The Unity of Oneness and Plurality in Plato's Theaetetus

PublishedbyLexingtonBooks
AnimprintofTheRowman&LittlefieldPublishingGroup,Inc.4501ForbesBoulevard,Suite
200,Lanham,Maryland20706

www.rowman.com

UnitA,WhitacreMews,26-34StannaryStreet,LondonSE114AB

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformorbyanyelectronic
ormechanicalmeans,includinginformationstorageandretrievalsystems,withoutwritten
permissionfromthepublisher,exceptbyareviewerwhomayquotepassagesinareview.

BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationInformationAvailable

LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData

Bloom,Daniel(AssistantProfessorofPhilosophy)

TheunityofonenessandpluralityinPlato'sTheaetetus/DanielBloom.

pagescm

Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-0-7391-8571-1(cloth:alk.paper)-ISBN978-0-7391-8572-8(electronic)

1.Plato.Theaetetus.2.Knowledge,Theoryof.3.Ontology.I.Title.

B386.B562015
121--dc23

2015016686

ThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmericanNational

StandardforInformationSciences—PermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials,
ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992.

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

Preface

EverycommentatoronaPlatonicdialoguefacesthedifficultchoiceofdecidinghowfar

heorsheiswillingtowanderawayfromtheexplicitclaimsmadeinthetext.Thisdifficulty
arisesbecausePlatohimselfdoesnotmakeanyassertionsinthedialogues,choosingratherto
puttheassertionsinthemouthsofhischaracters.Takinganyclaim,then,asPlato'sposition
requiresawillingnesstointerpretthetext,todrawaconclusionheneverexplicitlyendorses.

InordertodothisonehastofirstassumethatPlatoisendorsingsomeposition,andthen

takeonamethodfordeterminingwhatclaimscanbeestablishedasexpressingthatposition.
Thereismuchdisagreementregardingthepropermethodsforinterpretingadialogue,somuch
sothatfindingacommentatorthatmakessimilarmethodologicalassumptionsasyoudoislike
findingacompanioninthesearchforknowledge.

Settlingonspecificmethodologicalassumptionsshouldonlybedonepartiallypriorto

theaccountofthedialogue,forthedialoguesthemselvesaddresswhattheproperassumptions
are;i.e.,thedialoguesingeneral,andtheTheaetetusinparticular,provideuswithanaccount
ofgoodmethodologicalassumptions.Hence,wemustassumeamethodofinterpretationgoing
intothetextthatallowsustoadaptittowhateveritilluminatesforusinPlato'saccount.In
otherwords,itmustbeamovingmethod,onethatiscapableofadaptingasitproceeds;one
thatcanabsorbwhatitdiscovers.Thismeansthatinsomeveryrealsensetheresultofan
accountofaPlatonicdialogueleadsthereaderdirectlybacktothebeginningoftheinquiry—
onlythemethodofthisnewbeginningshouldhavenowbeenfilteredthroughthedialogue
itself.

Thisbookmakestwoprimarymethodologicalassumptionsattheoutsetofitsaccountof

thedialogue.ThefirstassumptionisthatPlatoisamasterofbothhisstyleandcontent.Thus,if
thereisaquestionastowhetherornotanapparent“mistake”isintentionalornot,Ialways
givePlatothebenefitofthedoubt.IdonotassumethatPlatohaschangedhismindsimply
becauseIamunabletounderstandthecontradictioninthewaythatPlatointendsit.For
example,towardtheendoftheTheaetetusPlatooffersaclearlyinvalidargumentdealingwith
allsandwholes.MyassumptionisthatPlatodidnotmakeanerror,norishetryingtoslipone
pastus;rather,thereisapointbeingmadeaboutthedifferencebetweendifferentkindsof
unities,apointthatmaybeoverlookedifthereader'sattentionwasnotcapturedbysomething
asjarringasSocratesmakingwhatatfirstglanceappearstobeabadargument.

Thesecondmethodologicalassumptionisthateachdialogueisawholeuntoitself.To

beawholeuntoitselfeachofthedialoguesmusthaveaunitytothem.Ourtask,asactive
readersofadialogue,istodiscoverandgrasptheunity.Eachdialogue'sunitycanbegrasped
inmanyways,justastheunityofawagoncanbethoughtofasbeingcomposedoffiveparts,
oronehundredparts.Aslongasdifferentaccountsofadialogueallowustograsptheunityof
thedialoguetothesameextent,eachwillbeasgoodanaccountastheother.

Withallthisinmind,myhopeisthatthisbookaccomplishestwothings.First,thatit

suppliesanaccountoftheTheaetetusthatuncoversaprincipleofunityofthedialoguethatis
similartotheonePlatohadinmindwhilewritingthetext,andthatthisprincipleofunitytells

Introduction

TheguidingquestionintheTheaetetusis“whatisknowledge?”Thedialogueends

withoutSocratesandTheaetetushavinggivenanadequateaccountofwhatknowledgeis,and
asaresultitappearsthatthedialoguefailstoachieveitsgoalofgivingalogos

ofknowledge.

However,Iwillarguethatthereisawayinwhichtheirinabilitytogivealogosofknowledge
reallyconstitutesasuccess:thefailureofthedialogue’slogostocaptureknowledgeisin
accordwithitsimplicitproofthatknowledgeandlogosareincompatible.Inotherwords,the
dialogue’sinabilitytogivealogosofknowledgeconstitutesakindofproofthatthereis
neitheralogosofknowledgenoraknowledgeoflogos.

Thesuccessofthisproof,however,restsuponsomekindoflimitedknowledgeoflogos

andsomekindoflimitedlogosofknowledge.Thismeansthatthedialoguegivesusan
argumentlimitingtheconnectionbetweenknowledgeandlogosthatitselfrestsuponthatvery
connection.ThisisnotanoversightonPlato’spart.Rather,IwillarguethatPlatoisusingthis
reflexivityinordertodrawoutthedetailsofthelimitedconnectionbetweenthetwo.

Thebasicargumentfortheincompatibilityofknowledgeandlogosrestsontwopoints.

Thefirstisthatknowledgeisonlyofwhatis.Sincetobeistobeone,thismeansthat
knowledgeisalwaysofwhatisone.Thesecondisthatlogosisinherentlymultiple.The
inherentmultiplicityoflogosmeansthatanyattempttoexpresswhatisknownmustalwaysfail
becauseitmustalwaysmakesomethingthatisoneintosomethingthatismany.Yet,inorderfor
logostobemeaningful,whichisoneofthedialogue’sfundamentalassumptions,the
multiplicitythatlogoscontainsmustsomehowbethesameastheonenessthatitseeksto
express.Inshort,thedialogue’sfailuretogivealogosofknowledgeisinaccordwithits
implicitproofthattheonenessofknowledgeandthemanynessoflogosareincompatible,and
yettherecognitionofthisdependsupontheabilitytoconnecttheonenessofknowledgeandthe
manynessoflogos.

Thisbookattemptstomakesenseoftheconnectionbetweentheonenessofknowledge

andthemultiplicityoflogosbytryingtoclarifythewaysinwhichtheconnectionisandisnot
intelligible.Thisisnotmerelyanepistemicquestion;itisalsoanontologicalone.Inthe
Theaetetus,theonenessofknowledgeistieddirectlytotheonenessofbeing,andwewillsee
thatlogosistieddirectlytothemultiplicityinherentwithindistinctbeings.Thus,the
investigationintotherelationbetweentheonenessofknowledgeandthemultiplicityoflogos
isalsoamoregeneralinvestigationintotherelationbetweenonenessandplurality,andthat
betweenBeinganddistinctbeing.

PlatousesbothliteraryandphilosophicaldevicesintheTheaetetusinordertodirectthe

readers’thinkingtowardtheissuesinvolvedintherelationandoppositionbetweenoneness
andplurality.HerepresentstheoppositiondramaticallythroughParmenidesandHeraclitus.
TherefutationofTheaetetus’firstproperdefinitionofknowledge(“knowledgeis
perception”

)underminestheHeracliteanpositionthateverythingisinflux,whichholdsthat

thereisnobeingoroneness.Thediscussionoffalseopinion

followingTheaetetus’second

properdefinitionofknowledge(“knowledgeistrueopinion”

)underminestheParmenidean

positionthatallisOneandthereisnoplurality.Weareleftwiththedifficultyofworkingour

waythroughtheproblemsinvolvedinunderstandingthemiddlegroundbetweentheonenessof
ParmenidesandthepluralityofHeraclitus.

Thismiddlegroundisinherentlycontradictory.Therearemanywaysinwhichthis

contradictionexpressesitself,andmanydifficultiesinvolvedintryingtomakesenseofit.The
basicproblem,briefly,isthatwhileallbeingisOne,distinctbeingalsorequiresmultiplicity.

Thus,distinctbeingissomehowbothoneandmany.Buthowisthispossible?Tostatethe
sameproblemsomewhatdifferently:distinctbeingsarecomposedofparts,andyettobeisto
beone.Thus,aunitycomposedofpartsseemstobesomethingthatbothisandisnot.

Theconnectionbetweenonenessandknowledgemeansthatthisproblemofconnecting

onenessandmanyness,orofunderstandinghowthesamethingbothisandisnot,isdirectly
connectedtothequestion“whatisknowledge?”Wewillfindthattheaccountgeneratedbythe
recognitionthatdistinctbeingbothisandisnotleadstoanaccountwherewebothknowand
don’tknowthesamething.Asaresult,theaccountIamofferingcanbereadasanargument
thatconcludesthatallknowing(withthepossibleexceptionofknowledgeoftheOne)is
simultaneouslyanot-knowing.

Sketchofthebook’smainargument

Iwillgiveabriefoutlineoftheargumenthere.Theargumentisstrangeandnotasclearas

Iwouldlikeittobe,butthatmaybeunavoidablewhenarguingthateveryactofknowingis
alsoanactofnot-knowing.Eachdistinctbeingisamultiplicitythatissomehowheldtogether
asonethingbyaprincipleofunity.Theprincipleofunityofanydistinctbeingcannotitselfbe
apartofthatwhichitunifies,butrathermustexistseparatelyfromthemultiplicity.Sincethe
principleofunitymakestheunifiedobjectone,andonenessandbeingarethesame,itfollows
thatthebeingofthatwhichisunifiedexistsseparatelyfromtheobjectitallowstoexist.Since
theunifiedobject’sbeingiswhatitis,andsincethisbeingisseparatefromit,theunified
objectisnotwhatitis.Thismeansthatasimplegrasp(suchasanopinion[δόξα])ofaunified
objectbothisandisnotagraspofthatobject,forknowledgeoftheunifiedobjectrequires
graspinghowitisone,whichinturnrequiresgraspingitsprincipleofunity.But,sincethe
principleofunityisdistinctfromthatwhichitunifies,thisgraspoftheunifiedobjectbothis
andisnotknowledgeoftheunifiedobject.Theunifieraswell,ifitisalsobothoneandmany,
willitselfthenonlybeknownbygraspingitsprincipleofunity.Thus,theprocesswillrepeat
untilwereachthatwhichisentirelyone.ItfollowsthattheentirelyOneistheonlybeingthat
canbeunqualifiedlyknown,sincetheknowledgeofeverythingelseisasimultaneousknowing
andnotknowing.

Theprocessofrepeatedlyfindinghigherandhigherprinciplesofunitygenerateslevelsof

being,eachlowerleveldependingonthehigherforitsoneness.Therelationsbetweenthe
levelsofbeingareattherootoftheaccountoflogosIwillbeoffering.

Asaunificationof

disparateelements,logosaccomplishesthesamethingthattheunifierdoes.Thatis,a
successfullogosisonethatallowssomeonetograspanobject’sprincipleofunity.
Consideringlogos’sinherentmultiplicity,weseethattheabilityitgivessomeonetograsp
oneness(intheformofaprincipleofunity)mustalsoentailthelogositselfbeingleftbehind.
Assuch,ameaningfullogosshowsitselftobethetransitionfromalowerlevelofbeingtoa
higher.Inotherwords,ameaningfullogosovercomesitself.Thisisthesuccessofthe

Theaetetus,itgivesusalogosthatallowsustoabandonitsoastobeabletograspthe
principleofunitythatmakesthedialogueasinglelogosasopposedtoseveraldisconnected
logoi.Theprincipleofunityofthedialogueisthelevelsofbeing.Thelevelsofbeing,
however,arebothoneandmany.Thus,thelogosoftheTheaetetus,ifsuccessful,leadsusto
theneedforanewlogossothatwecangrasptheunityofthelevelsofbeing.

Thefollowingisabriefsummaryoftheprimarysectionsofthedialogue.Thiswillbe

followedbyabriefoutlineofthechaptersthatmakeupthebook.Thebreakdownofthe
chaptersdoesnotpreciselylineupwiththeprimarysectionsofthedialogue.Thereasonfor
thisshouldbecomeevidentinthebookitself.

Outlineoftheprimarysectionsofthedialogue

142a-151e:Thissectionbeginswiththedialogue’sexternalframe,inwhichPlatotellsushow
thediscussionbetweenSocrates,TheaetetusandTheodoruscametoberecorded,andinwhich
heraisesthequestionofwhatdistinguishesonelogosfromseverallogoi?Followingthe
frame,therearefourkeycomponentsinthissectionofthedialogue.Thefirstisanintroductory
conversationbetweenthedialogue’smaincharacters.Thesecondisaninitialattemptata
definitionofknowledge.Thefailureofthisattemptisfollowedbyexamplesofwhataproper
definitionis,includingTheaetetus’owndefinitionofincommensurablenumbers.Lastly,this
sectionincludesthefamousimageofSocratesasamidwife.

151e-187a:Thissectioncontainsthefirstproperdefinitionofknowledge:“knowledgeis
perception.”Thelengthyjustificationandrefutationofthisdefinitionincludesaninvestigation
andrefutationofProtagoras’“manisthemeasure”doctrine,andoftheHeracliteanposition
that“allisflux.”Thissectionisinterruptedbyaratherlengthydigressioncomparingthe
characterofthephilosopherwiththecharacterofthelawyer.Thesectionendswiththepivotal
argumentunderminingtheclaimthatknowledgeisperception,andprovingtheexistenceofthe
soulasaprincipleofunity.

187a-201c:Thissectioncontainsthesecondproperdefinitionofknowledge:“knowledgeis
trueopinion.”Thissectionisalmostentirelytakenupwithanattempttoanswerthequestion
“whatisfalseopinion?”

201c-210d:Thissectioncontainsthethirdproperdefinitionofknowledge:“knowledgeistrue
opinionwithalogos.”Socratesattemptstoexplainthisdefinitionbyappealingtoanatomistic
accountofnature,anaccountthathereferstoasa“dream.”Theinvestigationintothedream
containsthecentraldiscussionofthewhole(ὅλος)asacombinationoftheall(πᾶς)andthe
singlelook(εἶδος).Thedialogueconcludeswiththreeattemptsatadefinitionoflogos.

Outlineofbook’schapters

Chapter1(142a-184b):Thefirstchapterestablishesthefundamentaloppositionthatserves
asthegroundforthedialogue’saccount.TheoppositionisbetweentheOneandthemany,or,

toputitindramaticterms,betweenParmenidesandHeraclitus.Platogoestosignificant
lengthstogetthereadertorecognizethatallbeingsthatwecanthinkortalkaboutarebothone
andmany,arecognitionwhichsetsusuptofacethequestionofhowmultiplicitycanbeheld
togetherasone.Throughtheprocessofestablishingtheoppositionattheheartofthedialogue
chapter1alsooffersabroadsketchoftheargumentstocome.

Chapter2(184b-201a):Therelationbetweentheunifiedandtheunifierisestablishedbythe
pivotalargumentthatservesastherefutationofTheaetetus’firstproperdefinitionof
knowledge.Theexplicitroleoftheargumentinthedialogueistodisprovetheclaimthat
knowledgeisperception.Iwillarguethatitsimpactisfarmoresignificantthanitsimmediate
roleinthetext,andthatthisargument,whichprovestheexistenceofthesoulasaprincipleof
unity,isattheverycenterofthedialogue’saccount.Itisatranscendentalargumentthat,in
additiontoprovingtheexistenceofthesoul,alsooffersawaytoovercomethedistinction
betweenthoughtandbeing.Thisisfollowedbyananalysisofthediscussionoffalseopinion
thatfollowsTheaetetus’secondproperdefinitionofknowledge(“knowledgeistrueopinion”).
ThissectionsuppliesuswithbotharefutationofParmenides,andaproofthattheprincipleof
unitytranscendsthatwhichitunifies.Thepossibilityoffalseopinion,alongwiththeexistence
ofthesoulasaprincipleofunity,leadsustorecognizetheneedforlevelsofbeing,whichare
distinguishedfromoneanotherinsofarasthehigherlevelssupplytheprincipleofunityforthe
lowerlevels.

Chapter3(201c-210d):Oncethelevelsofbeinghavebeenestablished,wearefacedwiththe
taskoftryingtounderstandhowthelevelsofbeingarerelatedtoeachother.Thedifficult
issuesinvolvedintheserelationscomeoutinthediscussionfollowingTheaetetus’finalproper
definitionofknowledge(“knowledgeistrueopinionwithalogos”).Wewillseethatitisthe
functionoflogostoconnectthelevelsofbeing.Wefindthatasuccessfullogosisonethat
allowsthethinkertograspanobject’sprincipleofunity,andbydoingsoallowshimtograsp
thatobjectonahigherlevelofbeing.Inotherwords,chapter3seekstounderstandthe
samenessbetweenthelevelsofbeingbyattemptingtoaccountfortheconnectionbetweenthe
unifiedandtheunifier.Oneoftherepercussionsofthisisthatwefindthateverylogosrequires
multiplicity,and,asinherentlymultiple,itwillalwaysfallshortoftheobjectitseeksto
express.

Chapter4:Havingestablishedthelevelsofbeingandtheirrelationsinthepreviousthree
chapters,andhencehavingformedagraspofthedialogue’sprincipleofunity,wefind
ourselvesfacingthelimitationsoftheaccount.Thecentralproblemliesinthenecessityof
difference,whichisnecessaryforthepossibilityofthelevelsofbeing,whichinturnis
necessaryforbothdistinctbeingandintelligibility.Yet,asinherentlynotone,differencemust
beunintelligible.Thus,differenceendsupbeingbothnecessaryfor,andprohibitiveof,distinct
beingandintelligibility.Inthissense,chapter4isanattempttodistinguishtheintelligiblefrom
theunintelligible,whichamountstoanattempttounderstandthedifferencesbetweenthelevels
ofbeing.

Conclusion:Alongwithgivingasummaryoftheoverarchingaccount,theconclusionwill

brieflydiscusstheissuesthatarisefromgivingalogosthatarguesforthelimitedintelligibility
ofanylogos.

Notes

1.Ileavethewordlogoshere,insteadoftranslatingitas“account,”becausetheprecise

meaningofthetermisamajorissueinboththedialogueandthisbook.Fornowitwill
sufficetothinkofitasmeaningaccountinaverylooseandflexiblesense.

2.Thefirsttimethisdefinitionisgivenitisstatedas“οὐκἄλλοτίἐστινἐπιστήμηἢαἴσθησις,”

whichtranslatesto“knowledgeisnothingotherthanperception.”151e2-3.

3.187d-200d.
4.Thefirsttimethisdefinitionisgivenitisstatedas“κινδυνεύειδὲἡἀληθὴςδόξαἐπιστήμη

εἶναι,”whichtranslatesas“thereisachancethattrueopinionisknowledge.”187b5-6.

5.Thedialoguearguesfortheexistenceofdistinctbeingprimarilythroughtheassumptionthat

falseopinionispossible.Thisisthefocusofthesecondhalfofchapter2.

6.This,ofcourse,appliesnolesstotheaccountIamoffering.Theproblemofgivingan

accountofhowallaccountsareincompletewillbearecurringthemeinthisbook,andwill
betheprimaryissueintheconclusion.

7.Logosisthefocusofchapter3.

ChapterOne

TheOneandtheMany

Thefunctionofthischapteristhreefold:first,IwilllayoutwhatItaketobethe

fundamentaloppositionoftheTheaetetus,anoppositionwhichIargueservesasthestructuring
principleofthedialogue.Theoppositionispresentedinseveralways,andIwilltrytoshow
howPlatoisusingeachoftheserepresentationsoftheoppositiontoorientusinthedialogue’s
accountofknowledge.Second,IwillraisetheproblemsthatPlatoseeswitheachofthepoles
oftheopposition(thoughthemeatofhisrefutationswillbeputoffuntilchapters2and3).
Therearetworelatedproblemswitheachofthepoles:bothpolesdoawaywiththepossibility
ofcontradiction,andbothpolesunderminethepossibilityofmeaningfuldiscourse.The
avoidanceoftheseproblemspushesus(andTheaetetus)intoamiddlegroundbetweenthetwo
polesoftheopposition,amiddlegroundthatisbothcontradictoryandnonethelesstheonly
philosophicallyfruitfulground.Becausethedialoguedoesnotexplicitlypointtothe
oppositionasitsstructuringprinciple,thethirdsectionofthechapterwillconsistofmostly
dramatictextualevidencethatPlatowantsustofocusontheopposition.

Imagesrepresentingthedialogue’sfundamentalopposition

TherearetwoprimarydramaticrepresentationsoftheoppositionbetweentheOneand

Many.Thefirstisfoundinthedialogue’s“digression”andisrepresentedbytheopposition
betweenthephilosopherandthelawyer.ThesecondisrepresentedbySocrates’predecessors,
HeraclitusandParmenides.Bothoftheseoppositionsareexplicitinthedialogue.

IntheTheaetetus’famousdigression(172b-177c)Socratespresentsuswithtwo

completelydifferentkindsofpeoplewithantitheticallifestylesandcorrespondingly
antitheticalsouls.Thelawyersarethosewhohave“bouncedaroundinlawcourtsandsuch
placesfromtheiryouth,”andare“alwaystalkinginanunleisuredway,sinceflowingwateris
sweepingthemalong.”Theyaredescribedasslaveswho“fawnandwormtheirwayinto
favor,”being“smallandnotuprightintheirsouls.”Thephilosophers,ontheotherhand,know
nothingofthemattersthatconcernthelawyers.Thephilosopher“takesflight”inhissearchfor
“thenatureofeachandeveryoneofthebeingsasawholeandnotloweringitselfatalltoany
ofthethingsnearby.”Eachofthetwoisdescribedasalaughingstockwhenheisforcedinto
therealmoftheother.Thephilosopherisajokewhenheismadeto“discussthethingsathis
feetandinfrontofhiseyes.”Thelawyerisleft“helplessandstammering”whenheisdragged
upwardawayfromtheparticulars.Thus,thelawyerandhisrealmofever-flowingparticularity
issetapartfromthephilosopherandhisrealmofelevateduniversality.

TheTheaetetus’characters,nottoosurprisingly,seektoseparatethemselvesfromthe

lawyers.Socrates,speakingtoTheodorus,referstothephilosophersas“ourchoralgroup,”

classificationwhichTheodorusenthusiasticallyendorses.Socrates’nonconformitytotheclass
ofthelawyerisnosurprise.Hislackoffamiliaritywiththeirmodesofoperationisoften

mentionedinthedialogues.TheApologycontainsperhapsthebestknownofSocrates’claims
tocarryhimselfinamannerthatcouldnotbemoredifferentthanthatofthelawyers:“The
positionisthis:thisismyfirstappearanceinalawcourt,attheageofseventy;Iamtherefore
simplyastrangertothemannerofspeakinghere.”

Socratesspenthislifewithoutengagingin

(indeedavoiding)theactivitiesofthelawyer.ThereareentiredialoguesinwhichSocrates
standsopposedtotherhetoricofthelawyers.

Socrates’oppositiontothelawyersisthusnotanythingsurprising.Whatisvery

surprisingisthattheappropriatenessoftheclassificationofSocratesasaphilosopher
becomeshighlysuspectoncewetakenoticeofsomeoftheparticulardescriptionsappliedto
thisclass,descriptionsthatclearlydonotfitwithSocrates(letaloneTheodorus).The
philosopherisdescribedassomeonewhodoesnotknowhiswaytothemarketplace,butPlato
tellsuselsewherethatthisisnotSocrates.

Thedigressionassertsthatthephilosopherdoes

nottakeintoaccountlineage,yetSocratesistheonewhorecognizesTheaetetusasthesonof
EuphroniusofSuniumatthebeginningofthedialogue,andpraisesthequalitiesofhisfather.

ThedialogueevenconcludesbypointingtoSocrates’lackoffreetime(whichisallthe
philosopherhas)asheispulledawaybytheindictmentthatMeletushasdrawnupagainst
him.

Socrates,theembodimentofphilosophyinthePlatonicdialogues,doesnotfithisvery

owndescriptionofaphilosopher!

Itseemsthat,accordingtothedigression,notonlyis

Socratesnotalawyer,heisnotaphilosophereither.ButifSocratesisnotaphilosopher,then
whois?

Andyet,Socratesclearlysharessomequalitieswiththephilosophers.Perhapsthemost

tellingoftheseishisattachmenttouniversals.HiscriticismofTheaetetus’firstattemptata
definitionofknowledgeisdirectedpreciselyatitslackofuniversality.

Socrates,withhis

awarenessofparticularsandinterestinuniversals,representsacombinationof,orsomekind
ofintermediatebetween,thesetwoantitheticalclasses,whichinturnmeansthatSocrates
representsacombinationoftwoutterlydistinctsouls.

Theimportance,andthedifficulties,ofthisunifyingofantitheticalsisalsoreflectedina

secondthematicoppositioninthedialogue:theoppositionbetweenthosewhobelieveall
thingsareinmotionandthosewhobelieve“allthingsareoneanditstandsstillinitself.”

ThisistheoppositionbetweenSocrates’predecessors,Heraclitus(partneredwithProtagoras)
andParmenides.

Socratessuggestsaninvestigationofthetwomen

withthiswarning,

Butifbothsidesshowthemselvestobesayingnothingwithinmeasure,we’llbelaughedatifweconsiderourselvesto

haveanythingtosay,sincewe’relowlyfolkswho’dberejectingveryancientandthoroughlywisemenasunqualified.13

Socratesdoesindeedmakehimselfthebuttofthejoke,butonlypartially.Hedoesshowthat
neithersidehas“anythingtosay,”butthattheirinabilitytospeakisonlypartiallyaflaw.In
short,Socratesarguesthatintelligiblespeech(logos)requiresboththeonenessofParmenides
andthemultiplicityofHeraclitusbecauselogosentailsusingmanywords(ornames)to
representoneidea.Thus,eliminatingeitheronenessorpluralityunderminesthepossibilityof
logos.Onerejection(thatofHeraclitus)isexplicit,whiletheother(thatofParmenides)is
implicit.

Whatisleftaftertherejectionofthesetwowisemen?Iwillsuggestthatthemiddle

groundbetweenthelawyerandthephilosopher,wherePlatoplacesSocratesinthedigression,

isamirrorofthemiddlegroundbetweenHeraclitus(asapartnerofProtagoras)and
Parmenides.

Itdoesn’ttaketooin-depthalookatHeraclitusorParmenides(astheyarerepresentedin

theTheaetetus)toseewhySocratestakeshismiddlepositiontobelaughable.Socratesrefers
toHeraclitusinthedialogueasoneofthosewhoclaimthat

Nothingiseitheranyonethingorofanyonesort,butit’sfromrushingaroundandfrommotionandfromblendingintoone
anotherthatallthingscometobe—wesaythey“are,”notaddressingthemcorrectly,sincenothingeverisbutisalways

becoming.15

SocratesclaimsthatanypersonwhoadoptstheProtagoreanpositionthatmanisthemeasureof
allthingsmustalsoacceptthepositionofHeraclitusandhiswisepartners.TheProtagorean
positionitselfissuggestedasthedoctrineofanyonewhobelievesknowledgeisperception.
Theconnectionbetweenthesethreetheses(knowledgeisperception,manisthemeasure,and
allthingsareinflux)isnevermadeexplicitbySocrates,andthereismuchdebateaboutit.

takeitthatthegeneralpushoftheconnectionliesinthenotionofsubstance.Ifthereweresuch
athingassubstanceunderlyingandunifyingtheperceptiblepropertiesavailabletousthen
clearlyknowledgecouldnotbeperception:forperceptionseestheproperties,notwhat
underliesthem.

Alackofsubstanceentailsthattheonlythingsthatexistareperceptible

qualitites,andtheseperceptiblequalititesarealwayschanging.Thedeniersofbeingarethe
deniersofsubstance,andthedeniersofsubstancearethedeniersofprinciplesofunityand
stability.

ThereismuchlesssaidaboutParmenidesinthedialogue.Whatismadeclearisthat

Parmenidesdeniesmultiplicity.SocratesreferstoParmenidesasonewhoclaimsthat“sinceit
iswhollymotionless,beingisthesamefortheall,”and“allthingsareoneanditstandsstillin
itself,havingnoplaceinwhichtomove.”

Parmenidesdeniesmultiplicityandmotion,while

theothersdenyonenessandstillness.

Thus,Socratesseemstohavetoaffirmanddenymultiplicityandmotion,andaffirmand

denyonenessandstillness.Howcanthisbe?Therearetwocentralthemesthatariseoutof
situatingSocratesinbetweenParmenidesandHeraclitus.

Thesethemeswillbeinvestigated

throughoutthebook,butasawayoforientingtheinvestigation,Iwillgiveasketchofthetwo
issueshere(withtheunderstandingthatmuchoftheargumentationtheyrequirewillbeputoff
untillater).ThefirstisthatbothHeraclitusandParmenidesremovethepossibilityof
contradictionfromtheiraccounts(thoughtheyobviouslydosoinoppositeways),whileany
positionthatcombinesthetwowillhavetoincorporatecontradictionsomehow.Thesecond
issueisthatlogos(oranykindofexpressionofknowledge)becomesanimpossibilityforboth
ParmenidesandHeraclitus,andthatthegroundingforaviablelogosisacentralmotivationfor
Plato’sposition.

1.ImpossibilityofcontradictionforHeraclitusandParmenides

Thegeneralformofacontradictorystatementis“AisBandnotB.”

Thus,inorderto

allowforthepossibilityofcontradictiontheremustbesomeonething(A)andalsothatwhich
isnotA(BandnotB).Contradictionrequiresonenessandmanyness,forinacontradiction
someonethingmustbeandnotbesomethingelse.Heraclitusdoesawaywithcontradictionby

eliminatingoneness,whileParmenidesdoesawaywithcontradictionbyeliminatingmanyness.
Whatmiddlegroundistobefoundinbetweenthesetwo?Socrates’laughablepositioninthe
TheaetetusisacombinationofbothHeraclitusandParmenides,

acombinationthatrequires

awillingnesstoaccepttheworld,andourselves,ascontradictory.

MuchofthesecondaryliteratureonthepassagesinvolvingthePresocratics,particularly

thoseinvolvingProtagoras,seemstohaveoverlookedthisdoingawaywiththeprincipleof
non-contradiction.Inparticularthenumerousdiscussionsoftheperitropé,

haveexpended

muchthoughtandtalentonatopicthat,whileinterestinginitsownright,onthisaccount
becomesanonissueforProtagoras.

ThereisconsiderabledebateoverwhetherPlatois

successfulinprovingProtagoras’“manisthemeasure”doctrinetobeself-contradictory.Does
Protagorasavoidcontradiction,ordoesheembraceit?

Theargumentaboveshowsthatthere

isnothingtheretoavoidorembrace,sinceinorderforcontradictiontobeapossibilitythere
mustbeoneness,whichtheHeracliteanProtagorasdenies.

Theposition'sdenialoftheprincipleofnon-contradictionseemstoraisetheproblemthat

itmakesitimpossibletoexplainProtagoras’attempts(viaSocrates)togiveoverargumentsin
ordertoconvinceTheaetetusofhisdoctrine,for,afterall,anyargumentProtagorasmightuse
wouldpresupposetheprinciple.Butthisisreallyonlyanimageofaproblem,forProtagoras’
concernisnotthegivingoverofobjectivetruth(forthereisnone);rather,hisgoalis
persuasion.JustasProtagorasiswillingtomakeappealtocreationmythsinthedialogue
bearinghisname

inordertogiveastorythatwouldpersuadethecrowd,sotooProtagoras

usesargumentsinordertopersuade.Arguments,forProtagoras,cannothaveanygenuinetruth,
forthiswouldrelyupontheprincipleofnon-contradiction,whichisnomorerealthanthe
charactersofhismyths.Thischargeofusingargumentsforpersuasionandnottruthisleveled
againstProtagorasbySocrateshimselfat161e.Strikingly,Protagoras,throughthemouthof
Socrates,laysasimilarchargeagainstSocrates.

TheaccusationisthatSocratesisusing

“persuasivetalkandwhatseemslikelyinarguments”

insteadofgraspingwhatisnecessarily

thecaseasmathematicsdoes.Socratesdoesindeeddothis.TheTheaetetus’digression
referredtoaboveisanelegantpieceofSocraticsophistrythatusesrhetoricinanattemptto
underminerhetoric.

SotooProtagorasstrivestouseargumentationtoundermine

argumentation,despite(andbecauseof)thefactthatargumentscannothaveanystrongerclaim
tonon-existentobjectivetruththananyotherformofpersuasion.

AftereachoftheattemptstorefuteProtagoras,Socratesclaimsthat,whileTheaetetusmay

beconvinced,heissurethatProtagoraswouldnotbe.

Ontwooccasionsduringthefinalset

ofrefutations,Socratesquestionstheeffectivenessofhisowncriticism.Acloserlookatoneof
thesecriticisms,alongwithSocrates’criticismofhisowncriticism,shouldhelpmakeitclear
thatPlatoisdirectingustowardrecognizingtheneedforcontradiction.Intheperitropé,

SocratesarguesthatProtagoras,accordingtohisownaccount,mustdisbelievehisown
account.For,sinceProtagorasclaimsthatwhateachpersonholdsistrue,andsincemany
peopleholdthathisaccountisuntrue,Protagorashimselfmustagreewiththetruthofthe
beliefsthathisaccountisfalse,andhence,hemustbelievehisownaccounttobefalse.In
responsetothiscriticism,SocratessaysthatProtagoras

wouldpopouthisheadasfarastheneck,oncehe’drefutedmeinmanywaysforspeakingnonsense,whichislikely,and

youforagreeing,havingsunkback,he’dbesweptoffandrunningaway.31

WhatarewetomakeofthisbizarreimageofProtagoras’head?Whatisthe“nonsense”that
Socrateshasspoken?ThecontentofProtagoras’criticismshereisnotofferedexplicitly,but
theimagegivesusanideaofwhatitwouldbelike.Thereminderofthepervasivenessof
becomingisevidentintheimageofProtagoras’departure,anditistheall-pervasivenessof
Heraclitean(andhenceProtagorean)becomingthatentailstheeliminationofsubstance.But
thereismorethanjustareminderoffluxintheimage;theissuesofmeaningfuldiscourseand
contradictionarebeingsuggestedaswell.

TheimageofheadspoppingoutofthegroundoccursagaininAristotle'sDeAnima.In

bookIII,chapter6Aristotleaddressesthepossibilityoffalsehood.Heclaimsthat

thethinkingofindivisiblethingsisoneofthoseactsinwhichfalsehoodisnotpossible,andwherethereisfalsehoodaswell
astruththereisalreadysomekindofcompoundingofintelligiblethingsasthoughtheywereone—justasEmpedocles

says“upontheearthforeheadsofmanykindssproutedupwithoutnecks.”32

Thepossibilityoffalsehoodisdirectlyconnectedtotheissuesofcontradictionandmeaningful
discourse,whichAristotleisalsohereconnectingtotherelationofoneandmany.Thesemany
foreheads,Empedoclesgoesontosay,remainseparateuntilfriendship(orlove)comesalong
andputsthemtogether.Aristotle’sreferencetoEmpedoclespointstotheclaimthatthe
possibilityofthinkingwhatisfalsearisesoutofacompoundingofthemany“asthoughthey
wereone,”whilethethinkingofwhatisindivisibleadmitsofnofalsity.Thus,untilfriendship
unitesthemanypartsthereisnofalsity.Inshort,Protagoras(intheHeracliteanformhe
appearsintheTheaetetus)deniesthepossibilityoffalseopinionbecausehedeniesthe
love/friendshipfoundinEmpedocles.IntheTheaetetusthedenialoflove/friendshipiswhatI
abovereferredtoasthedenialofsubstance/ousia.

IntheSophist,therecognitionofthenecessityoftheoneandmanyforthepossibilityof

contradictionispresentinfullforce.TheEleaticstrangerclaimsthatknowledgeisonly
possiblebyrejecting“fatherParmenides”andcombiningbeingandnon-being(andthereby
alsodenyingProtagorasandHeraclitus).ThestrangerappealstoEmpedoclesinhissuggestion
thatthemany(non-being)beunifiedbyloveinordertoallowforknowledge(242d).Itakeit
thattheTheaetetus’imageofProtagoraspoppinghisheadupasfarastheneckrepresentsthe
manynessofEmpedocleswithouttheunifyingprinciple,i.e.,withoutsubstance(or,touse
Empedocles’term,love).Itisonlyhalfofwhatthestrangersuggestsweneedforknowledge.
Thedenialofsubstance,aspointedoutabove,isattheheartoftheaccountsthatmakeup
Theaetetus’seconddefinitionofknowledge.Withtheexistenceofsubstance,knowledgecannot
beofwhatisandbeperceptible.Platousestheaboveimagetotellusthatthecontentof
Protagoras’criticismsisnottheissue.Indeedthecontentcannotbetheissue,fortherecannot
beanygenuinecontentwithouttheonenessthatsubstancesupplies.Oncesubstanceandthe
principleofnon-contradictionhavebeenabandoned,argumentationbecomesmerelyanother
rhetoricaldevice.Ithasnogreaterclaimtotruththananyothermeansofdecidinghow
somethingappearstooneself.

Thus,theuseofargumentcannevercompelProtagorastoabandonhisposition.Whythen

doesSocratesbotherwithformulatingargumentsagainstthesophist?Theanswertothisis
obviouswhenoneremembersthatSocratesisamidwifelikehismother,exceptthathebirths

opinionsinsteadofbabies,

andthatintheTheaetetusheisnotattemptingtobirththe

opinion(s)ofProtagorasbutthoseofTheaetetus.Socrates’argumentsexposeacontradiction
notinProtagoras’position(foragainthisisimpossible),rathertheyexposeacontradiction
withinTheaetetus.HeshowsTheaetetusthathecannotconsistentlyacceptboththeprincipleof
non-contradictionandbelievethat“manisthemeasureofallthings.”SinceTheaetetusdoes
accepttheprinciple,

hethereforecannotbelievethatmanisthemeasure.

ThetwisthereisthattheappealtoSocrates’midwiferymeansthattherefutationof

ProtagorasisparticulartoTheaetetus,foritisonlyinrelationtoTheaetetus’otherbeliefsthat
Protagoras’accountmustfail.OrtoputitinmoreProtagoreanterms,Socratesisusing
TheaetetusasthemeasureofTheaetetus’ownbeliefs:Theaetetusisthemeasureofallthings
forTheaetetus!InconvincingTheaetetusthatProtagoras’positionisunacceptabletohim
becauseofhisownbeliefs,Socratesisoperatingwithinthesubjectiverealm(ofTheaetetus),
whichispreciselytherealmchampionedbyProtagoras.

Thedifferencehere,however,isthat

itisnotperceptionthatmakesmanthemeasure,itisopinion.Itisnocoincidencethatitis
opinionthatmarksoffTheaetetus’nextdefinitionofknowledge.

Thefutilityofarguing

againstProtagoras(andHeraclitus),andthecorrespondingrecognitionthatProtagorasisonly
leftbehindbecauseSocratesisservingasmidwifetoTheaetetus,allresultsfromthe
impossibilityofapplyingtheprincipleofnon-contradictionwithinProtagoras’“account.”

Movingnowtotheotherpole,itisnoteworthythatPlatodoesnotsaymuchexplicitlyin

regardstoParmenidesintheTheaetetus.Thereislittletextualevidenceinthedialoguefor
Parmenides’denialoftheprincipleofnoncontradiction.Socratesclaimstobeafraidtotalk
about,letalonecriticize,fatherParmenides.Thereare,however,severalargumentsexplicitly
directedatfatherParmenidesintheSophist,andwhilenoneofthemexplicitlymentionthe
principleofnon-contradiction,itsrelevancetothediscussionthereisunquestionable.Oneof
theargumentsagainstParmenidesbeginswiththeassumptionthat“weneedtouseevery
argumentwecantofightagainstanyonewhodoesawaywithknowledge,understandingand
intelligencebutatthesametimeassertsanythingatallaboutanything”.

Thestrangerclaims

thatParmenidesdoesjustthisbydenyingthepossibilityofmotion,asdothebelieversinflux
bydenyingthepossibilityofrest:

Thephilosopher—thepersonwhovaluesthesethings[knowledge(ἐπιστήμη),intelligence(φρόνησις)andunderstanding
(νοῦς)]themost—absolutelyhastorefusetoaccepttheclaimthateverythingisatrest,eitherfromthedefendersofthe
oneorfromfriendsofthemanyforms(εἶδος).Inadditionhehastorefusetolistentopeoplewhosaythatthatwhichis
changesineveryway.Hehastobelikeachildbeggingfor“both”andsaythatthatwhichis—everything—isboththe

unchangingandthatwhichchanges.38

Inordertoallowforknowledgewemustbewillingtoacceptthecoexistenceofthecontraries,
restandmotion.ThisParmenidescannotdo,forinhisassertionofutteronenesshehasdone
awaywithanycontraries.

AllofthissuggeststhatwhatPlatoistryingtodointheTheaetetus(andtheSophist)is

carveoutthemiddle,contradictory,groundbetweentheOneandtheMany.Thepossibilityof
contradictionisthefirstissuethatdependsonthismiddleground.Thepossibilityoflogosis
thesecond.

2.ImpossibilityoflogosforHeraclitusandParmenides

Thesecondissuetotakenoteofhere,andonethatisbothcentraltotheTheaetetusasa

wholeandamajorfocusoftheupcomingchapters,istheconsequencesthatthepositionsof
ParmenidesandHeraclitushavefortheabilitytogivealogos,ortoputitinthetermsused
above,theissueiswhyHeraclitusandProtagorashavenothingtosay.

Iflogosinvolvesthe

relatingofpartstoawholeasthelastsectionofthedialoguesuggests,

thenbothParmenides

andtheadvocatesoffluxwillbeunabletogivealogos.Parmenidesisunablebecausethere
arenoparts,whiletheadvocatesoffluxlackthenecessarywhole.Thisisoneofthe
“refutations”thatSocratesgivesofHeraclitustowardtheendofthediscussionofthesecond
definition.

Thestructureoftheargumentisasfollows.

Therearetwokindsofmotion:localmotionandalteration.Thosewhosaythateverything

isinmotionmustsaythateverythingisinbothkindsofmotion,forotherwiseitwouldbejust
astruetosaythateverythingismovingandnotmoving.Butifeverythingisinbothkindsof
motion,thenthelocalmotionthatbringstheperceiverandperceivedtogethercannotbesaidto
bringtogethera“certainsortness”(ποιότης)

withaseeing,forthesortnessmustbean

altering,asmusttheseeing.Thus,inclaimingtoseewhitenessImustalsobeseeingwhat
whitenesschangesfromandto,i.e.,not-whiteness.AndinseeingImustalsobenot-seeing.
Thus,thenameofseeingshouldnotbeattachedtotheactofseeinganymorethannot-seeing
shouldbeattached.Seeingisperceiving.Thus,perceivingisnodifferentthannot-perceiving.
Therefore,tosaythatknowledgeisperceptionisalsotosaythatknowledgeisnotperception.
Inshort,oncewedoawaywithunchangingsubstance,wedoawaywithanymeaningful
discourse.

Theoverallpointhereisthattheacceptanceoftheclaimthatknowledgeisperception,

becauseofitsdenialofoneness,isincompatiblewithanykindofrationalaccount.Thetwoare
incommensurable.

Indenyingsubstance,Protagorashaseffectivelyunderminedany

possibilityoflogicalcriticism,forlogicalcriticismoperatesthroughdisplayingcontradiction,
andcontradictionrequirestheonenessfoundinsubstance.

MeaningfullogosisimpossibleinaParmenideanworldaswell.Oneoftheprimary

refutationsofParmenidesintheSophistfocusesspecificallyontheimpossibilityofgenuinely
Parmenideanspeech.Thestrangerpointsoutthatsimplybysayingthat“onlyonethingis”the
Parmenideanhasunderminedhisposition.Thename(theone)iseitherthesameaswhatis
namedordifferentfromit.Itcannotbedifferentforthenwehavetwothings,thename“one”
andtheoneitself.Ifthenameisthesameaswhatitnamestheneitherthenamenamesnothing,
orelseitmustbethenameofitself.Thefirstoptionisdismissedasempty.Thesecondentails
usagreeingthatthenameoftheoneistheoneofthename,whichalsoisdismissedas
absurd.

Inshort,languagerequiresbothasignifierandasignifiedifitistorefer.The

discussionofParmenidesintheSophistisfarmorecomplicatedthanIamsuggestinghere,and
mydiscussionoffalseopinioninchapter2willrequireustogomuchfurtherintothemeatof
whatthestrangerhastotellusthere,butthissimpleargumentisenoughtoshowthebasic
incompatibilityofParmenides’accountandaccountsingeneral.

LogosentailsamanynessthatParmenideshasdoneawaywith.Perhapsweshouldtake

Socrates’suggestionintheTheaetetusthathecannotdoParmenidesjusticeasareflectionof

hisviewthatthereisnologosthatcanactuallycaptureParmenides’position,thoughhetellsus
thatthisisonlypartoftheproblem:“I’mafraidthatwewon’tunderstandwhatwassaid(τὰ
λεγόμενα),andthatwe’llbeleftmuchfurtherbehindwhathewasthinkingwhenhesaidit.”

ItshouldbeevidentwhattaskPlatoissettingbeforeushere.Plato,simplybyappealing

tologicalinvestigation,isarguingforcombiningtheunchangingonenessofParmenidesandthe
un-unifiedmotionofHeraclitus.Socrateshimselfsaysasmuch,claimingthat“advancinglittle
bylittle,wehaveunwittinglyfallenbetweenthetwoparties.”

Iwillarguethattheprinciple

thatunifiestheseopposedaccountsforPlatoisthesoul.Itisinthisveryregardthatthe
Theaetetusistobeunderstoodasadisplayofthehumansoul,asSocratessuggestsatthe
beginningoftheinvestigationintoknowledge.

Plato’scarvingoutofthismiddlegroundworksbyarguingagainstthepolesofthe

oppositionwhichserveastheboundariesofthecontradictoryrealmofmeaningfuldiscourse.
This,ofcourse,requiresrefutationsofbothHeraclitusandParmenides.Thedetailsofthe
refutationsarecomplicatedandwilltakeupthebulkofchapter2.Fornowitwillsufficeto
prefacethisdiscussionwithageneraloutlineofthearguments.

WeareledoutofthestrictlyHeracliteanlandscapeintherefutationofTheaetetus’second

definitionofknowledge,thatknowledgeisperception,byrecognizingtheneedforaoneness
underlyinganychange.ThisonenessisexplicitlyseenasarefutationofHeraclitus,anditis
groundedintheacceptanceofthepossibilityofmeaningfuldiscourse.Thereareseveralstages
tothisrefutation.TherearedistinctrefutationsforProtagoras(manisthemeasure),Heraclitus
(allthingsareinflux)andTheaetetus(knowledgeisperception).Thecommonthreadthrough
thesethreeconnectedpositions,assuggestedabove,isthatallofthemdenythatthereis
substance,i.e.,aonenessthatprovidesthebeingofwhatisandpersiststhroughchange;
withoutthisonenessweloseallmeaning.

WeareledoutofanystrictlyParmenideanlandscape(thoughonlyimplicitly)byboththe

secondandthethirddefinitionsofknowledge,eachofwhich,invirtueoftheirfalseness(and
ourabilitytorecognizethatfalseness),showustheneedforplurality.For,asIwillarguein
chapter2,thedialogueshowsusthatfalseopinionrequiresthatonethingexistondifferent
levelsofbeing,andthatallerrorisamistakingofonelevelforanother.Thedistinctness
betweenlevelsofbeing(whichwillbeinvestigatedinchapter4)obviouslymeansthat
everythingcannotbeentirelyone.

Inshort,therefutationofHeraclitusshowsustheneedfortheonenesshisaccountis

lacking,whiletherefutationofParmenidesshowsustheneedforthepluralityhisaccountis
lacking.Thefourthandfinaldefinition(knowledgeistrueopinionwithalogos)developsthe
issuesthataretobefacedbythenewpathcarvedoutinbetweenPlato’spredecessors.

Wewillseethatthesenseinwhichtherefutationsofthetwoopposedpositionscome

togetheristhesameasthesenseinwhichthepossibilityforcomingtoknowariseswiththe
possibilityforerror.BothParmenidesandHeraclitus,indoingawaywiththepossibilityfor
contradiction,havedoneawaywiththepossibilityforerror.Itisindemonstratingto
Theaetetusthathebelieveserrortobepossiblebyarguingforthefalsenessofoneofhis
opinions(hisfalseopinionthatknowledgeistrueopinion),thatParmenidesisfirstcastaside
andHeraclitusisonceagainshowntobeinsufficient.Thepossibilityoffalseness,

orerror,

servesasarefutationtobothHeraclitusandParmenides.Forfalsenessentailstheprincipleof

non-contradiction,whichbothHeraclitusandParmenideshavedoneawaywith.

Evidencethattheoppositionissupposedtobefocusedon

TheprecedingispreparationfortheaccountIwillbearguingfor,withageneralsketchof

someoftheargumentationthatisused.Thefunctionoftheprecedingforetasteistoserveasa
kindofground-clearingfortheaccounttocome.ThisreadingoftheTheaetetus,however,is
notacommonone,andasaresultitmaybeusefultooffersomedramatictextualjustification
forthereading,beforeturningtotheargumentsthemselves.

Platofillshisdialogueswithmarkerstoindicatedirectionshistextscango.These

markerscomeinmanyforms:typesofcharacters,settings,events,digressions,myths,frames,
andmanyothers.Whilegenerallythesedonotserveasconvincingargumentsontheirown,
theycan,whenseenasfittingtogether,supportaparticularreading.Thefollowingarethree
suchmarkersthatIsuggestPlatoisusingintheTheaetetustopointusinthedirectionofthe
oppositionoutlinedabove.Allthreeofthefollowingmarkerstakeplaceinthedialoguebefore
Theaetetus’firstproperdefinitionofknowledge(andsecondattempt).

Firstmarker:theframe(142a-143d)

ThediscussionbetweenEuclidesandTerpsionintheopeningframesuggeststhe

oppositioninquestioninacontextthatremainscentralthroughoutthewholedialogue.Euclides
tellshowhecametohearthelogoi(“words”—plural)ofSocratesandTheaetetus.Thenafter
explaininghisrepeatedprocessofwritingnotesquickly,thenfillinginthenotes,thenchecking
backwithSocratesforcorrections,heclaimsthathewasabletogetsomethingprettymuch
liketheπᾶςὁλόγος(“thewholetalk”—singular).Thereareatleasttwothingssuggested
herebyPlato.Thefirstisthatthereisadifferencebetweenanununifiedcollectionofwords
andaunifiedcollectionofwords.Thesecondisthat(ifEuclidesisright)thereissome
processthatisabletoturntheoneintotheother.Thisactofunification,Iwillargue,iswhat
weengageinwhenwecometoknow.WewillseethatEuclides’methodforturninglogoiinto
alogosmirrorsthedefinitionsofknowledgeofferedinthedialogueproper.Euclides’hearing
ofthewordscorrespondswiththedefinitionofknowledgeasperception.Hiswritingthe
wordsdowncorrespondswithknowledgeastrueopinion(opinionbeingdefinedbySocrates
laterinthedialogueasassertingthesamethingoverandover,

asthewrittenworddoes).The

checkingwithSocratescorrespondswiththeadditionofalogostotrueopinion.Acceptingthat
Euclides’methodrecallstheprocessoutlinedinthedialogue,andprovisionallyacceptingthat
thisprocessistiedtocomingtoknow(asIwillargue)meansthat,intheframeofthedialogue,
Platoconnectstheturningoflogoiintologoswithcomingtoknow.Comingtoknow
correspondswithanactofunificationthatissomehowintimatelyboundupwithalogos
comingoutoflogoi.Thequestionthatwereadersarefacedwithintheframeiswhetherornot
Plato’sTheaetetusisalogos(acoherentunifiedwhole)orwhetheritislogoi(justa
collectionofwords).Theanswer,asIhopetoshowinchapter3,isthatthedialogue’sfailure
tounitethelogoiintoalogosispreciselywhatprovidesthedialoguewithitsunityandhence
qualifiesitasalogos.Or,toputitinthetermsusedbefore,theprincipleofonenessinthe
dialogueistherecognitionthatnologoscanevertrulycaptureaprincipleofoneness.Thefact
thatthisquestionisraisedinthecontextoflogosismeaningfulinrelationtothepointmade

earlier,i.e.,thattheoppositionbetweentheoneandthemanyhasseriousimplicationsforthe
possibilityofanymeaningfullogos.TheTheaetetus’framenotonlyorientsusaroundthis
issue,butitalsosuggests,throughEuclides’struggletocapturethedialogue,thatachievingthe
unityofalogosisadifficult,timeconsuming,task.

Secondmarker:firstattempttodefineknowledge(146c-148d)

Platoagainsuggeststheone/manythemeofthedialogueinTheaetetus’firstattemptata

definitionofknowledge.

ItisnotanuncommonfeatureofPlatonicdialoguestobeginwiththe

interlocutoransweringSocrates’requestforadefinitionwitheitheralistofmanyexamples,or
oneinstanceoutofalistofmanypossibleexamples.

Socrates’denialthateitherofthese

typesofanswersareasatisfactoryformofdefinitionisuniversal,buthisexpressionofthis
denialisnotalwaysthesame.TherearetwogeneraltypesofresponsethatSocratesgivesto
thesedefinitions.Inresponsetothegivingofasingleexample(orinstance)ofanactionthatis
takentoexemplifythetermtobedefinedSocrateseithershowsthat(1)theexamplecanalso,
incertaincases,bebad,therebyunderminingitsabilitytobethedefinitionofthatwhichis
alwaysgood,

or(2)Socratespointsouttotheinterlocutorthemanyexamplesthathehasleft

offthathethinksfallunderthetermtobedefined.TheEuthyphroexplicitlystatesthisasthe
problem.SocratesrespondstoEuthyphro’ssuggestionthatpietyisprosecutingthe
wrongdoer

bygettingEuthyphrotoagreethat“therearemanyotherpiousactions.”

Thelatterformofresponseistopointoutthatalistofexamplesfailstocapturethe

onenessofthedefinitionbeingsought.This,inafewplaces,elicitsfromSocratessomekindof
commentalongthelinesof“Iamingreatluck,Meno;whileIamlookingforonevirtue,Ihave
foundyoutohaveawholeswarmofthem.”

Itisthissecondtypeofdefinitionandresponse

thatwegetintheTheaetetus:

The ae te tus:Itseemstome,then,boththethingsonemightlearnfromTheodorusarepiecesofknowledge,geometryand
whatyouwentoverjustnow,andalsoskillatleather-cuttingandtheartsoftheothercraftsmen—eachandeveryoneof
theseisnothingotherthanknowledge.
Socrate s:It’scertainlywellbredandgenerousofyou,dearfellow,whenyou’reaskedforonething(ἕν),togivemany

(πολλά)andvariedthings(ποικίλα)insteadofsomethingsimple(ἁπλοῦ).57

Thereareacoupleofdialogues(theTheaetetusisoneofthem)inwhichSocratesfollowsup
hisinitialresponsetodefinitionbyexamplebydefiningatermfortheinterlocutor.

Socrate s:Inthenextplace,onewhohasitinhim,surely,toanswerinalowkeyandbriefway,isgoingaroundalongan
endlessroad.Forexample,inthequestionaboutmud,itwouldsurelybealow-keyandsimplethingtosaythatmudwould

beearthmixedwithliquid,andtosaygoodbyetowhoeverusesit.59

Onthesurface,allSocratesisdoinghereisgivingtheinterlocutoranexampleofwhat
Socrateshopestogetfromhim.Butlookingcloser,weseethatSocratesisdoingexactlywhat
heiscriticizingtheinterlocutorfordoing,i.e.,heisgivingaparticularexampleofadefinition
asastandinforadefinitionofdefinition,seeminglymakingtheassumptionthatthe
interlocutorwillbeabletomakethegeneralinferencethatisrequiredforhimtoapplythe
methodofdefinitiontothequestionathand.Sotootheinterlocutorisgivingaparticular
example(orinTheaetetus’caseacollectionofexamples)withtheexpectationthatSocrates
willbeabletomakethegeneralinferencetotheuniversaldefinition.Inshort,Socratesseems

tobecriticizingtheattempttodefinebyexamplebyshowingbyexamplethatdefinitiondoes
notentailexample.Orinotherwords,Socrates’explanationoftheproblemwithdefiningby
exampleappliestotheexplanationitself.

Socratescouldavoidthisproblembygivingadefinitionofdefinition,asopposedtoan

exampleofadefinition,andtherebybeinaccordwithhisownstandards.Whydoesn’thedo
this?TheanswerthattherestofthisbookwillbearguingforisthatSocratesdoesnotdothis
because,onhisownaccount,itisimpossible.Thereisnodefinitionthatcanbestatedthatcan
actuallyreflectwhatisbeingdefined.Thisappliesnottojusttheattempttodefineknowledge
undertakenintheTheaetetus.Alldefinitionswillbeincompletebecausethereisaninherent
incompatibilitybetweenknowledgeandexpression.This,ofcourse,wouldmeanthatSocrates
isaskingtheinterlocutortodotheimpossible.

Thereisquiteabitinthesecondaryliteraturedealingwithsomeofthemultitudeofissues

thatariseoutofSocrates’discussionsofexamplesandtheirrelationstodefinitions.Acommon
elementofthesediscussionsistherecognitionthataproperdefinitionshouldreflectthe
elementsoftheessenceofthatwhichisdefined.InthewordsofAlexanderNehamas,“toknow
whatxisandthustoknowxitselfisjusttoknowitsessentialproperties.”

Thisnotionof

knowledgethroughdefinitionbygivingessentialpropertiesiscompatiblewithPlato,butitis
nonethelessseriouslyproblematic.ThefinalportionoftheTheaetetusisadisplayofthe
problemsinvolved.Thesecondandthirddefinitionsofknowledgeinthedialogueraisethe
problemwiththisnotionofdefinitionfromoppositesides.

Thesesideswillbelookedatin

somedetailinchapter2(andthenagaininchapter3),butwecangetapreviewoftheoverall
problembylookingatwhatAristotlehastosayaboutthenotionofdefinitioninthePosterior
Analytics.

Aproperdefinitionofasubstance,accordingtoAristotle,doesinvolvetheessential

attributesofwhatisdefined.TherearefourkindsofessentialattributesthatAristotlelistsin
thePosteriorAnalytics,oneofwhichispartofthesubstance’sdefinition.

Yet,insofarasthe

attributesarewhattheydefine,theycannottrulybeattributes.Ifthedefinitionofasubstance
weresimplyattributes(essentialorotherwise)thentherewouldbenothingfortheattributesto
actuallybelongto.Attributesbelongtosubstances.Thus,todefineasubstanceasacollection
ofattributesistodoawaywiththeverythingtheattributesthemselvesdependon.Inshort,we
givethesubstancebylistingessentialattributesthatarenotactuallyattributes.Thiscomesout
inAristotle’sdifferentiatingbetweenthatwhichisdefinedandthatwhichisdemonstrated.He
says:

Everydemonstrationprovessomepredicateofsomesubject,eitheraffirmativelyornegatively;butinadefinitionnothingis
predicatedofanythingelse;“animal”isnotpredicatedof“two-footed”norviceversa,noris“figure”predicatedof

“plane”;aplaneisnotafigure,norafigureaplane.63

Tobeistobeone.Thus,thedefiniendum,insofarasitis,isonething;onethingthatis
describedbyessentialproperties,butisnotitself,astheessence,predicated.Yet,adefinition
alsomustentailgenusanddifferentia,whichmustbedifferent.Hence,thestatementofany
definitionmustreflectthatwhichisone,andyetmustalsoentailamultiplicityofparts.

AristotleraisesthisveryissueasanimpasseinMetaphysicsZ.13.Afterarguingthatno
substancecanbemadeoutofuniversals,andnosubstancecanbecomposedofother

actualitiesAristotlesays:

Sothattherecannotbeanarticulationinspeech(logos)ofanyindependentthing(ousia).Butsurelyitseemstoeveryone
andhasbeensaidfromearliesttimesthatadefinitionbelongstoanindependentthingeithersolelyormostofall;butnowit
seemsnottobelongtothiseither.Thereforetherewillbenodefinitionofanything;orinacertainwaytherewillbeandin

acertainwaytherewillnot.65

ThiscaptureswhatliesattheheartoftheTheaetetus,andtheupcomingdiscussion.Any
definition,andmoregenerallyanylogos,

isinvirtueofbeingoneinsomeway.Toconvey

theoneness,however,requiresarepresentingofthatonenessinparts.Ameaningfullogos
somehowrepresentsonenessthroughplurality(oratleastthroughmanyones).Wewillsee,
primarilythroughthefinalrefutationof“knowledgeisperception,”thatforPlatothisone/many
necessityforexpressionbelongsnotjusttoexpression,butalsototheobjectsbeingexpressed.
Inotherwords,theneedforaunifyingoftheoneandthemanyisnecessaryforbothlogoiand
beings.

Therearetwotypesofdefinitionofferedasexamplesofdefinitionintheseearlystagesof

thedialogue.Thefirstisthedefinitionofmudasearthmixedwithwater,suppliedbySocrates
andquotedabove.ThesecondistheonegivenbyTheaetetus.

Theaetetus,andhisfriend

(young)Socrates,comeupwithauniversaldefinitionforcommensurable(σύμμετρος)and
incommensurable(οὐσύμμετρος)number.Thedefinitiondifferentiateslength(μῆκος)from
potency(δύναμις),alengthbeingthesideofanequilateralnumberandapotencybeingthe
sideofafigurethatcanonlyberepresentedcommensuratelywithanonequilateral
quadrilateral.ThereismuchdiscussionabouttheparticularsofTheaetetus’mathematical
insight,butthepointrelevantforusisthatTheaetetus’definition,whichearnshighpraisefrom
Socrates,isunlikethedefinitionSocratesofferedjustamomentbefore.Theaetetushasnot
brokendownthedefiniendumintoitsparts,rather,hehasshownittobea“part”ofalarger
whole.Inshort,Theaetetushasdefinedincommensurableandcommensurablenumbersas
speciesofnumber,amethodthatdiffersfundamentallyfromSocrates’breakingthe
definiendumintoparts.Indeed,Theaetetus’definitionseemstoberightinlinewiththemethod
ofdivisionthatTheaetetuslearnsfromthestrangeronthedayafterhisdiscussionwith
Socrates,asdisplayedintheSophist.

Theaetetushasgivenusadefinitionthatoperatesby

dividingagenusintoultimatedifferentiae.

Thesetwomethodsofdefinitionbothoperatebyrelatingaoneandamany,thoughtheydo

soindifferentways.Socrates’exampledividesaoneintoamany,whileTheaetetus’example
startsbyrecognizingthatwhatistobedefinedisa(single)partofamanythatmakeupalarger
one.Thismirrorstheoppositionbetweenthelogosandthelogoiraisedintheframe,butherea
newquestionisadded:dowegraspthelogosthroughthelogoi,ordowegraspthelogoi
throughthelogos?Orinotherwords,isthewhole(i.e.,theoneness)knownthroughtheparts
(themany),orarethepartsknownthroughthewhole?Thesetwomethodsofdefinitionboth
comebackintoplayinthephilosophicallyloadeddiscussionofTheaetetus’finaldefinitionof
knowledge(as“trueopinionwithalogos”),andbothprove,ontheirown,tobeinsufficientto
supplyknowledge.Theirpositioningbeforethefirstproperdefinitionofknowledgeonceagain
orientsus,thereaders,aroundtheone/manythemesuggestedabove.

Thirdmarker:Socraticmidwifery(149a-151d)

Thefinalhintofthedialogue’sthemethatIwillsuggestisthemostopaque,andyetalso

themostwell-known.ItisSocrates’comparinghimselftoamidwife.Theissuesrelatedtothe
oneandthemanyarenotmentionedexplicitly,norareParmenideanbeingandHeraclitean
becoming,butpushingtheanalogyonlyslightlyleadsustothem.Themarkerbecomesclear
oncewerecognizeaproblemwithSocrates’analogy(betweenhisartandhismother’sart).

Socratestellsusthattherearecertainrequirementstobeamidwife:nowomanmaybea

midwife“whilesheherselfisstillconceivingandbearing,butonlythosewhonolongerhave
thepowertogivebirth.”

ThecauseforthisisthatthegoddessArtemisiswithoutmateor

child,andyethaschildbirthallottedforherprotection.However,sincehumannatureis“too
weaktograspanart[τέχνη]dealingwiththingsithasnoexperienceof”ithasthereforenot
beengrantedto“barrenwomentobemidwives.”

Thus,itisallottedtothosewhooncegave

birthbutarenolongerabletodosotobemidwives.

TheproblemarisesoncewerecognizethatSocrateshimselfisnotonlycurrentlybarren

ofanywisdombuthehasalsoalwaysbeenso:“TheGodcontinuallyforcesmetobea
midwifebut(eachtime)preventsmefromgeneratinganything.Imyself,then,amnotatall
anybodywise,norhasanydiscoveryofthatsortbeengeneratedinmeastheoffspringofmy
soul”(150c-d).ThusSocratesbothclaimsthecriteriaformidwiferyarepreviousbirthand
thathehasnevergivenbirth.HowthencanSocratesconsiderhimselfamidwife?

Therearetwopossibleinterpretationsthatcangivemeaningtotheseemingly

contradictoryanalogy.They,intypicalPlatonicfashion,contradictoneanother,andyetboth
seemtobetruetoanextent.

(1)Thisparticularproblemwiththemidwifeanalogydisappearsifitisimpossibleforbeings
subjecttobodilyexperiencetogivebirthtothatwhichistrueborn,i.e.,ifitisimpossibleto
cometohaveknowledge.IfthatisthecasethenSocrates’lackofwisdomcan’tpreventhim
frombeingabletobirththatwhichhedoesnot,andhasnever,had.SinceSocrateshasbirthed
wind-eggs

hehashadtheonlyexperiencethatisrequiredofthemidwifetothehumansoul.

Socrates’currentstateofbarrennessissimplyareferencetohiswellreferencedclaimthathe
knowshedoesn’tknow,i.e.,hedoesnothaveanyopinions(windeggs)thatneedbirthing.In
shortnopreviousexperiencehavingbirthedtruebornoffspringisnecessaryforthemidwifeof
thesoulbecausethisisnotsomethingtheywilleverhavetodoasamidwifetoanother.This
interpretationleavesthequestionofwhySocratesclaimsthathismidwiferyneedsto
distinguishbetweentherealandthewind-eggwhentherealisnotapossibility.Thiscanbe
explainedaway(whichisreallyallthatthisinterpretationcando)byrecognizingwhat
Socratesistryingtoaccomplishwiththeanalogy:heistryingtoencourageTheaetetusto
inquireintothequestion“whatisknowledge?,”eveninthefaceofTheaetetus’(rightful)self-
doubt.

Theimpossibilityoftruebirthisfarfromtheencouragementthattheanalogyintends.

SoitisforTheaetetus’sakethatSocratesmakestheclaimaboutrealbirths.

(2)ThesecondinterpretationstartsbyrecognizingthatintheanalogySocratesisreally
comparinghimselftoArtemisratherthanhismotherandtheothermortalmidwives.

Forboth

ArtemisandSocratesareputovermidwiferywithoutthemselveseverhavinggivenbirth.On
thisinterpretationweareledtoseeafundamentaldifferencebetweenSocrates’artandtheart
ofhismother.Theneedforexperienceinbirthinordertobeanordinarymidwifestemsfrom
theclaimthathumannatureis“tooweaktograspanartdealingwiththingsithasno
experienceof.”Socrates’artdoesnotrequireexperiencebecauseitis,insomeway,not
human.RatherwhatSocratesdoesismorelikeArtemis,i.e.,itisdivine.Theneedfor
experiencearisesinthematerialrealm;Socrates’arthasleftthatrealmbehind.Intheuseof
reason

experience(i.e.,bodilyexperience)isnolongerneeded—infactnotonlyis

experiencenotneededinSocrates’art,itiswhatcausestheneedforSocrates’artinthefirst
place.Inotherwords,itisthroughexperiencethatoneacquiresthewind-eggs.

Thus,onewayofresolvingtheapparentinconsistencyintheimageofthemidwifeisto

recognizethelimitednatureofmortalman.Itisbecauseofthislimitednaturethatwerequire
experienceinordertopracticeacraft.Itisas“beings”(or,moreappropriately,becomings)in
theworldofchangethatwewillneverbirthknowledge.Inotherwords,Socrates’barrenness
isauniversalbarrenness.Thisuniversallackofknowledge,Iwillsuggest,isanalignment
withthepositionofthebelieversinflux.Thereisnouniversaltruthtobebirthedand
differentiatedfromthewind-eggsontheiraccount,fornobirthisatruebirth.Thetwocriteria
forknowledgethatPlatosuggestsintheTheaetetusarethatitisunerringand“ofwhatis.”

Wehaveseeninwhatway“manisthemeasure”allowsforthefulfillingoftheunerring
criteria,i.e.,byunderminingthepossibilityofcontradictionitalsounderminesthepossibility
oferror.Alongwiththeimpossibilityoferror,however,alsocomestheimpossibilityoftruth.
Thiscanbeseenthroughthesecondcriteria.Ifallthingsareinflux,thennothingis.Allthings
inmotionmeansthatthereisnothingtobeknown,andhencenopossibilityofgraspingthetruth
aboutanything.Inthiswaywecandoawaywiththeinconsistencyinthemidwifeimage,for
theneedforexperiencewithtruebirth(whichSocrateslacks)inordertoserveasamidwifeto
another’struebirthisnolongerrequiredbecausetruebirthisnolongerapossibility.Inshort,
byturningSocratesintoHeraclituswecansavetheimageofSocratesasamidwifebydoing
awaywiththebirthingofknowledge.

Thesecondwayofresolvingtheapparentinconsistencyistorecognizethedivinity,and

hencetranscendence,ofman.Theprimaryargumentsfortheclaimsmadehereariseinthetext
duringthefinalrefutationofknowledgeisperception.Butacceptingfornowtheconclusionof
whatwillbearguedforlaterwecanseethatitisbyremovingourselvesfromtherealmofflux
(ofwhichwearemosttrulynotapart)thatwe(re)attainknowledge.Themultiplicityof
experienceissomethingthesoulmustwithdrawfromifitisevertoattainknowledge.The
imageofbirthingissavedbybeingflippedonitshead:weacquireknowledgenotbycoming
upwithsomethingnew,butratherbyceasingtocomeupwith,orpayattentionto,whatisnew
andchanging.Thereisnobirthingofknowledge,forknowledgesimplyisanddoesnot
become.Thebirthing,inthiscase,isofthesoulitself;thesoulreturningtobeingfrom
encumberedbodilyconcerns.Birthisakintoaleavingthebodybehindfortheheavenlyrealm
propertothephilosopher.Itisonlyinunchangingdivinitythatknowledgecanbefound.Thus
turningSocratesintoParmenideslikewisesavestheimageofSocratesasmidwife,thoughit
doessobyinvertingtheimage(i.e.,thebirtherbecomesthebirthed).

Eitheroneofthesealone(HeraclitusandParmenides),asmentionedabove,isinsufficient

forPlato,andwhatthedialogueundertakesistoshowwhatisentailedintheovercomingof
theopposition.TurningSocratesintoeitherofthePre-Socraticssavestheimage,butwhere
doesitleaveusintermsofthepossibilityofcomingtoknow?Heraclitussavestheimageby
effectivelyunderminingthepossibilityofcomingtoanyknowledgewhatsoeverbydoingaway
withanybeingtobeknown(apositionwhichSocrateswilllaterargueisimpossibletoargue
fororagainst).Parmenides,ontheotherhand,savestheimagebydoingawaywiththe
possibilityofbecoming(whetheritappliestothebirtherorthebirthed),andhence
undermininganypossibilityofcomingtoknow,whichseemstobewhattheSocraticmidwife
issupposedtobehelpingsomeonetodo.Theimagecanavoidcontradictionbyturning
SocratesintoHeraclitusorParmenides,butdoingsonecessarilygivesuppartoftheimage.
Plato’slaughablepositionwantstoholdontobothaspectsoftheimage:thepossibilityof
knowledgeandthepossibilityofcomingtoknow.

WhatthenwoulditmeanforSocratestobeboththedivineandthemortalmidwife?What

woulditmeanforthebirthingofknowledgetobothdependuponandnotdependupon
experience?Itisworthnotingthatthisattemptedcombinationisnotsomethingnewtoreaders
ofPlato;itistiedtothedifficultiesinherentinunderstandingtherelationbetweenthe
changeablerealmofexperienceandtheunchanging,transcendentrealmofBeing;therelation
betweentheinsideofthecave,litbycandlelight,andtheoutsideworlditself,illuminatedby
thesun;theconnectionbetweentheformanditsinstantiation.TheTheaetetus,however,is
uniqueinitsapproachtotheseproblems.Wefindourselvesinthemiddlerealmbetweenthe
eternalandthemortalinthedialoguebyrecognizingtheimpotencyoftheotheroptions.More
specificallywefindthatbothofthetwoways(HeraclitusandParmenides)ofdenying
contradictionleaveusunabletoaccountforwhatwefindinourselves.Theinadequacyofeach
ofthepolesoftheoppositionwillbearguedforinchapter2.Iwilldosobymovingthrough
thedialoguesequentially,followingPlato’sorderingofthediscussion.

Notes

1.Seeespecially172c-dfortheoppositionbetweenthephilosopherandthelawyer,and180d-

181bfortheoppositionbetweenHeraclitusandParmenides.

2.“τοῦἡμετέρουχοροῦ”(173b3).Unlessotherwisenoted,thetranslationsarefromJoe

Sachs.

3.Apology17d.
4.WhereastheoppositionisexplicitintheApology(17a-18a),theProtagorasandGorgias

areexamplesofdialogueswheretheoppositionisimplicit.

5.IntheApology,Socratessays“Ifyouhearmemakingmydefenseinthesamekindof

languageasIamaccustomedtouseinthemarketplacebythebankerstables,wheremanyof
youhaveheardme,andelsewhere,donotbesurprisedorcreateadisturbanceonthat
account”(17c-d).SeealsoGorgias447a.

6.Theaetetus144c.
7.210d.
8.Manypeoplepointthisout.Benardete(1997,p26)andWaymack(1985)aretwoexamples.
9.Aninvestigationofthisistocomeshortly.

10.181a-b
11.MarkHWaymackmakesthesameconnectionbetweenthetwooppositionsinhisarticle

“TheTheaetetus172c-177c:AReadingofthePhilosopherinCourt,”TheSouthernJournal
ofPhilosophyvol.23,No.4(1985),pp.481-489.

12.Ofwhichheonlyundertakesone.
13.181b.
14.Thedetailsoftheserefutationswilltakeupthebulkofchapter2,andwillbegintheaccount

oftheunderlyingontologyintheTheaetetus.

15.152d-e.
16.Fine(2003)arguesfora“connectioncriterion,”whichsaysthatanaccountofeachofthe

threethesesshouldbeabletoexplainitsconnectiontotheothertwo.Indeedthisabilityto
explaintheconnectionbetweenthethesesistoserveastheprimarycriterionforjudging
accounts(p.137).Burnyeat(1990)offerstworeadingsofthissectionofthedialogue,both
ofwhichdependupontheunityofthethreetheses(pp.7-65).

17.Anotherwayofpresentingthesameargument:Socratesassumesthatknowledgeisofwhat

is(152c).Sincesubstanceisthebeingoftheobject,andsincesubstanceisnotperceptible,
theexistenceofsubstancewouldhavetomeanthatknowledgeisnotperception.

18.180e.
19.TorefertoSocrates’positionas“inbetween”HeraclitusandParmenidesisnotquite

accurate.Partofthedifficultyexpressingthisaccountisthatitisnotunqualifiedlytrueto
consideronenessandmanynessassimplycontradictoriesorassimplycontraries,forwhatI
willbearguingisthatwecannotsaythateitherpositionistrueorfalse;weneedaspectsof
bothofthesepositionsinordertosayanythingmeaningfulatall.Thiswillbefleshedoutin
thebook’sexaminationofunityandwholeness.Togetintothisexamination,however,we
mustbeginwithclaimsthatwillshowthemselveslatertobeincomplete.

20.Themanydifferentformsthattheprinciplecantake,whileinteresting,arenotanissuehere,

forallofthementailaoneandamany.

21.Thisisalsothestranger’smoveinthesecondhalfoftheSophist(236d-268d).Therelation

betweentheTheaetetusandtheSophistisclearlyintimate,whichisevidencednomoreso
thanintheircommonattemptstocarveoutamiddlegroundbetweenthebelieversinflux
andthosewhobelieveallisone.TherewillbemuchmoretosayabouttheSophistlaterin
ourinvestigation.

22.170c-171c.“Peritropé”isthenamegiventooneofSocrates’attemptedrefutationsof

Protagoras’doctrine.ItarguesthatProtagoras’accountisself-refuting.Peritropéliterally
translatesas“turningaround”

23.ThoughitisrelevanttoTheaetetus,aswewillsee.
24.ThereisfarmorenuanceinthesediscussionsthanIsuggesthere,thoughIdon’tthinkthat

anyamountofnuancecanovercometheproblemIamraising.Theinterpretationsofthe
peritropédonotdivideneatlyintotwocamps.BesidesthosewhoarguethatProtagorasis
showntobeself-contradictory(SeeFine[2003],Burnyeat[1976b],Sedley[2004]),and
thosewhoarguethatPlatofailstoshowthatProtagoras’accountisself-contradictory
(Cornforddoesthis,thoughhedoessobyseparatingperceptionandjudgmentandclaiming
thatPlato’sargumentonlyappliestojudgments[1967,p.100]),therearealsothosewho

arguethatProtagorasisnotshowntobeself-refuting;heissimplyshowntobeunableto
convince(Chappell[2005],Bostock[1988]).

25.Protagoras320c-322d.
26.Thatis,SocratesthroughProtagorasisengagedinself-refutationoverhisownargumentthat

self-refutationispossible!

27.πιθανολογίᾳτεκαὶεἰκόσι(162e8).
28.Whilethereisageneralargumentbeinggiveninthedigressionestablishingthedifference

betweenthelawyerandthephilosopher,itiscouchedinaplayfulrhetoricalstylethat
appealstostotiesoffallingintowellsandlaughingThracianmaidservants(174a).

29.Therearetwoorthreeroundsofrefutation(dependinguponhowyoumakethedivisions).

M.J.LevettdividestherefutationsofProtagorasintothesuperficial(160e-165e),andthe
serious(170a-172c,177c-179b).Inresponsetothesuperficialobjectionsandthefirstpart
oftheseriousobjections,SocratestakesonthevoiceofProtagorasinordertosupplywhat
hethinkswouldbetheProtagoreanresponse(166a-168c,171c-d).Afterthefinalrefutation,
SocratesquestionstheeffectivenessofhiscriticismsofProtagoras,butthistimehedoesit
inhisownvoice(179c-d).

30.Peritropéliterallytranslatestosomethinglike“turningaround,”andgenerallyreferstoself-

refutation.

31.171d1-3.
32.DeAnima,420a26-30.TranslationbyJoeSachs.
33.Thisimageofmidwiferywillbeaddressedinsomedetaillaterinthischapter,sinceitis

alsooneofthewaysthatPlatosetsuptheoppositionbetweentheoneandthemanythat
structuresthedialogue.

34.Theaetetus’acceptanceoftheprincipleisnotonlyshownbyhisbeingconvincedby

arguments;itisalsodemonstratedinhisdefinitionofincommensurablenumbers(the
investigationofwhichwewillturntoshortly).ThedefiningbydivisionthatTheaetetus
usesreliesonAbeingnotnotA.Anotherwaytoseethisisinthecontextoftheopposition
asputforthinthedigression:Theaetetus’definitionseekstheuniversalthatappliesto,oris
setover,themanyparticulars.Inshortheisseekingawaytorelatetheoneandthemany,
butthedenialoftheprincipledoesawaywiththisopposition.

35.BysubjectivehereIsimplymeanthatwhichisfortheperceiver.Therearesomemore

nuanceddistinctionsmadethatquestionwhetherProtagorasisasubjectivistorarelativist,
butthesearenotrelevanthere.SeeBurnyeat’s“ProtagorasandSelfRefutationinLater
GreekPhilosophy”and“ProtagorasandSelf-RefutationinPlato’sTheaetetus.”Seealso
Fine(2003).

36.Theroleofopinion,orbelief,anditsdifferencefromperceptionintheProtagorean

doctrineissomewhatcontroversial.Fine(2003)claimsthat“tosayhowthingsappearto
meistosayhowthingsareforme”(p.133),whichistosaythatperceptionentailsopinion.
Idon’tthinkthatthiscanbethecase,oratleastweshouldnottakeopinionheretobethe
sameasopinionasitisdiscussedinTheaetetus’nextdefinitionofknowledge.Oneproblem
thatwouldariseonFine’saccountisthattherewouldendupbeingnodifferencebetween
thesecondandthirddefinitionsofknowledge.Ifwesaythateverythingthatappearstome
istrue(forme),andappearsisthesameasbelieves,thentheseconddefinition,insaying

thatperceptionisknowledgeandisalwaystrue,willamounttosayingthattruebeliefis
knowledge(thethirddefinition).Theprimarydifferencebetweenthe“belief”entailedby
perceptionandthebeliefdiscussedlateristhepresenceofmemory.Belief,properly
speaking,requiresthepresenceofmemory.ThisissuggestedintheTheaetetusbythe
involveddiscussionofmemoryinthethirddefinitionofknowledge(astrueopinion/belief).
AristotlesuggeststhesamethingattheconclusionofthePosteriorAnalytics:“Allanimals
have[senseperception],butinsometheperceptionpersists,whileinothersitdoesnot.
Whereitdoesnot,thereiseithernocognitionatalloutsidetheactofperception,orno
cognitionofthoseobjectsofwhichtheperceptiondoesnotpersist.”(PA99b37-100a1).
(AristotlemakesthesamedistinctionatthebeginningofMetaphysics,1.980a-b).Plato
hintsthatthisdistinctionbetweenhumancognitionandtheperceptionofanimalsis
somethingthatProtagoras’positiondoesnottakeintoaccount(161c4)(KennethDorter
[1990,pp349-350]makesthissamesuggestion).PlatoalsosuggeststhatProtagorasdoes
nottakethistobeaproblem(162d-e,166c-d),becauseforProtagorasthe“memory”(and
hencetheconnectedopinions)ofmanaresimplydifferentperceptionshadatdifferent
times:“Doyouthinkanyonewouldgoalongwithyouthatamemorythat’spresenttohimof
thingsheexperienced,whenheisnolongerexperiencingthem,isanexperienceofthesame
sortasheunderwentatthetime?It’sfarshortofit”(166b).Thedistinctionbetween
perceptionandopinionwillbeinvestigatedinmoredetailatthebeginningofchapter3.

37.Sophist249c.TheTranslationsoftheSophist,unlessotherwisenoted,arefromNicholasP.

White.

38.Ibid249c-d(Myemphasis).
39.Thiswillbeoneoftheprimaryissuesdiscussedinchapter3,wherewewillinvestigate

Socrates’lengthydiscussionoflogos,butitisworthnotingsomepreliminaryresultsatthis
pointinordertoreinforcemycurrentclaimthattheoppositionbetweenthetwoPre-
SocraticphilosophersisbeingusedbyPlatoasastructuringprincipleinthedialogue.

40.201d-210b,butspecifically202b.Iwillbearguinginthethirdchapterthattheentiretyof

thefinalsectionfocusesontherelationofthepartsandthewhole.

41.182c-183b.
42.182a.
43.MarinaBerzinsMcCoy(2005)makesasimilarclaimregardingtheincommensurabilityof

ProtagorasandTheaetetus(37);howeverherreasonsfordoingsoaredifferent.She
suggeststhatProtagoras’positionisinternallyconsistent,andisonlyshowntobe
inconsistentwithTheaetetus’opinions(22,32).Thisisright,butitismisleadingtoreferto
Protagoras’positionasinternallyconsistent.Consistencyisdeterminedbytheprincipleof
non-contradiction,andIhavearguedthatthisdoesnotplayaroleinProtagoras’“account.”
ThissameincommensurabilityisreflectedbetweenSocratesandProtagorasinthedramaof
thedialoguenamedafterthesophist(itisalsoreflectedinthearguments,butthatisharder
toshowinashortspace).Itrequirestheeffortofthegroup(335d-338e)aswellassome
physicalrestraint(335d)inordertokeepSocratesandProtagorasengagedwithone
another.ForauthorswhomakethissuggestionaboutProtagorasseeHalper(2004)and
Griswold(1999).

44.Sophist244b-d.

45.184a.
46.180e-181a.
47.145b.
48.Moreaccurately,itisthebeliefinthepossibilityoffalseness.
49.152c.
50.190a.
51.Onceonestartslookingforsuggestionsofreferencetotheone/manythemetheyare

(perhapstoo)easytofind.IwillonlyfocusontheonesthatIthinkwillframethebookin
theclearestmanner.Someothersare:thesimilarityinappearancebetweenSocratesand
Theaetetus,thesamename(Socrates)fortwodifferentcharacters,perhapseventhe
similaritybetweentheperiodinTheaetetus’lifeintheframetoSocrates’inthedialogue
proper(justbeforedeathforbothofthem).

52.TheCharmides(159b-160d)andtheMeno(71e-72e)actuallyhavebothoftheseproblems,

thoughindifferentways.ThesectionoftheTheaetetusunderinvestigationgivesalistof
examples,whiletheEuthyphro(5d)givesasingleinstance.

53.Charmides,159b-160d.
54.Euthyphro5d.
55.Euthyphro6d.
56.Meno72a.
57.Theaetetus146c-d.
58.OtherinstancesofSocratesgivingexamplesofdefinitionsare:Laches192b,andMeno75b

and76a.

59.Theaetetus147c.
60.Nehamas(1999)p.226.
61.Thesides,asweshallsee,aretheoneandthemany.
62.PosteriorAnalytics,I.4.73a35-38.
63.PosteriorAnalytics,II.3.90b34-39.
64.Themultiplicityofparts(predicates)thatthedefinitionseems(andinawayneeds)tohave

isreflectedintheroleofthedefinitioninademonstration.Inorderforthedemonstrationto
beabletoshowanecessaryconnectionbetweensubjectandpredicatethroughthemiddle
term,thedefinitionmustbeseenassupplyinganecessarypredicate;meaningthatinitsuse
indemonstrationthedefinitionistreatedasbeinganessentialpredication,whileproperly
speakingthedefinitiondoesnotentailpredication.

65.Metaphysics1039a,Sachstranslation.Aristotlesuggeststhisasarefutationofwhathe

takestobePlato’sposition.Hissolutiontotheproblemthatdefinitionseemstobe
impossibleistorecognizethatthegenusisapotenitality,andhence,itsinclusioninthe
logosofanousiadoesnotmakeeitherthelogosortheousiaitselfmultiple.Iwillbe
arguing,inagreementwithAristotle’saccountofPlato,thatforPlatotheuniversalisindeed
actual.Thisleadstotheresultthatinonewaydefinitionispossible,andinoneway
definitionisnotpossible(justasAristotleargues),butthatforPlatothisisnotaproblem.
SeeHalper,1989(pp.110-132),foranaccountofhowAristotlehandlestheseissues.

66.Definitionisonekindoflogos,aswewillseeinchapter3.
67.147d-148b.

68.TheTheaetetusisthefirstdialogueinatrilogy.Thedramaofthedialoguestellsusthatthe

discussionintheSophisttakesplacethedayafterthediscussionintheTheaetetus,and
involvesallthesamecharacterswiththeadditionoftheParmenideanStrangerfromElea.
YetthemethodofdefiningbydivisiontaughttoTheaetetusbythestrangerintheSophist
comesupatleasttwiceintheTheaetetus.ThefirsttimeitisusedbyTheaetetushimselfin
referencetoincommensurablenumbersandservesasanexampleofthekindofdefinitionof
knowledgeSocratesislookingfor(147d-148b).Andthenagainthismethodofdefinitionby
divisionbecomesthetopicinSocrates’finalattemptatadefinitionoflogosattheveryend
ofthedialogue(208c-210a),wherethemethodisproblematizedpreciselyinregardstothe
difficultyinrelatingtheOnetothemanythatitposes.

69.149b.
70.149c.
71.R.G.Wengertraisesthisproblem,thoughhissuggestedsolutionsareallunsatisfactory(as

hehimselfclaims).Wengert,R.G.“TheParadoxoftheMidwife,”HistoryofPhilosophy
QuarterlyVol.5(1988),pp.3-10.

72.PassagesintheParmenideswhereSocratesmakesclaimsseemtobeanexampleofthis.

ForinstanceParmenidesasksSocrates“isityourviewthat,asyousay,therearecertain
formswhichtheseotherthings,bygettingashareofthem,derivetheirnames—asfor
instancetheycometobelikebygettingashareoflikeness,largebygettingashareof
largeness,andjustandbeautifulbygettingashareofjusticeandbeauty,”towhichSocrates
responds“itcertainlyis”(130e-131a).AlsoSocratesselfcharacterizationofhisyouthin
thePhaedorecallshisself-birthingofwind-eggs.Ashesays“whenIwasayoungmanI
waswonderfullykeenonthatwisdomtheycallnaturalscience,forIthoughtitsplendidto
knowthecausesofeverything,whyitcomestobe,whyitperishes,andwhyitexists.Iwas
oftenchangingmymindintheinvestigation”(96a-b).Andhegoesontosay“this
investigationmademequiteblindeventothosethingswhichIandothersthoughtIclearly
knewbefore,sothatIunlearnedwhatIthoughtIknewbefore”(96c).

73.Thisinterpretation,withitsclaimthatknowledgeisimpossible,alignswithanaccountthat

arguesthatinquiryisthehighesthumangood.SeeHalper(2007)andBloom(2014)for
suchanaccount.

74.Anotherpossibility:thatifoneweretoactuallybirthgenuinewisdomtheneedforSocrates

willbegone.MeaningthatSocrates’lackofwisdomwillbenoimpedimenttotheonewho
actuallydoesbirthwisdom.Itis,ofcourse,alsofarfromclearhowSocrateswouldbe
actuallyhelpingthispersoninanywayotherthanriddingthemofwind-eggsthatare
impedingtheirseeingofthetruth,inwhichcasewewouldbebackinthesituationoutlined
abovewhereSocratesnolongerrequirespersonalexperienceoftrue-birth.

75.Thosewhoadoptthisapproach:Benardete(1997,p.30)andTschemplik(2003,p.51).
76.Reasonheremostproperlyappliestonous.Wewillseelater(chapter3)inwhatwaynous

mustleavetherealmofexperiencebehindinorderforittobeabletoserveastheground
forgenuineknowledge.

77.αἴσθησιςἄρατοῦὄντοςἀείἐστινκαὶἀψευδὲςὡςἐπιστήμηοὖσα.“Thereforeperceptionis

alwaysofwhatis,and,beingknowledge,iswithoutfalsity.”152c.

78.PartofthebeautyofHeraclitusisthathewasabletotreathimselfasbothmidwifeand

ChapterTwo

TheLevelsofBeing

(184b-201a)

Introduction

Thedialogue’sextendedargumentforthenecessityofoneness

iscompletedwiththe

finalrefutationof“knowledgeisperception.”

Theupshotoftheargumentisthatthesoul(and

itsobjects),inordertobeabletoaccountforthemultiplicityofexperiencesthatwehave,
mustbebothoneandmany.Theargumentholdsthatallobjectsofexperienceandthought
derivetheirbeingfromthesoulitself.Hence,byrecognizingthemultiplicityofexperiencewe
simultaneouslyrecognizethemultiplicityofthesoul,sinceallexperienceishadwithin,andis
abyproductof,thesoulitself.Thisargumentisfollowedbyanattempttoaccountforfalse
opinion.Whiletheinvestigationoffalseopinionappearstobeunsuccessfulitnonetheless
suppliesthereaderwithanimplicitaccountofhowfalseopinioncanoccur.Iwillarguethat
thepossibilityoffalseopinionrestsuponeachobject(ofthoughtorexperience)belongingto
multiplelevelsofbeing.Thegeneralideaisthateveryintelligibleobjectmustbeaone
composedofparts.Sinceknowingistiedtograspingbeing,andbeingistiedtooneness,to
knowanobjectistoknowitsprincipleofunity.Thus,eachobject,asbothoneandmany,will
beknownonlywhenitsmultiplicityisleftbehindforagraspofitsprincipleofunity.Or,in
otherwords,eachintelligibleobjectisdependentonsomethingtounifyit;thatprincipleof
unityisboththeobject’sbeingandyetis,nonetheless,distinctfromtheobjectassomething
thathasparts.Thisdistinctionbetweenthatwhichunifies(andhencesuppliesbeing)andthat
whichisunified(andhenceacquiresbeing)leadstothedistinctionbetweenlevelsofbeing.
Eachobject,therefore,asboththatwhichisunifiedandthatwhichunifiesmustbelongto
multiplelevelsofbeing.Thishastworepercussionsforthesoulitself.Thefirstisthatsince
allobjectsbelongtothesoulitself,andallobjectsbelongtomultiplelevelsofbeing,thesoul
itselfmustcontainmultiplelevelsofbeing.Thesecondisthatsincethesoulcontains
multiplicityitmustitselfbemultiple,and,hence,willitselfrequireaprincipleofunity.We
willseethattheprincipleofunityofthesoulwillhavetotranscendanypossibleintelligible
experience.

Thischapterwillbedividedintotwoprimarysections.Thefirstwillfocusonthethe

finalrefutationof“knowledgeisperception,”andbringoutsomeoftheunderlying
metaphysicalassumptionsthattheargumentmakesaboutthesoul.Thesecondwillfocusonthe
dialogue’saccountoffalseopinion.TakingthesetwotogetherwillgiveustheTheaetetus’
implicitargumentfortheexistenceoflevelsofbeing.Thiswillleadusintochapter3where
wewillinvestigatewhatwecanknowabouttherelationbetweenthelevelsofbeing.

Partone:therefutationof“knowledgeisperception”(184b-186e)

Theargumentinthedialoguethatistakentounderminetheseconddefinitionof

knowledge(andleadsthereadertorecognizetheneedforasoultoserveasaprincipleof
unity)beginsbyrecognizingthatperceptionsaremadethroughthesensesasopposedtowith
thesenses.Thethingsperceivedthroughonepower,i.e.,throughaparticularsenseorgan,
cannotbeperceivedthroughanyoftheotherpowers.Forexampleatasteassensedthroughthe
tonguecannotbesensedbyanyotherorgan.Thus,thinkinganythingaboutcommonobjectsof
thesensescannotbedonethroughanyparticularsense.Being(οὐσία),sameanddifferent,like
andunlike,andnumber,arecommontoallobjectsofsense.Therefore,thepowerbywhich
thesethingsarerevealedcannotbethroughthesenses.Thingsarecognizedeitherbythesoul
throughthesenses,orbythesoul“itselfthroughitself.”

Thus,being,andtheotherthings

commontoallthesenses,sinceitcannotbegraspedbythepowerofthesouloperatingthrough
thesenses,canonlybegraspedbythesoulitselfthroughitself.Knowledgeisonlyhadof
being.

Therefore,knowledgecanbehadonlybythesoulitselfthroughitself.Therefore,

perceptionhasnoshareofknowledge,andasaresultperceptioncannotbeknowledge.

Theargumenthingesontheactivityofthesoul.Thesoulcaneitherworkthroughthe

senses(i.e.oneofits“powers”[δύναμις])orthroughitself.Inworkingthroughtheeye,the
activityofthesoulistheactualseeing.Whenworkingthroughthetongue,theactivityofthe
soulistheactualtasting.Whenworkingthroughitselftheactivityofthesoulisdescribedas
workingwiththosethingsthatarenotimmediatelypresenttothesoulthroughthesenses.

onewayalltheseactivitiesaredistinct,dependinguponwhatpower,ifany,thesoulis
operatingthrough.Butinanotherwaytheseactivitiesarealloneandthesame;namely,theone,
singlesouliseitheroperatingthroughapower,oroperatingthroughitself.

Theargumentshowsusthatknowledgeisonlytobefoundinthesoul’sexerciseofits

activityindependentlyofanypower,orwhatamountstothesamething,knowledgeisonlyto
befoundintheactivityofthesoulitselfthroughitself.Thisfollowsonceweacceptthat
knowledgeisonlyhadofbeing,andthatbeingisnotgraspedbythesoulthroughapower.If
knowledgeishadintheactivityofthesoulworkingthroughitself,andperceptionisthe
activityofthesoulthroughthesenses,thenperceptionnecessitatesnothavingknowledge.
Thus,notonlycanperceptionnotbeknowledge,italtogetherprecludesknowledge.

Socrates’

commentafterthisargumenthascometolightthat“itwasnotforthesakeofallofthisthatwe
begandiscussingit,tofindoutwhatknowledgeisnot,butwhatitis”

hasadoublemeaning.

Theclaimisnotjustthattheyhavefoundperceptionandknowledgenottobethesame;they
haveactuallyfoundwhatknowledgeisnot,i.e.,theactivityofthesoulthroughsomethingother.
Thismeansthatthefindingofwhatknowledgeisnothascoincidedwith,andnecessitates,the
distinguishingbetweenthesoulitselfandparticularpowersofthesoul.

Thisrelationbetweenthesoulitselfandthesoul’sparts,orpowers,isattheheartofthe

dialogueandwillbepartofthefocusofthischapter.

Thedistinctionbetweenthesoul’s

activityanditspowersisourfirstrealcluetounderstandingthemiddlegroundbetween
HeraclitusandParmenides.Therefutationof“knowledgeisperception,”andtheopposition
betweenthesoul’sactivityandthesoul’spowerthatitgenerates,isthefinalrefutationofan

accountthatembracespuremultiplicity,showingustheneedforanunderlyingoneness.Yetthe
argumenthasdonemuchmorethanjustarguefortheexistenceof“someonelook”

(εἰςμίαν

τινὰἰδέαν)tounifythefaculties.Theargumenthasmovedtheentireinvestigationwithinthe
soul,forallintelligibilitydependsuponthecommonswhicharewithinthesoulitself.

Even

thediscussionofdistinctfacultiesisadistinctionwithinthesoulitself.Thedifferencebetween
subjectandobjecthasbecomeblurredtothepointofextinction.Eachobjectiswhatitis,i.e.,
derivesitsbeing,fromthesoul.Thus,byarguingforlevelsofbeingfortheobjectswe
simultaneouslyargueforlevelsofbeingwithinthesoul(theverysoulwehavejustarguedis
theprincipleofunityforallexperience).

Unpackingtheargument

Thereisanentireontologyandepistemologypackedintothisrefutationof“knowledgeis

perception.”Insomesense,therestofthisbook,andthesectionsoftheTheaetetusthatfollow
theargument,isallexplicationofthisargument.Hencetherestofthissection,dealing
exclusivelywiththeargument,shouldbetakenmoreasapreludetowhattheargumententails
thanasacompletefleshingoutofallitsdetailsandrepercussions.Tostartwemustnoticethat
theargumentdifferentiatespossibleactivitiesofthesoul,allthewhiletreatingthemas
activitiesofoneandthesamesoul.Thiscreatesanoppositionbetweenthesoulasaprinciple
ofunity(andhenceasone),andthesoulasdivisibleintomultiplefacultiesorpotencies(and
henceasmany).Thisoppositionisexpressedbydistinguishingthesoulitselfthroughitselfand
thesoulthroughanother.Bothsidesoftheoppositionrefertoactivities:eithertheactivityof
thesoulitselfthroughitself,whichiswhereknowledgeistobefound,ortheactivityofthe
soulthroughanother,whereknowledgeisnottobefound.

Therearetwostagestotheargumentandbothofthemrelatebacktotheopposition

betweenParmenidesandHeraclitusdiscussedinchapter1,forbothofthemfocusonthe
unifyingofamultiplicity.Thefirstpartoftheargumentshowsthatthesoul“issomeonelook”
thatisabletobringtogetherthatwhichisparticulartoeachofthesenses.Thesecondpartof
theargumentshowsthateachofthecommons(κοινός)isaprincipleofunitythatturnthe
undifferentiatedsense-contentsuppliedbythesensesintointelligibleobjectsofexperience.A
problemariseshere.Thecommonsbelongtothesoulitselfthroughitself.Thismustbethe
casebecausethecommonsmustbepresenttothesoulpriortoanyintelligibleexperience,for
theyarewhatmakeintelligibleexperiencepossible.Thus,thecommonsaresomehow
identifiedwiththesoulitself.Thesoulitselfissupposedtoserveasaprincipleofunity,and
hencemustbeone,andyetthereareamultiplicityofcommons.Inorderforthesoultobeone
andalsotocontainallthecommons,itmustbethecasethatthemultitudeofcommonsare
somehowalsoone.Or,inotherwords,thesoulistheprincipleofunitynotjustofwhatis
derivedfromthesenses(i.e.,sense-content),itisalsotheprincipleofunityofthatwhich
unifiesthesense-content(i.e.,thecommons).Thus,theargumenthasdividedexperienceinto
fourlevels,whereeachlowerlevelisunifiedbythelevelaboveit.Perceptionitself(first
level)isunifiedinthecombinationofsense-contentandthecommons(secondlevel),whichis
unifiedbythecommonsthemselves(thirdlevel),whichinturnisunifiedbythesoulasasingle
look(fourthlevel).

Thinkingbacktotheargumentsforthemiddlegroundgiveninchapter1,wecanseethat

thereisnothingtobesaidaboutperceptionitself,noristhereanythingtobesaidaboutasoul
thatwouldbeentirelyone,formeaningfullogosrequiresbothmultiplicityandoneness.The
onlywaywecangrasp“pure”perceptionandanutterlyonesoulisthroughrecognizingtheir
necessityfortheintelligibleexperiencewedohave.Inotherwords,theargumentforthesoul
asaprincipleofunityunderlyingperceptionisatranscendentalargument.Theargumentrests
upontheassumptionpointedoutearlierthatthereissuchathingasmeaningfullogos,anditis
unitythatsupplieslogoswithitsmeaning.Sincethecommonsareresponsibleforunifyingthe
undifferentiatedsense-content,wemustgrasptheminordertograspperceptualexperience.
Yetinsofarasthecommonsthemselvesaremultiplewemustlikewisegrasptheirprinciple(s)
ofunityinordertobeabletograspthecommons.Thereisaregressatworkhere.Knowledge
isofbeing,andbeingisone.Thus,toknowsomethingistoknowhowitisone.Thus,any
principleofunitythatisitselfmultiplewill,despitemakingthatwhichitunifiesintelligible,
itselfbeunintelligibleuntilonegraspsitsprincipleofunity.

ThisiswhatthefamouscaveanalogyfromtheRepublicsuggestsaswell.

TheGood,or

theOne,isthatwhichmakeseverythingelsebe,andbeintelligible.Yetthegraspingofthe
shadowsasshadowsdoesnottakeusimmediatelybacktotheGooditself,butratherallowsus
torecognizethebeingoftheobjectscastingtheshadows.Theseinturnaregraspedbythat
whichallowstheseobjectstobe,andsoforth,untileventuallywearrivebackatthesourceof
thebeingofeverystage,i.e.,theOneitself.SotoointheTheaetetuscomingtoknowisa
continualprocessofseekinggreaterandgreaterunity.

Thenatureoftheselevels,andtheirrelationstooneanother,arenotexaminedinthe

argumentforthesoulitself,buttheyarenonethelessneededfortheargumenttowork.A
primaryexampleofadistinctionbetweenlevelsofbeingisthedistinctionbetweenthe
commonitself,asitispresentinthesoulpriortoanyexperience,andtheobjectofexperience
thatderivesitsunityfromthecommon.Therelationsatworkbegintogetfleshedoutwhenwe
thinkthroughtheproblemsoffalseopinionthatarisefromSocratesandTheaetetus’discussion
immediatelyfollowingtheargument,butsomethoughtaboutthisrelationnowwillbetter
prepareusforthatdiscussion.

Thedistinctionbetweenthesoul’sworkingthroughanotherandthesoul’sworking

throughitselfisdifficulttoparseout.Perceptionwithsomekindofminimalawareness,i.e.,
wheresomekindofbasicstructureisimposeduponthesense-content,isprettyclearlyacase
ofthesoulworkingthroughanother.So,too,thinkingaboutthecontentofwhathaspreviously
beenperceived,evenifnotcurrentlyperceiving,wouldseemtoalsobetheactivityofthesoul
throughanother(memory).Buthowfarcanwegetawayfromtheparticularsensecontent
beforewecansaythatthesoulisnolongeractingthroughanother,butratherisitselfbyitself?
Take,forexample,Theaetetus’definitionsofcommensurableandincommensurablenumbers.

Isthisactofdefiningachievedbythesoulitselfthroughitself,ordoesittoodependonthe
soulreachingoutsideofitself?TheaetetusseparateswhatheandyoungSocratesdidfromwhat
Theodorusdidbydistinguishingbetweenparticularexamplesandacollectionofallthe
particularsintosomeonething.Theaetetussays,

Theodorusherewasdiagramming(ἔγραφε)somethingforusaboutpotencies(δυνάμεών),demonstratingaboutthe
potentialsideofthethree-footsquareandaboutthatofthefive-footsquarethattheyarenotcommensurableinlengthwith
thefoot-longline,anddemonstratinginthiswayashepickedouteachofthemonebyoneuptothepotentialsideofthe

seventeen-footsquare;atthatone,forsomereason,hegottangledup.Sosomethingofthissortoccurredtous:sincethe
potentialsquaresareobviouslyinfiniteinmultitude,wewouldtrytogatherthemtogetherintosomeonething(πειραθῆναι

συλλαβεῖνεἰςἕν),inwhichwecouldaddressourspeechtoallthesepotentialsquares.13

HowdoesthetechniqueusedbyTheaetetusandyoungSocratesdifferfromthatusedby
Theodorus?Arebothtechniquesexamplesofthesoulworkingthroughanother,orarethe
youngmathematiciansworkingthroughthesoulitself?Oneoftheexplicitdifferencespointed
toisthatTheodorusisworkingthrougheachparticularexample.Hedrawseachsquareandits
diagonal,diagrammingtherelationinawaythatcanbeseen,andisdistinctforeachone.
TheaetetusandYoungSocrates,ontheotherhand,cannotbedemonstratingvisuallyfortheir
demonstrationappliestoeachofthenumbers.Thereisnoparticularthatisthefullembodiment
oftheirdefinitionfortheirdefinitionincludesalltheparticulars.Thus,itseemsthatatleast
partofwhatdifferentiatestheworkoftheyoungmenfromthatoftheirteacheristhat
Theodorus’workistiedtoperceptioninawaythattheyoungmen’sworkisnot.

Yet,itisfalsetosaythattheworkofTheaetetusandyoungSocratesisfreefrom

perception;for,afterall,theirtechniquewasinspiredbyTheodorus’diagrams.Theymoved
fromtheparticularstoamoregeneralgrasp.

Thedistinctionbetweenthatwhichbelongsto

thesoulitselfasopposedtowhatisgeneratedbythesoulthroughanotherisakintothe
distinctiontowhatmustbepresenttothesoulapriori,andwhatisonlypresenttothesoula
posteriori.Forthecommonsarewhatallowustohaveanyintelligibleexperienceorthought,
andhencemustbepresenttothesoulpriortoanyexperienceorthought.Buthowdowedraw
aclearlinebetweentheaprioricommonsandtheuniversalsthatariseoutofourexperience?
TheTheaetetusdoesnotfleshoutananswertothisproblem,andprovidingoneismorethanI
amwilling,andperhapsable,toundertake.Attemptingtomaketheseissuesclearis,afterall,
theseminalworkofnolessaphilosopherthanImmanuelKant.

ThepointIaimtomakehere

isthattheargumentforthesoulrequiresadistinctionbetweentheaprioricommons
themselvesandthecommonsmixedwithsense-content,andthatfurtherdistinctionsarise
withinthisdistinctiondependingonhowfarthelatterobjectsarefromthecommons
themselves(i.e.,howintertwinedwithsensecontenttheobjectsare).Thesedistinctionsare
centraltoPlato’sdiscussionoffalseopinion,adiscussionwhichwillfurtherdevelopthe
distinctionsmadehere.

Beforeturningtotheexaminationoffalseopinion,whichcomprisesmostofthe

investigationintoTheaetetus’secondproperdefinitionofknowledge(thatknowledgeistrue
opinion)itisworthtakingstockofwhatimplicationstheargumentforthesoulhasforthe
dialogue’searlierinvestigationsofHeraclitusandProtagoras.Theargumenthasdisprovedthe
claimthatknowledgeisperception,whichwaslinkedtothepositionsofbothHeraclitusand
Protagoras,yettherearesignificantportionsofthetwoPre-Socraticpositionsthatare
nonethelessstillpresentwithusafterTheaetetus’firstproperdefinitionofknowledgehasbeen
showntobeawind-egg.

Therefutationof“knowledgeisperception”hasshownthatthepurefluxofHeraclitusis

anincomplete,andincoherent,pictureofreality.Thesinglelookthattheargumentseeksto
proveisfundamentallyopposedtotheever-changingfluxoftheHeracliteanworld.Thesoulis
theunchangingseatoftheflowingexperiencewehave.Itisaonenessthatimposesstructure
andunitytotheflowingrealmofsense-content.Thesense-contentitself,however,seemstofit

perfectlywiththesubstancefreeworldofHeraclitus.Sense-content,accordingtothe
argument,onlyacquiressubstancethroughthesoul.Thisisthereasonthatnothingatallcanbe
saidaboutsense-contentindependentofthecommons,justaswesawwiththeaccountof
Heraclitusgivenearlierinthedialogue

andexaminedinchapter1.

Theargument’srelationtoProtagorasisparticularlystriking.Inasignificantsensethe

argumentforthesoulhasreinforcedtheideathat“manisthemeasure.”Theintelligibilityof
allexperienceandthoughtisentirelydependentonthecommonsthatbelongtothesoul.An
opinionorjudgmentisaparticularstructuringofundifferentiatedsense-content,

astructuring

thatisaccomplishedbythejudger’s(i.e.,thesoul’s)applicationofcommons.Further,
accordingtothetranscendentalreadingoftheargumentofferedhere,thecommonscannotcome
fromexperience,butrathermustbesuppliedbythesoulitselfthroughitself.Thus,theobjectof
anindividual’s(lower)judgment,orexperience,issomethingthatiscreatedbythatperson.
Judgmentdoesnotrecombinethebeingandonenessofwhatissensed,forthatwouldrequire
thattheobjectsofsensationalreadyhavethecommonsappliedtothem.Thereisno“thing”that
issensedatall,atleastnothingthatanyonecansayanything,ormakeanyjudgments,about.
WereallyseemtostillbesquarelyintherealmofProtagoras!

YetthisaccountcannotbethesameasProtagoras’iffornootherreasonthanthatwehave

justdeemed‘knowledgeisperception’tobeafalseopinion,andaccordingtoProtagorasthere
arenofalseopinions.Howcantheaccountarisingoutoftheargumentforthesoulretain“man
isthemeasure”andyetalsobeabletoallowforthepossibilityoffalseopinion?Theanswer
liesintheideaoflevelsofbeing.Theargumententailsthatthebeingandonenessofevery
objectofjudgmentstemsfromthecommonbelongingtothesoulitself.Thepuremultiplicityof
sense-contentbecomessomethingthatisonlybyitsconnectionwithbeingitself;comingtobe
isbecomingone.Thus,everymultiplicitythatisderivesitsbeingfromthatwhichsuppliesit
withoneness(forallobjectsofexperienceandlogosthisisacommon),andthatmeansthatthe
multiplicityissomethingotherthanitself.Orinotherwords,sincethebeingofevery
multiplicityliesinsomethingoutsideofitself,everymultiplicitymustnotbewhatitis.Thisis
howthingsare(andarenot)inthecontradictoryrealminbetweenParmenidesandHeraclitus;
thingsmustbeandnotbewhattheyare.

Weshallnowturntoaninvestigationofhowthelevelsofbeingarenecessaryforthe

possibilityoffalseopinion,whichinturnwillhelpusunderstandtheargumentforthesoul
moreclearly.

Parttwo:falseopinion(187d-201a)

Therearefivepartstothesectionofthetextdedicatedtofiguringoutwhatfalseopinion

is.Thefirstthreeparts(188a-e;188d-189b;189b-190e)areargumentsthatconcludethatfalse
opinionisimpossible.Thefinaltwoargumentsareimages(thewaxblock[191c-198c]andthe
aviary[198d-200c])thatareunabletocapturefalseopinion,atleastnotcompletely.The
arguments,thougheachadistinctargumentfortheimpossibilityoffalseopinion,fittogetherin
awaythatleadsustorecognizetheneedforlevelsofbeing.Abriefoutlineoftheupcoming
sectionisasfollows.

Iamgoingtoarguethatthefirstargumentinthissectionisunabletoaccountforfalse

opinionbecauseitfailstorecognizethatthesoulmusthaveseveraldistinctpowers/faculties.
Thesecondargumentisunabletoaccountforfalseopinionbecauseitfailstorecognizethat
therearemultipletypesofbeingsthatcorrespondtothemultiplicityoffaculties.Thethird
argumentincludesbothoftheabovementionedmultiplicitiesbut,nonetheless,isstillunableto
accountforfalseopinionbecauseitfailstorecognizejudgment’sabilitytorelatethedifferent
facultiesandcorrespondingbeingstooneanother.Theimageofthewaxblockdoesrelatetwo
distinctfacultiesandtheircorrespondingbeingstooneanother,andasaresultitisableto
explaincertaintypesoffalseopinion;however,theimagefailstoincludethefacultyof
“thought”(dianoia)asindependentfromtheothersandis,thereby,unabletoexplainfalse
opinionsthatsupposedlyoccurwithinthatfacultyalone.Thefinalimageoftheaviaryattempts
totreatthoughtindependentlyoftheotherfaculties,andasaresultitisonceagainunableto
accountforfalseopinion.

Thefirstlessontodrawfromthisisthaterrorsinpurethoughtareactuallyimpossible,as

areerrorsinanyisolatedfaculty.Theerrorsonlyarisewhenthefacultiesaremixedinwith,or
mistakenfor,oneanother.Toputitinthetermsusedearlier,falsejudgmentonlyoccurswhen
thesoul’sactivityinvolvestherelatingofcommonsthemselvestocommonsmixedwithsense-
content.Itisintheactofmis-relatingthesethatfalseopinionoccurs.

Wewillseethatthis

meansthatitispossibletomistakeamemoryforaperception,butnotamemoryforamemory.
Likewiseitispossibletomistakeanunmixedcommonforamixedcommon,butnotan
unmixedcommonforanunmixedcommon.Thenext,andmoreimportant,lessonisthe
generalizationthatallerrorisaconfusingoftheobjectsofonefacultyfortheobjectsof
anotherfaculty.Thisconfusingoftheobjectsofonefacultyfortheobjectsofanotherfacultyis
thesameasconfusingonekind(orlevel)ofbeingforanother.Thus,allerrorisamistakingof
onekind(orlevel)ofbeingforanother.TheconclusionsIdrawfromtheinvestigationinto
falseopinionareimplicitinthedialogue.Theyariselargelythroughapplyingthelessons
learnedfromtherefutationof“knowledgeisperception”totheinvestigationintofalseopinion.
Weshouldexpectthesetwosectionsofthedialogue(i.e.,therefutationofthe
Protagorean/Heracliteanpositionthatknowledgeisperceptionandtheinvestigationintothe
possibilityoffalseopinion)toberelatedsinceanintegralpartoftheProtagoreanposition
beingdismissedisthatfalseopinionisnotpossible.

Thefirstargument:knowingornotknowing(188a-e)

Thefirstargumentstatesthatallopinionsareeitherofwhatoneknowsorwhatone

doesn’tknow.Thisallowsforonlyfourpossiblewaysthatfalseopinioncouldoccur:
mistakingwhatisknownforwhatisknown,mistakingwhatisnotknownforwhatisnot
known,mistakingwhatisknownforwhatisnotknownandmistakingwhatisnotknownfor
whatisknown.Allfourofthesearedeemedimpossiblefortworeasons.Thefirstisthat
knowledgecannotbethesourceofignorance;thesecondisthatwhatisnotknowncannotbean
objectofjudgment.TheexampleSocratesusesissomeone’smistakingTheaetetusfor
Socrates.IfonedoesnotknoweitherTheaetetusorSocrates,onecannotmistaketheonefor
theother,andifoneknowsthemthenonecouldneverthinkthattheoneistheother.Hence
falseopinionappearstobeimpossible.

Theargumentisclearlyproblematic.Afterall,“knowledgeisperception”hasalready

beenshowntobefalseearlierinthedialogue.So,ifweareinagreementwithSocratesand
Theaetetus’earlierrefutation,wemustbelievethatthereisfalseopinion.Itis,however,not
easytoseewhattheproblemwiththeargumentactuallyis.JohnAckrillraisesacaseoffalse
opinionthathethinksSocrates’argumentfailstobeabletoaccountfor.Hewrites:

Unfortunately,ofcourse,withordinarypropernamestheargumentoutlinedabovedoesnotwork.Amanmightbe
introducedtomeatonetimeas“Jo”andatanothertimeas“Smith,”anditmightbeamatterforlaterdiscoverybyme
thatJoandSmithareoneandthesameperson.BeforethisdiscoveryImightwellthinktheyweredifferentpeople,andI

couldexpressthisbeliefbysaying“JoisnotSmith.”19

Theconditionsforthiserror,Ackrillnotes,arethatIcanidentifysomesetoffeaturesofthe
personinquestiontowhichIhaveappliedthename“Jo.”andsomeothersetoffeaturesto
whichIhaveappliedthename“Smith.”Properlyspeakingthesefeaturesareofthesame
person,andmyfalseopinionarisesfrommyfailuretorecognizethis.Theconfusioninthis
case,accordingtoAckrill,isoneofnaming.AsAckrillputsit,Socrates“operateswith
ordinarypropernamesasthoughtheywerelogicalpropernames,”

meaningthatSocrates

takesthenames(i.e.,TheaetetusandSocrates)tobenecessarilyconnectedtoasingle,simple
object,wheninactualitytheyarenothingmorethanameredescriptionconsistingofseveral
unifiedcharacteristicsofsomethingthatadmitsofnumerouspossibledescriptions.Itis
Socrates’confusingofthesetwodifferentkindsofnamingthat,Ackrillthinks,leadstothe
argument’smistakenconclusionthatfalseopinionisimpossible.

Thisdistinctionbetweenlogicalpropernamesandordinarypropernamesrelatesdirectly

backtothepreviousdiscussionaboutthecommonsandtheirrelationtosense-content.Touse
thename“Theaetetus”intheordinarysenseistorefertosomeunifiedsetofcharacteristics
(saybulgingeyesandsnubnose),andthisamountstoamixingofsense-contentand
commons.

Tousethename“Theaetetus”inthelogicalsenseistorefertothesimple

principleofunityitself.Thisprinciple,wehavejustargued,isTheaetetus’beautifulsoul,
whichisthesourceofthecommons.

Thus,anamingcaneitherbeareferencetoamixtureof

sense-contentandcommons(ordinarynames)oritcanbeareferencetoanunmixedcommon
(propernames).

Thus,Ackrill’sdistinctionbetweenthetypesofnamesiscentral,buttheinferenceshe

drawsfromthedistinctionmissthemark.HisclaimisthatifwetreatthenamesJoandSmith
asordinarynames,themistakenjudgmentthat“JoisnotSmith”isclearlypossible,

forthe

mistakeissimplytakingonesetofpossiblecharacteristicsofJoSmithandcallingitJo,and

takinganothersetandcallingitSmith.SincethesetsofcharacteristicsaredifferentwhenI
holdthemnexttoeachotherIcanjudgeJoandSmithnottobethesame,therebyallowingfor
thefalseopinion.TheproblemhereisthatinAckrill’sscenariothesupposedlyfalsejudgment
that“JoisnotSmith”isactuallyatruejudgment.IfJoisadistinctsetofcharacteristicsfrom
SmiththenJoisnotSmith,andthecorrespondingjudgmentthatJoisnotSmithmustbetrue.
Bypushingasidethesoul(asanunmixedcommon)andfocusingonthecharacteristicsalone
thejudgmentthat“JoisnotSmith”ceasestobefalse.

Whatthenmustbethecasefor“JoisnotSmith”tobecorrectlydescribedasfalse?In

orderfortheclaimtobefalse,itmustbetruethatJoisthesameasSmith.Yet,inordertobe
abletojudgeJonottobeSmiththeymustbedifferent,foriftheywereentirelythesameone
couldneverjudgetheonenottobetheother.WhatweneedisforJotobeandnottobeSmith.
Howisthispossible?Thesolutionisobvious;JoisthesameasSmithinsofarasbothreferto
thesameindividual,i.e.,thesamesoul,andJoisdifferentthanSmithinsofarastheyare
distinctrepresentationsofthatsameindividual.Again,JoandSmithdifferasdistinct
collectionsofsense-content,butJoandSmitharethesameinsofarasthedistinctcollectionsof
sense-contentareunifiedbythesameprinciple.Thisduality—ofsubstanceandappearance
—resolvestheproblemsthatarisewithfalseopinioninthisargument,andtheydosoby
underminingoneoftheargument’sfundamentalassumptions.Theargumentassumesthatthings
areeitherknownornotknown,withnomiddleground.Recognizingtheabovedualitywecan
seethatthisassumptionisafalsedisjunction.TohavearepresentationofJoSmith,i.e.,to
graspJoSmithasaunityofcharacteristics,isneithertoknowJoSmith(foritdoesnotgrasp
hisprincipleofunity)norisitnottoknowJoSmith(forthereissomelooselyunifiedcontent
presenttothesoul).

Tosumupsofar:theobjectofagraspcaneitherbetheprincipleofunityitselforitcan

betheprincipleofunityasitappliestothatwhichitunifies.Ortousethelanguagefromthe
refutationof“knowledgeispercerption,”thecommonmixedwithsense-contentbothisandis
notthecommon.Thisisageneralprincipleatworkinthedialogue;thatwhichisunifiedbya
principleofunitybothisandisnotthatprinciple.Thisisperhapsmostobviouswithοὐσία;the
beingofanobjectofexperienceliesinthecommonitself.Thus,insofarastheobjectof
experienceisnotidenticaltothecommonitmustnotbewhatitis.Thus,toknowabeingonly
asanobjectofexperienceistobothknowandnotknowthatbeing.Itispreciselythisknowing
andnotknowingofthesamethingthatthefirstargumentagainstfalseopinionassumesis
impossible.Itistherecognitionthatthebeingoftheobjectsofexperienceissuppliedbythe
soulthatgivesusawaytoseehowthesamethingcanbeknownandnotknownatthesame
time.

Wecannowseehowitispossibletomakethefalsejudgmentthat“JoisnotSmith.”

InsofaraswetakeJoandSmithasmerelyobjectsofexperience(orappearances)thereisno
falseopinion.For,iftheyaresimplyappearances,itmeansthattohavethemappeardistinctto
us,whichisrequiredforjudgingthemtobedifferent,entailstheirtrulybeingdistinct.For
similarreasonstheycannotbeentirelythesameeither,foriftheywereentirelythesamethey
couldneverappearasdistincttous.Asobjectsofexperiencetheymustbedistinctandnot
distinct.Yet,JoandSmith,intheirοὐσία,arenotdistinct.

Inthisway,therelationbetweenthecommonsandthesense-content(oranyunifierand

unified)underminethefirstargumentofferedagainstfalseopinion.Whatallowsforthe
possibilityofthefalsejudgmentthat“JoisnotSmith”isthatJoSmithisinmultipleways;he
isasaprincipleofunityandheisasobjectsofexperience.

ThemultiplicityofwaysinwhichJoSmithisareallrepresentationsconstructedbythe

souloftheoneexperiencing(orjudgingorthinking)

JoSmith.Themultiplicityofbeing,

therefore,issomethingpresenttothesoulofthe“measurer”(touseProtagoras’term).A
questionariseshere:sincetheobjectspresenttothesoulexistinseveraldifferentways,and
theobjectsthatareforthesoulexistbecausethesouldeterminesthemtobethatway,doesthat
meanthatthesoulitselfmustexistinseveraldifferentways?Theanswertothismustbeyes.
Thereasonisthattheentirerangeoflevelsofbeingbelongswithinthesoul.Thus,ifthe
differencebetweenthelevelsofbeingisreal(whichIaminthemidstofarguingtheymustbe,
iffalseopinionisgoingtobepossible)thentheremustberealdifferencewithinthesoul.The
soul,atleastpotentially,correspondstoandisresponsiblefor,multiplelevelsofbeingandas
aresultmustitselfexist,atleastpotentially,onthesemultiplelevels.

Becausethecommonsareboththeprincipleofunityforallintelligibleexperience,and

aresuppliedbytheverysoulhavingtheexperience,itshouldbethecasethatregardlessof
whetherwelookatthelevelsofbeingfromthestandpointoftheobject,orfromthestandpoint
ofthesubjectwecometothesameresults.Thisispartofmakingmanthemeasure,andpartof
whatwesawwithProtagoras’accountfromearlierinthedialogue.AsSocratessaysin
regardstoProtagoras’viewoftheperceivingandtheperceived:

Therearetwoformsofmotion,eachinfiniteinmultitude,theonehavingthepowertoacttheothertobeactedupon.From
theintercourseoftheseandtheirrubbingagainsteachothertherecometobeoffspring,infiniteinmultitudebuttwins,a

perceivedandalsoaperceivingthatalwaysfallsoutconjoinedandgeneratedwithwhatisperceived.26...Forthereisn’t
evenanyactivethinguntilitcomestogetherwithwhat’sactingonit,andthethingthatcomestogetherwithonethingand

actscomestosightagainasbeingacteduponwhenitcomesupagainstsomethingelse.27

SotooinPlato’spicturetheexperiencer,quaexperiencer,onlycomestobealongwiththe
comingtobeoftheexperienced.ThedifferencebetweentheaccountsisthatforPlatothebeing
ofanexperiencerisnotreallyfoundintheactofbeinganexperiencer.Inotherwords,the
experienceristhesoulworkingthroughanother.Thebeingofthisunityofsoulandotheris
foundinthatwhichservesastheprincipleofunityofthecompound;theprincipleofunityof
thesoulandotheristhesoulitself.Orinyetotherwords,theexperiencerisacompound,and
asacompounditsbeingliesinthatwhichsuppliesitwithitsunity.Thesoulitselfistheunity
underlyingthemultiplicityoftheexperiencer.Thereforethesoulitself(notasexperiencer)is
fundamentallythebeingoftheexperiencer.

ThisisthesameasthedistinctionpointedtoearlierintheJoSmithexample,exceptin

thiscasewearetalkingaboutthefacultiesofperception(i.e.,beinganexperiencer)insteadof
theobjectsofperception(thequalitiesattributedtoJoandtoSmith).These,Ihavebeen
arguing,areequivalent.Forthequalitiesandthefacultyresponsibleforperceivingthe
qualitiesbothexpressthesamelevelofbeing.Thisisalsothepointoftransitionbetweenthe
firstargumentagainstfalseopinionandthesecond.Thesecondargumentisfundamentallythe
sameasthefirst,onlyinsteadoffocusingonthesubject,itfocusesontheobject.AsSocrates
sayswhenmovingfromtheoneargumenttotheother,“wellthen,iswhatwe’relookingfor

somethingoneoughtnottoexamineinthisway,goingbyone’sknowingornotknowing,but
ratherbysomething’sbeingornot?”

Thesecondargument:beingornotbeing(188d-189b)

Thesecondargumentisgenerallytakenasanotherformulationofanoftrepeatedargument

inPlato’sworks.Thesuggestionthatmotivatestheargumentisthatfalseopinionishavingan
opinionaboutwhatisnot,whiletrueopinionsareopinionsaboutwhatis.Thegeneral
structureoftheargumentagainstthisviewoffalseopinionisthattohaveanopinionabout
whatisnotistohaveanopinionaboutnothing,andtohaveanopinionaboutnothingistonot
haveanopinionatall.Therefore,itisnotpossibletohaveanopinionaboutwhatisnot,and
hence,onthisaccount,falseopinionisimpossible.Someversionofthisargumentisgivenin
theCratylus,

theSophist,

andtheEuthydemus.

Thegeneralargumentisstrikingfor

severalreasons,butthespecificcontextandexamplesusedintheTheaetetusareparticularly
tellingforus.Theversionoftheargumentinourdialogueisactuallyanargumentbyanalogy.
HereispartoftheexchangebetweenSocratesandTheaetetusthatconstitutestheargument:

Socrate s:Isthereanysuchthinganywhereelse?
The ae te tus:Whatsortofthing?
Socrate s:Ifsomeoneseessomething,butseesnothing.
The ae te tus:Howcouldhe?
Socrate s:Butsurelyifheseesanyonething,heseesoneofthebeings;ordoyousupposethatwhat’soneiseveramong
thingsthatarenot?
The ae te tus:NotI.
Socrate s:Therefore,someonewhoseesatleastanyonethingseessomethingthatis.
The ae te tus:Soitappears.
Socrate s:Andtherefore,someonewhohearsanythinghearssomeonethingatleast,andhearssomethingthatis.
The ae te tus:Yes.
Socrate s:Andsodoessomeonewhotouchesanyonethingatleastalsotouchsomethingthatis,ifindeedit’sone?
The ae te tus:Thattoo.
Socrate s:Sodoesn’tsomeonewhohasanopinionhaveanopinionaboutatleastsomeonething?
The ae te tus:Necessarily.
Socrate s:Anddoessomeonewhohasanopinionaboutsomeonethingnothaveanopinionaboutsomethingthatis?
The ae te tus:Igoalongwiththat.
Socrate s:Therefore,someonewhohasanopinionaboutsomethingthatisnothasanopinionaboutnothing.

Thefirstthingtonoticeaboutthispassageisthatitmakesthesameproblematicassumptionas
thefirstargument,thoughhereitiscouchedindifferentterms.Thefirstargumentassumesthat
somethingiseitherknownornotknown(withnoinbetween),whilethisargumentassumesthat
somethingiseitheroneornotone(withnoinbetween).Itisfundamentallythesame
assumptionexceptthatthefirstargumentmakestheassumptioninreferencetotheactivityof
thesubjectwhilethesecondmakestheassumptioninreferencetotheobject.Aswe’vejust
seenthedistinctionbetweentheactivityofthesubjectandthebeingoftheobjectis
fundamentallyfalsesincethebeingoftheobjectisderivedfromtheactivityofthesoul.Thus,
thetwoargumentsworkinfundamentallythesameway.Asaresult,itisnotsurprisingthat
theyarerefutableinthesameway.Admittinglevelsofbeing,oroneness,underminesthe
argument.Iftherearelevelsofoneness,thenitisnotenoughfortheargumenttosaysimplythat
anobjectofopinionisorisnot,forthelevelsofonenessmeanthatanobjectcanbeoneand
notoneatthesametime.Infactbeingoneandnotoneatthesametimeisexactlywhatthe

refutationof“knowledgeisperception”showedusmustbethecaseforallobjectsof
experience.Everyobjectgraspedbythesoulthroughanotheriswhatitisinvirtueofa
combinationofcommon(e.g.,oneness)andsense-content.Thesense-contentismultiplicity
thatisunifiedthroughthecommon.Thus,everycombinationofcommonandsense-contentis
somethingthatisamixtureofwhatisoneandnotone.Theupshothereisthatthesecond
argumentagainstthepossibilityoffalseopinionisovercomeinthesamewayasthefirst,by
admittinglevelsofbeing.

Thesecondthingtonoticeaboutthisversionoftheargumentagainstfalseopinionisthat

itisanargumentbyanalogy,connectingwhatistrueofseeing,hearingandtouchingwithwhat
istrueofopining.Theanalogyisbetweenperceptionandopinion,anditisintentionally
problematic.Perceptionhasjustbeenprovennottobeknowledge.Whythensupposethat
opinion,thecurrentlyproposeddefinitionofknowledge,shouldresembleperception?Infact,
therefutationof“knowledgeisperception”showedusthatperceptionandopiniondifferin
preciselythewaythatthisargumenttreatsthemasthesame;theanalogybetweenperception
andopinioninthisargumenttakestheonenessoftheirobjectsasthecenteroftheanalogy.Yet,
wesawthatperception,aspuresense-content,liesbeyondallintelligibilitypreciselybecause
itwasdevoidofoneness.Opinionisderivedfromthecombinationofthesense-content
suppliedbyperceptionwiththecommons.Thismeansthatopiniondiffersfromperception
preciselyintheirrelationtooneness.Tosaythisagaininanotherway,properlyspeakingbeing
andonenessarenotperceived.Itisonlyoncethecontentsofperceptionarejoinedtogether
withthecommons(beingandonenessbeingtwoofthese)injudgmentthatperceptionhasany
relationtobeing.Itisinterestingtonotethatbasedontheaboveanalysiswearepreparedto
recognizethattheassumingofasamenessbetweenthetwodistinctfacultiesofperceptionand
opinion(theassumptionusedtoargueagainstthepossibilityoffalseopinion)isitselfafalse
opinion.Thismistakingofonefacultyforanotheristhesameproblemasthemistakingofone
levelofbeingforanother,whichwesawwasaprobleminthefirstargumentagainstthe
possibilityoffalseopinion.Interestingly,thismeansthatthefirstargumentagainstfalse
opinionstartedwithfaculties(i.e.,knowingornotknowing)andthenshowedusthattheremust
belevelsofbeingintheobjects,whilethesecondargumentagainstfalseopinionstartedwith
thebeingoftheobjects(i.e.,somethingeitherisorisnot)andthenshowedusthatwemust
distinguishbetweenthefaculties.Thisisnotatallsurprising,andperhapsitcanevenbetaken
assupportfortheargumentImadeearlierthattherefundamentallyisnodistinctionbetween
thesubjectandobjectintheaccountgeneratedintheTheaetetus.

Thislackofagenuine

distinctioniswhytheunderminingoftheargumentsagainstfalseopinioncanbedonefrom
eithertheperspectiveofthesubjectorobject,andineithercaseweendupinvokingtheother.

Thethirdargumentagainstthepossibilityoffalseopinionrecognizesboththenecessary

multiplicityofwaysthingsarepresenttothesoulandthenecessarymultiplicityofwaysof
being,andhenceitcanbeseenasacombinationoftheprevioustwoarguments.Theargument
failstobeabletoaccountforthepossibilityoffalseopinion,however,becauseitdoesnot
considerthesedifferentfacultiesandbeingsinrelationtooneanother.

Thethirdargument:allodoxia,orother-judging(189b-190e)

Thethirdargumenthypothesizesthatfalseopinionis“ἀλλοδοξία,”

or“other-judging.”

SpecificallySocratessaysthat“Falseopinionisakindofother-wiseopinion,whenever
someone,havingmadeanexchangeinhisthinking,saysthatoneofthebeingsisanotherofthe
beingsinturn.”

Wearenowexplicitlydealingbothwiththingsthatarepresenttooneofthe

soul’sfaculties(towhichthefirstargumenttriedtolimititself)andthingsthatare(towhich
thesecondargumenttriedtolimititself).Falseopinion,accordingtothethirdargument,is
mistakingsomethingthatisandispresenttothesoulforanotherthingthatisandispresentto
thesoul.Theproblemwiththis,accordingtoSocrates,isthatwesimplyneverdoit.Noone
eversaystothemselvesthat“what’sbeautifulismoreuglythananything,orwhat’sunjustis
just.”

Itisimpossibletosaythatoneofthethingsthatispresenttoyoursoulisanotherofthe

thingsthatispresenttoyoursoul,andsinceother-judgingrequiresustodothis,itfollowsthat
other-judgingisimpossible.

Thedevelopmentthisargumentmakesovertheprevioustwo,besidesindicatingthatthe

relation(thisisreallytooweakaword)betweenthesubjectandtheobject,istobefoundin
theexamplesthatSocratesuses.Tomakesurewesetaboutquestioningtheargument,Platohas
insertedintohisexamplesofimpossibleopinionsareferencetoanopinionexpressedearlier
inthedialogue.AtthebeginningoftheirdiscussionTheodorussaysthatTheaetetusisnot
beautiful.

LateronSocratessaystoTheaetetusthat“youarebeautiful,Theaetetus,andnot

uglyasTheodoruswassaying,foronewhospeaksbeautifullyisbeautifulandgood.”

Theodorusseemstohavemistakenthebeautifulandtheugly,yetSocrateshasjustclaimedthat
thisneverhappens.

Whataccountsforthetwoopposedopinionsbeingexpressedhere?HowcanTheodorus

judgeTheaetetustobeuglyandSocratesjudgehimtobebeautiful?Doesthetruthofoneof
theseopinionsprecludethetruthoftheother,orcanbothbetrue?Itwouldseem,basedon
whathasbeenagreedtointheargument,thatsimplytobeabletojudgeTheaetetustobe
beautifulmeansthathemustbebeautiful,andlikewisetobeabletojudgehimtobeuglymeans
thathemustbeugly,forafterallἀλλοδοξίαistheexchangingofsomethingthatisforsomething
elsethatis.HowhasTheodorusseenuglinesswhereSocratesseesbeauty?Theanswerisboth
obviousandcentraltoanunderstandingofPlato’sconceptionoffalseopinion.Theodorusis
referringtoTheaetetus’appearance,whileSocratesisreferringtohissoulorform.

The

beingthatisjudgedtobeuglybyTheodorusisanobjectofperception(i.e.,sense-content
mixedwithcommons).ThebeingthatisjudgedtobebeautifulbySocratesisanobjectof
judgment,andservesastheprincipleofunityfortheexperience.

Itisimportanttokeepinmindboththesamenessandthedifferencebetweenthesetwo

objects(i.e.,theappearanceandthesubstance).Theappearancedependsuponthesubstance
foritsbeing;thesubstanceistheprincipleofonenessforthemultiplicitythatappearanceis
composedof.Thismeansthatsubstanceisthebeingoftheappearance.Ortosayitanother
way,appearancederivesitsbeing/onenessfromsubstance,butcanonlyrepresentthisoneness
throughitsmultiplicity,andassuchislessthanthesubstancefromwhichitderivesitsbeing.

Thusthetwojudgments(ofappearanceandsubstance)arefundamentallyofthesamething
(Theaetetus),butpresentthebeingofthatthingmoreorlessfully.

Thenatureoftheunified/unifierrelationandhowmanydifferentkindsofrelationsfitinto

thistypeofrelationwillbedevelopedovertheremainderofthebook.Inparticularchapter3

willshowthatonemeaningfulwaytothinkaboutthisrelation,whichcanalsobethoughtofas
therelationbetweenthelevelsofbeing,isintermsofthewholeandthepart.Chapter3will
arguethatthepartsareunifiedintoawholethroughonekindoflogos,andthatanotherkindof
logosshowsthewholetobearepresentationofanevenhigheroneness.Thisisnotdifferent
thanthethreelevelsthatIhavebeenlayingoutinthischapter;perceptionisunifiedin
judgmentsofcommonsandsense-content,whichareunifiedinthecommonsalone.The
recognitionthatitislogosthatjoinsthelevelsofbeingtogether,alongwiththerecognitionof
theimportanceofdifferentiatingwholesandparts,willhelpustobetterunderstandthe
unified/unifierrelationthatissocrucialforthepossibilityoffalseopinion.

Lookingbackatthethirdargumentwecannowseeitsproblem.Nooneeversaysthat

beautyisugliness.Whatwedosayisthatoneandthesamethingisbeautifulinonewayand
uglyinanother.ThisdoesnotmeanthatwesaythatTheaetetus’noseisuglybuthiseyesare
beautiful,forinthatcasewearenotsayingthatthesamething(Theaetetus)isbeautifuland
ugly.ThiswasthetypeoferrorthatAckrillmade.Whatitmeansisthatthefalseopinionarises
outofalackofrecognitionofthedifferentwaysofviewingthesameobjector,whatamounts
tothesamething,afailuretorecognizethedifferentwaysofbeingthatathingcanhave.
ApplyinguglinesstoTheaetetusisnotfalseifwetakethenameTheaetetustorefertohis
appearance,whichisonewayinwhichTheaetetushimselfexists.Itisfalseifwereferittohis
soul,whichisanotherway

inwhichTheaetetusexists.Failingtodistinguishbetweenthe

appearanceandthesubstancethatunderliestheappearancecausesustohavefalseopinions.

ItmaybeworthnotingherethatSocratescallsTheaetetusbeautifulinresponsetohim

differentiatingbetweenthesoulitselfthroughitselfandthesoulthroughanother.Theexchange
betweenthetwoisasfollows:

The ae te tus:Itseemstomethatthere’sabsolutelynosuchspecialorganforthesethings[i.e.,thecommons]asthereis
forthoseothers[i.e.,judgmentscontainingsense-content],butthesoulitself,throughitself,appearstometoobservethe
commonthingsinvolvedinallthings.
Socrate s:Becauseyouarebeautiful,Theaetetus,andnotuglyasTheodoruswassaying,foronewhospeaksbeautifullyis

beautifulandgood.42

Beautyhereistiedtotherecognitionofthedistinctionbetweentheunifierandtheunified,the
veryrecognitionthatIamarguingiscentraltoavoidingfalseopinion.Furthertheunifier,
whichinthiscaseisthesoul,istiedtospeech.Theimportanceofspeechistiedtothe
importanceoflogosthatwasmentionedbefore,i.e.,initsroleconnectingthelevelsofbeing
thatitissocrucialtodistinguishbetween.

Asmentionedbefore,failingtodistinguishbetweentheappearanceandthesubstancethat

underliestheappearancecausesustohavefalseopinions.Thisisakintosayingthatfailingto
distinguishtheobjectsofonefacultyfromtheobjectsofanotherfacultycausesustohavefalse
opinions.ThisobviouslyfollowsfromtheargumentIgaveearlierconnectingthebeingofthe
objectswiththefaculties.Fromtheperspectiveofthefacultieswehaveseenthattoavoidthe
puzzlesraisedbythethreeargumentsweneedbothtoknowandnotknowthesamething.We
needtoknowitinsofarasitispresenttousasanobjectofjudgment,andweneedtonotknow
itinsofarasitspresencetousisconnectedwithignorance.Itisthemultiplicityofwaysthat
somethingcanbepresenttothesoulthatallowsustobothknowandnotknow.Andsince
knowledgeisofwhatis,

thepossibilityoffalseopinionrestsuponsomething’sbothbeing

andnotbeing.Thesebeingsthatareandarenotarethemixturesofsense-contentandcommons
thatwe’vebeendiscussing.

Thismeansthatthereistruthtothesecondargument’sassertion

thatfalseopinionisjudgingwhatisnot.Itisnotthattheobjectofjudgmenthasnobeingatall,
butratherthatitreceivesitsbeingfromelsewhereandthusislessofabeingthanthatwhich
suppliesitwithitsbeing.

Allthisshedslightonthefalsityofthedefinitioninquestion.Theaetetushasmistaken

opinionforknowledge.Opinion,ifwetakeittobeformedfromperception,isbasedonsome
kindofappearance,whileknowledge(sinceitisofwhatis)

isbasedonsubstance.

Theaetetus’definitionhasmistakenonefacultyforanother,andhenceithasmistakenonemode
ofbeingforanothermodeofbeing.ThusTheaetetus’thirddefinitionofknowledgeisnotjust
false,itistheformoffalseopinioninsofarasitconfusesoneofourdiscerningfacultiesfor
another,whichaswe’vejustseenisthegroundforthepossibilityofallfalseopinions.

Sectionfour:thewaxblock(191c-196c)

ThewaxblockisthefirsttimeSocratesincludestherelationbetweendistinctfacultiesin

hisattempttoaccountforfalseopinion,andasaresulthesuccessfullyidentifiesasourceof
oneofthetypesoffalseopinion.Morespecificallyhelaysoutanimageofhowwecan
mistakeamemoryforaperceptionoraperceptionforamemory.Thesuccessoftheimage
lendscredencetomyassertionthatfalseopinionrequiresmultipletypesofcognition,andthat
theobjectsofthesemultipletypesofcognitionmustbeabletobeseenasbothunifiedand
separate.Theintroductionofmultiplicityinthesoul,however,introducestheneedfora
principleofunityforthesoulitself,i.e.,aprincipleofunityforthecurrentprincipleofunity.
Inotherwords,thewaxblockforcesustoconfrontthefollowingquestion:whatisitthatunites
themultiplicityoffacultiesinthesoul?Abrieflookattheimagewillmaketheproblemclear.

Accordingtothewaxblockanalogyfalseopinioncanariseinthoseinstancesinwhich

having“knowledge,”i.e.,rememberingbyhavingstampsinthewaxblockinoursouls,we
mistakeperceptionsforthatofwhichwehavethestamps.Socrates’exampleisseeing
TheaetetusandTheodorusoffinthedistance“knowing”themboth(i.e.,havingstampsofthem
both)andyetmatchingeachoneuptothewrongstamp.InthiscaseTheaetetusandSocrates
agreethatfalseopinionoccurs.

Thedifferencebetweenthetrueandthefalseopinionsisthat

inthetrueopinionsthesoulmatchesupthestamp(s)andtheperception(s)properly,whilein
thefalseopinionsitdoesnot.Thismeansthatinorderfortheimagetoillustratefalseopinion
weneedtopositdistinctfacultieswhichpresentdifferentobjectstothesoul,whichthesoulis
thenabletorelatetooneanotherthroughsomethingotherthanthefacultiesbeingrelated.
Clearlyitisthisrelatingoftheobjectsofthetwofacultiesthatisreallytheactofjudgingor
opining,foritisinthisrelatingthattruthandfalsityarepossible.Thewaxblockusesmemory
andperceptiontoshowusthatjudgmentinvolvesourabilitytounify(eithertrulyorfalsely)
theobjectsoftwodistinctfaculties.

Aquestionariseshere:whatkindofbeingispropertotheobjectsofperceptionandwhat

kindofbeingispropertotheobjectsofmemory?Intheinvestigationofthefirstthree
argumentsproblematizingfalseopinion,Imadetheclaimthatdistinctfacultiesentaildistinct
typesofbeingsastheirobjects.Theintroductionofmemorycomplicatesthisrathergeneral

assertion.Afterall,ifwearecapableofrememberingobjectsperceived,objectsopined,and
objectsthought,andeachofthesearedifferenttypesofbeings,thenitwouldseemtofollow
thatmemoryitselfmustbeabletohavemultipletypesofbeingsasitsobject.

Furtherit

wouldthenseemthatmistakingperceptionsandmemoriesofTheaetetusandTheodorusisa
mistakethatonlyinvolvesonetypeofbeing,thetypeofbeingthatisinvolvedinjudgments
aboutperception,i.e.,sense-contentmixedwithcommons.Ifthiswerethecaseitwouldbea
counterexampletothepositionthatallerrorentailsamistakingofonetypeofbeingfor
another.Thefollowingparagraphswillshowwhythisisactuallynotaproblembyshowing
howtheimproperrelatingofperceptionandmemoryisalsomistakingonekindofbeingfor
another.

Judgment,accordingtothewaxblock,relatestoimages.Socratesgoesthroughalengthy

discussionofthefacultiesrequiredforfalsejudgment,concludingthataccordingtothewax
blocktherearethreecriteriaforsuchjudgments:perception,memory,andthesoul.Perception
andmemorysupplytheobjectstobejudgedaseitherthesameordifferentbythesoul.The
soulmust“see”thetwoimagesasdistinctinordertobeabletojudgethemasthesameor
different.Thatmeansthatinordertomakeajudgmentofsamenessordifferencethesoulmust
havealreadyjudgedadifference,i.e.,simplyinordertorecognizetwodistinctobjectsof
judgmentthesoulmusthavealreadyjudgedtheobjectsasdistinct.Thismeansthatthememory
ofTheaetetuscannotbetheperceptionofTheaetetus,forifitweretherewouldbeno
possibilityofjudgingthemtobedifferent.Toputitintermsofthewaxblock,thesignetringis
notthesameastheimpressionitleavesinthewax.

Thusevenjudgingtwoimagestobethesamerequiresthemtobedifferentinsomeway.

ThiswasalsooneofthelessonsderivedfromAckrill’soversightdiscussedearlier.Icanonly
judgethatJoisnotSmithbecausetherepresentationthatisJoisactuallydifferentthanthe
representationthatisSmith.Thefalsityofthejudgment“JoisnotSmith”iscontingentuponJo
andSmithreferringtosomethingbeyondthedistinctappearanceofeachoneofthem.Sotoo
herewiththetwoimagespresenttothesoulthroughthewaxblockandperception,aslongas
wetreatthemmerelyasimagesitwillalwaysbetruetosaythattheoneisnottheother.

Inwhatwaythencanthejudgmentthattheimpressioninthewaxisthesameasthesignet

ringfromwhichitcamebeatruejudgment?Clearlyitcannotbeajudgmentthatholdsthatthe
impressionitselfandthesignetringitselfarethesame,ratheritmustbeajudgmentthatthey
eitherbothrefertothesamethingorthattheonereferstotheother.

Inthiswayjudgment

requiresadistinctionbetweenkindsofbeings.Thereisthebeingoftheimageasareferent,
andthereisthebeingofthatwhichisreferredto.This,onceagain,takesusbacktothe
distinctionmadeearlierbetweentheunmixedcommonsandthecommonsmixedwithsense-
content.Theunmixedcommon(sayTheaetetus’soul)is“referredto”bythecommonmixed
withsense-content(sayTheaetetus’appearance)inmuchthesamewaythatboththeimpression
inthewaxandtheperceptionofthepersonmustreferbacktothesoulofthepersonbeing
sensedorremembered.Morespecifically,thememoryandtheperceptionmustreferto
somethingincommonifthejudgmentthattheyarenotthesameispossiblyfalse,andifthe
judgmentthattheyarethesameispossiblytrue.

Therelationbetweenthefacultiesandtheobjectsofthefacultiesrequiressomethingto

holdthefacultiesinrelation.Thisisthefunctionofthesoulinjudgments,justasitwasthe

functionofthesoulinperceptionearlier.Intherefutationof“knowledgeisperception”
Socratesreferstothesoulasthatwhichbringsthecontentsuppliedbythedifferentsenses
together.Theremustbesomethingcapableofthissincewecanattributevisualandauditory
propertiestooneandthesameobjectofjudgment.Likewiseforthedistinctfaculties;wecan
recognizeTheaetetus’beautifulsoulasbeingsomehowconnectedtotheuglyimagethat
appearsbeforeus.Inordertodosotheremustbesomewayofconnecting(injudgmentof
somekind)theobjectsofperceptionandtheobjectsofopinion/thought.Thisisonceagainthe
soul.Yet,aswe’veseen,eachoftheactivitiesoftheparticularfacultiesisalsotheworkofthe
soul.Thus,thesoulisboththeexaminerandtheexaminedofthesejudgments.Tobeboththe
examinerandtheexaminedistobeboththeprincipleofunityandthatwhichisunified.Thisis
reallynosurprisesincewe’veseenthatthebeingofthatwhichisunifiedmustalsocomefrom
theunifyingsoul.However,forthesoultobeboththeunifiedandtheunifierthesoulmustbe
multiple.Andtobemultipleistorequireaprincipleofunity.Thus,thesoulitselfmustalso
requireaprincipleofunity.

Thismultiplicityintheprincipleofunity(i.e.,thesoul)hasbeenpresentfromthemoment

werecognizedthatallintelligibilitystemsfromthesoul.TheaccountIhaveofferedthusfar
hasinvolvedthedoingawaywithofthesubject/objectdistinction;everyobjectofperception,
opinionandthoughtisonlybecauseofitsattachmenttothecommonssuppliedbythesoul.The
beingandstructureofeverythingiswithintheunifyingsoul.Butthismeansthattheunifying
soul,inunifyingtheobjectspresenttoit,isunifyingitself.Thisiswhatitmeanstosaythatthe
soulmustbebothunifiedandunifier;itisboththeonenessandthemultiplicity,andassuch
requiresahigherprincipleofunitytoaccountforitsbeing.Further,thishigherprincipleof
unityneededtoaccountforthebeingofthesoulmust,clearly,lieoutsideofthesoul.Forto
placeitinthesoulwoulddonothingtoovercomethefactthatthesoulisbothoneandmany,
andhencedonothingtoovercomethemanynessofthesoul.

This,Isuggest,refersusbacktooneofthepolesoftheoppositionthatframesthe

dialogue:theutteronenessthatisrepresentedbyfatherParmenides.Indeedthissectionhas
shownthatthesoulfillsthemiddlegroundbetweenthepurefluxandmanynessofHeraclitus
(asrepresentedbythepure,andunintelligible,sense-content)andthecompleteonenessof
Parmenides.Boththepurefluxandthecompleteonenessmustlieoutsideofthesoul,andyet
botharenecessarytomakesenseofallthatcanactuallybepresenttothesoul.Whatitmeans
tosaythatthepureflux(sense-content)isneededtobeabletoaccountforthemultiplicityof
sensation,opinionandthoughtwillbethefocusofchapter4,thoughtheargumentforthesoul
providedmuchofthejustificationforthisclaim.Theneedforahigherprincipleofunitylying
outsideofthesoulhasbeendemonstratedthroughthemultiplicitypresentinthesoul,andwill
beamaincomponentoftheinvestigationoftherelationbetweenlevelsofbeinginchapter3.

Westartedwithonepoleoftheopposition:thepuremultiplicityexpressedbyHeraclitus

andProtagoras.Wearguedthatthispositionrequiresthepositingofaprincipleofunityas
representedbythesoul(or“someonelook”).Wehavenowseen(atleastinapreliminary
way)thatthisprincipleofunityitselfrequiresaprincipleofunity,whichwillbethecasefor
everyprincipleofunityuntilwereachtheParmenideanOneitself.Thedialogue’smovement
“upward,”however,hasstalled.ThemomentofderailingwasseenearlierwhenTheaetetus
havingclaimedthatthereweresomethingsthatthesoulundertakesitselfbyitselfnevertheless

suggeststhatknowledgeisofjudgmentsthatinvolvethesensiblerealm,i.e.,judgmentsthatare
ofcommonsmixedwithsense-content.

BecauseofthismistakebyTheaetetusthedialogue

neverexplicitlyinvestigatestherepercussionsofthesoulbeingmultiple,thoughitdoesgiveus
anargumentforthisbeingthecase,aswellasplentyofimplicitdirectionastohowto
conceiveofourcontradictorysouls.

Turningbacktothewaxblockwecannowseethattheerrorsitallowsforarealsoa

resultofmistakingacommonitselfforacommonmixedwithsensecontent.Oncethejudgment
hasgottentothesoulsofTheaetetusandTheodorusthereisnolongerthepossibilityforerror,
fortosaythat(thesoulof)Theaetetusis(thesoulof)Theodorusisasabsurdassayingthat
“theunjustisjust,”orthat“onethingis,morethananything,someotherthing,”whichSocrates
explicitlydeniesthepossibilityof.

Sectionfive:theaviary(197a-200c)

ThisreadingofthethreeargumentsandthewaxblockissupportedbySocrates’criticism

ofthewaxblock.Themoveawayfromthewaxblocktotheaviaryrefocusestheaccountback
ontheunitynecessarilysuppliedbythesoul.IndoingsoSocratesexplicitlybringsinto
questiontheverythesisIamsuggestingthewaxblockinvokes:

hesuggeststhattheproblem

withtheimageisthatitmakesitimpossibletomakemistakesinthought

alone,i.e.,itis

impossibletomakemistakeswithoutmistakingtheobjectsofonefacultyfortheobjectsof
another.Orinotherwords,Socratesclaimsthatthewax-blockisinsufficientbecauseitisonly
abletoaccountforfalseopinionbyappealingtomultiplefaculties(andthecorresponding
beingstheyhaveastheirobjects).Theexampleheusestomoveawayfromthewaxblockand
towardtheaviaryisonewhichheandTheaetetusclaimbelongssolelytoonefaculty.Socrates
says:

Whatabouttheeleventhatonedoesnothingotherthanthink;doesthisargument[thewaxblock]sayotherwisethanthat

onecouldneversupposeittobetwelvethatonealsothinks?54

Heexplainsthatthiserrorclearlyhappenswhenonesetsbeforehimselffiveandseven
themselves(asopposedtofiveandseventhings)andsupposesthemtobeeleven.Thiserror,it
seems,takesplaceinthoughtalone,withoutanyneedformultiplefaculties.This,however,
wouldtakeusbacktotheproblemassociatedwiththefirstargumentofthesection:mistaking
onethingheknowsforanotherthingheknows.Thiskindoferrorhasalreadybeenagreedto
beimpossibleandwastakenasthefirstgroundfortheimpossibilityoffalseopinion.

Thus,

acceptingthearithmeticalexampleoffalseopinionseemstoleaveuswithaninsoluble
dilemma.AsSocratessays:

Socrate s:Butthenonehastoshowthathavingfalseopinionisanythingbuttheswervingofathoughtinrelationtoa
perception,forifitwerethat,wecouldneverbewronginthoughtsthemselves.Butnow,yousee,eitherthereisnofalse
opinion,orit’spossiblenottoknowthethingsoneknows.Andofthese,whichdoyouchoose?

The ae te tus:You’reputtingforwardachoicethere’snowaythrough,Socrates.56

Theaetetus’responsehereseemstoberightontarget.Howcanonechoosebetweenthe
impossibilityoffalseopinionandtheimpossibilityofnotknowingwhatisknown?Theseare
thechoicesofferedbyHeraclitusandProtagoras,thechoicesthatwererefutedearlier.

arefacedwiththisdilemmaasadirectresultoflimitingourinvestigationoffalseopinionto
onefaculty,andhencetoonelevelofbeing,forasseenbeforetherecognitionoflevelsof
beingmakesnotknowingwhatisknownintelligible.

Torepeat:theexistenceoffalseopinionrequiresnotknowingwhatyouknow,andthis

ignoranceofwhatisknownisonlypossiblebyintroducingmultiplelevelsofbeing.But
Socrates’focussolelyononefacultyintheimageoftheaviaryhaseliminatedthewaxblock’s
methodforintroducingmultiplicityintobeing.Thus,solongasweremainintheconfinesofa
singlefacultywearestuckinaninsolubledilemma.

Platomustthereforecomeupwithanewwayoffindingthemultiplicitynecessaryfor

arithmeticalerrors.

Theprimarysolutionproposedbytheaviaryistointroducemultiplicity

intothefacultyofthoughtitselfbydifferentiatingthepotentialfromtheactual,or,touse
Socrates’phrasing,bydifferentiatingbetween“apossessingofknowledge”

and“ahavingof

knowledge.”

Oncesomeonehaslearnedsomethinghe(passively)possessesthatpieceof

knowledge.This(passive)possessionallowshimtorecallthepieceofknowledge,andwhile
thinkingwhathe(passively)possessedhe(actively)“has”it.Theerrorinjudgmentoccurs
whenhemistakesonepieceofknowledgethatheactively“has”foranotherpieceofpassively
possessedknowledge.Intheimagethedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassiveisthedifference
betweenholding(orhavingre-caught)apreviouslycaughtbirdasopposedtohavingabird
storedintheaviarysomewherebutnotholdingit.

Thinkingbacktotheargumentfortheexistenceofthesoulitshouldbeobviousthatthere

issomethingamisswiththeimageoftheaviary.Accordingtotheimage,thepiecesof
knowledgearecollectedfromexperience.Theaviarystartsoutemptyandisslowlyfilledover
time.Thisisnotatallthepictureofknowledgethatwesawthroughtherefutationof
knowledgeisperception.Previouslywesawthatknowledgeisfoundonlyintheactivityofthe
soulitselfthroughitself,andishadonlyofwhatis,andhenceisknownonlythroughthe
commonsthemselves.Thatwhichisgatheredfromexperienceisneverofthecommons
themselves,butalwaysinvolvessense-content.Thus,theaviary’sclaimtorepresentnumbers
themselves(i.e.,elevenitselfasopposedtoelevenapples)cannotbeaccurate,atleastnot
insofarastheobjectsofpurethoughtaretheunmixedcommons.

Takingtheaboveintoaccount,wecanraisethisquestionabouttheaviary:whatactually

aretheobjectsofjudgmentthatbelongtothefacultythattheaviaryissupposedtorepresent?
Theimageexplicitlydistinguishesthisthinking(dianoia)fromjudgmentsthataredirectlytied
toperceptiblecontent,anditimplicitlydistinguishesthisthinkingfromjudgmentsaboutthe
commonsalone(bytyingtheobjectsoftheaviary’sjudgmentstowhatisgatheredfrom
experience).Thus,theobjectsofdianoiaareneitherthecombinationofsensecontentand
commonsthatconstitutetheparticularsfoundinexperiencenoraretheythecommonsalone
thatbothmaketheobjectsofexperiencepossibleandconstitutetheproperobjectsof
knowledge.Inmakingdianoeticjudgmentsaboutthenumbersevenweareneitherthinking
aboutsevenapplesnorarewethinkingaboutacommon.Rather,theobjectsofdianoiamake
upsomemiddlegroundbetweenthetwo.

Afullaccountofwhattheobjectsofdianoiaare(totheextentthatoneispossible)will

requiretherestofthebook(andthensome).Inbrieftheanswerliesinthenotionofa
universal.Dianoeticjudgments,asrepresentedintheTheaetetus,areapplicabletomorethan

oneobject(i.e.,theyarenotparticular),butarenotapplicableaswidelyasthecommons.The
objectsofdianoeticjudgment,rather,havealimitedgenerality.Therearetwoissuesthatwe
mustfaceincomingtoanunderstanding(totheextentthatitispossible)oflimitedgenerality,
andnotsurprisinglythetwoissuescorrespondtotheironenessandtheirmanyness.(1)What
connectstheseobjects(andtheirfaculty)tothatwhichunifiesthem(thecommons)andthat
whichtheyunify(theobjectsofexperience)?Thiswillbethefocusoftheinvestigationin
chapter3.(2)Whatdistinguishestheseobjectsfromoneanother?Thiswillbethefocusofthe
investigationinchapter4.Bothofthesequestionsalsoapplytotheobjectsofexperienceand
thecommons,butitiswithdianoeticjudgmentsthattheanswersbecomemostclear,for
reasonsthattheinvestigationwillhopefullydemonstrate.

Theimagesofthewaxblockandtheaviarybothfailtopresentuswithanaccurate

portrayalofthesoulitselfthroughitself.This,ofcourse,isnosurprisesincethesoulitself
throughitselfisindependentofimages.Thewaythattheyfailisnoteworthyforour
understandingofthesoul’snecessaryonenessandplurality.Thewaxblockrequiresusto
assumeasoulthatrelatesthedistinctfaculties.Similarlytheaviaryforcesustopositasoul
thatisdistinctfromthesinglefacultyrepresentedbytheaviary.Toputitintermsoftheimage:
Theaviaryisacontainerwithin

thesoulthatstoresthepiecesofknowledgecollected

previouslybythesoul.Theimage,besidesjustaskingustoviewtheaviaryaspartofthesoul,
alsoforcesustoconsiderthesoulenteringtheaviaryinsearchoftheknowledgethatit
contains.Theactiveknowingdescribedaboveisrepresentedintheimagebythesoulentering
intotheaviarythatitissupposedtocontainwithinitself.Inotherwords,therecallingof
previouslypossessedknowledgerequiresthatthesoulenterintoapartthatitcontainswithin
itself.Thisisclearlycontradictoryinthatthesoulmustbeawholewithinapartofitself.This
wasanissueinthewaxblockaswell.Thesoulhastostandoutsideofwhatitisdirectly
perceiving,outsideofthewaxblock,inordertorelatethetwoobjectsthatthefaculties
convey.Indeedthenotionofconveyanceitselfbringswithitexternality.Thus,accordingtothe
imagesthesoulmuststandapartfromthatwhichisapartofitself.Thismeansthatneitherthe
waxblocknortheaviarycanbeanaccuratedepictionofthesoulitselfthroughitself,which,as
therefutationoftheseconddefinitiontaughtus,istheprovinceofknowledge.Italsomeans
thatthesoul,asmultiple,willitselfrequireaprincipleofunity.

Conclusiontochaptertwo

Thethreeargumentshaveshownusthatinorderforfalseopiniontobepossiblewemust

introducemultiplicityintothesoul.Theimagesattemptedtointroducethepropermultiplicity,
andbydoingsohaveshownusonceagaintheneedtoseethesoulasone.ThustheTheaetetus
hasproventousthatthehumansoulmustbebothoneandmany.Theproofhasbeenbasedon
tworelatedassumptions.Thefirst,andmorefundamental,istheprincipleofnoncontradiction.
Withoutit,Socratesarguedearlier,wearestuckintherealmofHeraclituswherenothingwe
sayorthinkcanpossiblyhaveanymeaning.Thesecondassumptionisthatthereisfalse
opinion.Denyingfalseopinionleavesusboundtoattributeequalworthtoanyjudgmentaswe
foundtobethecaseinthe

Protagoreanrealm.

Extricatingourselvesfromthesetwoparallelextremeshasleftuswiththeproblemof

makingsenseofasoulthatisbothoneandmany,asoulthatmaywellbecapableofbeing
entirelywithinapartofitself.Theone/manycharacterofthesoulisalsoreflectedinitsability
tograspmultiplelevelsofbeing,eachlevelofbeingcorrespondingtoafacultyofthesoul.
Thelevelsofbeingarethegroundforthepossibilityoffalseopinion,whichmustbepossible
sinceTheaetetus’opinionthatknowledgeistrueopinionturnedouttobefalse.Wehave
sketchedanoutlineoftheselevelsofbeing,andthegeneralkindsofobjectstobefoundon
eachlevel.Furtherinsightintothelevelswillbeuncoveredbychapter3’sinvestigationinto
therelationbetweenthelevels,andchapter4’sinvestigationintothedifferencebetweenthem.
Allofthisisplayingoutinwhatweareseeingisahierarchyofbeingalongthelinesofthe
hierarchyproposedbyPlotinusintheEnneads.AhierarchyholdingfatherParmenides’Oneat
thetopandworkingdown,throughthesoulitselfthroughitself,andthroughthesoulitself
throughanother,towardtheever-flowingriversofHeraclitus.

Notes

1.151e-187a.

2.184d-187a.
3.αὐτὴδι᾽αὑτῆςἡψυχὴ(185e1and185e6).
4.Socratesmakesthisassumptioninrelationtoperceptionat152c.
5.“Aren’tsomethingsbynatureforbothhumanbeingsandanimalstoperceiverightfrom

birth,allthoseexperiencesthatstretchthroughthebodytothesoul,whileotherthings,
gatheredup[ἀναλογίζομαι]abouttheseinconnectionwiththeirbeingand
advantageousness,cometobepresentwithdifficultyandovertime,throughmanytroubles
andthrougheducation,tothosetowhomtheycometobepresentatall”(186b11-186c5).

6.Cornford(1935)recognizesthisaswell(p.102).
7.187a.
8.PerhapsitisworthremindingourselvesthattheentirediscussionbetweenSocratesand

Theaetetustakesplaceunderthepretextofanexaminationoftheyoungman’ssoul(145b).

9.184d.

10.D.K.Modrak(1981)makesasimilarsuggestion,thoughdifferencesariseinour

explanationsofwhySocratesemphasizestheamountoftimeandeffortittakestograspthe
commons.Modraksuggests(46-47)thattheneedfortimeandenergyindicatesthatSocrates
probablythinksthatousia,andtheothercommons,cannotbepresentinsimpleperceptions
suchas“thisisred.”Myaccountsuggestshowevensimplejudgments,suchas“thisisred,”
canbothrequirecommons,andyetstillentailthatthecommonscanonlybegraspedwith
timeanddifficulty.Ontheotherhand,Burnyeat(1976)argues(primarilythrough
philologicalmethods)that“whatthesouldiscoversinperceptionisexternaltoand
independentofourselvesandourbodies”(43).Thisseemstobeentirelycountertomy
positionhere.However,Burnyeatalsoassertsthat“toperceivesomethingisnot,assuch,to
beawareorconsciousofitasbeinganythinginparticular”(50).Thisisverymuchinline
withatranscendentalreadingoftheargumentinthatitdeniestheintelligibilityofanything
thatmaybeexternaltotheindividualperceiver/thinker.

11.514a-520a.
12.147d-148b.
13.147d-e.
14.Inhisexpressionofwhattheydidwhentheymovedfromthemoreparticularinstancetothe

moregeneralgrasp,Theaetetususesthetermἀπεικάζω(147eand148a),whichcanbe
translatedinseveralways,suchas“imaging”(Sachs),or“compared”(Levett),or
“likened”(Cornford).

15.Chapterfourwilladdresstheseissues,butitwilldosoinawaythatshowsthatourgrasp

ofthenuancesoftherelationsbetweentheselevelsmustbeincomplete.

16.181c-183c.
17.Thesense-contentisundifferentiatedtome.Whetherornotitisundifferentiatedinitselfis

beyondthescopeofthecurrentdiscussion.

18.Onecanconceiveofthismis-relatingasmistakingaformforitsinstantiation,orviceversa.
19.Ackrill(1966)p.386.
20.Ibid.p.387.
21.Howmanyandwhichcommonsareinvolvedinanyjudgmentisadifficultquestion,andone

that,becauseitisnotnecessaryforthecurrentaccount,willnotbeaddressedhere.

22.Itisworthremindingourselvesthatitis,asyet,unclearifweshouldthinkofthecommons

asbeingwithinthesoul,orifweshouldthinkofthemsomehowasthesoulitself.Thislatter
optionhasthefurthercomplicationthatproperlyspeakingtherewouldthenonlybeone
common,forthesoul,astheprincipleofunity,isone.Thiscentralandcomplexissuewill
beexaminedingreaterdetaillaterinthischapterandinthefinalchapterofthebook.

23.Ibid.pp.386-387.
24.Itisactuallymorecorrecttosaythatheismanyobjectsofexperience.
25.Thedistinctionbetweenexperience,judgment,andthought,canonlybemadeloosely.Allof

themaresomekindofgraspofthatwhichisoneandmany.Thesourceofthedifferences
betweenthemisdeterminedbytheirattachmenttosensecontent.Experienceissomething
likesimpleperceptionwithonlythemostbasicdistinctionsbeingmade.Judgmentinvolves
usinglogostofindprinciplesofunityofobjectsofexperience.Andthoughtinvolves
findingprinciplesofunityforprinciplesofunity(perhapsevenforthecommons
themselves).Again,thereisnowaytodrawclearlinesbetweentheseactivitiesandthere
objects.Thereasonforthiswillbediscussedinchapter3,andbethefocusofthe
examinationinchapter4.

26.156a-b.
27.157a.
28.188c-d.
29.429d.
30.236e.
31.283e.
32.188e-189a.
33.SocratesgivesanargumentattheendofBookVoftheRepublicthatdealswiththese

issues.InarguingfortheruleofthephilosopherSocratesdistinguishesbetweenthevarious
facultiesbyappealingtotheirobjects.Hesays,“Inacapacity(δύναμιν)Ilookonlytowhat

it’sdirectedtoandwhatitaccomplishes,andbythatIcalleachofthemacapacity,andthat
whichisdirectedatthesamethingandaccomplishesthesamethingIcallthesame
capacity,whileIcallthatwhichisdirectedatsomethingdifferentandaccomplishes
somethingdifferentadifferentcapacity”(477d).Socratesusesthisaccountofcapacities(or
faculties)todistinguishknowledgeandopinion,i.e.,knowledgeisthecapacitythatdeals
withthethingsthatare,whileopinionisthecapacitythatdealswiththethingsthat“lie
betweenwhatispurelyandsimplyandwhatinnowayis”(477a).Thisisverysimilarto
whatisbeingassumedintheTheaetetus,apossibledifferencebeingthatintheTheaetetus
thatwhich“purelyandsimplyis”iscontainedwithinthesoulitself.

34.ἀλλοδοξία(189b12).
35.ἀλλοδοξίαντινὰοὖσανψευδῆφαμενεἶναιδόξαν,ὅταντίς<τι>τῶνὄντωνἄλλοαὖτῶν

ὄντωνἀνταλλαξάμενοςτῇδιανοίᾳφῇεἶναι(189b12-c2).

36.ἀναμιμνῄσκουδὴεἰπώποτ᾽εἶπεςπρὸςσεαυτὸνὅτιπαντὸςμᾶλλοντότοικαλὸναἰσχρόν

ἐστινἢτὸἄδικονδίκαιον(190b2-4).

37.οὐκἔστικαλός(143e8).
38.καλὸςγὰρεἶ...(185e3-5).ThiscommentonthebeautyofTheaetetusbySocratesis

causedbyTheaetetus’assertionthattherearesomethings(i.e.,thecommons)thatthesoul
engagesinitselfthroughitself.Theaetetus’beautyisattachedtohisabilitytoseparatethe
commonsfromthesenses.SocratesgoesontosaythatTheaetetus’recognitionthatthereare
somethingsthesoulthinksitselfthroughitselfhassavedhimalongaccount.Onthe
interpretationofthetextbeingofferedherethiswouldindeedhavebeenalongaccount.
Theaetetus’acceptanceoftheactivityofthesoulitselfthroughitselfisanadmittanceofthe
presenceofthecommonsinthesoulpriortoanyperception.Iaminthemidstofarguing
thatthisamountstonolessthananacceptanceofthegroundsforthepossibilityof
recollectionandtheexistenceoftheforms.

39.184d3.
40.Whatwecansayaboutthedifferencebetweensubstanceandappearanceishighly

problematic.Sincethebeingofappearanceliesinsubstanceitwouldseemthatwhatmakes
appearancedifferentfromsubstancemustbe“notbeing.”Thiswillbethesubjectofchapter
4’sinvestigation.

41.Andamorecompletewaysinceitistheprincipleofunityoftheappearance.
42.185d-e.
43.152c.
44.Wewillseelater,however,thatthisdoesnotmeanthatitiscorrecttothinkofthejudgments

aboutthecommonsthemselvesasbeingjudgmentsaboutwhatpurelyis.

45.152c.
46.Therearethreesuchcasesofpossiblefalseopinionoutofthetotalofseventeencases

investigated.Ithasbeenpointedout(Sachsp.97n.47)thatthenumberofcases
investigatedbySocrateshere(seventeen)isthesameasthenumberofcasesinvestigatedby
Theodorusinhisinvestigationofsquareandrectilinearnumbers.Itisalsoworthnotingthat
thethreecasesofpossiblefalseopinionthatSocratesdiscoversisthesameinnumberas
thethreesquarenumbersthatTheodoruswouldhavefoundinhisinvestigation.Whatreason
Platohasforaligningfalseopinionwithsquarenumbers,oropinionwithnumberin

general,isadifficultquestiontoanswer.

47.Itshowsusthisbyitselfbeinganobjectofjudgment.Theimageofthewaxblockisbeing

judgedtobethesameasjudgmentitself.

48.Ionlyraisethisasapossibilityforitisnotatallself-evidentthatmemoryremembers

thoughtsasthoughts,oropinionsasopinions,orperceptionsasperceptions.

49.Whetherwetaketheimpressioninthewaxtoreferbacktotheperceptionitself,orwhether

wetakeboththeimpressionandtheperceptiontoreferdirectlybacktothesoul(or
principleofunity)ofthatwhichisperceivedmakesnorealdifferenceforthisaccount
(thoughitisimportantforanunderstandingofwhatmemoryis).Wehavealreadyargued
thatthesoulistheprincipleofunitythatallowsforthebeingoftheobjectofperception,
andasaresultevenifwetakethememorytorelyon(i.e.,getitsunityfrom)theperception
thatwouldstillmeanthatfundamentallyitisunifiedbythesoul(astheprincipleofunityof
itsprincipleofunity).Besides,theimportantpartformyaccountisthatthereissome
differenceinbeingatworkhere,i.e.,inorderforjudgmenttobefalsethejudgmentmust
somehowbemixinganobjectandthatobjectsprincipleofunity.

50.Hedoesthisat187a,whenheidentifiestheactivityofthesoulitselfthroughitselfwith

opinion.

51.190b.
52.Thatis,falseopinionrequiresamultiplicityoffaculties.
53.διανόημα196b6
54.195e.
55.188a.
56.196c-d.
57.Theimpossibilityoffalseopinionwasamajoraspectoftheaccountattributedto

Protagoras.Falseopinion’simpossibilityobviouslymeanttherewasnoproblemnot
knowingwhatwasknown,forsinceknowledgewasperception,andthatwhichwas
perceivedonlyexistedinsofarasitwasperceivedtherecouldbenothingthatexistedthat
wasnotknown.163a-165eaddressestheseissuesinProtagorasandHeraclitusmost
directly,buttheyarerelevantthroughouttheentireinvestigationintoTheaetetus’second
definitionofknowledge.

58.Platocouldsimplyavoidthedilemmabydenyingtheclaimthatarithmeticalerrorstake

placeinthoughtalone.Thereseemtobetwowaystodothis.Thefirstistotreatarithmetic
likewetreatedobjectsinthewaxblock,whichwouldamounttoassertingthatthereisno
sevenitself,butrathertothinkofsevenisalwaystothinkofsevensomethings.This,
however,wouldputusbackinthepositionofthosewhodenyjudgmentsofthecommons
alone,apositionwhichhasdireconsequencesforthepossibilityoffalseopinion.Theother
alternativeistorecognizethatthecommonsthemselvesaremultipleandhencerequiretheir
ownprincipleofunity.Ifweidentifythecommonswiththesoulthenthemultiplicityofthe
commonsentailsamultiplicitywithinthesoulitselfthroughitself,whichinturnmeansthat
thesoulitself,asthemultiplicityofcommons,requiresahigherprincipleofunity.Sinceit
ispreciselyintherelationshipbetweenthatwhichunifiesandthatwhichisunifiedthatwe
findthemultiplelevelsofbeingthatallowforfalseopinion,thisintroductionofmultiplicity
innumberwouldofferawaytoaccountforthearithmeticalerrorinquestion.Itwould,

ChapterThree

TheSamenessBetweentheLevelsofBeing(201c-210d)

Introduction

WehaveseenthroughthefirsttwochaptersthatPlatohasencloseduswithinan

opposition.Thepossibilityofmeaningfuldiscourseariseswiththepossibilityofcontradiction,
bothofwhichdependupontheexistenceofsubstanceorousia.Theexistenceofousiainturn
underminesthepossibilityofapurelyHeracliteanaccount,ousianotbeinginflux,butrather
persistingthroughit.Thebeingofousiaasopposedto,andconjoinedwith,thenon-being(or
becoming)offluxgeneratesthelevelsofbeingthatwefoundintherefutationof“knowledgeis
perception.”ThroughthediscussionfollowingTheaetetus’secondproperdefinitionof
knowledge(“knowledgeistrueopinion”)werecognizedthatitisthesemultiplelevelsof
beingthatallowforthepossibilityoffalseopinion,allfalseopinioninvolvingamistakingof
onelevelforanother.Error’sneedformultiplelevelsofbeing,however,meansthatapurely
Parmenideanaccountunderminesthepossibilityoffalseopinion.Thus,byacceptingboththe
possibilityofmeaningfullogosandthepossibilityoffalseopinion

wefindourselves

embracingtheunificationoftheOneandmanyspreadoutoverlevelsofbeing.

Eachofthelevels(inbetweentheOneandnon-being)mustbeacertaincombinationof

onenessandmanynessthatisboththesameasanddifferenttotheotherlevelsofbeing.They
mustallbethesamebecause(1)theyarealllevelsofbeingand(2)eachofthelowerlevels
getsitsbeingfromitsrelationtothehigherlevels.Indeed,insomesense,whateachofthe
lowerlevelsisisfoundonlyinthebeingofthehigher.Andyetdespitethissamenessthe
possibilityoffalseopinionrequiresadifferencebetweenthem.Aswesawthegraspof
Theaetetusasanobjectofperceptionmustbedistinctfromthegraspofhimasasoul.Thus,
therearetwofundamentalquestionsthatmustbefacedifwearetounderstandthelevelsof
being:(1)howarethelevelsthesameasoneanother?and(2)howarethelevelsdifferent?
Thischapterwillattempttoaddressthefirstofthesequestions.Thefourthchapterwilltryto
dealwiththesecond.

Outlineofupcomingargument:

Therefutationofthefinaldefinitionofknowledgeas“trueopinionwithanaccount”(μετὰ

λόγουἀληθῆδόξαν,201c-d)isbrokenintotwoprimarysections,eachonecorrespondingto
oneofthetwopartsofthedefinition.Thefirstmainsectionistheatomisticaccountofthe
dream(201d-206a).Thissectionisthemostexplicitaccountofthelevelsofbeingofferedin
thedialogue,thoughitendsinaporia.Thesecondmainsectionisanattempttodefinelogosin
suchawayastosolvetheaporiathatarisesoutofthedream(206c-210b).ThroughSocrates
andTheaetetus’attemptstosalvagethedreamwecometoseethatlogosistherelation
betweenthelevelsofbeing.Thesetwoprimarysectionsareseparatedbyabrief,yetcrucial

argumentagainstthedream(206a-206c).

Thedreamdividesobjectsintoelementsandcompounds.Elementsareoneanddonot

admitoflogosorknowledge,whereascompoundsaremanyanddoadmitoflogosand
knowledge.Thus,thedreamviewsobjectsaseitheroneormany.Wewillseethatthisstrict
dualityinthedreamcreatesadilemma.Thedilemmacanbeovercomebyrecognizingthat
besidesthepossibilityofobjectsbeingoneormany,thereisalsothepossibilityofthembeing
oneandmany.Puttingitinthetermsthattheinvestigationwilluse,insteadoftryingtothinkof
anobjecteitherasallitsparts(πᾶς)orasasinglelook(ἰδέα),wemustthinkofitasa
collectionofallitspartsthatisalsoasinglelook,i.e.,wemustthinkofitasawhole(ὅλος).
Thisisanotherwayofsayingthatallintelligibilitydependsuponthecombinationofoneness
andmanyness.Furtherwewillseethattheall,thewhole,andthesinglelookareanotherway
(andperhapstheclearestway)ofrepresentingthelevelsofbeing.

Thelogosoflogosthatconcludesthedialogueholdsthekeytounderstandingthe

movementbetweenthelevelsofbeing.Itisthroughlogosthatweareabletounderstandthe
movementfromthealltothewhole,andfromthewholetothesinglelook.Thismovementcan
becalled“comingtoknow,”thoughwewillseethatintheinstantthatwecometoknowwe
simultaneouslyceaseknowing.Coming(andceasing)toknowinthiswaywillshowitselfto
betheactofgraspingaprincipleofunity,whichispreciselywhatweshouldexpect
consideringourinvestigationsuptothispoint.

Thegeneralpositionthatarisesoutofthesesectionsisthatthelevelsofbeingarealso

levelsofknowing.Thereisnologosexpressiveofknowledgepreciselybecauselogos
belongstotheintermediaryrealmbetweenoneandmany,whilegenuineknowledge,

beingof

whatisone,belongstotheParmenideanrealmofpureoneness.Inorderforlogostobe
possibletheremustbesomeinitialobjectgraspedasonething,andtheremustbethe
possibilityofrepresentingthatobjectthroughitsmultiplicity.Anyobjectthatcanbe
representedthroughitsmultiplicitymusthaveahigherprincipleofunitythatisdistinctfrom
itselfassomethingmultiple.

Thegoaloflogosistoallowthethinkerorhearerofthelogosto

movefromaninitial(lower)graspofanobject,throughthatobject’smultiplicityas
representedinthelogos,andtoahighergraspoftheobject’sprincipleofunity.Inotherwords
agoodlogosallowsustogofromgraspinganobjectasitisonalowerlevelofbeingto
graspingthatobjectonahigherlevelofbeing.Thus,asuccessfullogoswillleaveitself
behindasitgraspsthehigherunitythatitbothseeksanddependsupon.

Onepositiveoutcomeofthisdialecticisthatthedialogue’sfailuretogiveanaccurate

logosofknowledgeturnsintoa(potential)success;forifmyreadingiscorrect,thedialogue’s
ostensiblefailuretoexpressknowledgeisakindofconfirmationofitsownclaimthat
knowledgeisinexpressible.Failingtobeabletosaywhatknowledgeisistheconsequenceof
graspingthatgenuineknowledgeisofwhatisone.Thedenialthatthereisanylogosof
knowledgedoesnot,however,underminethepossibilityofknowledge.Itdoes,however,leave
usfacingtheimposingquestionsofwhatrelationlogoscouldhavetoknowledge,andwhat
value(orevenbeing)logoscanhaveas(atleastpartially)separatefromknowledge.

Thedreaminreturnforadream(201c-202c)

Theaetetus’rememberingofsomethinghe“heardsomeonesaying”leadstohisfinal

definitionofknowledgeastrueopinionwithanaccount.

Thisistheonlyproperdefinition

offeredthathastwoparts.Wewillseeinthischapterthathavingtwopartstothedefinition,
opinionandlogos,isasignificantmovementforwardincomingtograsptheincompletenessof
anydefinitionofknowledge.Inshort,weshallseethatthetwopartsofthedefinitionsignify
thecontradictorynatureofallobjectsoflogos,thatitbebothoneandmanyatthesametime;
opinioncorrespondstotheonenessrequisiteforanygrasp,andlogoscorrespondstothe
manynessthatdependsupononenessforitsbeing.Theonenessofopinionandthemanynessof
logosareeachtobeunderstoodintwoways.Theonenessofopinionisthatfromwhichlogos
beginsandalsothattowhichlogosisdirected.Inotherwords,opinion,asitisusedhere,isa
generictermforagraspofaoneness,andassuchcanrefertoboththatwhichisunifiedand
thatwhichunifies.Thisalsoexplainsthetwotypesoflogos:logostowardtheprincipleof
unityandlogosawayfromit.

Socrates’fillinginofTheaetetus’incompletememoryleadstothefollowingaccountof

knowledgeastrueopinionwithalogos.Allthingseitherfallintotheclassofelements
(στοιχεῖον)orintotheclassofcompounds(συλλαβή).

Theelementsarewithoutparts

whereasthecompoundsarecomposedoftheelementalparts.AsSocratessays:

There’snothingforit[theelement]otherthantobenamedonly,sinceithasonlyaname,butthethingsmadeoutofthese
arealreadycomposite,andjustastheyareintertwined,sotoowhentheirnamesareintertwinedinthesamewaytherehas
cometobeanarticulation(λόγον),sincetheverybeing(οὐσίαν)ofanarticulationisanintertwiningofnames.Sointhat
waytheelementsareinarticulableandunknowable,thoughthey’reperceptible,butthecompoundsareknowableand

speakableandcapableofbeingheldintrueopinion.7

Thegeneralideabehindthedream’saccountiseasyenoughtofollow,thoughallofits
consequencesareverydifficulttograsp.Onlycompoundsarecapableofhavingalogosand
beingsubjecttotrueopinion;sincethesearethetwocriteriathecurrentdefinitionattributesto
knowledge,thecompounds,andthecompoundsalone,arecapableofbeingknown.Accepting
thisposition,however,putsusinadilemma.Ifthecompoundissimplyalltheelementsthen
theaccountholdsthateachoftheelementsbeingunknowableonitsownbecomesknownwhen
heldtogether.Thisisdeemedasabsurd.

Whilethereisnojustificationforthisclaimof

absurdityTheaetetus’reasonfordeemingitsoseemstobethatiftheelementsareunknown,
andifthecompoundisnothingotherthanalltheelements,thentosaythatthecompoundis
knownthroughtheelementsistosaythatignoranceisthegroundforknowledge.Theother
optionisthatthecompoundis“someonelook”

arisingoutofallofitselements;butasone

look,itiswithoutpartsand,hence,hasnologos,whichmeansthataccordingtothecurrent
definition,thecompoundwillalsobeunknowable.Thus,ineithercase,whetherwemakethe
compoundtheall(πᾶς)orsomeonelook(ἰδέα),itisunknowable.

Theconnectionsbetweenthelevelsofbeingdiscussedearlierinthebookandthecurrent

distinctionbetweencollectionsandsinglelooksareevident.Thetwooptionsforidentifying
thecompoundthusfarofferedareitsmultiplicityanditsprincipleofunity,neitheroneof
whichallowsforknowablecompoundswhilemaintainingthedefinition’sdenialofknowable
elements.Asweshouldexpectfromchapters1and2,thereisathirdoptionbesidesthealland
thesinglelook.Thisthirdoptionisthecombinationofoneness(representedbythesinglelook)
andplurality(representedbytheall).Besidestheallandthesinglelookthewhole(ὅλος)is

brieflyintroducedasthethirdoptionforexplainingwhatthecompoundis.Thiscombinationof
theoneandmanyisofferedandthenwithdrawnbySocratesinthecourseoflayingoutthe
dilemma.Itisintheintroductionand(intentionally)fartooabruptdismissalofthisthirdoption
thatthemeatofthissectionistobefound.

Afterpresentingthefirsthornofthedilemma(associatedwithidentifyingthecompound

andtheall)Socratesbeginstoshifttotheotherhorn(identifyingthecompoundwiththesingle
look).Thisshiftisinterruptedbytheintroductionofamiddlegroundrepresentedbythewhole,
whichischaracterizedaswhat“hascomeintobeingoutoftheparts[and]isalsosomeone
form(εἶδος),differentfromalltheparts.”

Thewholeistheone(i.e.,thesinglelook)andthe

many(i.e.,theall).Thisnewwhole,asbothoneandmany,ispreciselywhatwe’vebeen
pointedtowardfromtheverybeginningofthedialogue.YetSocratesarguesagainstthewhole
beingdistinctfromtheall,eventuallyabandoningitasadistinctoption,andtherebytrapping
usinthedilemma.WhydoesPlatohaveSocratesdothis?IfIamrightthatthisthirdoptionis
whatwearelookingfor(andwhatPlatowantsustofind),

thenitfollowsthatthearguments

Socratesusestoeliminatethedistinctionbetweentheallandthewholeshouldbeflawed,and
flawedinawaythathelpthereadersmoveintheproperdirection.ThisispreciselywhatI
thinkhappensinthedialogue,andwhatIwilltrytoshow.Inmyview,Platoisonceagain
tryingtohelpusthinkthroughtherelationbetweentheunifierandtheunified,arelationwhich
isessentialtothepossibilityoflogos,andheisdoingsobygivingalogosquestioningthe
beingofsucharelation.

Therearetwopartstothedialogue’sinvestigationofthewhole.Thefirstisanargument

identifyingtheallandthewhole.ThisargumentgetsderailedbyTheaetetus.Thesecondis
anotherargumentidentifyingtheallandthewholethat,despitebeingacceptedbyTheaetetus,
isblatantlyfallacious.ThequestionwemustaskiswhyPlatousestheargumentshedoes?
Chapter2was,afterall,anargumentfortheexistenceofjustsuchawhole.WhythenisPlato
unableto,orwhydoeshechoosenotto,giveusaviableaccountofwhatawholeis?

IwillarguethattheexamplesSocratesusesinhisargumentidentifyingthewholeandthe

allactuallylayoutarelativelyclearpictureoftheexistenceoflevelsofbeing,whichagain
reaffirmstheexistenceofwholesasacombinationoftheallandthesinglelook.Thereason
thatPlatochoosesto,orreallyhasto,useanargumentthatfailstocapturethenatureofwholes
isbecauseofthelimitationsoflogosingeneral.Specifically,logosisunabletotrulycapture
beingatanylevel,butwhatitdoesdoisputthesoulinapositiontobeabletoleavelogos
behindandtherebygraspthebeinglogoscanneveractuallycapture.Inotherwordslogosisa
kindofspringboardthatcanbeusedtograspbeingatanylevel(atleastuptothecommons),
butonlyifthethinkeriswillingtojumpoffthespringboard.Thisiswhytheargumentfailsto
giveusanaccurateaccountofwholes:ithasto.Thewayitfails,ontheotherhand,isjustthis
kindofspringboardwhichgivesustheabilitytograspthekindofbeingawholemusthave.
This,again,isalsothecasewiththegraspingofknowledgeitself,andthereasonwhynot
beingabletogivealogosofknowledgedoesnotmeanknowledgeisnotpossible.

Denyingtheidentityoftheallandthewholeleavesus(onceagain)withthreelevelsof

oneness:theall,thewhole,andthesinglelook.Inonesensethesemirrorthelevelsseenin
chapter2,whichweresense-content,sense-contentmixedwithcommons,andcommons
themselves.Inanothersensethesethreelevels(all,whole,andsinglelook)allbelongtoeach

ofthethreepreviouslevelsinsofaraseachofthepreviouslevelsliesbetweenthepurefluxof
HeraclitusandtheutteronenessofParmenides.

Thiswillcomeoutbyworkingthroughthe

chapter,butthebasicideaisthatallthreelevelsexaminedinchapter2arelevelsbecausethey
represent(orcontain)akindofunity.Thedistinctnessbetweenthelevelshastodowiththe
degreeofonenessoftheunities;oneunitybeing“higher”thananotherinvirtueofcontaining
thelower’sprincipleofunity.Thus,sinceeachlevelrepresentsaunity,andallunitiescontain
theall,thewhole,andasinglelook,thecurrentinvestigationappliestoobjectsoneverylevel
ofbeing.

Theintentionallyproblematicargumentsidentifyingtheallandthewhole
(204a-205e)

Intheintentionallyproblematicargumentsidentifyingtheallandthewhole,thewhole

servesasastandinforthecompound.Justasinthedilemmathatfollowedfromthedream,
wherewefacedthequestionofwhethertoconceiveofthecompoundasanallorasinglelook,
sotoointhissectionSocrateschallengesTheaetetustodecidewhetherthewholeisanallora
singlelook.Inresponsetothequestionofwhetherthewholeandtheallarethesame
Theaetetussays“Ihavenothingclear,butbecauseyouurgemetoanswerconfidently,takinga
boldrisk,Isaythatthey’redifferent.”

Thus,theinvestigationstartsbyassumingthatthe

wholeandthealldiffer.ThisisareasonableassumptionbyTheaetetussincetheyhavejust
arguedthatthecompoundandtheallmustbedifferentifthedreamistobearfruit.Thereare
twoargumentsthatfollow;eachonepurportstodisprovetheidentityoftheallandthewhole.
Thefirstdoessobytryingtoidentifyboththeallandthewholewiththe“number”(ἀριθμός)
ofthething.Theseconddoessobyidentifyingboththeallandthewholewith“thatfromwhich
nothingislacking(οὗἂνμηδαμῇμηδὲνἀποστατῇ).”

Thefirstattemptedargument(204a-204e)worksthroughexamplesandisleft

uncompleted.Itbeginsbystatingthatthenumbersixisthesameasthreeplustwoplusone,
threetimestwo,twotimesthree,andanyotherexpressionthatequalssix.Inallthesecaseswe
speakofthesamething,i.e.,six.Sinceeachoneisequivalenttosix,whenwesayanyoneof
themwesayallofthem.Thus,sixisallofthewaysofsayingsix.Therefore,theall(six)isthe
sameasalltheparts(allthewaysofsayingsix),atleastforwhateveriscomposedof
numbers.Thedialoguecontinues:

Socrate s:Thenlet’sspeakoftheminthefollowingway.Thenumberoftheplethronandtheplethronarethesamething,
aren’tthey?
The ae te tus:Itappearstobe.
Socrate s:Andit’sthesamewaywiththenumberofthestade?
The ae te tus:Yes.
Socrate s:Andsoalsothenumberofthearmyandthearmy,andsimilarlywithallsuchthings?Witheachofthem,allthe
numberisallthething.
The ae te tus:Yes.

Sincethenumberisnothingotherthantheparts,andthepartsareagreedtobetheall,it
(supposedly)followsthatiftheallandthewholearedifferentthenthewholeisnotmadeof
parts,“sincethenitwouldbeanall,beingalltheparts.”

Havingestablished(supposedly)

thattheallisthesameasalltheparts,SocratesasksTheaetetusifitis“possiblethatapartis

theverythingthatitisasbelongingtoanythingelsewhateverthantothewhole?”

Accepting

thiswouldthenmeanthatthepartsbelongtoawhole,andhencewouldmakethewholeandthe
allthesame.Theaetetusavoidsthisbysuggestingthatapartcanbeapartofanallasopposed
toawhole.Thisresponseisintherightvein,asSocratesindicatesbytellingTheaetetusthathe
isbattlingina“manlyway”

andabandoningthislineofargumentinfavorofanother

approach.

ImmediatelyafterabandoningthefirstargumentSocratesturnstothesecond.Theallis

whenevernothingislacking.Awholeisthatfromwhichnothingislacking.Thatfromwhich
somethingismissingisneitheranallnorawhole,“thesamething,havingbecometogether,
fromthesamething.”

Thus,theallandthewholedon’tdifferinanyway.Thissecond

argumentseemstometobearelativelyobviousfallacy,alongthelinesofAisB,CisB,
thereforeAisC,thoughonecouldprobablydenythatthisishowtheargumentistoberead.
Theevidenceforreadingitasfallacious,however,canbefoundbylookingbackatthe
examplesusedinSocrates’previousattempttoprovetheidentityoftheallandthewhole.

Thefourexamples(six,theplethron,thestade,andthearmy)usedinthefirstargument

arealldistinctfromeachother,andrepresentakindofprogressionintomultiplicity.Witheach
successiveexampleitbecomesmoredifficulttoidentifythewholewithalltheparts.

Beginningwithsix,weshouldnoticethattheterm“part”isbeingusedinaparticular

way.Inthediscussionoftheaviary,Socratesmadethedistinctionbetweenanumberitself,and
anumberofthings.

Assumingheistalkingaboutsixitselfinthecurrentexample,itishardto

understandwhatitmeansfor3x2tobeapartofsix.Heisnotsimplysayingthatthreeandtwo
arepartsofsix,i.e.,whenyouhavesixthatthreeandtwoaredivisibleoutofit.Theclaim
alsoinvolvestheoperationofmultiplication.So,too,3+2+1involvestheoperationof
addition.Inwhatwayaremultiplicationandadditionpartsofsix?Aredivisionand
subtractionpartsofsixaswell,ordoesthefactthatyouhavetobeginthoseoperationswitha
numberlargerthansixprecludethemfrombeingpartsofsix?Thedifficultyisconnectedtothe
attributingofpartstothatwhichisnotmaterial.3x2,2x3,5+1,andalltheotherformulaedo
notseemtobeactualpartsofsix,butrathertheyaredifferentwaysthatsixcanbeexpressed.
Eachisaparticularlogosofsix,andassuchfailstocapturealltheotherlogoibelongingto
six.

Onemightsuggestthatthepartsofsixaretheunits.Theproblemwiththisisthatwethen

havetosaythatsixisequivalenttosixunits.Butthismeansthatwehavetousesixinthe
definitionofsix,aproblemwhichSocratesraiseswithboththefirstandlastattemptsata
definitionofknowledgeintheTheaetetus.

Theidentificationofthewholeandtheallinthe

caseofsixisprettyclearlytheeasiesttoswallowofalltheexamplesSocratesuses,butitis
easytoswallowpreciselybecauseitisfarfromclearwhat,ifany,partssixactuallyhas.In
otherwords,notonlyisithardtoargueagainsttheallandthewholebeingthesameinsix,itis
hardtoargueagainsttheallandthesinglelookbeingthesame!

Theplethron(whichisequivalenttoonehundredfeet)alsorepresentsaquantity,but

unlikesixtheplethronincludesameasureaswell.Inotherwords,theplethronisanumberas
itappliestosomething(inthiscaseadistance).Whatthenarethe“parts”ofthemeasureofa
distance?Shouldwedividetheplethronintomeasure(feet)andnumber(onehundred)?Or

shouldwethinkofthepartsassomesmallerunitsintowhichtheentireplethronis
commensurable?Forexample,sincetheplethronisonehundredfeet,thentheplethronis
composedofsinglefeet,contiguouslyarranged,andonehundredinnumber.This,however,
wouldmeanthattheallandthewholediffered,foreventhoughtheallandthewholebothare
onehundredfeet,thewholemustalsoincludeacontiguousarrangement.Theplethronasa
measureofwhatisspatialrequiresacertainsortofstructurethatisatbestdifficulttoseein
thenumbersix.

Thestade(whichissixplethra,orsixhundredfeet)hasallthesameissuesasthe

plethron,withtheadditionalfactthatthemeasurebecameidentifiedwithaspecificthing;as
JoeSachspointsout,thestade“isnotonly6plethra,butthelengthoftheracetrackatthe
Olympicgames,andhenceastandardwordforaracecourse;itisnotamereaggregate.”

Thestadeisnolongersimplyameasureofsomethingliketheplethron;itisalsothematerial
thinghavingthatmeasure.Whatthenqualifiesasapartofthestade?Notonlyisitnumber,
measure,andcontiguousarrangement,therearenowalsomaterialcomponentstoconsider.

Theexamplesoftheplethronandthestaderaiseseriousconcernswithidentifyingtheall

andthewhole,buttheexampleofthearmyshowstheidentitytobeblatantlyfalse.Anarmyis
clearlymorethanitsparts.Simplyhavingtenthousandmendoesnotanarmymake.Thereneed
tobeparticularrolesandaprincipleofordersettingeachroletoitstask.Somethingmust
allowtheinfantryandthearcherstooperatetogetherasasinglegroup.Gotoaboxingmatch,
andyou’llhavetenthousandmentogetherunderoneroof,butyouwon’thaveanarmy.The
“soldiers”won’tevenberootingforthesameend.Somethingmustbeaddedtothemere
multiplicity.Somethingmustunifythemintoaoneness.Thisdistinction,thepresenceofa
singleunifyingprinciple,ispreciselythedifferencebetweentheallandthewholethat
Socratesisarguingagainst.Oneofhisownexamplesseemstoclearlyunderminethe
equivocationheismakingbetweentheallandthewhole.Thisiswhythesecondargumentisa
fallacy;theallisthatfromwhichnopartsaremissing,andsoisthewhole.

Butthewhole

requiressomethingelsebesidesjusttheall.Itrequiresaform,orasinglelook.

Thus,theexamplesSocratesusestoidentifytheallandthewhole,andtherebyleaveus

withonlytheallandtheonesinglelookaswaysofunderstandingwhatthecompoundis,
underminethatveryidentity.Insteadofshowingthatthereisnowaytodifferentiatebetween
theallandthewhole,theexamplesSocratesusesseemtodependonjustsuchadistinction,
andinsodoingtheyofferfurtherevidenceforthelevelsofbeingthatIhavebeenarguingfor.
Thisleavesuswiththethirdoptionforwhatthecompoundis,athirdoptionthatissome
combinationoftheothertwooptions.Thereis,besidesthemanyandtheOne,aonethatis
many.Indeeditisobviousthatanargumentidentifyingtheallandthewholewillfail,justasit
isobviousthatanargumentidentifyingthewholeandthesinglelookwillfail;clearlythe
wholecannotbeidentifiedwiththeallorthesinglelookbecauseitmustbebothofthem.

Again,thereasonthatPlatoputssuchpoorargumentsandexamplesinthemouthof

Socrates,usinganargumentthatexplicitlyunderminestheneedforthewholewhileimplicitly
supportingit,hastodowiththenatureoflogosingeneral.Makingtheargumentdealingwith
alls,wholes,andsinglelooksblatantlyfallaciousisonewayPlatohasofindicatingtousthat
thereisnoconsistentaccountthatcanbegivenofthem.Anyattempttocapturethemin
languageisboundtofailbecausethebeingofsomethingisfundamentallyone,whilelogos

requiresmultiplicity.Thus,everylogosmustfallshortofthebeingofthatwhichitistryingto
express.Choosingthisargumenttopointtotheincompletenessoflogosisparticularlystriking
because,aswe’veseen,denyingtheexistenceofwholesunderminesmeaningfullogos
entirely.

ThepoornessofPlato’sargumentmakesitdifficultforthereadertofailtoseethat

somethingisnotbeinggraspedhere.WhatdirectionthenhasPlatogivenustonavigatethe
stormywatersassociatedwiththeseissues?

Itisfarfromanewclaiminthisbookthattheallandthesinglelookarefundamentally

unaccountable.Thefactthatthismayalsobethecaseforthewholeisdisturbing.Thewholeis
supposedtobethefertilemiddlegroundbetweenfluxandtheOne,anditsfertilitywasthought
tobeadirectresultofourabilitytothink,andtalk,aboutit.Butwhatareweactuallygrasping
whenwethinkaboutawhole?Ithasbeenarguedthatanyobjectofthoughtorlogosmustbe
onetosomedegree,andhencemusthaveaprincipleofunity.Ithasalsobeenarguedthatany
objectofthoughtandlogosmustalsobemanytosomedegree,andhenceissomekindof
compound.Thewholehasbothoftheseaspects,buthowdoesthatmakeitknowable?

Itisasiftheknowabilityofanythingisalwaysslippingjustbeyondourgrasp,orperhaps

moreaccurately,itisalwaysjustbeyondourlogos.Theallisgraspedonlyinsofarasitcanbe
seenasawhole.ThiswasseenintherefutationofHeraclitus;ifthereisnoprincipleofunity
andstillness,thenanythingiseverything.Thewhole,likewise,isonlygraspedwhenits
principleofunityisfound,therelationbetweenunifierandunifiedfoundinthewholebeing
thegroundforthelevelsofbeing,andhence,forthepossibilityoffalseopinion.Thesingle
lookandthecommonsaredoublyproblematicinregardstologos.Iftheyaretreatedas
entirelyone,whichisakintothembeingtreatedsimplyasthesourceofunityforcompounds,
thentheyadmitofnologos.Ifwerecognizethattheytoomustbemany(asthemultiplicityof
commonspresenttothesoul,andthediscussionofsix,suggested)thenweareleftscratching
ourheadsastowhatthemultiplicityis.Sayingwhatthismultiplicityiswouldamounttogiving
alogosofanall,whichisnotsomethingthatcanbedone.Andyetdespiteallofthisweare
capableofformingdifferentkindsofgrasps,andwearecapableofgivingmanytypesoflogoi.

Therelationbetweenourgrasps

andourlogoiisatthefocusoftherestofthedialogue,

andaccordingtomyaccountisreallyattheheartofeverydialogue.Thegraspandthelogos
seemtobemutuallyexclusive.Thegraspisalwaysofwhatisone,andhenceslipsawaywhen
weseektogivealogosofit.Logosisinherentlymultipleandhencewouldseemtoprevent
anypossibilityofagrasp.Thisproblemfinallycomestotheforefrontofthediscussionnow
becauseTheaetetus’finaldefinitionofknowledgeastrueopinionwithanaccountrequiresthe
unificationofagraspandalogos.

Havingeliminatedthewholeasanoption,thedream’sfirstattemptatanexplanationof

Theaetetus’finaldefinitionofknowledgehasfallenbackonthehornsofthedilemma;the
compoundisonlyasknowableaseithertheelementsorthesinglelook.Sincewecannotknow
eitherofthosethedreamremainsunabletoaccountforknowledgeastrueopinionwitha
logos.ThefailureisactuallysoextremethatSocratesreversestheentireaccount.

Thedreamreversed(206a-c)

UsingourchildhoodexperiencesinlearninggrammarandmusicasevidenceSocrates

pointsoutthat

Inlearningthem[thelettersofthealphabet]youperseveredinnothingotherthantryingtodistinguisheachoftheletters,
itselfbyitself(αὐτὸκαθ᾽αὑτὸἕκαστον),bysightandbyhearing,inorderthattheirarrangementwouldnotconfuseyou
whentheywerespokenorwritten....Thereforeinthosethingsinwhichweourselvesareexperiencedwiththeelements
andthecompounds,ifoneoughttoconcludefromevidencefromthesethingstoeverythingelseaswell,we’llassertthat
theclassofelementshasamoredistinctandmoreauthoritativerecognitionthanthatofthecompounds,forgettingholdof
eachlearnablethingperfectly,andifanyoneclaimsacompoundismoreknowable,andanelementisbyitsnature

unknowable,we’llconsiderthat,willinglyorunwillingly,he’sbeingplayful.29

Judgingbythethingswefirstlearnitistheelementsthatarethemoreknowablesincethey
makepossiblethe“gettingholdofeachlearnablethingperfectly.”Judgingbythesekindsof
pastexperienceswecometolearnthingswellonlybygraspingtheirelements.Hence,since
thegraspoftheelementsappearstobethecauseofourgraspofthecompound,wemustsay
thattheelementismoreknowablethanthecompound.

Thisargumentfromexperienceisalsoproblematic(evenifweignorethefactthatitis

basedonexperience).Clearlyitisinsufficienttocallknowledgeofthenotesknowledgeof
music.Amusicianisabletointerweavethenotes.Justlikethewritercreatesalogosby
interweavingnames,

sotoothemusiciancreatesamusicallogosbyinterweavingnotes.Itis

grantedthatinordertobeabletodoso,hemusthaveagraspofthenotes;butthisgraspisnot
initselfknowledgeofmusic.Thegraspoftheelementsissomethingakintoamaterial
conditionfortheknowledgeofmusic;theabilitytocreatethecompoundbyinterweavingthese
notesisclosertothefinalend.Learningtoidentifytheelementsispartoftheprocessof
becomingknowledgeable,justasSocratesasserts,butitisonlypartoftheprocess.Indeed
whatismissinghereispreciselywhatwasmissingintheexamplesidentifyingtheallandthe
whole.Thearmyisnotsimplyitspartsorelementsitisalsosomestructureorformtakenon
bythoseparts.Wemustbuilduptoknowledgeofthecompoundsthroughsomekindof
incompletegraspoftheelements.

Thisraisesthequestionofwhatanincompletegraspmaybe.Thisquestionisclosely

connectedtothequestionofhowitispossiblethatwecannotknowwhatweknow(raisedin
chapter2).Theargumentfortheincompletenessofourgrasps(anargumentwhichdoesnot
explainthe“how”wegraspincompletely,butonlyinsiststhatwedo)isthattheelementis
whatitisinvirtueofitsplaceinthecompoundofwhichitisapart.Socratessuggestsasmuch
inthedialogue.

Acceptingthismeansthatsincewegrasptheelementthroughourgraspofthe

compound,andwegraspthecompoundinitiallythroughourgraspoftheelements,

wemust

(assumingthepossibilityofknowledge)grasptheelementpriortoourgraspoftheelement.
Hence,wemustgrasptheelementonlypartiallypriortoourgraspofthecompound.

Theissuesatworkintherelationbetweenthedreamanditsreversalarefamiliarto

readersofPlato’sMeno.Thefamousparadoxfromthatdialoguefocusesonthesamebasic
oppositionthatwefindwhenwerelatethedreamanditsreversal.

Theparadoxarguesthat

learningisimpossiblebecauseonemusteitherlearnwhatonedoesnotknoworwhatone
alreadyknows.Onecannotlearnwhatonedoesnotalreadyknowbecauseoneneedstoknow
itinordertobeabletothinkit,andonecannotlearnwhatonealreadyknowsbecausewhatis
alreadyknowncannotbecomeknown.Inotherwords,wecannotlearnsomethingbystarting
withwhatisnotknownorbystartingwithwhatisknown.Thedreamsuggestsstartingwiththe
unknowableelements,whileitsreversalsuggestsstartingwiththeknownelements.To
recognizetheissuesinMeno’sparadoxistorecognizethatneitherthedreamnoritsreversal

willleadustoknowledge.Socrates’responsetotheparadoxalsosuggestswhatneedstobe
changedtoovercometheproblem.

The“solution”totheparadoxliesinthedoctrineofrecollection,whichholdsthatthe

potentialobjectsofknowledgeareknown(presentinoursouls)buthavebeenforgotten.

mustberemindedofthembyseeingimagesorrepresentationsoftheminotherthings.

RecollectionispresentintheTheaetetus,butitisstrippedofallitsmysticalovertones.The
commons,aswesaw,mustbeapriori,fortheyarethegroundsforthepossibilityof
intelligibleexperience.Wegrasptheobjectsofexperiencebyunifyingcommonsand
sensecontent.Knowledgeoftheseobjectsrequiresgraspingtheirprincipleofunity(the
commonsthemselves).Thus,inourinitialintelligibleexperiencewegrasptheobjectswithout
fullyknowingthem,i.e.,weknowthemwithoutknowingthem.Thissimultaneousknowingand
notknowingsupplieduswiththesolutiontotheproblemsoffalseopinion.Wealsosawin
chapter2thatthisknowingwhatisnotknown(ornotknowingwhatisknown)requireslevels
ofbeing.Thetwopoles(knowledgeandignorance)mustbecombinedtoallowforcomingto
know.

Consideringallthis,weshouldaskourselveswhatkindofmiddlegroundthereis

betweenthedreamanditsreversal?Thedreamsuggestsamovementfromunknowable
elementstoknowablecompounds,whilethereversalsuggestsamovementfromknown
elementstolessknowncompounds.TheovercomingofMeno’sparadox,aswellasthe
solutiontotheproblemoffalseopinion,hingesuponbeginningwithanobjectofjudgmentthat
isbothknownandnotknown.Toapplythistothedreamanditsreversalrequiresfindinga
wayinwhichtheelementisbothknownandnotknown.Thiswouldcorrespondtoaninitial
stageincomingtoknow,astagethatonitsownmustfallshortofknowledge,andyetisnot
completelyothertoit.Followingthemovementinthedialogue,wecanthenseeinwhatway
thisinitialgraspofanelementthatisnotfullygrasped(i.e.,notknown)isdevelopedbythe
generatingofacompoundoutofit.Andwecanalsoseeinwhatwayourgraspofthe
compoundisdevelopedbyrecognizingtheroleoftheelementinit.ThisiswhatItakePlatoto
suggestinthedreamanditsreversal:thebeginninginthesimpleisdevelopedbyananalysis
ofthecompound,whichinturnisthenfurtheredbyalookbackatthesimple.Thereis,touse
ananalogy,akindofaccordionmotionbeingsuggested.Amovementfromtheonetothemany
andthenbacktotheone.Forthistobevaluabletheremustbesomedevelopmentfromthe
initialgrasptothelatergraspthatisaccomplishedbybreakingtheinitialgraspintoparts.This
iswhatIintendonshowing,thoughitwilltaketheentirechaptertodoso.Theaccordion
motioncorrespondstoonenessgraspedonalowerlevelofbeing,whichisbrokenapart
throughlogosinordertoleadtoagraspoftheinitialgrasp’sprincipleofunity.

Thereisaproblemherethough.Howcantheinitialgraspofanelementleadtoagraspof

thecompound?Orinotherwordshowdoesthestudentofmusicmovefrom“knowledge”of
thenotestotheknowledgeofamusician?Howdoesonewho“knows”theletterslearnto
constructsyllables,andthenwords,sentences,andlogoiingeneral?Howdoesoneconstructa
whole,letaloneasinglelook,outoftheelementsasopposedtoconstructinganall?Howdoes
apersonconstructsomethingthathasanature(i.e.,ousia)asopposedtoamerecollectionof
parts?Thesearetheissuesthatareatstakeinthemovementfromtheelementtothecompound
andfromthecompoundtotheelement.

Theseproblemsofrelatingtheousiatotheallarefamiliarfrombothchapter2and

earlierinthepresentchapter.Wemustrememberthateverythinggraspedbythesoulispresent
onlyinsofarasitisseenasbeingone.Thisemergedfromtherefutationsofthefirstdefinition
ofknowledgeasperception.Withoutaprincipleofunity,everythingisinconstantflux.This
recognitionmakesitdifficulttoseehowwecanrelatethealltoanything,forwhatsetstheall
apartfromthewholeisthatitlacksaprincipleofunity.Howthendowehaveanysortofgrasp
oftheall?Wegraspitonlyinsofaraswethinkitunified.Butitistheousiaitselfthatsupplies
theprincipleofunityfortheall.Thus,inthinkingtherelationbetweentheousiaandtheall,we
needtohavepreviouslythoughttherelationbetweentheousiaandtheall.Tosaythesame
thinganotherway:tothinktherelationbetweentheousiaandtheall,weneedtohave
previouslythoughttheousiaitselfandtheallitself.Buttothinktheallitselfweneedto
supplyitwithaprincipleofunity.Theprincipleofunityoftheallistheousia.Thus,tothink
theallitselfweneedtothinktheallinrelationtotheousia.Therefore,tothinktherelation
betweentheousiaandtheallwemusthavepreviouslythoughttherelationbetweentheousia
andtheall.

Acceptingthisargumentmeansthatifwecometoknowanousiathroughtheall,thenin

doingsowemustbecomingtoknowwhatwealreadyknew.Fortheknowledgederived
throughallthepartsisoftheousia,butsimplygraspingallthepartsasanallrequiresa
previousgraspoftheousia.Whatthenisthemechanismbehindthislearningwhatonealready
knows?Whatactivityisthesoulengagedinthatallowsittorecollect?Inonesensetheanswer
isnomystery.SocratesconcludesthediscussionoftheTheaetetuswithalengthyexamination
ofit.Logosisthenameoftheactivitythatmovesfromtheelementtothecompoundandback
again.Itislogosthatallowsonetoturnbackintooneselfandrecollectwhatonehasalways
known.Theinvestigationoflogosthatconcludesthedialogue,whichwewillturntoina
moment,examinesinwhatwaylogosdoesthis.

Onemorethingworthnotingabouttherelationbetweenthedreamanditsreversal

thatthedream’sassertionthatthereisnologosoftheelementsisbroughtintodoubtbythe
dreamreversal’sassertionthat,basedonourpastexperience,thereisnograspofthe
compoundwithoutsomegraspoftheelement.Reasonfordoubtingthatitispossibletogivea
logosoftheelementswaspresent,however,priortothedream’sreversal.Lookingbacktothe
dream,Socrates,aftergettingTheaetetustoagreethatthelettersandtheelementsarethesame,
asksTheaetetustogivealogosofthelettersigma.Theaetetusresponds:

Howisanyonegoingtostateanelementoftheelement?Andinparticular,Socrates,thesigmaisoneoftheunvoiced
ones,onlyasound,asofthetonguehissing;andforbeta,inturn,there’sneithervoicenorsound,noristhereformostof
theletters.Soitholdsupquitewellforthemtobecalledinarticulable(ἄλογα),whenthemostdistinctofthemarethevery

seventhathavevoiceonly,andnoarticulation(λόγον)whatever.38

PayingsomeattentiontoTheaetetus’shortgrammarlecture,weshouldnoticethathisaccount
ofwhytheelementshavenoaccounthasactuallygivenanaccountoftheelements!Hehasnot
givenelementsoftheelements,buthehasnonethelessdifferentiatedtheelementsintothree
groups:thefirstbeingtheunvoicedandsounded,thesecondbeingtheunvoicedand
unsounded,andthethirdbeingthevoicedseven.Hehasdividedtheelementsintoclasses.

ThisisnotthefirsttimeTheaetetushasdefinedsomethingwiththismethod.Goingbacktothe

beginningofthedialogue,weshouldrecognizethismethodofdefinitionastheoneTheaetetus
usedindefiningcommensurableandincommensurablenumber,thekindofdefinitionthat
Socratesaskedhimtoduplicateinhisdefiningofknowledge.Thiskindofdefinition,aswe
sawbackinchapter1,

wasopposedtotheexampleSocratesusedindefiningmudaswater

mixedwithearth.Thetwodifferentmodesofdefinitionhaveonceagainmovedtotheforefront
ofthedialogue’sdiscussion.

Toreview:Onemethodofdefinitionworksbylistingalltheelements.Themainproblem

withthistypeofdefinitionisthatitlosessightofthe“singlelook,”which,astheprincipleof
unityofalltheparts,servestomakethewholewhatitis.Thesecondmethodofdefinitionisto
gatheramultitude“intoone.”

Thisamountstofindingthesingleclasswhichcapturesallthe

particularsfallingunderit,i.e.,itistofindthe“singlelook”thatissharedbyamultiplicity.
Thus,ourtwomethodsofdefinitionseemtooperateinoppositedirections.Thefirstmoves
towardHeraclitusbybreakingthecompoundintoitsparts.Thesecondmovestoward
Parmenidesbyfindingtheclassintowhichthecompoundfalls.Thisisclearlyparalleltothe
movementslaidoutinthedreamanditsreversal:thereisamovementfromtheelementstothe
compound,andfromthecompoundtotheelements.Turningnowtoaninvestigationoflogos
(asthedialogueitselfdoes),wewillseethatthesetwomethodsholdthekeytounderstanding
thetypeofknowledgethattheTheaetetussuggestswearecapableof.

Logos(206c-210b)

Theexplicitreasonthedialoguegives(206c)fortheexaminationoflogosisasanattempt

tocompletetheinvestigationintothedefinitionofknowledgeastrueopinionwithan
account.

Iwillbearguingthattheimplicitreasonisthatlogosholdsthekeytounderstanding

(insofarasitisunderstandable)thetransitioningbetweenthegraspingofsomethingasan
elementandthegraspingofitasacompound,andbetweengraspingsomethingasacompound
andgraspingitasasinglelook.Inotherwords,itislogosthatfillsthespacesbetweenthe
grasps.

Therearethreedefinitionsgivenforlogosaddedontothedefinitiongivenearlierinthe

dream.

Thefirsthastodowithmakingwhatispresenttothesoulapparent.Thesecondtakes

usbacktothedreambymakinglogosadivisionintoelements.Thethirdpushesustowardthe
definitionthroughdivisionthatthestrangerfocusesonintheSophist,andthatTheaetetus
himselfhasalreadygivenustwoexamplesof.

Eachofthethreefallwithintheoriginal

definitionoflogosasanintertwiningofnames.Therearemanywaysofreadingthissectionof
thedialogue,andmanydifficultissuescometothesurface.IsPlato’slogosoflogosinaccord
withoneofhisthreedefinitionsoflogos?Isthesectiononlogosmerelyacollectionof
distinctparts(i.e.,anall)?Isitawhole?Ordoesitreflectsomesinglelook?

Iwillarguethateachdefinitionoflogosrepresentsadistinctpartoftheprocesswe’ve

beenlayingoutinthisaccount.Eachlogosisamoving-towardoneness,eitherbymovingaway
frommultiplicityorbygeneratingamultiplicityforthesakeofestablishingaunitywithinit.Its
positioninthemiddlegroundbetweentheoneandthemanyleavesitalwaystransitioning
betweenthetwo.Thus,whileeachofthedefinitionsisdistinct,theyallfallunderthesame
kind,namely,therelatingoftheoneandthemany.Thiskindofdefinitionisreflectedinthe

definitionoflogosgivenearlierinthedream.Theideaof“intertwining”carrieswithitan
expressionofamanynesssomehowbeingheldtogetherasoneand,yet,stillhavingpartsthat
remainseparate.ThedialogueshowsuswiththelengthyrefutationsofHeraclitusand
Protagorasthatthebeginningpointtoanylogosisagraspofoneness.Thediscussion
followingthedefinitionofknowledgeastrueopinionshowsusthatthisoneness(orthese
onenesses)admitsofdivision.Thedreamthenfocusesontheunifyingofparts.Thismovement
ismirroredinthedefinitionsoflogosthatconcludethedialogue.Webeginwithanempty
graspofasimplicity,thendivideitintopartssothatwecanbringthesepartsunderasingle
lookthatistheirsourceofunity.

Firstdefinitionoflogos(206d-e)

ThefirstdefinitionSocratesoffersforlogosis“makingone’sthinking[διάνοια]apparent

throughsoundwithphrasesandwords,molding[ἐκτυπούμενον]one’sopinion[δόξα]intothe
streamflowingthroughthemouthasifintoamirrororwater.”

Thisdefinitionisquickly

dismissedbySocrates’assertionthateveryonecandothis(soonerorlater),

whilenot

everyonecanturntheirtrueopinionintoknowledge.Thisbriefrefutationisleftunquestioned
inthedialogue.Inspiteofitsquickdismissalthisdefinitionoflogoscontainsseveralkey
pointstounderstandingthemovementbetweenlevelsofbeingthatPlatoischaracterizingfor
us.Twooftheseareparticularlyrelevanttothecurrentinvestigation.Thefirsthastodowith
whatisbeingassumedbySocrateswhenheclaimsthateverybodyisabletoperformthistype
oflogos.Thesecond,whichbecomesclearerafterthinkingthroughthefirst,iswhatrolethis
typeoflogoshasinrelationtotheacquiringofknowledgeasitischaracterizedinthedream
anditsreversal.

Thereasonforthewidespreadandcommonabilitytogivethistypeoflogosisnot

difficulttograsp.Inorderfortheexpressionofthoughtandopiniontofollowsoquicklyon
thoughtandopinionthemselvesitmustbethecasethatthereislittleornosignificant
differencebetweenthoughtandexpressionofthought,andbetweenopinionandexpressionof
opinion.Everyonewhocanthinkcanspeaktheirthoughtbecausethoughtandspeechare
fundamentallythesame,andsotooareopinionandspeech.Thedifferencebetweenthought
andexpressionisthe“makingapparentthroughsound,”whilethedifferencebetweenopinion
andexpressionisthe“streamflowingthroughthemouth.”Otherthanthemakingexternal,
expressingisfundamentallythesameasthinkingandopining.

ThisisconfirmedbynoticingthatpreviouslyinthedialogueSocratesdefinedboth

dianoiaandopinionforusintermsoflogos,andnowheisdefininglogosforusintermsof
opinionanddianoia.Dianoia,inthediscussionoffalseopinion,wasdefinedas“logosthat
thesoulitselfgoesthroughwithitself

aboutwhateveritconsiders,”

whileopinionwas

definedas“astatement[logos]that’sbeenmadethoughnottoanyoneelseorwithsound,butin
silencetooneself.”

Logosissomehowthesameasbothdianoiaandopinion,differingfrom

theminthisfinalsectiononlyinsofarasitis“outloud.”

Wehaveseenpreviously(inthediscussionsofHeraclitusandProtagoras)thatboth

dianoiaandopinionrelyuponthepresenceofaprincipleofunity.So,too,hereintheinitial
discussionoflogoswearepointedbacktothismostfundamentalfeature.Eventheimagery

Platousesinthisfirstdefinitionoflogosevokesourearlieraccount.Tomold(or“setin
relief”)

one’sopinionsintothestreamfromthemouthcongersupanimageofputtingformto

theHeracliteanflux.

Weonceagainarebeingremindedthatanyaccount(aswellasany

thoughtoropinion,oranythingelseforthatmatter)canonlybethroughthepresenceof
oneness,andthatthisonenessistherootandbeginningofanyandallintelligibility.Andyet
thisonenessalonecannotbeenoughtoallowfortheinterweavingthatisalogos.Theremust
alsobeamanynesscapableofbeinginterwoven.Hereagain,asinanydiscussionoflogos,we
seethenowfamiliarneedforthecombinationofcommonandsense-content.Whatsetsthis
definitionoflogosapartfromtheothersistheease,andnaturalness,withwhichitis
accomplished.Indeedthisisitsdownfallasadefinitionofknowledge.JustaswithHeraclitus
andProtagorasearlierinthedialogue,thisdefinitionoflogosresultsineveryonehaving
knowledge.

Therefutationof“knowledgeisperception”madeitclearwhatitwouldmeanforalogos

toleadtoknowledge:itmustbeabletomakegraspabletheousiaofwhateverisinquestion.
Knowledgeisonlyhadwhenonegraspsbeing.

Buthowcanalogosdothis?Itiscertainly

noeasymattertoeitherrecognizethenecessarypartsofwhatiscombinedtomakeanousia,or
toorderthosepartsinawayastomaketheousiavisiblewithinthem.Thisrequiresmorethan
theambiguousunityandmultiplicitynecessaryforthesimplespeechofthefirstdefinition.
Indeed,sincegraspingtheousiaisagraspingofwhatmakessomethingone,itmustrequirea
thoroughgoingdisambiguationoftherelationbetweentheprincipleofunityandtheparts.So
whilethisfirstdefinitionoflogosremindsusthatourinvestigationwillinvolvesomekindof
relationbetweentheoneandthemany,andthatgraspingthisambiguousrelationisenoughfor
opinionwithoutknowledge,itfallstothetwodefinitionsoflogosthatfollowtointroducethe
methodsforaccomplishingthedisambiguationnecessaryformovingfromopinionto
knowledge.

Therecognitionthatthisinitiallogosfallsshortoftheousia,alongwiththerecognition

thattheabilitytogivethislogosisbasic(becauseeveryonecandoitsoonerorlater),helpsus
seewhatrolethistypeoflogoshasincomingtoknowledgeasitischaracterizedinthedream
anditsreversal.Thisfirstdefinitionoflogosincorporatestheideaofmirrorreflectioninit,
inasmuchastheaudibilityofthelogosreflectsthoughtoropinion.Butthereisanotherlayerto
thereflective“nature”ofthislogos.Thethoughtandopinionofthisdefinitiondonotcapture
anousia,andyetitisonlyinvirtueofaconnectiontoanousiathatathoughtoropinionhas
meaning.Justlikeareflectioninamirror,thereflectivenatureofthoughtsandopinions
suggeststhattheylackthatintheoriginalswhichmakesthembewhattheyare.Whatthenisthe
thoughtoropinionthatisverbalizedaccordingtothisdefinition?Itisareflectionofwhatcan
beknown,nottheknowableitselfbyitself;itistheknowableobjectasrepresentedonalower
levelofbeing.Everyonecanperformthistypeoflogosbecauseitdealswithbeingatitsleast
real,i.e.,beingastheobjectsofperceptionandexperience.Thedisambiguationnecessaryfor
movingfromopinionandthoughttoknowledgeissuppliedintheupcomingdefinitionsof
logos.Itinvolvesraisingourgraspuptoahigherlevelofbeing.Tosaythesamething,the
disambiguationbetweenopinion/thoughtandknowledgecorrespondstothedisambiguationof
sense-contentandousia,whichisaccomplishedbygraspingtheousiaitselfandleavingthe
sense-contentbehind.

Seconddefinitionoflogos(206e-207b)

Theseconddefinitionoflogosissupposedtotakeusbacktothedream,asSocrates

makesclear.

Socratessuggeststhathavingalogosisbeingabletoanswerthequestionabout

whatsomethingisbylistingthething’selements.

Thisexplanationoflogosthusorientsus

aroundthedistinctionbetweenanaskerandananswerer.Thedefinitionsuggeststhatwhat
differentiatestheanswerer(i.e.,knower)fromtheasker(i.e.,non-knower)isthatthelatter
cannotlistallthepartsofwhatheisaskingabout.

Fortheanswerertoactuallyanswertheasker’squestion,thetwomustsharesome

commonnotionabouttheobjectbeingaskedafter;yet,despitesharingacommonalitytheir
notionsalsomustdifferpreciselyinsofarasoneisaknowerandtheotherisnot.Theaskerhas
agraspwithoutknowledge,whiletheanswererhasagraspwithknowledge.Agraspwithout
knowledgeisanotherexpressionforopinion,andisatleastsomethingliketheobjectofthe
previousdefinitionoflogos.Theanswerer’slogos,asalistingofparts,mustthereforebein
additiontotheopinion,sinceitistheopinionthatgivesussomethingtogivealogosof.Thus,
inordertolistthepartsofthewagononemusthaveapriorgraspofthewagon(intheformof
opinion).

AsSocratessaystheknoweristheonewhohas:

Thepowertogothroughtheverybeing(ousia)ofit[thewagon]bywayofthosehundredthings,whobyaddingthishas
addedalogostohistrueopinion,andinsteadofbeingcapableofopinionhasbecomeartfulandaknoweraboutthevery

beingofawagon,havinggoneallthewaythroughthewholebywayofitselements.55

Thegoingthroughtheelementsissupposedtoallowsomeonetobecome(γίγνομαι)aknower
oftheousiaofthewagon.Thislogos,therefore,marksthetransitionfromthegraspofthe
askertothatoftheanswerer.What,then,canwesayaboutthegraspofthewagonpriortothe
goingthroughtheelements,andwhatcanwesayofthegraspofthewagonafterthegoing
throughoftheelements?

Thoughwecannot“know”theobjectthatisonlyanobjectofopinionandnotanobjectof

knowledge,wehavenonethelessdeterminedsomething(actuallyquiteabit)aboutits
character.Theobjectofopinionsharedbytheaskerandtheanswererisacombinationof
commonsandsense-contentgraspedambiguouslyasonething.Itmustbeacombinationofthe
twobecause,aswasarguedatlength,allopinionsareacombinationofthetwo.Itmustbean
ambiguousrelationbecauseifthedifferencebetweenthesense-contentandtheousiawere
clearthenboththeaskerandtheanswererwouldbeknowers,whichisnotthecase.Thegrasp
oftheaskercanbesomethingassimpleaspointingtoawagonandsaying“whatisthat?”This
wouldstillbeanapplicationofcommonstosense-content,forsimplypickingoutoneobject
fromthemanifoldfoundintheperceptualfieldrequirescommons.Thispickingoutoneobject,
asthecombinationofacommonandsense-content,isthenarecognitionofawhole,thoughit
isarecognitionofthewholeambiguously(i.e.,withoutdistinguishingbetweentheousiaand
theparts).

Thedisambiguationofthecommonandthesense-contentisessentialtoknowing.Ihave

arguedatlengththatknowledgemustinvolvethegraspofacommon,orspecificallythegrasp
ofousiai.Thisdefinitionoflogosonceagainmakesthatclaim;asSocratessays,thislogosis
“thepowertogothroughtheverybeing(ousia)ofit[thewagon]bywayofthoseonehundred

things.”Whatistherelevanceoftheonehundredelements?Thelistingoftheonehundred
elementsisopposedtodividingthewagonupintomerelythe“wheels,axle,box,poles,
crossbar.”

Thefirstpersonknowsthebeingofthewagon,thesecondpersonmerelyhasa

trueopinionregardingthewagon.Socratesconnectsthisbacktothedreambymakingasimilar
claiminreferencetospelling.Hesays:

Butthequestionerforhispartmightperhapssuppose,ashewouldifwehadbeenaskedyournameandhadansweredby
itssyllables,thatwewereridiculous,eventhoughwehaveacorrectopinionandarticulatedthethingswearticulated
correctly,ifwesupposedthatwewereliteratepeopleandthatwehadandgavethearticulationofthenameTheaetetusin
aliterateway;he’dsupposetherecouldn’tbeanyarticulatingofitknowledgeablyuntilonehadgottenallthewaythrough

eachnamebywayofitslettersalongwithatrueopinion,aswassurelystatedinwhatwentbefore.57

Thediscussionofspellingtakesusbacktothedream,butthedifferencebetweenknowledgeof
spellingandwagonsbringsanewpointtobear.The“wheel,axle,box,poles,crossbar”are
comparedtothesyllables,whiletheonehundredpartsarecomparedtotheletters(or
elements).Takingtheletterstobefundamentalandindivisibleisonething,

buttakingthereto

beonehundredindivisiblepartsinawagonisimpossible.Thewholenotionofmaterial
indivisibilityisproblematic.Ifmattertakesupspaceitmusthaveextension,andtohave
extensionistobepotentiallydivisible.ButthenwhatdifferencedoesitreallymakeifIlist
five,ten,twenty,onehundred,oronethousandpartsofthewagon?NomatterhowmanyIlistI
willnotexhaustthewagon’snumberofmaterialparts.Recognizingtheinfinitedivisibilityof
materialpartsseemstoundermineanyrealdistinctionbetweenfiveoronehundredparts.

What,then,isthedifferencebetweenlistingfiveoronehundredparts?Thedefinitionin

questionreallygivesustheanswerexplicitly;theknoweristheonewhograspstheousia.In
somesensethismakesthenumberofpartsirrelevant,forafteralltheousiaistheprincipleof
unityandhencemustbeone.Fundamentallythereisnodifferencebetweenlistingfivepartsor
onehundredpartssolongasthelistisgeneratedthroughagraspoftheousia.Thedifferenceis
reallyonlysignificantfromwithintheasker/answererrelation.Whatmakesalistingofsome
numberofpartsbetterthanalistingofsomeothernumberofpartscanonlybethattheone
reflectstheousiabetterthantheother.Theaskerhasidentifiedasomethingtoaskafter.The
answerer(assuminghehasknowledge)hasidentifiedtheousiaofthatsomething.Togetthat
ousiaacrosstotheaskertheanswererdividestheobjectupintoparts,butnotjustanynumber
ofparts,theappropriatenumberofparts.Theappropriatenessofthenumberofpartscanonly
bedeterminedbywhatisneededtoconveytheousia,sincethatisthegoalofthelistingof
parts.

Thereareseveralsignificantmetaphysicalissuesatworkinthesepassages,allofthem

revolvingaroundthequestionofwhatanousiais.Inonesensewe’vehadananswertothisfor
quitesometime.Ousiaisaonenessthatisappliedbythesoulallowingfortheintelligibilityof
anythingpresenttothesoul.TheproblemisthatSocratesandTheaetetuskeeptalkingabout
particularousiai(thewagonforexample),andwhatmakeseachparticularousiadistinct
cannotbeousiaitself,forousiaitselfiscommontoallousiai.Ifitisnottheousiathat
differentiatesbetweentheparticularthings,ortypesofthings,thenitmustbetheparts.This
becomesthecentralissueinthefinaldefinitionoflogostobediscussedshortly,anditwillbe
theprimaryfocusofthefourthchapter.Thatitisthepartsthatdifferentiatetheousiaifrom
eachotherisnotatallanewclaim,itisactuallywhatwe’vebeenclaimingsincetheargument

fortheexistenceofthesoul.Thecommonsprovidesamenessandstillnesstointelligible
objects,whilesense-contentprovidesthedifferenceandmovement.

Thisisouroldoppositionbetweenoneandmanycomebacktotheforefront,onlythis

timethediscussionisexplicitlywithintheconfinesoflogos.Inchapters1and2wesawthat
meaningfullogosrequiresamixtureofoneandmany.WhatPlatoiswrestlingwithnow,with
thedialogue’sconcludingthreedefinitionsoflogos,iswhatrelationlogoshastothelevelsof
being/oneness.Howdoeslogosrelatetoandreflectthedifferentwaysinwhichobjects
presenttothesoulexist?Theseconddefinitionoflogosdescribesitasgoingthroughthe
wholebywayoftheelementstherebyprovidingknowledgeoftheousia.Thisisthemystery;
howdoesgoingthroughthewholebytheelementsleaveoneknowingtheousia?Actually,this
istwomysteries;howdoesgoingthroughtheelementsleaveonewithagraspofthewhole?
andhowdoesagraspofthewholeallowonetoknowtheousiaitselfbyitself?Thereisaleap
beingmadeineachofthesetransitions.Thearrangementofthemultiplicitysomehowallows
thesoultoseetheonenessthatmakesalltheelementsandthewholebewhattheyare:wethink
somekindofintelligible(andhenceunified)manynessandtherebyendupknowingaoneness!

Socrateshadactuallysaidsomethingtothiseffectbackinthediscussionoffalseopinion.

Thinking(dianoia)wasdefinedas“speechthatthesoulitselfgoesthroughwithitselfabout
whateveritconsiders...askingitselfquestionsandansweringthemitself.Butwheneverit
hasmadeadeterminationwhethermoreslowlyorwithaquickerleap[ἐπᾴξασα],andit
assertsthesamethingandisnotdivided[διστάζῃ],wesetthatdownasopinion.”

Taking

“opinion”asagenericwayofreferringtoanygraspmadebythesoul,thispassageistellingus
thatgraspingaonenessrequiresa“leap,”andwecannowseewhy.Thinking,orinternal
logos,mustmovethroughmultiplicity,butgraspingmustbeofprinciplesofunity.The
overcomingofthemultiplicityisagraspingofitsprincipleofunity,andthisrequiressome
kindofjump.Thisnewlygraspedunityisthendividedbyanotherlogosandtheprocess
repeats.

Takingallthisintoconsideration,wecanreorientourselvesinthecurrentinvestigationof

logos.Thefirsttypeoflogosbeginsfromagraspthatisanambiguousrelationofcommonand
sense-content,i.e.,somemostbasicformofopinion.Thelogosthenmakesthismultipleby
“moldingone’sopinionintothestreamflowingthroughthemouthasifintoamirroror
water,”

ascharacterizedinthefirstdefinitionoflogos.Thismultiplicityisthenarrangedby

theanswererofthesecondtypeoflogosinsuchawayastoallowtheaskertoseetheoneness
underlyingit.Thisseeingoftheunderlyingonenessisthedisambiguationofthecommonand
thesense-contentthatremainambiguouslyconnectedinthefirstdefinitionoflogos.

ToputitintermsoftheimageusedbySocrates,thereissomeinitialgraspofthewagon

thatneedbenothingmorethanrecognizing“thatthingoverthere.”Thisrelativelyemptygrasp
correspondstotheambiguousrelationofsensecontentandcommonmentionedabove.The
examinationofthisgraspallowsfordivisionintoparts(fiveorfiftyoronehundredorany
othernumber),whichhopefullyallowsfortheleaptothegraspoftheousiaofthewagon;the
graspoftheousiabeingthedisambiguationofthecommonandthesense-content.Thisisthe
basicmovementthusfar.

Weshouldpauseforamomentandaskwhatisentailedinthegraspoftheparts?Afterall,

tograspeachpartistograsponething,andthiswouldseemtorequiregraspinganotherousia.

Ortosaythesamethinginanotherway,everypartisalsoawhole.Thiswasseenearlierin
thediscussionofthedreamanditsreversal.Notonlydidthedreamanditsreversalshowus
thateverygraspisofawhole,italsodemonstratedthateverywholeiscomposedofasingle
lookandanall.Tobesomethingintelligible(i.e.,tobeanobjectcapableofbeinggrasped)
requiresbeingbothoneandmany;thisappliesjustasmuchtothepartasitdoestothewhole.
What,then,differentiatesthepartfromthewhole?Orforthatmatterwhatdifferentiatesone
partfromanotherpart,oronewholefromanotherwhole?

Thesequestionscanbestatedmoregenerally.Sinceallintelligibleobjects(whethera

partorawhole)arethesameinsofarastheyareallaunityofmanyness,weareleftwiththe
problemofunderstandinghowwecanaccountforthedifferencebetweenthem?Therearetwo
kindsofdifference.Thefirstdifferenceliesinthedistinctionbetweenlevelsofbeing;the
wagonisdifferentiatedfromtheaxlebecauseitistheousiaofthewagonthatmakestheaxle
whatitis.Thiswasthefocusofthesecondhalfofchapter2andthefirsthalfofchapter3.The
secondkindofdifferenceisthatbetweenobjectsonthesamelevelofbeing.Forexample,
whataccountsforthedifferencebetweentheaxleandthewheel?Botharewhattheyarein
virtueofthesamething(i.e.,theousiaofthewagon),andyeteachdiffersfromtheotherin
spiteofsharingacommonprincipleofunity.Thesedifferenceswillbethefocusofchapter4.
Thedistinctionbetweenthepartandthewholeaskedaboutaboveobviouslyliesinthefirst
kindofdifference.Thepartisdifferentfromthewholebecausethepartgetsitsbeingfromthe
whole.

Thisdifferencebetweenthepartandthewhole,however,endsuponceagainbeinga

similaritybetweenthetwoassoonaswerecognizethatthewagonitselfalsoderivesitsbeing
fromsomethingelse;thewagon’sbeing,aswithallartifacts,comesfromhumanactivity,which
inturnistiedtoman’sousiaorsoul.Thisonceagainpointstothesamenessofallobjects.
Everyobjectthatderivesitsprincipleofunityorbeingfromsomethingoutsideofitselfwill
necessarilybebothoneandmany.Indeed,itmaybeworthnoticing(inpassing)thatobjects
canhavemorethanoneprincipleofunity.Sincetheprincipleofunityaccountsforanobject’s
being,thisamountstosayingthatanobjectcanbemorethanonething.

Thisiseasilyseenas

soonaswerecognizethateverymaterialthingisapartofnature.Thus,theaxlequaaxle
derivesitsousiafromthewagon(whichinturnderivesitsousiafromman),whiletheaxle
quawoodenderivesitsbeingfromnature.

Theseconddefinitionoflogosstartswithawholeandattemptstograspitbydividingit

intoparts.Takingintoaccountthateverypartisalsoawhole,andeverywholealsoapart,we
canseethatthereisanotherpossiblekindoflogos.Insteadofbreakingintopartsthatwhich
oneseekstoknow,wecanalsograspthatofwhichitisapart.Thismakesmuchmoresenseas
anattempttocometoknowsincewehaveseenthattoknowsomethingistoknowitsprinciple
ofunityorbeing,andtheprincipleofunityforapartliesinthatofwhichitisapart.Thisis
preciselywhatthethirddefinitionoflogosattemptstodo.

Thirddefinitionoflogos(207c-210b)

Thethirdandfinaldefinitionoflogosis“havingsomesigntosayinwhatrespectthe

thinginquestiondiffersfromallthings.”

Socratesgoesontoexplainthat

assoonasyougraspthedifferenceofeachthing,bywhichitdiffersfromeverythingelse,you’llgraspanarticulation,as
somepeopleclaim;butaslongasyouhangontoanythingthat’ssharedincommon(κοινοῦ),yourarticulationwillbeabout

thosethingsamongwhichthecommonnessisshared.63

Afterprovingintherefutationof“knowledgeisperception”thatknowledgeisonlyhadofthe
commons,thedialogue’sfinalattempttoaccountforknowledgeassertsthatknowledgeof
somethingisonlyhadwhenonemovesawayfromwhatitsharesincommonwitheverything
elseandgraspsitsdifference.Basedonwhathascomebefore,thissimplycannotbe.Can
Platoseriouslytakethisasaplausibledefinitionofknowledgeafterbuildinganentireaccount
aroundtheclaimthattobeistobeone,andknowledgeisofwhatis?Adefinitionof
knowledgethatinvokesdifferenceisdeadfromthestartbecauseitisnotofwhatisone,and
hencenotofwhatthethingis.Indeed,thehangingontowhatiscommonispreciselywherewe
shouldexpecttofindknowledge.Inaway,thedefinitionisentirelybackwards;knowledgeis
acquiredwhenweovercomethedifference,notwhenwerecognizeit.Thisiswhyitisonly
thecommonsthatareknowable,ormoreaccurately,itisonlyousiathatisknowable,i.e.,
becausethereisnodifferencewithinit.Thenecessityfordifferenceliesonlyinthelower
levelsofbeing,andanygraspofwhatbelongstothelowerlevelsmustalwaysfallshortof
knowledgeinsofarasitsprincipleofunitymustlieinahigherlevelofbeing.Thisiswhatthe
Theaetetushasbeenshowingus.Thefinaldefinitionoflogosandknowledgeareconfirmation
thatthereisnoknowledgeofparticularsorindividuals,noristhereevenknowledgeof
universals.GenuineknowledgebelongsonlytotheOneofParmenides,thatterrifyingobjectof
reverence,

andyetthattoowehavefoundtobeunintelligible.WhatParmenidesmissed,

speakfartoodisrespectfully,isthatfalseopinionispossibleandthatinorderforthattobethe
casetheremust,insomeway,bethatwhichisnot.Evenifmotionandchangeareanillusion,
thebeingoftheillusionmuststillbeexplained.

AlookatthetwoexamplesthatSocratesusestoillustratethisfinaldefinitionoflogos

bearsthisout.Thefirstexample,thesun,isusedasanexampleofwhatthiskindofdefinition
lookslikewhenitissuccessful.Thesecondexample,Theaetetushimself,isusedinthe
refutationofthedefinition.Whatisstrikingaboutbothexamplesisthattheyareindividuals.
Thereisonlyonesun,andonlyoneTheaetetus.

ThedefinitionofthesunofferedbySocratesisthat“itisthebrightestofthethingsgoing

acrosstheheavensaroundtheearth.”

Therearetwoprimarypartstothisdefinition:aclass

(“thingsgoingacrosstheheavensaroundtheearth”)andadifferentia(“brightest”).Thefinal
definitionoflogosclaimsthatitisthedifferentiathatmakesatrueopinionknowledge,andthe
differentiaofferedbySocrates(bothforthesunandforTheaetetus)isaperceptiblequality.
Thisamountstoareaffirmationthatgraspingdifferencecannotleadtoknowledge,becauseit
amountstoclaimingthatperceptioncanturnagraspintoknowledge.

Thisisthevery

oppositeofwhatwehavebeenseeing.Perceptionisthecorruptingofthecommons.Ortoput
itanotherway,perceptionkeepsonefromgraspingacommonitselfbyitself.

Thedifficultyariseshere,atleastinpart,becauseSocrateshasusedtwoindividualsas

hisexamplesofwhatthisdefinitionmakesknowable.Tograspanindividualrequiresa
graspingofwhatseparatesthatindividualfromallotherindividuals,butitispreciselyin
doingsothatonefailstograsptheousiaitselfbyitself.Orinotherwords,theousiaiof
individualsmustincorporatedifference,butitisthisverydifferencethatmakesthem

unknowable.ThisisactuallythecriticismthatSocratesraiseswithhisowndefinition.Without
differencethereisnograspofanyindividualthing;so,tosaythatknowledgeofTheaetetusis
havingatrueopinionofTheaetetusandaddingtothatalogosofhisdifferenceisself-refuting,
forwithoutalreadyhavingthedifferenceincorporatedintotheopinionthereisnowaythatthe
opinioncouldbeaboutTheaetetus.AndyetthisgraspofTheaetetusthatisnotagraspof
Theaetetusasanindividualisreallywhatwe’vebeenlookingforalong!Thedoingaway
withindividuality,whichcoincideswithamovingawayfromdifference,leavesussimply
withousiaitselfbyitself.Infact,takingthisintoconsideration,wecanseethattherecognition
ofdifferenceisconfirmationthatknowledgehasnotbeenreached.

Anotherwaytosaytheaboveisthatfundamentallythereisnoknowingofousiai,thereis

onlyknowingoftheousia.WhatmaybePlato’smostfamousimagereflectsthisidea,animage
whichalsoinvokesoneofthetwoindividualsusedasexamplesinthisfinaldefinitionof
logos.InRepublicBookVIISocratessaysthatthesunisthesourceofboththebeingandthe
knowabilityofallthatisandisknowable.

Thesameideaisatworkhere:thereisousia

itselfbyitselfthatisresponsibleforthebeingofallousiai.Thatisactuallypartofwhatisso
strikingabouttheexamplesSocratesusestoillustratethisfinaldefinition.Thesunisperhaps
Plato’smostwell-knownimagefortheOne,whileTheaetetus(asthehumansoulunder
investigation)hasbeenthesourceofallousiaithroughouttheTheaetetus.

Lookingattheothersideofthecurrentdefinition(i.e.,theclassinsteadofthedifferentia)

wecanseethissameidea.Theclassiscommontoallthatbelongstotheclass.Itcapturesthe
beingofwhatisinvestigatedinawaythatisthesameforallobjectsfallingwithintheclass.In
theexampleofthesun,theclassistheheavenlybodiesmovingaroundtheearth.Thisclass,
however,canalsobedividedintoparts.Thenew,broader,classwouldbetheheavenlybodies
andthedifferentiawouldbemovingaroundtheearth.Andagainthisstepcanberepeatedby
dividingthenewclassintotheclassofbodiesanddifferentiatingthembyheavenlyand
terrestrial.ThisispreciselythekindofdefinitionthatTheaetetusoffersofcommensurableand
incommensurablenumberswaybackinthebeginningofthedialogue,

whichistheformof

definitionthatSocratesasksTheaetetustoemulateinhisattemptstodefineknowledge.Itis
alsotheformofdefinitionthatisexaminedinTheaetetus’discussionwiththestrangerthat
takesplaceintheSophist.Whyisthisformofdefinitionsosoughtafterifitisclearthatitdoes
not,ofitself,provideuswithgenuineknowledge?

Theclasses,liketheindividualstheycontain,arewaysofreferringtoparticularousiai,

eachsuccessivedefinitionbeingamorecommonrepresentationofwhatissoughtafter.Itis
preciselythiskindofmovementthat,whenrepeatedenoughtimes,willtakeusalltheway
backuptothecommons,foreachmovementupaclassidentifiestheprincipleofunitythatis
commontoalltheclassesbelowit.Andtotakeitevenfurther,thecommonsthemselves
constituteaclass,andtheirprincipleofunitywillcontaintheirtruthinit.Thus,therepeated
applicationofsuchadefinitionwill,inprinciple,eventuallyleadusbeyonddifferencetothat
whichisnotinneedofanyprincipleofunityitself.

Whatdoesallthistellusaboutthegraspofalls,wholes,andsinglelooks?Everyoneof

themfallsshortofknowledgeinexactlythesamewayastheyfallshortofoneness.Agraspof
anythingthatfallsinbetweenthefluxofHeraclitusandtheabsoluteOneofParmenides
requiresarecognitionoftheirdifference,whichinturnunderminesanygenuineknowledgewe

canhaveofthem.Inonesensetherearereallytwokindsofgraspsatworkhereforevery
object.Thefirst,whichwehavebeencallingknowledge,isfundamentallythesamefor
everything.Knowledgeofeverythingisthesamefor“allthingsareone.”

Thisisthetruthof

fatherParmenides.Thesecond,whichIhavesimplybeenreferringtobythegenericterm
grasp,isarecognitionofsomethingasdistinctfromotherthings.Thiskindofgraspistheone
thatcorrespondstotheobjectsofperceptioninthelowestlevelofbeing,theobjectsof
opinionandthoughtintherealmofopinion,andeventhejudgmentsaboutthecommons
themselvesintheactivityofthesoulitselfthroughitself.Themovementbetweentheselevels
iswhatPlatohasbeencharacterizing(insofarasitcanbemadeintelligible)inthedefinitions
oflogos.Thefirstlogosisareflectionanddividingofwhatisgraspedinaconfusedway.The
secondisalayingoutofthemultiplicitysoastograsptheousia.Andthethirdisaclassifying
ofakindofousia.

TherearemanymoreissuesatworkinthesepassagesoftheTheaetetus,andmuchmore

tobesaidabouteveryaspectoftheaccountgiven.Thegoalofthischapteristohaveshown
howtheTheaetetus’supposedfailuretogiveanaccountofwhatknowledgeisreally
constitutesakindofsuccess.Thisfollowsfromthefactthatanygrasp,oranyobjectof
“knowledge,”requiresrecognizinghowitentailsdifference,arecognitionwhichundermines
genuineknowledge.Thisisseenbyrealizingthatanygrasprequiresrecognizinghowthe
objectgraspedisdifferent,arecognitionwhichunderminesgenuineknowledge.Inspiteof
theselimitationsanygrasponanylevelofbeingdoesallowforakindofimitationof
knowledge.Eachgraspisagraspofoneness,anditisgraspingonenessitselfthatconstitutes
genuineknowledge.Thus,eventhoughtheknowledgeweacquireiscorruptedbythe
distinctness(ordifference)ofeachofourgrasps,itstillfollowsthateverygraspattachesusto
onenesstoagreaterorlesserdegree,andhence,thateverygrasp,ofwhateverkind,isa
knowing.

Notes

1.Thetwoargumentsagainst“knowledgeisperception”thatdirectlyprecedethefinal

refutationof“knowledgeisperception”revolvearoundthepossibilityoffalseopinionand
themeaningfulnessoflanguagerespectively.Thesearguments,whilenotsufficientontheir
owntomoveusoutoftherealmofperception,aregenerallyheldasthemostpersuasive
argumentsofthesection(excludingthefinalrefutation,whichisalsoanargumentfor
substance/soul).M.J.Levettreferstothemasthe“seriousrefutations”ofProtagorasand
Heraclitus(Levett,p.252).

2.Theseparationofthesetwoquestionscannotbecomplete,forattheheartofthisaccountis

therecognitionthatintelligibilitydependsuponbothsamenessanddifference.Soany
investigationofsamenessordifference(oronenessandmanyness)willhavetoinvolvethe
other.Thus,thedifferencebetweenthechaptersreallyamountstowhichofthetwoisbeing
focusedon.

3.BygenuineknowledgeImeanknowledgethatmeetsthetwocriterialaidoutearlyoninthe

dialogue,i.e.,thatknowledgebeofwhatisandthatitbeunerring(152c).

4.Thiswaspartoftheargumentfromchapter2.

5.201e.ThefactthatinthisdefinitionTheaetetusisrememberingsomethingsaidbyanother

indicatesthatthedefinitioncanonlybesomethingthatfallsundertherealmofopinion,for
knowledge,astheargumentforthesoulshowedus,canonlybefoundintherecollectionof
thecommonsthathavealwaysbeenpresenttoeverysoul.Theinclusionofexternalityinthe
formofsomethingheardindicatesthatthedefinitionforTheaetetuscanonlycorrespondto
thatwhichisamixtureofcommonsandsense-content,whichwehavearguedatlength
cannotentailknowledge.Burnyeat(1990)pointsthisoutaswell(p.129).

6.Thetermsusedforelementandcompoundalsomeanletterandsyllable,asSocrateshimself

laterpointsout(202e).Thispointsbacktothediscussioninchapter2inwhichitwasnoted
thattheoppositionbetweenthesubjectandobjectdisappearsinPlato’saccount.Sotoo
here,onecanspeakofthepartsandwholesoftheobjectsthemselvesorwecanthinkabout
howwethink(throughlanguage)aboutthosepartsandwholes.Itamountstothesamething.
Thenewadditionhereislogositself,whichwewillseeisnottobeunderstoodsimplyas
anoperationofthemind,butalsoasapartofbeingasit“is”inmultiplicity.

7.202b.
8.Inresponsetothesuggestionthattheunknowableelementsbecomeknowablewhenheld

togetherTheaetetussays,“Butthat’saterrible(δεινόν)andunspeakable(ἄλογον)thing
Socrates”(203d).

9.“μίαντινὰἰδέαν”(203c).Thisisexactlythesameexpressionusedinreferencetothesoulin

theargumentthatundermines“knowledgeisperception”(184d).Thisisnocoincidence,as
weshallsee.

10.SocratesandTheaetetusactuallyspendmoretimeentertainingtheideaofthecompoundas

thewholethantheydodiscussingtheallorthesinglelook.Thecompoundastheall
stretchesfrom202e-203d.Thereissomeoverlapbetweenthediscussionsofthewholeand
thesinglelook,butareasonablewaytodividethemistosaythatthediscussionofthe
wholestretchesfrom204a-205a,andthediscussionofthesinglelookstretchesfrom205c-
d.

11.204a.
12.Iamnotentirelyaloneinthisreading.SeeMiller(1992)p.93.
13.Itisproblematictorefertoperceptionandsense-contentasrepresentingalevelofbeing,as

wediscussedinchapter2(p.36-37).Whatwewillseeintheupcominginvestigationisthat
referringtoeachofthemasalevelofbeingisawaytorefertotheleastintelligibleof
intelligibleexperience.

14.204b.
15.205a.
16.204d-204e.
17.204e.
18.Ibid.
19.205a.
20.205a(mytranslation).
21.Abriefwaytostatethetwoargumentsisthatthefirstarguesthatboththeallandthewhole

areidenticalwithalloftheparts,andthereforetheymustbethesame.Thesecondisthat
theallandthewholearebothidenticaltothatfromwhichnothingismissing,andtherefore

theymustbethesame.Foreitherargumentwecometotheconclusionthattheallandthe
wholeareallthepartsandthatfromwhichnothingismissing.

22.195e-196a.
23.147a-b,210a-b.
24.Sachs(2004),p.118note60.
25.Anissuecanbeseenherethatwillariseexplicitlyjustafewpageslaterinthedialogue.

Howmanypartsareneededtomakeuptheall,andisthisthesamenumberofpartsthatis
neededtomakeupthewhole?Anarmycanlosesomenumberofsoldiersandstillbean
army,butcananarmyloseallofitsarchersandstillbeanarmy?Orallofitsinfantry?Or
itsgenerals?

26.MitchellMillermakesasimilarargument(Miller[1992],p.93-95).
27.Wewillspendquiteabitoftimearguingthatitisnotonlythelogosthatfallsshortofa

particularobject’sbeing,butalsotheparticularobjectitselffallsshortofitsownbeing
insofarasitsbeingisdependentonaprincipleofunitylyingoutsideofit.

28.Again,“grasp”isagenerictermforanythingthatisrecognizedbythesoul.Forexample,

seeingTheaetetuswalkingtowardyouisagrasp,andsotooisrememberingTheaetetus,
andsotooishavinganopinionaboutTheaetetus,andsoforth.

29.206a-c.
30.202b.
31.“Butisitpossiblethatapartistheverythingthatitisasbelongingtoanythingelse

whateverthantothewhole?”204e.

32.Thisisthecaseinboththedreamandthedream’sreversal.
33.Meno80d-e.
34.Meno81b-e.
35.Phaedo74a-75d.
36.Thedifficultissuesregardingrecollectionareevidentinallthis.
37.Itisworthnotingbecauseitwillshowitselftobehelpfulinunderstandingthedefinitionsof

logostocome.

38.203b2-7.
39.Benardete(1994,I.171)recognizesthistoo.
40.Seep.20-21.
41.147d8.
42.Thisreasonishighlydubious,foracceptingtheidentificationoftheallandthewholemakes

itverydifficulttoseehowanyaccountofaccountscouldpossiblysalvagethedream.See
Miller(1992),p.89.

43.“Theverybeing(ousia)ofalogosisanintertwiningofnames”(202b).
44.Thefirstexampleisincommensurableandcommensurablenumbers(147d-148b).The

secondishisdefinitionoftheletters(203b).

45.206d.
46.206d.
47.“αὐτὴπρὸςαὑτὴνἡψυχὴ”incontrasttothe“αὐτὴδι᾽αὑτῆςἡψυχὴ”(185e)which

referredtothejudgmentsaboutthecommons.

48.189e.

49.190a.
50.Thewordfor“tomold”isfromἐκτυπόωwhichcanalsobetranslatedas“toworkin

relief.”

51.Benardette(I.176)andTschemplik(130)bothpointthisoutaswell.
52.Thisisindicatedat152cinthediscussionofperception,anditisstatedmoreexplicitlyat

186c-dintheargumentfortheexistenceofthesoul,andyetagaininthediscussionoffalse
opinionat188e-189b.

53.207b.
54.206e.
55.207b-c.
56.207a.
57.207a-b.
58.TheGreektermtranslatedas“element”(στοιχεῖον)inthissectioncanalsomean“letter.”
59.189e-190a(myemphasis).
60.206d.
61.Itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatobjectscanbemorethanonething.Afterallithasbeen

arguedatlengththattheobjectsofourgraspareincompletelyone.

62.208c.
63.208d.
64.183e.
65.This,again,isjustParmenidesasheisrepresentedintheTheaetetus.Partofhispoem,

afterall,is“thewayofopinion.”

66.208d.
67.Thisisthesamethingthattherefutationofthesecondproperdefinitionofknowledgedoes.

Therefutationclaimsthatthetrueopinionofthejurycannotbeknowledgebecausetheydid
notwitnessthecrime(201a-201c).

68.“Intheknowableregion,thelastthingtobeseen[i.e.,thesun],withgreateffort,isthelook

ofthegood,butonceit’sbeenseen,ithastobeconcludedthatit’stheverycause,forall
things,ofallthingsrightandbeautiful,thatitgenerateslightanditssourceinthevisible
realm,andisitselfthesourcethatbestowstruthandinsightintheintelligiblerealm”
(Republic517b-c.Sachstranslation).

69.147d-148b.
70.180e.

ChapterFour

TheDifferenceBetweentheLevelsofBeing

Thepreviousthreechaptershavearguedthatanunderstandingofanything,whileitcanbe

betterorworse,willalwaysbeincomplete.Theincompletenessresultsfromtherecognition
thattheintelligibilityofeverydistinctthingliesoutsideofitself;

theintelligibilityofevery

distinctobject,asacollectionofparts,liesinitsprincipleofunity.Thisprincipleofunity,in
turn,asadistinctthing,findsitsprincipleofunityinsomethingelseaswell.Theonlywayfor
theintelligibilitytoremain“within”thatwhichitmakesintelligibleisfortheprincipleofunity
tobeinternaltothatwhichisunified.Butthiscanonlybepossibleinsomethingthathasno
parts,forinvolvedintheparadoxofadistinctexistenceisthatitreallyisnotwhatitis.

Soin

anythingthathaspartstheprincipleofunityandthatwhichisunifiedmustbedifferent,forthe
principleofunityisproperlywhatthecollectionofpartsis,whilethecollectionofpartsisnot
properlywhatitis.Thus,theonlywayforintelligibilitytobeinternalisfortheretobe
somethingthathasabsolutelynoparts.

Thatwhichhasabsolutelynoparts,however,cannotbeanydistinctthing.Allwereally

needtorecognizeasjustificationforthisisthattobedistinctrequiresdifferenceandtobe
differentrequires(minimally)bothagenusandadifferentia.

Thus,thatwhichisabsolutely

Onecannotentaildifferenceand,hence,cannotbeadistinctthing.Thiswaspartofwhatwas
recognizedearlyoninthelayingoutofthedialogue’sframeworkandpartofthereasonwhy
PlatoiscarvingoutamiddlegroundbetweenHeraclitusandParmenides.For,ontheirown,
neithertheHeracliteanfluxnortheParmenideanOneallowforanysortofintelligibility.

So,ontheonehand,theintelligibilityofanydistinctthing(whichisanythingthatcanbe

spoken/thoughtof)mustlieoutsideofitself.Ontheotherhand,thatwhichhasitsintelligibility
withinitselfcannotbedistinctinanyway,andhencecannotbethesubjectofanylogos.Thisis
whyknowledgeisalwaysslippingawayfromus;wheneverwefindtheprincipleofunityof
whatevertheobjectofourgraspis,weareonceagainleftgraspingsomethingwhoseprinciple
ofintelligibilityliesoutsideofitself.Thisiswhythedialoguemustendwithoutacompleted
logosofknowledge:anythingthatisdistinctandhencegraspablewillalwaysrequireanother
logosforitsintelligibility.Ifthesecontinuinglogoiwerethensomehowtoleadustothat
whichisabsolutelyOne,therewouldbenowaytothinkthatwhichwouldresultfromall
logos.Inshort,anythingdistinctandthinkablefallsshortofwhatisknowable,andwhatis
knowablemustbeentirelyindistinctand,hence,unthinkable.

Makingtheunintelligibleintelligible,andviceversa

Theseclaimsareclearlyparadoxical.Afterall,thatwhichisutterlyOne(andhence

utterlyindistinct)isbeingdistinguishedfromthatwhichisdistinct(anything)preciselyin
regardstoitsindistinctness!Thisparadoxagainpointsusbacktotheoverarchingstructureof
theTheaetetus,asIdescribeditinchapter1.Theutterlydistinct(theOne)andutterly

indistinct(puremultiplicity)arebeyondanyaccount.Thus,anythingwesayabouteithercannot
reallybetrueofeither,andyetnothingisthatdoesnotentailoneorbothofthese.Thisposes
significantdifficultiesforanyontologicalaccount.Theaccount,tobemeaningful,mustbe
unifiedoroneinsomeway,yetitcannotbecompletelysoforthatwouldbothunderminethe
possibilityoflogosandalsofailtobeabletoaccountforanyofthedistinctnessthatwe
experienceorthink.Whatweneedisapartiallyintelligibleandpartiallyunintelligibleaccount
ifwearetograsphowthings(i.e.,themanythings)are.Buthowcanwepossiblyfindthe
properbalancebetweenintelligibilityandunintelligibility?Todosowouldseemtorequire
makingtheunintelligibleintelligible,andhencemakingitnotwhatitis.

ThemeatofPlato’sontologyaspresentedintheTheaetetusgetsoffthegroundwithan

assumption:thereismeaninginwhatwecanthinkandsay.Itisthisassumption,aswesaw,

thatgetsusawayfromHeraclitus,andleadstotheargumentfortheexistenceofthesoulas
“someonelook”thathaswithinitthepowertodeterminesamenessanddifference.The
onenessofthesoulalsoappliestotheobjectgraspedbythesoul.Everygrasp,likeevery
being,onlyisinsofarasitisone.Soeverygraspisthesameaseveryothergraspinsofarasit
isone,andyetisdifferentfromallothergraspsinsofarasitisdistinct.

Wehaveactuallyseenmultiplewaysinwhichgraspsmustbethesameanddifferent,

alongwiththerelatedrecognitionthattheymustbeoneandmany.Afundamentaldistinction
betweenwaysinwhichtheoneandmanyarerelatediswhethertherelationtakesplacewithin
onelevelofbeing,orwhetheritextendsoverdifferentlevelsofbeing.Wesawinchapter2
thatforfalseopiniontobepossible,thesamethingmustexistondifferentlevelsofbeings.
Forexample,itmustbetruethatTheaetetusisbothsomeunifiedcollectionofphysical
properties(i.e.,anobjectofperception)andaunifyingsoul(i.e.,anobjectofthought)ifitis
possibletomaketrueandfalsejudgmentsabouthim.Further,itisalsothecasethatcertain
collectionsofattributeswillapplytohim,andcertaincollectionswillnot.Forexample,itis
truetosaythatTheaetetushasasnub-noseandbulgingeyes,andfalsetosaythathehasan
aquilinenoseanddeep-seteyes.Ortosaythisanotherway,thereareonenessesthatexiston
thesamelevelofbeinganddifferfromeachotherbecauseoftheirrelationstoadifferent
(higher)levelofbeing.Statedmoregenerally:someunifiedcollectionsofpropertiesmustbe
connectedwithcertainprinciplesofunity,andothercollectionswithdifferentprinciples.

Denyingtheexistenceofmultiplelevelsofbeingdoesawaywithtruthandfalsity,and

establishesusfirmlyintheHeracliteanflux.Thatistosaythatwhenlimitingourselvestoone
levelofbeingnotonlyisthewagoninthefieldutterlydistinctfromthehorse,asitisfromthe
plow,asitisfromeveryotherobjectofperceptionorjudgment,itisalsoutterlydistinctfrom
itself.Thereisnosamenessbetweenanyobjectswhenourattentionremainsonanysingle
levelofbeing;indeed,objectsarenoteventhesameasthemselves.Forsameness,oranyother
common,inpickingoutaprinciplesharedbyseveralobjectsatonceorbyoneobjectthrough
time,alwayspointstoatranscendentprincipleofunity,andatranscendentprincipleofunity
alwayspointstoahigherlevelofbeing.Thisprocessappliesnotjusttotherelationbetween
differentobjects,butalsototherelationbetweenthe(supposedly)“same”objectfrommoment
tomoment.ThisiswhyforHeraclitusthereisnotrueorfalsejudgment:thereisnosameness.
ThereisnosamenessforHeraclitusbecauseherecognizesnolevelsofbeing.Itisonlyonce
weaccepthigherprinciplesthattheobjectsonthesamelevelofbeingactuallystandinany

relationtoeachother.Theserelationsarethendeterminedbytherelationsbetweentheobjects
onthehigherlevelofbeing.Utterdifferenceanditscorrespondingdenialoflevelsofbeing,
therefore,putsusbackintheutterlymeaninglessrealmofHeraclitus.Indeed,wehavealready
seenthatneitherdifferencenorsamenessalone(i.e.,onewithouttheother)canconstitutea
relation.Differencerequiressameness,for,attheveryleast,twoobjectsmustbothsharebeing
(andoneness)incommoninordertostandinarelation.Ontheotherhand,iftwoobjectswere
entirelythesametheywouldnotbetwoandhencebeunabletobedistincttermsinarelation.

ThepicturewehavearrivedatinthisaccountofPlato’sontologyislayered.Thegraspof

objectsbelongingtoahigherlevelcorrespondtothe(incomplete)knowingoftheobjectson
thelowerlevel.

Further,withineachleveltherearedistinctobjectsstandinginvarious

relationsofsamenessanddifference.Anyobjectofjudgment,asdistinct,isgraspedasa
particularinstanceofamoregeneralclass.

Asthefinaldefinitionoflogossays,anygrasp

approachingknowledgemustbeabletosay“inwhatrespectthethinginquestiondiffersfrom
allthings,”andmorespecificallyinwhatrespectitdiffersfromthattowhichitismostsimilar.
Theobjectisthesameasotherinstancesfallingwithinthatclassanddifferentfromobjects
fallingoutsideoftheclass.Sotootheclassitself,liketheobject,willbesimilartoand
differentfromotherclasses,andthoseclasseswillinturnbethesameasanddifferentfromyet
other,moregeneral,classes.Followingthispattern,wemusteithercontinueinfinitelyseeking
moreandmoregeneralclassesorwemustcometotheclassthatincludesallotherclasses.For
PlatothisistheOne.Sinceknowledgeofsomethingisachievedbygraspingitsprincipleof
unity,andessentiallyeverythingsharesthesameprincipleofunity(theOne),itbecomes
obviousthatnothingistrulyknownuntilweknowtheOne,andassoonastheOneisknown
everythingisknown.Yetinknowingonenessweovercomedifference,andinsodoingthereis
nowayforustoknowanyofthemanydifferentobjectsofjudgment.However,itisobvious
thatwedograspmanydifferentthings,andinsodoingwegrasphowthesethingsarethesame
anddifferentinthewaysoutlinedabove.Howdowerecognizetheserelations?

TheOnebothmakespossibleandunderminesthegraspofanydistinctthing.Itmakes

possiblethegraspofanythingbecausetobegrasped(andsimplytobe)requiresbeingone.It
underminesthepossibilityofdistinctthingsbecausedistinctnessdependsonmultiplicityandis
therebynotknowable.Samenessanddifference,inturn,dependuponthelevelsofbeing.As
arguedinchapter3,thesamenessbetweenlevelsisexplainedbyrecognizingthatthehigher
levelssupplytheprinciplesofunityforthelowerlevels,meaningthatthelevelsare
reflectionsofthesamethingbecauseoftheir“degree”ofoneness.Yetsomelowerlevel
“onenesses”arenotreflectionsofcertainotherhigheronenesses.Forexample,wecangivea
listofthepartsofawagonthatistrueorfalse.The“onehundredelements”ofthewagonthat
isgraspedbythepersonwhoactuallyknowswagonsisboththesameasanddifferentfromthe
ousiaofthewagon.Ortouseanotherexamplefromthetexttherearecertainphysical
characteristicsthatcanbetrulyascribedtoTheaetetus(saysnubnosedandbulgingeyes)and
othersthatcannot.Iftheconnectionbetweenthelevelsofbeingisonenessthenshouldn’titbe
thecasethatanythingthatwecanthink,sinceitmustbeone,willbeareflectionofeverything
else?Whatcanpossiblydifferentiatetheonesthatbelongtothesamelevelofbeing?

Thesamedifficultycanbeseeninanother(perhapsevenmorebothersome)way.Howdo

wedistinguishbetweendifferentgraspsatall?Everygraspisinsofarasitisone.Sinceour

graspisalwaysofoneness,whatcouldpossiblyaccountforthedifferencebetweenonenesses?
Onlypluralitycould,andyetpluralityasdistinctfromonenessisnot.Yetwenonethelessare
abletograspdistinctonenesses.Howisthispossible?

Thisissuehasbeenwithussincewebegantheaccountoffalseopinioninchapter2(and

reallysinceweleftHeraclitusbehind).

Wesawinchapter2thatfalseopinionrequiresthe

mistakingofonelevelofbeingforanother.Eventhemistakingofonesetofcharacteristicsfor
anothersetofcharacteristics(i.e.,themistakingoftwothingsbelongingtothesamelevelof
being)canonlybefalseifthesetsofcharacteristicsareheldinrelationtoahigherprincipleof
unity.

Thepossibilityofthisdependsuponcertaindistinctsetsofcharacteristicshaving

connectionstocertaindistinctprinciplesofunitiesandnotothers,andyetthepossibilityofthis
ishighlymysterious.

Alltheseissuesraisethequestion:towhatextentisitpossibletogiveanaccountofthe

relationbetweenlevelsofbeing?Itisrelativelyclear(forreasonsabouttobegiven)thatitis
notpossibletomakeabsolutelyintelligibletheconnectionbetweenthatwhichmakesthings
intelligibleandthatwhichismadeintelligible.Thisiswhatweseektodobytryingtoanswer
howtheprincipleofunityisconnectedtothatwhichitunifies.Thedifficultyisthatin
differentiating“thatwhichisunified”fromitsprincipleofunity,yousimultaneouslystripitof
itsintelligibility,foraswe’veseenrepeatedlyintelligibilityisinherentlytiedtooneness.Once
you’vestrippedoneofthetermsinarelationofitsintelligibilityyouwouldseemtohavedone
thesamethingtotherelationitself.Itisliketreatinganarmyasmerelyanassortmentoften
thousandparts.Withoutaprincipleofunity,themultiplepartsexistonlyindependentlyand,
hence,cannotbeintelligibleasparts.Theargument,again,isthatsettingahigherandalower
levelofbeinginrelationrequiresseparatingthem,andseparatingalowerlevelfromthe
higheramountstoseparatingthelowerlevelfromthatwhichmakesitintelligible.Thus,setting
ahigherandalowerlevelofbeinginrelationmustmakeoneofthetermsintherelation(i.e.,
thelowerlevelofbeing)unintelligible.Butifoneoftherelatainarelationisunintelligiblethe
wholerelationwillbeunintelligible,forinsucharelationwhatisgrasped(i.e.,intelligible)
willsimplybeoneoftherelataandhencenottherelationitself.

Perhaps,though,itisincorrecttothinkabouttheconnectionbetweentheunifierand

unifiedasarelation.Arelationmaywellrequiretwoindependentrelata,andthisisnotthe
caseinthelevelsofbeing.Thelevelsofbeingarenotindependent,forthebeingofeachofthe
lowerlevelsdependsuponallofthelevelsaboveit.Thisiswhyanunderstandingofanything
requiresthegraspofthatthing’sprincipleofunity.Theprincipleofunityismostproperlywhat
thethingis,butthenthethingitselfisnotproperlywhatitis.Moreover,thething’sprincipleof
unityisaprincipleforallthingsofthatsort.Thisiswhyeverygraspmustbeincomplete.
Eitherwegraspthething’sprincipleofunityandnotthething,orwegraspthethingwithoutits
principleofunityandfailtograspitsousia.Tosaythesamethingfromtheperspectiveof
knowing(insteadofgrasping),immediatelyuponcomingtoknowsomething(i.e.,graspingits
principleofunity)knowledgeofitislost,fortheprincipleofunityisitselfsomeotherthing
thatexistsonahigherlevelofunity.

Soinonesenseweshouldnotthinkaboutthelevelsofbeingasstandinginrelationtoone

another,butwhatisouralternative?Wehaveseenthatourabilitytogiveanylogosatall
dependspreciselyupontherelationinquestion;forlogosrequiresbothacollectionofparts

andaprincipleofunitysomehowconjoined.Thus,thinkingofthelevelsofbeingasarelation
makesthempartiallyunintelligible,andyetourthinkingnonethelessdependsonacceptingsuch
arelationbecausetheintelligibilityofeachleveldependsuponitsconnectiontothelevel
aboveit.

Everygraspisknowingandnograspisknowing

Therelation(andopposition)betweentheunifierandtheunifiedisthesameasthe

relation(andopposition)betweenanobjectasknownandthesameobjectasgrasped.

Knowingandgraspingarereallytwosidesofthesamecoin,orperhapsmoreaccurately,two
polesofthesamerelation.Tograspanobjectistoseesomeunifiedthing.Toknowthatsame
objectistograspthatunifiedthing’sprincipleofunity.Thegraspofthishigherprincipleis
thenboththeknowledgeofthelowergraspandalsoitselfthegraspofanobjectthatisseenas
someunifiedthing,whichinturnwillbeknownonlybygraspingitsprincipleofunity.Thus,
oneandthesamerepresentationtothesoulcanbeagraspandaknowingdependingonwhatit
isheldinrelationto(i.e.,whetheritisheldinrelationtothatwhichitunifies,orthatwhich
unifiesit).Onceagain,weseethesameprogressionincomingtoknowseenabove,a
progressionthatentailsasteadymovementupthelevelsofbeing.

Thus,inonesensethegraspandtheknowledgearebothofthesameoneness,andin

anothersensetheyareofdifferentonenesses.Forexample,Icanrecognizethatthewagonis
someonethingwithorwithouthavingknowledgeofwhatthatonethingis.Bothofthese(the
graspandtheknowledge)areofthesamething,i.e.,thewagon;buttheyareeachdifferent
insofarastheyentailthemultiplicityofwagonindifferentways.Thefirstgraspissomething
likethefirstlogos;itispriortoanyunderstanding.Itcorrespondstoasimplerecognitionofa
distinctbeing,withoutanyideaastowhatthatdistinctbeingis.Theknowingispost-logos,
onlyhavingthemultiplicitypotentiallywithinit,astheteacherwhoisabletoshowthe
essentialpartstothestudent.Asarguedinchapter3,themovementfromagrasptoaknowing
isaccomplishedthroughlogos.Thegraspassociatedwiththefirstkindoflogosisdivided
throughthefinaltwokindsoflogoiinordertofindaprincipleofunityforthepartsproduced
bythedivision.Thisprincipleofunity,despitebeingthesourceofknowledgeforthatwhichit
unifies,willthenlikewiserequireaseekingoutofitsownprincipleofunity,andsoforth.
Thus,thedialoguesuggestsamethodforacquiringknowledge,butstopsshortofactually
presentinguswiththesoughtafterknowledgeofknowledge.

Thereasonforthedialogue’sstoppingshortofknowledgehasalreadybeenexplained.

Onlythatwhichhaspartscanhavealogos,andaslongasthereareparts,therecannotbe
knowledge.Knowledgeonlyariseswhenthelogosasappliedtothegrasphasbeenleft
behind.Andyetassoonastheprincipleofunityisgraspedasanindependentthingitceasesto
beknowledge,andonceagainisjustsomeobjectgraspedasdistinctfromotherobjects.That
whichallowsagrasptobeknownbecomesnotknownatpreciselythemomentitmakesthe
originalgraspknown!

Thisproblem,thatthatwhichmakesthingsknownisnotitselfknown,wasactuallyoneof

theprimarydifficultiesraisedinreferencetothedream.Torecall,therefutationofthedream
raisedtworelatedproblems:eitherthecompoundismerelytheaggregateoftheelements,orit
issomeonelookarisingoutofthem.Ineithercasethecompoundwillbeunknowableinthe

samewayastheelements.Ifitismerelytheaggregate,thenthecompoundwillhavethesame
natureastheelementsand,hence,beunknowableinpreciselythesameway.Ifthecompound
issomeonelookarisingoutoftheinterweavingoftheelements,thenthecompoundwill
necessarilyhavethesamecharacterasanindividualelement(i.e.,itwillbeoneand
indivisible),andasaresultitwouldbeunknowableinthesamewayaswell.So,too,onmy
accountthehigherunitythatservesastheknowledgeofthatwhichitunifiesendsuphavingthe
samecharacterasthatwhichitunifies;forittoo,insofarasitisanobjectofthoughtatall,
mustbeacombinationofoneandmany.Becausethehigherunityhasthesamecharacterasthat
whichitunifies,itshowsitselftobenot-knowninpreciselythesamewayasthatwhichitis
supposedtomakeknown.

Theproblemwiththedreamisthatitmakestheelementsthefundamentalbasisforbeing

andthought.Thisiscompletelybackwards,astheargumentfortheexistenceofthesoulshows
us.Thehigherprinciples,notthepartsthatareinterwoven,arethefundamentalbasisforbeing
andthought.

Theelementsaccountforthemultiplicity,butitistheonenessthatallowsfor

beingandknowledge.Thedream,therefore,invertsreality.

Buthowdoesthisinversionof

thedreamhelpusavoidtheproblemsraisedearlier?Isn’tthepresentaccountstillmaking
knowledgeofthingsrestuponthatwhichisnotknown,evenifitdoessoinawaythatis
differentthanthedream?

Therecognitionthatthebasisofknowledgeandbeingliesintheprincipleofunity,as

opposedtotheunifiedparts,givesusawaytoavoidthedilemmathatunderminedthedream.
Thegraspofthehigherunityarisesoutofthemultiplicityrecognizedintheparts.Thesingle
grasparisingoutoftheperceivedmultiplicity(whichistheknowledgeoftheoriginalgrasp)is
ofwhatisone,butsincethegraspofithasarisenoutofthemultiplepartsitisalsosomething
overandabovetheemptyonenessofthegraspofanelement.Thewagonasasimple,
contentless,objectofperceptionisanelement.Thewagonasanobjectofknowledgeisstill
simpleandone,butitalsohascontent,contentthatisimplicitintheknowingandcanbelaid
outinallitsparts(throughlogos)iftheknowersochooses.Theprincipleofunityislikethe
elementofthedreaminsofarasitisoneandfundamentallyindivisible,butitdiffersfromthe
elementinthatitsindivisibilitynonethelesshasthepossibilityofdivisionwithinit.The
seemingcontradictionofsayingthattheindivisibleobjectofknowledgeisnonetheless
potentiallydivisibleisnotreallyacontradictionatall,forthedivisionoftheobjectisnotthe
knowingoftheobject,eventhoughtheproperdivisiondoesdependupontheknowledge.This
iscentraltounderstandingtheaccountbeingofferedasitpointsusrightbacktothelevelsof
being.

Therecognitionofknowledge’sneedforhigherprinciplesofunityavoidsthepitfallsof

thedream’selementsonlybyacceptingthateventhougheveryobjectoneverylevelofbeing
onlyexistsinvirtueofitsoneness,thereisnonethelessadifferenceindegreesofoneness.This
isconnectedtotheseemingcontradictionpointedtoabovethatthemoreone(i.e.,thatwhich
suppliestheprincipleofunityforsomethingelse)has“within”itthatwhichislessone.That
oneandthesamethingcanberepresentedinwaysthataremoreandlessonewasatthecenter
ofwhatallowsforthepossibilityoffalseopinion(aswasarguedinchapter2).Therearetwo
requirementshere:(1)Onenessoneachlevelisfundamentallythesame,foritisonenessthat
makeseverythingbe.(2)Therearelevelsofthisoneness,despiteonenessbeingfundamentally

thesame.Ingraspingaprincipleofunity,wearegraspingsomethinglikeanimageoftheOne
itself.Yeteachmovementupward,whilealwaysincomplete,isnotmerelyamovementtoward
theOne,itisalsoaknowingoftheOne;forwithouttheonenesstherewouldbenograspatall.
However,eachofthesegrasps,asgraspsofdistinctthings,underminesitselfasknowledgejust
atthemomentitisgrasped.Inotherwords,despitethefactthateverydistinctgraspfallsshort
ofknowledge,eachone,nonetheless,mustbeagraspofsomedegreeofoneness.Assucheach
graspisaknowing,forallknowingisofoneness.Thelevelsofbeing,notsurprisingly,
correspondtolevelsofknowing.Butsinceeachprincipleofunityhasitssourceof
intelligibilityoutsideofitself,eachoftheseinstancesofknowingisalsoaceasingtoknow.

Goodlogosandbadlogos

Theaboveargumentconcludingthatknowledgeisnevercompleterestsuponaclaim

aboutknowledge.Specifically,itrestsupontheclaimthattoknowsomethingistograspits
principleofunity.Doesthismeanthattheargumentunderminesitself?(Afterall,theclaimthat
“toknowsomethingistograspitsprincipleofunity”mustitself,iftheconclusionitgroundsis
true,beatbestonlypartiallytrue.)Theanswertothisquestionmustbeyes.Theclaimsmade
abouttheincompletenessofeverygraspisalogos,andwehaveseenthatanyandeverylogos
mustbeincomplete.Morespecifically,wehaveseenthateverylogosmustunderminethe
multiplicityinherentinitinordertoleadtoagraspofaprincipleofunity.Inotherwords,not
justthisone,buteverylogosisselfundermining!Actually,theironyhereisthatitisonlythe
meaningfullogoithatunderminethemselves.Themeaninglesslogoi,becauseoftheirlackof
meaning,areunabletounderminethemselves.Thereisnoutterlytruelogos,thereareonly
betterandworselogoi.Agoodself-refutinglogosleadstoaprincipleofunitywhileabad
logosdoesnot.

Thus,todistinguishbetweenagoodlogosandabadlogoswemustbeabletoidentify

principlesofunity,andthisrequiresbeingabletodeterminehowlevelsofbeingrelatetoeach
other.Yet,makingintelligibletherelationbetweenlevelsofbeingseemstobeimpossible.So
thequestionbecomes:howcanwepossiblydeemonelogosgoodandanotherbad?This,
again,appliesnolesstothisbook’slogosthanitdoestoanyother.Howcanweknowthatone
accountisanybetterthananyother?ThepositionofProtagoras,wherenojudgmentwastruer
thananother,isbroughttomindhere.Movingbeyondhislogosrequiredtherecognitionof
substance,whichtranslatesintoanacceptanceofoneness.Thesameprincipleappliesnowin
differentiatingonelogosfromanother.

Thebetterlogoiaretheonesthatcansupply(orlead

tothegraspof)amoreunifiedandmoreunifyingprinciple.Thequestionishowwecan
recognizethis.

Abriefinvestigationofhowmyaccountofaccountsappliestoitselfwillbeincludedin

theconclusionofthebook,butthegeneralideaofhowtodifferentiateaccountsshouldbe
evident.Differentiatingbetweenbetterandworselogoiisakintodifferentiatingbetween
higherandlowerlevelsofbeing.Whilewecannotdifferentiatethelevelsofbeingfromone
anotherinvirtueoftheironeness,foritistheironenessthatmakesthemalllevelsofbeing,we
canrecognizethatcertainloweronenessesarecontainedincertainhigheronenesses.The
beingsharedbytheobjectsofexperienceiscontainedinthesoulitselfthroughitself,forthe
objectsofexperienceareinvirtueofthecommonssuppliedbythesoulitselfthroughitself.

Thebeingofthewholeofthewagoniscontainedinthesinglelook,thoughitisnotcontained
thereasawagon,fortobethewagonrequiresamultiplicitythatasinglelookcannothave.
Theindividualiscontainedinthespecieswhichiscontainedinthegenus.Thisiswhat
accountsforthedifferencebetweenthelevelsofbeing,i.e.,thehigherlevelscontainthebeing
ofthelowerandnotviceversa.Thus,thedifferencesbetweenthelevelsofonenessis
understandableintermsoftheircontent,orlackthereof.Thelackofcontentofthelowerlevels
ofbeingallowsustounderstandthebeingandnotbeing(andcorrespondingknowingandnot
knowing)thatwesawinchapter2wasnecessaryforthepossibilityoffalseopinion.Judging
TheaetetusasuglyisfalsewhenweholdthejudgmentinrelationtowhatTheaetetusmoretruly
is(i.e.,abeautifulsoul).JudgingTheaetetus’appearancetobeuglywithoutholdingitin
relationtowhatTheaetetusmoretrulyisisnotafalsejudgment,itisjustamostlyempty
judgment.

Thus,althougheachgraspisone,itisstillthecasethateachsingleobjectcanbegrasped

inamultitudeofways.Allofthewaysareboththesameaseachotheranddifferentfromeach
other.Thesamenessissuppliedbytheirsharedoneness,whichissupplied,intheTheaetetus’
limitedaccount,bythecommons.

Thecommons,wehaveseenrepeatedly,arethesourceof

allintelligibility.What,then,islefttobesaidaboutthedifferencebetweenthegrasps?Ifthe
sourceofintelligibilityisresponsibleforthesameness,itwouldseemtofollowthatthesource
ofthedifference,ordistinctness,mustbeunintelligible.Thismeansthatweshouldnotexpect
anintelligibleanswertothequestionofwhatconnectsadistinctprincipleofunitytosome
distinctsetofparts,fordistinctnessisinherentlyunintelligible.

Andyet,wecan,anddo,distinguishbetweenprinciplesofunityandparts.Youcannot

articulatethedifferencebetweenthelevelsofbeingfromtheperspectiveofthelowerlevels.
ThisisunderstandablethroughthestandardPlatonicdistinctionbetweenformsandimitations
(whichisrelativelyeasytoreadintothisaccount).Forexample,youcannotsayhowthe
particulartreediffersfromtheuniversaltreebyarticulatingwhatitisabouttheparticularthat
differs,fortheparticulardiffersfromtheuniversalonlyinsofarasitisanimitationoftheform.
Buttoimitatetheformistolacktheform(i.e.,theprincipleofunity)insomeway,forifthere
werenolackthentheparticularwouldnotbeanimitationoftheform;itwouldbetheform
itself.Buttheformisresponsibleforthebeingofthatwhichimitatestheform.Hence,what
makestheparticulardifferentfromtheuniversalisalackofbeing,andsincenon-beingcannot
be(norbearticulated)itisnotpossibletosaywhattheparticularhas(orrather,lacks)that
makesitdifferfromtheform.Theonlywaytodistinguishthetwoistorecognizethat,while
stillbeingone,theformmustcontainthebeingoftheparticularwhiletheparticularcannot
containthebeingoftheform.Thedifferenceisintherichnessoftheoneness,aonenessthat
theybothmusthavetobegraspableatall.Tosaythatthelackinthejudgmentoftheparticular
isalackofonenessisinonesensetrue,butitisalso,likeeveryotherstatement,partially
false.Bothgraspsareone.Theyhavetobeinordertobeatall.Buttheonenessofthehigher
levelbeingincludestheonenessofthelowerlevel.Thisinclusion,however,isnottobe
interpretedasamultiplicity,foritispreciselyinthelackofmultiplicity,orthelackofnon-
being,thatthehigherlevelisabletoincludethelower.Rather,theinclusionofthelowerlevel
beinginthehigherisonlyintermsofitsbeing,notintermsofitbeingsomedistinctthing.

Thistakesusbacktologos,foritislogosthatsomehowholdsthedistinctonenesses

belongingtoseparatelevelsofbeinginrelationtooneanother,whetherbymodelingthemina
streamthroughthemouth,listingelements,dividingintogenusanddifferentia,ormore
generallyinterweavingnames.Everylogosisareflectionofwhateveritisalogosof,and
everylogosworksbyhavingastartingonenessandbreakingthatonenessapart.Thisactof
division,however,canhavetwodifferentendsordirections,onecorrespondingtotheroleof
theaskerandtheothertotheroleoftheanswerer.Thegraspoftheaskerisempty,thoughthere
mustbesomeminimalunitybeingaskedafter,forquestioningitself(atleastoftheform“what
is...?”)isarecognitionofsomeonenessthattheaskercannotidentifyotherthanto
(somehow)pointouttheobjectinquestiontotheanswerer.Theanswererinturntakesthe
onenessinquestionandmakesclearerwhatitisbypointingoutwhatitiscomposedof.Both
logoiaredividedrepresentationsofthesamething,butthesamethinggraspedatdifferent
levelsofbeing.Theasker’sattempttodividetheobjectfailstoallowhimtorecognizethe
(firstlevel)underlyingunityofwhatheasksafter,thoughitispossiblethatintheactof
formulatingthequestiontheunitybecomesclear,

whiletheanswerer’slogosarisesoutofa

graspofthatveryunitywhichtheasker’slogosseeks.

Partofthechallengehereisthatonceweacceptthismovementbetweendifferentdegrees

ofonenessbeingmediatedbydifferenttypesoflogoiweareforcedtoconcludethatnothing
canactuallybesaidofanyofthedegreesofonenessthemselves,whichinturnmeansthat
nothingcanbesaidofthethingsthatweareactuallygraspingorknowing.Forassoonaswe
saysomethingabouttheonenessitselfwearenolongerdealingwiththatonenessalonebut
onlywithalogosofthatoneness.Aswearguedearlierlogoiallrequirenotjustonenessbut
alsomultiplicity.Thegraspsareoneinawaythatthelogoicannotbe,andhencethelogos
mustundermineaunity.

Theflipsideofthisisalsotrue:inseekingoutknowledgeofwhatalogosis,weare

turninglogositselfintoanobjecttobegraspedorknown,butbymakinglogosanobjecttobe
graspedorknownitceasestobethatwhichunifiesthegraspandtheknown.Butifknowingthe
relationbetweengraspsorknowingsrequiresknowinglogos,andknowinglogosrequires
makinglogosanobjecttobegraspedorknownandhencenotlogos,thenitisnotpossiblefor
ustoknowtherelationbetweenagraspandaknowing.Thisisyetanotherargumentforwhat
wesawearlierinthischapter:whatisknowablecannotbespokenof,andwhatcanbespoken
ofisnotknowable.

Atthecruxofallofthesedifficultiesistherecognitionthatdifferenceisinherently

unintelligible,andyetnecessaryforthepossibilityofanythought.Thishasbeenanunderlying
problemthroughoutthedialogue;indeedithasbeentheunderlyingproblemateveryturninthe
dialogue’slogos(orlogoi).Thelevelsofbeing,whichIhavebeenarguingareindispensable
forunderstandingtheTheaetetusasawhole,remainunclearintheirdetailsbecausetosupply
detailswouldrequireexplainingdifference.Allwereallygetexplicitlyinthedialogueasa
representationofthelevelsisadistinctionbetweenthesoulitselfthroughitselfandthesoul
itselfthroughanother.

YettherearehintsthroughouttheTheaetetusatseveraldistinctions

withinthesoulthroughanother.Asexamples,thedialoguegivesusimages.Thewaxblock
(memory)andtheaviary(thought)arebothdistinctrepresentationsofthesoulthroughanother,
sotooistheimageofthewoodenhorsewiththesoulsittinginside

(perception).Eachof

theseimagesinsomewaycorrespondstograspingadistinctlevelofbeing,andeachfalls

shortofthesoughtafterknowledge(whichitselfsomehowcorrespondstoadistinctlevelof
being).Tomakethedifferencesbetweentheselevelsclearwouldrequiredistinguishing
differencefromdifference,foraspointedoutearlier,eachlevelmustbeoneinsofarasitis,
andhenceitispreciselyintheironenessthattheyremainindistinctfromeachother.Thisis
whytheonlymeaningfulwayofdistinguishinglevelsofbeingisbyrecognizingthatonetypeof
beingsuppliestheprincipleofunityforanother,forinsodoingwefocusontheonenessof
boththelevelsinquestionasopposedtotheirmultiplicity.Yet,assoonaswerecognizethat
theobjectofjudgmenthasaprincipleofunitythatliesoutsideofitself(i.e.,isdifferentfrom
itself),werecognizethatthatobjectofjudgmentfundamentallyisn’t,andthatthereisnoactual
thingitselfthereforustojudge,andthatwhatisactuallybeingjudgedbelongstosomething
else.Thus,whenwepayattentiontoeachofthelevelswenoticethatthey(asintelligiblein
anyway)arealwaysvanishingintothelevelabove,whichinturnwillvanishintothelevel
aboveit,andsoforth.Eachofthesevanishingsisasclosetoagraspofdifferenceasweget;
werecognizethatwhatwetookasoneisnotreallyone,i.e.,itismany.Inthissensedifference
endsupbeing“thesame”asnon-being,fordifferencehererepresentswhatisnottheoneness.

ThisisnotsomethingthatisparticulartotheTheaetetus.Thereareseveraldialoguesin

whichPlatoexplicitlynotesthatlogosrequireshypothesizinganintelligibilitytodifferenceor
non-being.BothintheSophistandtheParmenides,Platohasthediscussionleaderhypothesize
differenceandnonbeingforthesakeofallowingformeaningfuldiscourse.

IntheTheaetetus

thehypothesizingisnotasexplicit,butnolessnecessary.Inthepivotalargumentrefuting
“knowledgeisperception,”differenceistakentobeoneofthethingscommontoallthesenses,
aclaimwhichisacceptedwithoutreservationbyTheaetetus.Claimingthatdifferenceisa
common,oraform,isimmenselyproblematic.Aswe’veseeninchapter2,thecommonsare
thegroundforallintelligibility.Theirroleinsupplyingintelligibilityisconnectedtotheirrole
astheunifierofthatwhichisconveyedthroughthesenses,thesoulbeingthepointatwhichall
thesenses“convergeintosomeonelook.”Difference

andunlikeness

arebothlistedamong

thecommons.Thedifferencebetweendifferenceandunlikeness(ortheunlikenessbetween
them)isveryhardtounderstand,butbothofthem,regardlessoftheirrelationtoeachother,
appeartobeunintelligibleascommons(i.e.,unintelligibleasprinciplesofintelligibility):
commonsarebydefinitionwhattheobjectsofexperienceshare,i.e.,whatisthesameforall
ofthem.Howcandifference,asacommon,possiblyberesponsibleforwhatisthesameinall
objectsofexperience?Inshort,whatisdifferentcannotbeshared,forinbeingshareditis
madethesame.

OneoftheparadoxesoftheaccountI’vebeenofferingisthatittreatsdifference(or

distinctness)asthenon-common.Tosaythesamethinginaslightlydifferentway,difference
seemstobethecommonresponsiblefornoncommonness.Onewaytoseethisistorecognize
thatthelevelsofbeingcorrespondtovaryingrelationsbetweenoneandmany,andtobemany
istohaveamultitudeofdifferentparts.Aswe’venotedseveraltimes,tospeakofthemanyis
toapplyonenesstoit(otherwiseweareleftwiththelogos-lessaccountofHeraclitus).To
speakofdifferenceistospeakofdifferencewithsameness,orinotherwords,tospeakof
differenceisinsomesensetonotspeakofit.

Thewholeaddsanotherlayertotheissuewhenthinkingthroughtheneedforsameness

withindifference.Therearetwolayersofonenessesinthewhole.Thereisanall,i.e.,a

collectionofparts,andthereisthesinglelookthatturnstheallintothewhole.Thisisthe
quintessentialexampleofadistinctionbetweenlevelsofbeing.Whatisthedifferencebetween
theonenesses?Eachofthepartsoftheallmustbeoneinordertobe,andthesinglelookmust
beoneinordertobetheprincipleofunityofthewhole.Thismeansthatboththepartandthe
wholemustbeone.This,again,isthesourceofthedilemmathatarisesoutofthedream;either
thecompoundisanall(i.e.,abunchofones)orasinglelook(i.e.,asingleone),andineither
caseitisonlyasknowableastheelements.Whatthenislefttodifferentiatebetweenthepart,
thesinglelookandthewhole(whichissupposedtobethecombinationofthetwo)?

Whatissostrikinghereisjusthowdifficultitistofindanythingtosayaboutthese

onenesses,somuchsothatitisverydifficulttomakeanymeaningfuldistinctionbetweenthem.
Onceagain,asI’vebeenarguingfromthebeginning,whatweneedisacombinationofthe
two,butsinceeachofthepairseemtobethesame,itisnotclearhowwehavetwohere,nor
isitclearhowifwedohavetwohowourunifyingofthemwon’tmakethemoneagain.We
haveaseriesofproblemsallrevolvingaroundanattempttomakedifferenceintelligible,
whichisallthemorestrikingbecausewe’veseenthat,asacommon,differenceisrequiredto
makethingsintelligible.Somehowtheonesthatcorrespondtothepartsaredifferent(without
usbeingabletosayhow).Somehowtheseonesareunifiedintoaonethatincludesthemall,
withthecharacterofthenewlyformedonebeingknowableinawaythattheelementalones
arenot,andhencehavingadifferentcharacterfromthem.Somehowtheprincipleofunity
allowingfortheonethatisacompoundispartlessandhencedifferentfromitselfwithinthe
unifiedobject.Theseareallnecessaryfortheaccountoffered,whichinturnisclaimingthat
theyarenecessaryformeaningfuldiscoursetobepossible.Theinabilitytogivealogosof
onenessmeansthatthatwhichmakeslogospossiblealsolimitsthescopeoflogosbecauseno
logoscanbegivenofit.

Thedialogueendswithpreciselytheseissuesattheforefront.Theproblemraisedwith

definingTheaetetusbystartingwithatrueopinionofTheaetetusandthenaddinghowhe
differsfromwhatheismostsimilartoisthatthereisnoopinion(trueorfalse)withoutfirst
graspingtheobjectofopinion’sdifference.

Opinionentailsdifference.Infactanygraspof

somethingentailsdifference,andyetitispreciselyinthefailuretoovercomedifferencethat
knowledgeisundermined.Theendofthedialogue,however,makesitseemlikethefailureto
knowarisesfromnotrecognizingdifference’sfundamentalroleinknowledge.AsSocrates
says:

assoonasyougraspthedifferenceofeachthingbywhichitdiffersfromeverythingelse,you’llgraspanarticulation
(λόγον),assomepeopleclaim;butaslongasyouhangontoanythingthat’ssharedincommon[κοινοῦ],yourarticulation

willbeaboutthosethingsamongwhichthecommonnessisshared.22

Takingthispassageastellingusthatknowledgeisgraspingdifferenceisamisreading,orat
bestanincompletereading.Differenceismostcertainlyfundamental,butnottoknowledgein
anunqualifiedsense,forknowledgeisofoneness.Differenceisfundamentaltoopinion,orto
graspingandthinkingingeneral.Theturningofopinionintoknowledgetakesplaceprecisely
intheovercomingofdifference,i.e.,itliesingraspingbeingasacommon,andinsodoingwe
mustleavetheobjectasdistinctfromitsbeingbehind.Thegraspingofthecommonisknowing
inonesense,asitisagraspofaprincipleofunity,butasadistinctgraspitimmediately

reincorporatesthedifferenceithadovercome,onlythistimeonahigherlevelofbeing.

Thispointstoaprogressionfromaparticulartoitsspeciestoitsgenus,etc.,andthis

progressionwillremainincomplete(i.e.,shortofknowledge)foraslongasaprincipleof
unitymustbefoundforwhateverisgrasped.Eachofthesegraspswillentaildifferenceuntil
wecometotheOneitself.Ihavebeenarguingthateachofthesegraspsisofsomethingthatis
bothoneandmany,i.e.,awhole.Theknowledgeofthewholedependsupongraspingits
principleofunity,whichitselfwillbeanotherwhole,andhencewillalsorequireaprinciple
ofunity.Eachgraspofaprincipleofunitythatisitselfawholeisbothaknowingandanot
knowing.Itisaknowingofthebeingofthatforwhichitsuppliestheprincipleofunity,andit
isanotknowingofitsownbeing.Thisamountstosayingthateachgraspisaknowinginsofar
asitisofaprincipleofunity(i.e.,insofarasitisofwhatisone),anditisanotknowing
insofarasitisofthatwhichrequiresaprincipleofunity(insofarasitentailsplurality).

Notes

1.Tobedistinctheremeanstobesomethingandnotsomeotherthing.Thisentailssomekind

oflimitationandmultiplicity(alittlemorewillbesaidregardingthisinthenextparagraph).
Distinct,inthesenseusedhere,appliesasgenerallyastheterm“grasp”does.Theterm
graspisawayofreferringtoallofthemanywaysthesoulcanattachtoanobject.
Perceiving(insofarasthereisminimalintelligibilityinvolved),opining,andknowingare
allformsofgrasping.Distinctnessisthesamenotionappliedtotheobjectbeinggrasped
insteadoftothefacultygraspingit.Distinctnessisoneofthetwocriteriaforanintelligible
object,theotherbeingoneness.

2.Thiswasarguedforinchapter2.
3.Thisisaversionoftheone/manyrequirementwehavebeenseeingfromthebeginningofthe

investigation.

4.Chapter2,pp.21-24.
5.Thisknowinghasbeenseentobeincompleteintwoways.Thefirstisthatthegraspofthe

objectonthehigherlevel,insofarasitisagraspatall,willshowitselftobeamultiplicity
inneedofaprincipleofunitylyingoutsideofitself.Thesecondisthatthegraspofthe
objectonahigherlevelleavesthedistinctnessofthatobjectasitexistsonthelowerlevel
behind.Forexample,theknowingofTheaetetusasahumanbeingdoesnottellusabout
Theaetetusasadistinctindividual.

6.Therehavebeenmanyexamplesgiveninthedialogue.Thesunisaninstanceofheavenly

bodiesmovingaroundtheearth.Sigmafallsintotheclassofunvoicedletters.Theaetetusis
aninstanceofhumanbeing,etc.

7.WithHeraclitus,ofcourse,wehadtheoppositeproblem.Nowwearestrugglingtoaccount

fordifference,whileatthebeginningofthedialoguethestrugglewasinaccountingfor
sameness.

8.Theexampleusedinchapter2wasjudgingJotonotbeSmithwhenreallyJoandSmith

weresimplytwodifferentsetsofcharacteristicsthatbelongtothesameperson(JoSmith).

9.Thisfollowsfromtherecognitionthatbeingissuppliedbythesoulitself.Theobjectsbeing

judgedbythesoularetheobjectsthatare.

10.Iarguedinthepreviouschapterthatthefinalsectionofthedialogueissimplythelast

example(orstep)inaseriesofonenessesdividedbyalogosinordertobeovercomebya
higheroneness.Eachofthedefinitionsreallyaccomplishesthis.Thefirstonenessis
perceptionbythesoul.Weseethatthisisreallyacombinationoftheworkofthemany
sensesandthecommons.Thisrecognitionleadsustoopinionasthehigherunity.Opinionis
thenshowntobemultipleinsofarasanyopinionisonlyoneofanynumberofpossible
representationsofahigherunity.Thefinaldefinition’sinclusionoflogosthenindicatesthe
waywearetomoveupwardtowardthathigherprinciple.

11.Thiswasactuallypointedoutinchapter3.Thedreamtalksaboutelements(στοιχεῖον)asa

“lotlike”(στοιχεῖα)the“firstthings”(πρῶτα).Thefirstthings,I’msuggesting,arethe
principlesofunity.Theabove,hopefully,showsbothhowtheelementsofthedreamare
similaranddifferenttotheprinciplesofunity.

12.ThisisapossiblereasonthatSocratesreferstoitasadream.
13.ItisinterestingthatthisisreminiscentofthedefensethatProtagorasgaveofhisposition

(throughthemouthofSocrates)backintheseconddefinitionofknowledge.Hesaysin
regardstoeducationthat“oneshouldproduceachangefromoneconditionthatholdstoa
betterone,butwhileadoctorproducesachangewithdrugs,asophistdoessowith
speeches.Onedoesnot,however,makesomeonewho’sbeenhavingsomefalseopinion
afterwardhavesometrueopinion,forthereisnopowertohaveasopinionseitherthings
thatarenot,orotherthingsbesidesthoseoneexperiences,andthelatterarealwaystrue”
(167a).ThedifferencebetweenProtagoras’positionandtheonewearelookingatnow
aroseoutoftherefutationof“knowledgeisperception,”theargumentwhichshowedthe
needforaprincipleofonenessandlevelsofbeing.

14.Limitedbecause,asdiscussedinchapters2and3,thecommonsthemselvesalsorequirea

principleofunity,andthis/thesehigherprinciple(s)arenotexplicitintheTheaetetus.

15.Thisisnotanuncommoneventinaphilosophycourse:thestudent,incomposingthe

question,comestoseewhatsheisreallyaskingafter.Whenthisdoesn’thappentheteacher
asanswerermustreplacethelogosoftheaskerwithanotherlogosthatmakesthe
underlyingonenesssomehowmoreobvious.

16.185d-e.
17.184d.
18.ThisisamajorthemeofthediscussioninthesecondhalfoftheSophist.See236e-241ein

particular.AlsoseeParmenides135b-c.

19.ἕτερον(185a).Thisiscommonlytranslatedas“otherness.”
20.ἀνομοίω(185b).Thisisalsocommonlytranslatedas“otherness.”Sach’stranslatesitas

“unlikeness”andIkeptitheresincemostofthetranslationsI’vebeenusinghavebeenhis.

21.209c.
22.208d.

Conclusion

What,then,havewelearnedaboutknowledge?Everyactofknowingisasimultaneous

actofnot-knowingtheverythingknown.Thereasonforthis,statedsimply,isthatevery
knowingisofwhatisandeverybeing(exceptOne)bothisandisnot.Toputtheargumentin
thetermsusedintheTheaetetus,inordertoknowwhatawholeisitisnecessarytograspthe
onelookthatallowsittobe.Butthewholecannotbeidentifiedwiththeonelook,forthe
wholehaspartswhiletheonelookdoesnot.Thus,incomingtoknowthewholeIgraspone
look,andinsodoingceasegraspingthewhole.Thegraspoftheonelook,assomething
intelligible,willthenhaveitsownprincipleofunitywhichmustbegraspedifknowledgeisto
behadofit.Thus,everyactofknowingleadsdirectlyintotheneedforhigherknowledge,and
everygraspofhigherknowledgeis,insomesense,agraspofaonenessthatwasalready
known,thoughtoalesserdegree.Comingtoknowcan,therefore,betakentobeacontinual
distancingfrommultiplicityforthesakeofricherandrichergraspsofoneness.

Thisconclusion,thatknowingisagraspingofonenessthatleadstotheneedfornew

graspsofoneness,aroseoutofanattempttounderstand(i.e.,know)thedialogueasawhole.
Theattempttounderstandthedialogueasawholeamountstotryingtoseehowthemanyparts
ofthetextfittogetherintoonething.Thismeansthatthedialogueisreflexive:comingtoknow
whatknowledgeis,weengageinthesortofinquirythatisnecessaryforanyparticular
knowledge,butishereaninquiryintoknowledgeitself.Thismeansthatinsomesensethe
conclusionthatweneedtoseekoutonenessinordertocometoknowwasassumedatthevery
beginningoftheinvestigation.Indeed,theseekingoutofoneness,thedialogueargues,isthe
groundforthepossibilityofanymeaningfulinvestigation.Thisiswhattherefutationofthefirst
properdefinitionofknowledge,anditscorrespondingrefutationofHeraclitus,taughtus.There
waswithinus,attheverybeginningoftheinvestigation,agraspofwhatwehadtodoinorder
tocometoknow,despitethefactthatfiguringoutwhatwehadtodoinordertocometoknow
wastheexplicittopicoftheinvestigation.Theknowledgebeingsoughtafterwas,insome
lessersense,knownpriortothesearch.

Ihavearguedthatthiscomingtoknowwhatistosomedegreealreadyknownismade

possiblebythelevelsofbeing(asrepresentedbytheall,thewholeandthesinglelook).The
initialgraspofsomethingisanambiguousrelationoftheprincipleofunityandtheparts;some
ambiguousonenesswithminimalcontentpresenttothesoul.Thisminimalgraspisnecessary
merelytobeabletoaskafterthebeingofsomething.Logosallowsfortherecognitionthatthe
ambiguousonenessisawhole,whichinvolvesakindofdisambiguationofthesinglelookand
alltheparts,whichinturnentailsakindofgraspofthesinglelookitself.Thus,theknowledge
oftheprincipleofunity(i.e.,thesinglelook)ofthewagonisprecededbyanemptygraspof
thewagonasanobjectofexperience.Bothoftheseareagraspofoneness,andhencebothof
themmarkakindofknowing.Thedifferencebetweenthetwoisthatthegraspoftheprinciple
ofunityincludesthebeingofthegraspoftheobjectofexperience;andsinceknowledgeisof
beingthismakesitamorecompleteknowing.Yetthemorecompleteknowingsarealso
incomplete,for,ashasbeenargued,theknowledgeofanydistinctthingmustinvolve
multiplicity,andhencemustappealtoahigherprincipleofunityforitsbeing.

So,too,fortheinsightsthedialoguehastooffer;theymustbepresenttousinorderforus

tobeabletodiscovertheminthetext.Socratesisrelativelyexplicitaboutthisinhis
conversationwithTheaetetus;hisartofmidwiferyisonlycapableofbirthingwhatisalready
present.Therefutationof“knowledgeisperception”showedusthisaswell.Itdemonstrated
thatallintelligibilityisrootedinbeingandonenesswhicharesuppliedbythesoulitself.This
appliestobeingonanylevel.Thismeansthatthemovementfromtheinitial(mostlyempty)
graspsoftheobjectsofexperiencetothegraspofwholeness,andthemovementfromthegrasp
ofwholenesstothegraspofousia,arereallymovementsbacktothesoul:eachgraspof
onenessonanylevelisthesoulreturningtoagreaterorlessergraspofitself.Tousetheterms
ofthedialogue:eachactofknowingisanactofthesoulitselfthroughitself.Whattheaccount
hasshownusisthateveryintelligibleexperienceofthesoulisareturningtoitself,some
returningsbeingmorecircuitousthanothers.Logos,astherelationbetweenthelevelsof
being/oneness,canbethoughtofastheothernessthatthesoulpassesthroughinreturningto
itself.Inotherwords,successfullogosisthemovementfromonenesstoonenessthrough
multiplicity.

Astheexpressionofbeing,logosmustalwaysfallshortofthatwhichitseekstoexpress.

Thisincompletenessoflogosisbothepistemicandontic.Notonlydoesagraspofbeing
overcomelogos,beingitselfrequirestheovercoming.Tostatethissimply:thelowerlevelsof
beingfallshortofthehighersimilarlytohowlogosfallsshortofbeing.Or,lookedatfromthe
otherdirection,theinabilityoflogostoeverfullycapturebeingistiedtoalowerlevelbeing’s
inabilitytobefullyone.

MylogosofthelogosintheTheaetetus,likealllogoi,isincomplete.Thegoalhasnot

beentogiveadefinitiveaccount,for,accordingtomyownposition,thereisnosuchthingasa
definitiveaccount.Rather,Ihavetriedtoshowwhatallaccounts,intheirquestforknowledge,
seektoaccomplish.Oneoftherepercussionsofmyaccountisthatagoodaccountwillalways
leadtotheneedforanother,new,account.Hence,attheconclusionoftheirlongexaminationof
Theaetetus’soulSocratessays“atdawn,Theodorus,let’smeethereagain.”

Bibliography

TextsandTranslations

Armstrong,A.H.,trans.Plotinus.EnneadsIV.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1984.

———.Plotinus.EnneadsV.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1984.

Burnet,John,ed.PlatonisOpera,Vol.II.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1979.

Cooper,John,ed.Plato:CompleteWorks.Indianapolis:Hackett,1997.

Sachs,Joe,trans.Aristotle.Metaphysics.SantaFe:GreenLion,1999.

———.Aristotle.OntheSoul.SantaFe:GreenLion,2001.

———.Plato.Republic.Newburyport:Focus,2007.

———.Plato.Theaetetus.Newburyport:Focus,2004.

Tredennick,Hugh,trans.Aristotle.PosteriorAnalytics.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity1966.

White,NicholasP.,trans.Plato.Sophist.Indianapolis:Hackett,1993.

Books,ArticlesandCommentaries

Ackrill,John.“PlatoonFalseBelief:Theaetetus187-200.”TheMonistVol.50,No.3(July
1966):383-402.

Adalier,Gokhan.“TheCaseof‘Theaetetus.’”PhronesisVol.46,No.1(Feb.2001):1-37.

Allen,R.E.“ParticipationandPredicationinPlato’sMiddleDialogues.”ThePhilosophical
ReviewVol.69,No.2(Apr.1960):147-164.

Benardete,Seth.TheBeingoftheBeautiful.TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1984.

———.“Plato’sTheaetetus:OnthewayoftheLogos.”TheReviewofMetaphysics,Vol.51,
No.1(Sep.1997),pp.25-53.

Bloom,Daniel.“TheSelfAwarenessofReasoninPlato.”JournalofCognitionand
NeuroethicsVol.2,No.1(Mar.2014):95-103.

Bostock,David.Plato’sTheaetetus.Oxford,1988.

Burnyeat,M.F.“ExamplesinEpistemology:Socrates,TheaetetusandG.E.Moore.”
PhilosophyVol.52,No.202(Oct.1977):381-398.
———.“ProtagorasandSelf-RefutationinLaterGreekPhilosophy.”ThePhilosophical
ReviewVol.85,No.1(Jan.1976):44-69.
———.“ThePhilosophicalSenseofTheaetetus’Mathematics.”IsisVol.9,No.4(Dec.
1978):489-513.
———.TheTheaetetusofPlato.Hackett,1990.

Chappell,T.D.J.“Readingtheperitropê:Theaetetus170c-171c.Phronesis.Vol.51,No.2

(Aug.2006):pp.109–139.

Collingwood,R.G.AnEssayonPhilosophicMethod.ClarendonPress,1933.

Cooper,JohnM.“PlatoonSense-PerceptionandKnowledge(Theaetetus184-186).”
PhronesisVol.15,No2(1970):123-146.

Cornford,FrancisMcDonald.Plato’sTheoryofKnowledge.RutledgeandKeganPaulLtd,
1935.

Cross,R.C.“LogosandFormsinPlato.”MindVol.63,No.252(Oct.1954):433-450.

Dorter,Kenneth.“Levelsofknowledgeinthe‘Theaetetus’.”TheReviewofMetaphysicsVol.
44,No.2(Dec.1990):343-373.

Fine,Gail.PlatoonKnowledgeandForms.OxfordUniversityPress,2003.

Ford,Andrew.“Protagoras’Head:InterpretingPhilosophicFragmentsinTheaetetus.”The
AmericanJournalofPhilologyVol.115,No.2(Summer1994):199-218.

Foster,M.B.ThePoliticalPhilosophiesofPlatoandHegel.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1935.

Griswold,CharlesL.“RelyingonYourOwnVoice:AnUnsettledRivalryofMoralIdealsin
Plato's‘Protagoras.’”TheReviewofMetaphysicsVol.53,No.2(Dec.1999):283-307.

Halper,Edward.“DialogundArgumentinPlatonsProtagoras.”Platonverstehen(ed.M.van
Ackeren),Darmstadt,2004:39-56.
———.“ALessonfromPlato’sMeno.”InGorgia-Menon:SelectedPapersfromthethe
SeventhSymposiumPlatonicum,ed.MichaelErlerandLucBrisson,234-242.Sankt
Augustin,Germany:AcademicaVerlag,2007.
———.“OneandManyinAristotle'sMetaphysics.TheCentralBooks.”Columbus:Ohio
StateUniversityPress,1989.

Holland,A.J.“AnArgumentinPlato’sTheaetetus:184-6.”ThePhilosophicalQuarterlyVol.
23,No.91(Apr.1973):97-116.

Klein,Jacob.ACommentaryonPlato'sMeno.UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1965.
———.GreekMathematicalThoughtandtheOriginofAlgebra.MITPress,1968.

Knorr,WilburRichard.EvolutionoftheEuclideanElements:AStudyoftheTheoryof
IncommensurableMagnitudesandItsSignificanceforEarlyGreekGeometry.D.Reidel
PublishingCo.,1975.

Kolb,DavidA.“TimeandtheTimelessinGreekThought.”PhilosophyEastandWestVol.
24,No.2(Apr.1974):137-143.

McCoy,Maria,Berzins.“ReasonandDialecticintheArgumentAgainstProtagorasinthe
Theaetetus.”InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterlyVol.45,No.1(2005),pp.21-39.

Miller,Mitchell.“UnityandLogos:AReadingofTheaetetus201c-210a.”AncientPhilosophy
Vol.12(1992):97-111.

Modrak,D.K.“PerceptionsandJudgmentintheTheaetetus.”PhronesisVol.26,No.1(1981):

35-54

Nehamas,Alexander.“EpistemeandLogos.”InVirtuesofAuthenticity:EssaysonPlatoand
Socrates,ed.AlexanderNehamas,224-248.Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversity
Press,1999.

Owens,Joseph.“AristotleonCommonSensiblesandIncidentalPerception.”PhoenixVol.36,
No.3(Autumn1982):215-236.

Robinson,Richard.“FormsandErrorinPlato’sTheaetetus,”ThePhilosophicalReview,Vol.
59,No.1(Jan.,1950),pp.3-30.

Rosen,Stanley.G.W.F.Hegel:AnIntroductiontotheScienceofWisdom.St.AugustinePress,
2000.

Rowe,C.J.,andM.Welbourne,andC.J.F.Williams.“Knowledge,Perception,andMemory:
Theaetetus166b.”TheClassicalQuarterlyVol.32,No.2(1982):304-306.

Rudebusch,George.“DoesPlatoThinkthatFalseSpeechisSpeech?”NousVol.24,No.4
(Sep.,1990):599-609.

Ryle,G.“LogicalAtomisminPlato’s‘Theaetetus.’”PhronesisVol.35,No.1(1990):21-46.

Sedley,David.TheMidwifeofPlatonism:TextandSubtextinPlato’sTheaetetus.Clarendon
Press,2004.

Tschemplik,Andrea.KnowledgeandSelf-KnowledgeinPlato’sTheaetetus.Lexington
Books,2008.

Vlastos,Gregory.“Self-PredicationinPlato’sLaterPeriod.”ThePhilosophicalReviewVol.
78,No.1(Jan.1969):74-78.

Waymack,MarkH.“TheTheaetetus172c-177c:AReadingofthePhilosopherinCourt,”The
SouthernJournalofPhilosophyVol.23,No.4(1985),pp.481-489.

Wengert,R.G.“TheParadoxoftheMidwife,”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterlyVol.5(1988),
pp.3-10.

Document Outline