority. Thus, throughout all the years of Israel’s
existence, only very few people were granted this right. A claim against
the use of Hebrew as a criterion was never submitted to the Israeli
courts, the reason being that the Minister of Interior grants permanent
residence in such rare cases that an appeal would be irrelevant. In the
past few years, few law proposals were submitted to the Parliament,
mostly by Arab members demanding to include Arabic as an alternative
language to Hebrew, in which proficiency is required; these were all
denied.

Since 1989, Israel started to grant foreign/migrant workers temporary

residence permits to substitute for the Palestinian labour that ceased
working in Israel after the beginning of the Intifada in 1987. These per-
mits were granted for limited periods. In 2003, about 189,000 foreign
workers were residing in Israel, of whom 104,000 were illegal (Fisher
1999). Figure 13.1 below points to the fact that until the beginning of

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

251

the 1990s, only Jews and Arabs were living in Israel and no ‘others’.
Since then there are about 4 per cent ‘others’ implying about 200,000–
300,000 people, mostly foreign workers.

One exception is the case of a ministerial committee approving that

citizenship will be granted to children of illegal workers and to their
parents after meeting certain conditions. Specifically, in 2002, a report
of the intercommittee of a number of cabinet ministers about the status
of foreign workers was submitted to the government. A few weeks later,
the then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, made a declaration about the
expulsion of 50,000 undocumented migrants until the end of 2003, and
announced the establishment of the Immigration Administration that
will be responsible for their deportations. A total of 400 police officers
were assigned and a budget of 200,000 million NIS (around 50 million
USD) was allocated to this special office. Since the establishment of the
office in 2004 and until November of 2005, about 145,000 foreign work-
ers were expelled or left Israel out of their own will (Center for Migrant
Workers Support 2003). When the minister of interior, Avraham Poraz,
requested to grant permanent residence status to children of illegal
migrant workers, the government was forced to establish a committee
of ministers that would reach a set of recommendations regarding the
request that would have to be approved by the cabinet. The cabinet, in
decision 3807 of 26 June 2005, and in its amendment of 16 June 2006,
decided that in order to get permanent residence, the child of an illegal

100%

95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

5%
0%

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

JEWS

OTHERS

ARABS

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Figure 13.1

Distribution of Jews, Arabs and others from 1948–2004 (Source:

Department of Central Statistical Information 2007)

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

252

worker will have to fulfil the following requirements: the child entered
Israel when (s)he was less than 14 years old, has been in Israel for more
than six years, has acculturated in the Israeli culture, his/her parents
entered Israel legally, is studying in the first grade or above and speaks
the Hebrew language. This decision referred to 1,500 children of for-
eign migrants; along with their parents the number was about 5,000 out
of a number of 200,000 foreign workers. This decision of the Israeli
government, it was stated, should not serve as a precedent, thus open-
ing the way to expulsion and deportation of all illegal foreign/migrants
workers. Nowadays, there is no issue of granting permanent residence/
citizenship to foreign/migrant workers; they are only granted tempo-
rary residence.

In terms of the Hebrew language, knowledge of Hebrew is a require-

ment; this requirement is stricter than the requirement made in the
Citizenship Law of knowledge of ‘some Hebrew’. Yet, the issue of lan-
guage has never been dealt with in the court.

13.3.5 Conclusions

In conclusion, Israel represents a case where the doors to citizenship
are not open to anybody but Jews. In 2005, 30,000 people received per-
manent residence status, 90 per cent of them were Jews that received it
based on the Law of Return. The rest of the immigrants obtained that
status as part of family reunification, that is, being married to an Israeli
citizen (Jew or Arab). In other words, the number of people who were
granted permission for permanent residence and for the opening of citi-
zenship proceedings was minimal (Department of Central Statistical
Information 2007). Section 13.5 offers a summary of the differences in
legal residence status in Israel.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Zionist movement and

later the state of Israel in the Declaration of Independence established
the central role of the Hebrew language as main ideology of the Jewish
state and as a symbol of its national collective identity. Yet, at the same
time, the Declaration of Independence also declares that the state of
Israel ‘will maintain equal social and political rights to all its citizens
regardless of religious, race and gender differences. It will guarantee
freedom of religion, consciousness, language, education and culture’.

In terms of officiality, both Hebrew and Arabic are official languages

in Israel, as of Section 82 of the King’s Order in Council from 1922; yet,
in practice, the reality brought about a situation whereby the Hebrew
language is the main language of the state. Rubinstein and Medina
(2006: 440) state that there was a major development with regards to
the Arabic language. Thus, in a court decision from 1992 (HJC 105/92

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

253

Re-em engineers), chief justice Aharon Barak determined that it should
be possible to post public advertisements in Arabic only and forbade
the municipality to limit the right of private people to express them-
selves publicly or apply to the municipality in Arabic. Another Supreme
Court decision from 1996 (HJC 12/96 Mer’i) determined that the use
of Arabic only on voting notes to the general elections is legitimate.
Finally, in another court decision (HJC 4112/99 Adalah) municipalities
were required to post signs in Hebrew and Arabic in towns and cities in
which a significant Arabic minority resides, not only in Arab neigh-
bourhoods but also in Jewish neighbourhoods.

These Supreme court decisions were not based on the notion that

Arabic is an official language in Israel, and not even on the basis of the
collective rights of the Arab minority as an indigenous ethnolinguistic
group, but mostly due to the right of individuals as being a large minor-
ity consisting of 20 per cent of the population of the state.

The Supreme Court stressed the important role that the Hebrew

language has in Israel and that given the special status to Arabic it may
harm the status of Hebrew, but emphasizes that this potential harm
is justified, given the strong hegemony and status that the Hebrew lan-
guage has.

13.4 Citizenship, hollow citizenship,

language and tests

It is in the above context that we argue that the terms citizenship, lan-
guage and tests need to be understood in broader and more complex
ways. Specifically with regards to citizenship, Jamal (2007) argues that
this notion is not homogenous, as it has different meanings to different
groups in terms of obligations, rights and benefits, embedded in the
socio-political context of the place. Brubaker (1996, 2004) claims that
nation-states use judicial, economical and cultural mechanisms to pre-
vent indigenous minorities from gaining access to the main resources of
the state. This is so since the essence and existence of indigenous
minorities challenge the vision and ideology of the nation-state. In the
case of Israel, Jamal (2007) uses the term hollow citizenship to refer to
situations when Arabs are granted citizenship but with limited rights.

The founders of the state of Israel and all its governments viewed

Israel both as a Jewish and democratic state. In that way, they granted
citizenship to the Arab residents of Israel, including voting rights. Yet,
Gontovnik (2003) poses the following question: ‘Is Israel in fact a liberal
state?’ and he claims that it is not. The answer to the question, accord-
ing to him, is embedded in a constitutional fact that is unique to Israel,
its Jewish nature: ‘. . . in every liberal state there is dominance to the

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

254

culture of the majority . . . but in Israel . . . the state is committed prima-
rily to cultivate and maintain its Jewish character’ (Gontovnik 2003: 63).

The constitutional law of the state of Israel is based on the notion

that Israel is a Jewish state, as was already written in the declaration of
Independence of 1948 (Rubinstein and Medina 2006: 45). This status
was anchored in two constitutional laws in 1992 (Basic Law: Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty – 1992 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupa-
tion – 1992). These two basic laws were meant to be part of the constitu-
tion that was never legislated in Israel. As noted earlier, the Law of
Return anchored the right of every Jew to enter Israel, and the Citizen-
ship Law grants him/her citizenship.

This concept is also shared by the Supreme Court of Israel. In spite

of the view of the former chief justice Aharon Barak that the democratic
values of the state of Israel are parallel to its liberal values, he too
believes that the state of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, that
Jewish immigrants are allowed to immigrate to Israel and reside here at
any time, that its main language is Hebrew and that its main holidays
are Jewish, providing a central notion of its status.

Yet, when it comes to the Arabs in Israel, we believe that the most

important law are the amendments from 1985 and 2002 to the Basic
Law: Ha-Knesset (the Parliament). Article 7 (a) states that a political
party will not take part in the elections to the parliament, and a person
will not be a candidate to the parliament, if in the goals or actions of the
party or that person, implicitly or explicitly, there is a negation of the
existence of the state of Israel as a democratic and Jewish state, or a sup-
port in an armed struggle, of an enemy state or a terror organization,
against the state of Israel. These amendments require that parties and
candidates must act in complete loyalty to the notion of the state as
a Jewish state, and prevent Arab citizens from the possibility to strug-
gling against it (Jamal 2007).

These types of laws create ‘taboo territories’ where access is pre-

vented from Arab citizens and thus disables them from battling to
change the identity of the state as the state of the Jewish people (Saban
2002). In that way, the Israeli law left the Arab parliament members
only with the option to battle for equal distribution of resources, but
not with the fundamental right to represent the Arab minority and its
values (Samooha 2000). Thus, the Israeli political system is not ready
to differentiate between the right to self-determination of the Jewish
people and full public hegemony of all public authorities and forbids
any protest and struggle to change this status (Gans 2006). The Jewish
society in Israel views the Palestinian state that is about to be estab-
lished in the areas of Judea, Samaria and Gaza as a place where the rights
and national aspirations of the Arab minority in Israel are supposed to

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

255

take place and therefore fulfilling these aspirations in the state of Israel
is considered not legitimate.

This situation which does not allow Arab Parliament members to act

for their expression as a national indigenous minority, along with the
fact that since the establishment of the state of Israel, the Arabs have
been isolated and prevented from any meaningful role in the govern-
ment and the parliament, weakens their ability and potential to protest
in order to achieve justice and equal distribution of the national resources.
In that way, the Arab representatives are prevented from full represen-
tation of the very group that elected them; this is clearly a different situ-
ation than that of the Jewish Parliament members.

In that way, there is de-legitimacy of the Arab representatives in the

Israeli media (Wolfsfeld et al. 2000). They are prevented from marrying
Arabs from the occupied territories. More than 90 per cent of their lands
have been nationalized and this places them in the lowest level of
the salary ranges so that their average salary is 60 per cent of that of the
Jews (Zureik 1979; Yiftachel 1996). They are under-represented in the
major governmental institutions and companies, in spite of the fact that
they consist of 20 per cent of the population. Thus, if we put the two
issues together, on the one hand, limiting the rights of Israeli Arabs and
viewing them as a demographic threat, and on the other hand, the Law
of Return that encourages Jews, even those whose grandparents only
were Jewish, to enter Israel and be granted automatic citizenship, it is
clear that there is a policy that aims at suppressing the Arabs (Sofer
2001). In that way, citizenship for Arabs in Israel needs to be viewed as
‘hollow’ as it was emptied by the Jewish nation-state (Jamal 2007).

It is true that the Arab minority in Israel has its own autonomous

educational system from pre-school age until the 12th grade, but this
educational system is under very close supervision and monitoring of
the Israeli Ministry of Education in terms of the content of the curricu-
lum. This holds also for all higher education institutions. The academic
achievements of Arab students are substantially lower than those of
Jewish students. Jamal (2007) argues that the state of Israel is engaged
in an act of nationalization whereby it imposes the hegemonic Jewish/
Hebrew culture on all its citizens (see Jamal 2007 for a more detailed
description of the notion of ‘hollow citizenship’ and its implications).
Specifically, with regards to language, while both Hebrew and Arabic
are official languages in Israel, ‘hollow citizenship’ in linguistic terms
and contexts implies the denial of linguistic rights of Arabs in Israel as
the language is suppressed in most domains of life.

One of the major channels of participation in society is access to

higher education. In Israel, Hebrew is the only language of instruction
in all universities. This creates strong pressure on the part of Arabs to

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

256

give priority to learning Hebrew over Arabic in Arab schools. Moreover,
it blocks their access to the labour market, leading to low salaries, low
social status and prevention from entering government agencies, result-
ing in limited participation in society.

Kimmerling (2004) argues that the revival of the Hebrew language

and its status as the single and only common language in the commu-
nity of immigrants coming to Israel compared to all other languages
blocked any linguistic and cultural ‘otherness’. This situation, he argues,
helped create and maintain a hegemonic group that was proficient in
the Hebrew language. It is still today, he notes, that knowledge of the
Hebrew language and of specific registers are viewed as the ‘entrance
card’ to the core of society. Although there are no official language tests
for citizenship as those discussed elsewhere in this Volume, a variety of
Hebrew language tests and language performances are required for par-
ticipating in society in various high stake domains (e.g., entrance exams
as well as final course exams to the universities). Whether the impact
of the language tests for citizenship is more far reaching than those
mentioned here is an open question.

Yet, the notion of ‘hollow citizenship’ can also be extended to the

status of Jewish immigrants in Israel on the basis of language. The state
of Israel is eager to include these groups of immigrants as part of its
continued ideology of sustaining a Jewish state and grants them auto-
matic citizenship. This citizenship can be viewed as hollow as well
given the various difficulties but especially the lack of language services
and accommodations.

Specifically, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia,

two of the largest groups of Jewish immigrants in the past two decades,
are expected to acquire Hebrew, to obtain jobs and attend schools. This
approach was presented clearly in the verdict of chief justice Aharon
Barak in the Adalah case (HJC 4112/99 Adalah: 417):

(. . .) the question that may come up is what is unique about the
Arabic language, and why should it be different than other lan-
guages, in addition to Hebrew, that Israelis speak? Does it not origi-
nate from our approach that now it will be possible for residents
from other cities, among them minorities that speak other languages,
that public signs should be displayed in their languages? I answer
this question in the negative, as not all other languages are the same
as the Arabic language. The unique aspect of the Arabic language is
double-fold: first it is the language of the largest minority in Israel,
and second Arabic is an official language in Israel.

For Jews, there is no education whatsoever in any of the languages

they use as Hebrew is the only medium of instruction and of tests in
schools, in spite of research showing that it takes between seven to

Citizenship, language and nationality in Israel

257

able 13.1

Legal status and linguistic rights of three groups in Israel

Jews

Arabs

Others

Citizens

Automatic, law of return

Residents of 1948 and their

children

Hardly any

Citizenship for new

immigrants

Automatic, law of return

Like all non-Jews, very

rarely

ery rarely

Family reunion (with

citizens)

If spouse is Jewish: automatic.

If spouse is not Jewish:

a procedure of 4–5 years.

Not with Arabs from the

occupied territories, since

2003. Otherwise: a

procedure of few years.

If spouse is a permanent

resident or citizen: a

procedure of few

years.

Otherwise no.

Language at school

Hebrew

Arabic

Hebrew

Language at university

Hebrew

Language rights

For Hebrew speakers: all rights.

For others (e.g., Russian speakers

or Ethiopian speakers): no

rights.

Partial rights

No rights

Elana Shohamy and Tzahi Kanza

258

eleven years for immigrants to acquire a new language in school set-
tings (Levin, Shohamy and Spolsky 2003; Shohamy 2006; Levin and
Shohamy 2008). The state does not see its obligation to fill this ‘hollow-
ness’ with meaningful rights. Thus, while language is not stated as a
condition for those citizens, it is a major obstacle for manifesting full
citizenship rights. One exception is the entrance test, entitled the psy-
chometric test, which is used as criterion of entrance to higher educa-
tion and which is administered in a number of languages; yet, all other
tests are conducted exclusively in Hebrew.

Table 13.1 summarizes the legal status and linguistic rights of the

three different groups in the Israeli society, as discussed in this chapter.

13.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, we showed that Israeli citizenship is granted to all
Jews and to Arabs who resided in Palestine in 1948 without language
stipulation. Yet, the Hebrew language and various tests in that language
are required from its citizens in high stake domains. Further, while
Arabic is also an official language in Israel and serves as the language
of instruction in Arab schools, it is only Hebrew that is a condition
for entering high levels of the labour market and higher education. This
has an effect on a rapid state of attrition and suppression of the Arabic
language in Israel and is in this way a case of ‘hollowing’ the citizenship.
With regards to Jewish immigrants in Israel, citizenship can be viewed as
hollow as well given the lack of language services and accommodations.
The state, thus, does not see its obligation to fill this hollowness with
meaningful rights.

It is not clear whether Israel can maintain its policy to grant auto-

matic citizenship to Jews. Moreover, it is not clear whether Israel can
continue with its policy not to grant citizenship to its foreign/migrants
workers. If this policy in fact changes, then it is likely that the language
requirement as stated in Section 5 to the Citizenship Law may become
more central and used as a device to perpetuate the current immigra-
tion policy. It is a question whether this language proficiency require-
ment is legitimate considering that the acquisition of language is not
always possible.

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261

Aantjes, W.  134
accessible English  66
Actioun Lëtzebuergesch (AL)  149
Adalah  249, 253, 256
admission

regime 133, 134
test 130–3, 140

Adult Migrant English Program

(AMEP) 224, 227–8, 234–5

Ajuntament de València  182
Aleinikoff, T.  196, 197, 199, 200, 201
allochtoon 10, 125–7
Amara, M.  245
American Immigration Law

Foundation 194, 195, 196, 199,
200

Amnesty International  136
Anderson, B.  6, 67, 68, 70, 126, 153
Anderson, Hon. G. M.  200, 201
Anglo-Saxon differentialistic

approach 21, 112, 118

Arango, J. 170
assimilation 11, 13–14, 67, 72, 117,

134, 153–4, 158, 194, 202, 204,
208

Association of Language Testers in

Europe (ALTE) 14, 44, 55

asylum seeker 61, 113, 118, 128,

136–8, 230

Aubert, R. 109
audiovisual phone test 130
Aussiedler 91–2, 98
Australian Language and Literacy

Policy 232

Australian Second Language

Proficiency Rating (ASLPR) 224,
227–8

autochtoon 125–7
autonomous region 171, 173, 178,

180, 182

Bade, K.  87
Bakhtin, M.  81, 82
Baldwin-Edwards, M.  183
Barbour, S.  6, 7
Barni, M.  10, 13
Baron, D.  192, 193, 194, 195
Basic Law  249, 254
Bauböck, R.  11
Bauman, R.  194, 198
Bauman, Z.  162
Beirão, D.  152
belonging  8, 10–11, 67, 72, 76, 83–4,

87–8, 95, 103, 128, 178, 182, 247

Ben-Rafael, E. 243, 244, 245
Bericht 95, 98
bilingual 7, 19, 58–9, 68, 108–9, 173,

180, 199–200, 204–5, 211–12,
218, 220–2, 243

Bilingual Education Act  199–200, 204
bilingualism  39, 148, 195, 221
Billig, M.  68
Blackledge, A.  5, 7, 81, 82, 102, 236
Blair, T.  77, 78
Block, D.  5
Blommaert, J.  4, 10, 120, 122, 149,

155, 193, 194, 197

Böcker, A. 11
Bourdieu, P. 69, 73, 74, 82, 84, 122,

197, 198, 202, 204

Boyd, S.  63
Brettell, C.  181
Briggs, C.  194, 198
Brindley, G.  227
Brubaker, R.  6, 37, 253
Brumfit, C.  9
Bundesamt für Migration und

Flüchtlinge 96, 97, 103

Bundesministerium des Innern  89
Bundesregierung  91, 92, 95
burger  125, 127–8, 136

Index

Index

262

Burns, W. 205
Bush, G. 202

Cairns, A.  215
calculus regime  129–30
Carmichael, C.  7
Castles, S.  8, 66, 67
CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de

Statistiek) 129

Center for Immigration Studies 194,

197

Center for Migrant Workers

Support 251

Centro de Investigaciones

Sociológicas 174, 176

Certificates in Spoken and Written

English (CSWE) 224, 228, 235

Cesarini, D. 112
Chinese Exclusion Act 194
citizenship

act 55, 232
application 11, 19–20, 64, 114,

179, 216, 239

law 19, 38, 41–2, 45–7, 50, 180,

246–50, 252, 254, 258

test 46, 69, 88, 99, 129, 138, 174,

215, 217, 232–3, 238, 242

Citron, L.  12
civic integration  21, 81, 112, 125, 127
Civil Rights Act  199, 205
Claes, B.  109
Clyne, M.  232
colonial 70, 225
colonialism 260
colony 211–12, 225
Committee on the Elimination of

Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 121

Common European Framework of

Reference (CEFR) 5, 15–18, 24,
26, 28, 74, 83, 96, 115–16, 121,
129–30, 132, 134, 140, 143,
161–2, 233–4, 236, 240

communicative skills 16, 63, 229
community 6, 10, 37, 40, 67, 69–70,

72, 77, 80, 82–3, 100, 102, 108–9,
111–12, 114, 117–18, 126, 152,

168–71, 173–5, 178, 180, 183,
195, 214, 218, 221–2, 232, 244,
245–7, 256

language 232, 245

computerized phone test  130, 132
Comunidad de Madrid  176
constitution(al)  7, 9, 10–11, 39, 41,

44, 47, 69, 91, 93, 95, 100, 108,
138, 144, 167, 171–2, 175, 178,
180–1, 191, 200, 207, 214–15,
217–18, 220, 234, 249, 253–4

contract worker (Vertragsarbeiter) 88
Council of Europe 15–16, 24, 26, 28,

44, 48–9, 115–16, 121, 129, 233,
240

Crawford, J. 193, 198, 199, 200, 202,

203, 204, 205, 206, 207

Crick, B. 74
cultural

diversity 11, 38, 142, 144, 181, 199
knowledge 19, 38
pluralism 14

Dagevos, J.  139
Dauw, A.  117
Davies, A.  225, 239
Davis, K.  148
De Bot, C.  15
De Hart, B.  128
De Heer, J.-C.  127
De Jong, J.  234
De Morgen  119, 121
De Ruijter, A.  9
De Volkskrant  136
Delanty, G.  183
Deltaplan Inburgering  139
democratic deficit  174
Den Uyl, R.  135
Department of Central Statistical

Information 251, 252

Department of Immigration and

Multicultural Affairs 232

Deutscher Bundestag 93
(Australian) Dictation Test 23, 224–5,

228–9, 240

Dietz, G. 170
DiGiacomo, S. 156

Index

263

Dilday, K. 174
discrimination 47–8, 100, 121, 144,

150, 158, 170, 193, 199, 202,
205, 214

discriminatory 83, 133, 136, 196,

199, 206, 226, 240

Dispas, C.  14
Displaced Persons Act  197
diversity visa  201
dual citizenship  18, 49, 53, 62, 91,

128, 129, 143

dual nationality 11, 175
Duchêne, A. 160

Edwards, J.  6, 7, 214
El Mundo  170
El País  179
elections  42–3, 47–8, 63, 114, 174,

177, 180, 184, 212, 214, 219–20,
253–4

English Language Unity Act 192
English-Only Movement 7, 200–1,

205

Etzioni, A. 143
Euromosaic 41
European Commission against

Racism and Intolerance
(ECRI) 137, 144–5

European identity  9, 10, 126, 149
European Inclusion Index  11
European Union (EU)  4, 7–15,

18–19, 22, 37–9, 42, 46, 49–51,
53–4, 59, 61, 62, 90, 98, 103,
110, 113–14, 116, 127, 136–7,
139, 144, 148, 150–3, 160–3,
169–70, 174, 176–8, 180–1

exclusion 6, 10–11, 15, 42, 67,

117–18, 143, 157, 159, 226

Extra, G. 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 61, 63,

125, 126, 129, 143, 234

Fairclough, N. 80
family

reunification 60, 152, 249,

252

reunion 12, 71, 110, 113, 132–3,

238, 249

Federal Office for Migration and

Refugees (Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge) 94,
96–7, 103

federal state  19, 88, 107, 108, 214
Fehlen, F.  151
Fenton, S.  67
Ferguson, S.  202
Fermin, A.  134
Fietz, M.  91
Fisher, A.  250
Fishman, J.  6, 7, 243
Foblets, M.  14
FOD 110, 111
foreign

labour 50, 152
worker 51, 87, 245–6, 250–2

Foreigners Act (Ausländergesetz) 89
Foro para la Integración Social de los

Inmigrantes 184

Foucault, M.  226
Fowler, R.  80
Franssen, J.  131
frontaliers 151
Fulbrook, M.  112

Gal, S.  6, 9, 155
Gales, T.  10, 236
Galligan, B.  213, 223
Gallo, B.  150
Gans, H.  254
Garcia, O.  84, 199
gate-keeping 83
Gathier, M.  134
Geddes, A.  37
Geets, J.  117
Generalitat Valenciana  182
Giesen, B.  155
Gijsberts, M.  139
globalization  8, 15, 38, 153
glocalization 15
Gogolin, I.  13
Gontovnik, G.  253, 254
Gorter, D.  7, 13, 15, 126, 129, 143
Gould, R.  90
Gowan, R.  12
Gowricharn, R.  134

Index

264

Griffith, P.  11
Grimmeau, J.  109
Groenendijk, C.  132
Gubbins, P.  7
guest worker (Gastarbeiter)  46,

50–3, 87

Guiguet, B. 5

Haarmann, H.  7
Handbook on Integration  14
Hansen, R.  38, 70, 71
Hansen-Thomas, H.  88
Hanvelt, M.  214, 222
Harrington, T.  180
Harshav, B.  243, 244
Harvey, D.  149
Heath, S.  192
Held, D.  67
Heller, M.  4, 68, 69, 126, 160, 221
heterogeneity  7, 9–10, 22, 70, 150–1
Hielkema, H.  134
historical minority language  59
HJC  247, 249, 252, 253, 256
Hobsbawm, E.  67, 68
Hogan-Brun, G.  5, 38, 39, 42, 46
Hollifield, J.  181
hollow citizenship  253, 255, 256
Holt, M.  7
Home Office, The  72, 73, 74, 75, 76,

78, 79

homogeneity 7, 69, 70, 80, 154, 158,

163

homogenization 125
Horner, K. 149, 150, 154, 155, 156,

157, 158, 160

human rights 19, 38, 47–50, 52–3,

132, 181–2, 207

Human Rights Watch  133, 136
Huss, L.  63
Hyltenstam, K.  59

identity 5–7, 9–10, 13, 15, 20–3,

38–9, 46, 51, 66, 69, 76–7, 112,
126, 128–9, 144, 149, 153, 155,
159–60, 162, 167–8, 176, 180–1,
183–4, 194, 202–4, 214, 221, 225,
231, 240–2, 252, 254

imagined community 6, 70, 126
immigrant minority language 150
immigration act

(Zuwanderungsgesetz) 71,
89–90, 93–5, 194–5, 199–201

immigration history 19, 22, 202
Immigration Reform and Control

Act 200

inburgering 115, 121, 125, 127–31,

133–7, 139–42

inclusion 10–12, 38, 72, 77, 88, 113,

117, 144

IND brochure 137
indexicality 156
Ingram, D. 227
Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya

(IDESCAT) 172

Instituto Galego de Estatística

(IGE) 172

Instituto Nacional de Estadística

(INE) 168, 173, 184

Instituto Vasco de Estadística

(EUSTAT) 172

integration policy 12, 14, 50, 55,

90–1, 95, 107, 111–12, 114–18,
121, 136, 145

Irvine, J. 155
Isin, E. 162

Jachimowicz, M.  170
Jamal, A.  253, 254, 255
Jaspaert, K.  122
Jenks, J.  194
Jensen, J.  215
Johnson, G.  10
Johnson, S.  59
Joppke, C.  11, 72
Joseph, J.  6
jus sanguinis (law of the blood)

10–11, 62, 90, 156, 173, 181, 246

jus soli (law of the soil) 10, 23, 90,

156, 173, 181

Karmi, S.  243
Kennedy, J.  195, 196, 198
Kersten, A.  141, 142
Kessens, J.  132

Index

265

Kimmerling, B.  256
Klaver, J.  139
Kloss, H.  193, 194, 203
Kollwelter, S.  151, 152
Koning Boudewijnstichting  110
Koot, N.  134
Korianaldi, M.  247
Kroon, S.  122
Kroskrity, P.  154, 155, 156, 161
Krüger-Potratz, M.  88
Kruyt, A.  11
Kuzar, R.  245
Kymlicka, W.  38

labour

force 50–1, 64, 109
immigration 60, 62
market 12–13, 20, 37, 50, 57, 61,

63, 87, 92, 151, 181, 228, 256, 258

Ladino 175, 243
Lakoff, G. 202
language

debate 20–1
ideology 150, 155–7, 160–1, 163
law 39, 42, 148–9, 151, 154,

157, 171

legislation 39, 109
policy 17, 39, 56, 59, 69, 88, 99,

101–2, 113, 149, 153, 158, 173,
180, 230–2, 245, 260

politics 64, 155, 163
proficiency 15–18, 20–1, 38–40,

62, 66, 72, 74, 78–9, 82–4,
91–3, 98, 101–2, 113–16,
118–19, 121–2, 142, 153–4,
162, 224, 227–8, 232, 234,
236, 239–40, 242–3, 245,
250, 258

regime 19, 38
requirement 12, 14, 22, 44, 72–4,

79, 81, 107, 113, 153–4, 156–7,
159–60, 162, 180, 184, 214, 216,
231–2, 236, 242, 258

revival 243–4, 260
shift 122, 172, 243
status 59
testing regime 23, 66, 79, 80–4

Languages Other Than English

(LOTE) 76, 83, 193, 199, 204–7,
231–2

Latin universalistic approach 21,

112, 118

Latvia Naturalisation Board  44
Lauck, W.  194
Law of Return  247–8, 250, 252,

254–5, 257

Leitkultur 7, 89
Leonard, M.  11
Lëtzebuerger Land  158
Leung, C.  14
Levante 183
Levin, T.  258
Lewkowicz, J.  14
Linde, C.  99
linguistic

repertoire 99, 150, 158
rights 255, 257–8

Lo Bianco, J.  231, 232
Lucassen, L.  128
Lukes, M.  203, 205
Luxemburger Wort  157, 159, 160

McColl Millar, R. 6
McNamara, T. 225, 229, 230, 234,

235, 236, 237, 239

majority language 59, 63, 109,

122, 172

Makoni, S.  67, 68, 70, 76, 83, 84
Mål i mun  59, 63–4
Manz, S.  89
Mar’i, A.  245
Mar-Molinero, C.  5
marriage visas  79, 83
Martin, D.  196, 197, 199, 200, 201
Martin Rojo, L.  68, 69
Martiniello, M.  109, 112, 114
May, S.  7, 67, 69, 153, 155
Medina, B.  247, 248, 249, 252, 254
Melander, B.  63
Mémorial 154
Mencken, H.  203
Michalowski, I.  11
Migrant Integration Policy Index

(MIPEX) 12, 50

Index

266

Milani, T.  59, 62, 160
Miles, R.  11
Milroy, J.  155
Milroy, L.  155
Ministère de l’Education nationale

et de la Formation professionnelle
(MENFP) 149, 150

Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos

Sociales (MTAS) 169, 173, 174,
177, 178, 184

minority language 7, 58–9, 66, 69,

83, 150, 170, 172, 204, 260

Ministerio de Justicia 175
mobility 21, 119, 120, 148, 151, 161,

162

monocultural 143
monolingual 13, 17, 143, 171, 193,

200, 202, 204–7

monolingual policy  17, 193, 204, 206
monolingualism  18, 69, 203, 204, 221
Morawska, E.  11, 72
Morelli, A.  109
Moyer, M.  68, 69
multicultural  11, 13, 70, 77, 93, 99,

107, 111, 134, 143, 211, 214,
221–2, 232, 245

society 11, 70, 93, 107, 111,

214, 245

multiculturalism 11, 13, 23, 38, 67,

77, 89, 94, 107, 134, 214–15, 231

multilingual 10, 15, 66, 68–9, 88,

108–9, 122, 143, 184, 193,
231, 245

context 66

multilingualism 9–10, 18, 72, 101,

157, 167–8, 171, 199

multiple-choice test 75, 130

national identity 6–7, 20–2, 39, 66,

69, 76, 144, 153, 155, 159–60,
162, 167–8, 180, 184, 240

National Integration Plan 94–5,

97, 103

national language 6, 13, 17, 19, 21–2,

37, 39, 88, 103, 113, 126, 149,
154, 160, 163, 167, 173, 192

National Language Act 142

national language policy 39
National Origin Quotas 195–7,

199–201

national policy on languages  231
nationalism  6–7, 37, 66–8, 155
nationality  5–6, 10–12, 29, 45–6,

67–8, 70, 72–3, 83, 107, 112, 114,
126, 128, 137, 153, 159, 160,
174–5, 177–8, 180, 184–5, 195,
198, 205, 242

Nationality, Immigration Asylum

Act 73

nationality act 70, 72, 198
Nationality Law

(Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) 107,
114, 160

naturalization (Einbürgerung) 10, 21,

38, 40–50, 52–3, 72, 74–5, 88, 90,
94, 98–9, 107, 111–12, 114, 128,
137, 151, 153, 156, 158, 162–3,
167, 170, 173–5, 177–9, 181, 191,
198

newcomer 3, 5, 11, 17–19, 21, 59, 64,

79, 114–16, 121, 125–31, 134–5,
137, 139, 143–4, 152, 162, 203,
215

Nickels, H.  153
Niessen, J.  11, 12
Nolen, R.  134
non-citizen  41–3, 45–8, 52–4
Nygren-Junkin, L.  61, 160

Oakes, L. 7, 9
Observatorio Permanente de la

Inmigración (OPI) 169, 174

Occupational English Test (OET)  229
Odé, A.  139
Office for National Statistics  71
Official English Act  192
official language  7, 20, 22, 39–40,

59, 69, 100, 102, 107, 109, 113,
115–16, 122, 149, 157, 170–1,
173, 178–80, 183, 192, 200, 202,
208, 214–15, 217–18, 221–2, 244,
252–3, 255–6, 258

official state language 7–8, 18,

113–15, 204

Index

267

Oficina Económica del

Presidente 168, 173

Ogden, C. 235
oldcomer 114, 116, 121, 125, 128,

130, 134–7, 139

O’Loughlin, K.  236
Oltmer, J.  87
O’Reilly, C.  38
Ortiz, A.  174
othering 125–6

Pajares, M.  174, 177, 178
Papillon, M.  214, 222
Parekh, B.  71, 72
Partido Popular  179, 180
Patriot Act  201
Pavlenko, A.  5
Pennycook, A.  67, 68, 70, 76, 83, 84
Phalet, K.  9
Phillips, S.  215
Piller, I.  6, 88, 234, 235, 236, 237
Pluymen, M.  135
portfolio 140, 234
Priedı¯te, A.  43
print media  156
ProEnglish  192, 202, 204, 205
Pujolar, J.  68

Quirt, M. 220, 221

racialization 67
Rampton, B.  68, 99
Rea, A.  114
Redman, J.  89
refugee  3, 14, 60–1, 63–4, 94–5, 98,

113, 128, 137, 196–7, 199, 228,
230, 238

Refugee Relief Act 197
residence 11–12, 15, 17, 23, 40–4,

51–2, 57, 61–2, 78, 89–90, 94,
97–8, 103, 107, 113–15, 117–19,
128, 130, 137–8, 140, 152, 169–
70, 174–9, 184, 230, 246, 249–52

resident 10, 19–20, 22, 40, 43–5,

47–8, 61–2, 64, 66, 81, 113, 125,
128–9, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143,
150–2, 156, 158, 162, 167,

169–70, 174, 176–80, 184, 193,
198–9, 203–4, 208, 216, 228, 236,
238, 247–9, 253, 256–7

Roever, C.  230
Roth, J.  178, 180, 181
Rubinstein, A.  247, 248, 249, 252, 254

Saban, I.  254
Samooha, S.  254
Samuelsson, W.  60
Sandu, D.  183
Santolaya, P.  177
Sasse, G.  38
Schanze, L.  99
Schiffman, H.  193, 195
Schily, O.  93
Schneider, J.  94, 98
Schönbohm, J.  89
Schrecker, E.  198
Scuto, D.  153, 154
Segev, T.  244
Serra, A.  169, 170, 175
Shohamy, E.  4, 5, 122, 243, 244,

245, 258

Sí, se puede 179
Simm, L. 41
social

cohesion 20, 39, 66, 71, 78–9, 82,

102, 111, 142, 144, 154, 163

inclusion 38, 88
mobility 119

Sofer, A.  255
Spijkerboer, Th.  134
Spizzo, D.  148, 159
Spolsky, B.  149, 243, 244, 245, 258
Spotti, M.  15, 63, 125, 143, 234
Squires, J.  37
standard language  13, 17, 119–20,

150, 155–6, 161, 163

Statec 148, 150, 151, 152
Statens Offentliga Utredningar

(SOU) 59, 61, 62

Statisitiska Centralbyrån (SCB) 58,

60, 61, 62

Stead-Sellers, F.  4
Stevenson, P.  5, 7, 18, 88, 155, 162
Stock, P.  216

Index

268

Stråth, B.  149
Strik, H.  132
super-diversity 4
Swyngedouw, M.  9

Temporary Quota Act 195
territory 4, 6, 9, 21–2, 38, 40, 113,

118, 128, 158, 171, 180, 211–12,
219–20, 260

testing regime 3–6, 18–19, 21–3, 66,

77, 79–84, 125, 128–34, 138, 141,
143–4, 178, 229, 232, 236

Thränhardt, D.  11
Toomsalu, M.  41
Toronto Star  213
trilingualism 148–9
Turell, M.  173

Ulpanim 244–5
United Nations Human Development

Report 143

United States Code 191, 199, 201
US Census Bureau 191, 193
US Citizenship and Immigration

Services 191

US Customs and Border

Protection 197

US Department of State 201
US English 7
US Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) 205, 206

Valdés, G.  206
Van Avermaet, P.  14, 18, 120, 122
Van Dijk, T.  81
Van Londen, S.  9
Van Oers, R.  14, 138, 140
Van Velthoven, H.  109
Verdonk, R.  132, 135
Verhovek, S.  207
Verlot, M.  107, 109, 111
Verordnung 96

Verschueren, J.  155, 193, 194, 197
Vertovec, S.  4
Vogelaar, E.  138, 139
Vološinov, V.  202
voting  5, 47–8, 76, 93, 153, 214, 253

rights 5, 47–8, 153, 253

Walter, A. 132
Weber, J.-J. 149, 150, 157, 158
Wet Inburgering in het

Buitenland 131

Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers 127
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het

Regeringsbeleid (WRR) 126, 144

White Australia Policy  224–5
White House  202
Wiley, T.  193, 199, 200, 203, 204,

205, 207, 208

Witte, E.  109
Wodak, R.  53, 81
Wolfsfeld, G.  255
Wood, P.  162
Woolard, K.  155
work permit  51, 53–4, 61, 152
worker  46, 50–3, 57–8, 60, 71, 87–8,

110, 119, 142, 150, 152, 181, 183,
197, 200, 206, 228, 242, 245–6,
250–2, 258

Working Group on Testing

Regimes 4

Wright, S. 4
Wylie, E. 227

xenophobia 48, 178, 193, 195

Yag˘mur, K. 11, 13, 125
Yiddish 59, 243–5
Yiftachel, O. 255

Zureik, E. 255
Zuwanderung gestalten – Integration

fördern 90

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