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R O M A N M I L I T A R Y A N D D I P L O M A T I C

P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T : 9 2 B C E – C E 3 6 3 ,

P A R T I

DOMINIC MANCUSO

This paper, the second half of which will appear in Pinax vol. I, no. 2, was prepared in
satisfaction of the requirements of the Henry Rutgers Scholars Program under the advise-
ment of Dr Sarolta Anna Takács. In addition to Dr Takács, the author would like to
thank Professor Jack Cargill and Mr Jack Tannous.

CO NTEN TS

INTRODUCTION

I. THE FIRST CENTURY BCE: THE RIVALRY BEGINS

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONTIERS AND

POLICY IN THE FIRST CENTURY CE

III. FARTHER EAST: CAMPAIGNS, POLICY, AND FRONTIER

DEVELOPMENT IN THE SECOND CENTURY

C O N V E N T I O N S A ND A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Ancient authors and texts are generally abbreviated in the manner of LSJ and the OLD;
the reader should consult the lists printed therein. Modern scholarship is cited by author,
date and page number alone:

Badian, E. (1968) Imperialism in the Late Republic. Ithaca, N.Y.
Balty, J.C. & van Rengen, W. (1993) Apamea in Syria, tr. W.E.H. Cockle. Brussells.
Bennett, J. (1997) Trajan Optimus Princeps. Indianapolis.
Debevoise, N. (1968) A Political History of Parthia. New York.
Eckstein, A.M. (1987) Senate and General. Berkeley.
Ferrill, A. (1991) Imperial Grand Strategy. Lanham, MD.
Gregory, S. (1986) ‘Road, Wall of Rock: Interpreting an Aerial Photograph from the Jebel Sinjar’,

in: D. Kennedy & P. Freeman (edd.) The Defense of the Roman and Byzantine East. Oxford: 325–28.

Hammond, M. (1934) ‘Corbulo and Nero’s Eastern Policy’, HSCP 45: 81–104.
Harris, W.V. (1979) War and Imperialism in Republican Rome. New York.
Isaac, B. (1992) The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East. Oxford.
Keall, E.J. (1975) ‘Parthian Nippur and Vologases’ Southern Strategy: A Hypothesis’, Journal of the

American Oriental Society 95: 620–32.

Keaveney, A. (1981) ‘Roman Treaties with Parthia circa 95–circa 64 B.C.’, AJP 102: 195–212.
Kennedy, D. & Riley, D.N. (1990) Rome’s Desert Frontier. Austin.
Kennedy, D. (1995) ‘Water Supply and Use in the Southern Hauran, Jordan’, Journal of Field

Archaeology 22: 275–90.

Knox M’Elderry, R. (1909) ‘The Legions of the Euphrates Frontier’, CQ 3: 44–53.
Lepper, F.A. (1948) Trajan’s Parthian War. Westport, CT.
Luttwak, E.N. (1979) The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. Baltimore.

Dominic Mancuso, ‘Roman Military and Diplomatic Policy in the East: 92

BCE

–

363, Part I’, Pinax 1 (2008),

49–89.
Copyright 2008 Dominic Mancuso.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

Mattern, S.P. (1999) Rome and the Enemy. Los Angeles.
Millar, F. (1993) The Roman Near East: 31 BC–AD 337. Cambridge, MA.
Oates, D. (1956) ‘The Roman Frontier in Northern Iraq’, Geographical Journal 122: 190–99.
Opreanu, C. (2000) ‘The Consequences of the First Dacian-Rumanian War (101–102): A New Point

of View’, in: J. Gonzalez (ed.), Trajano, Emperador de Roma. Rome.

Sartre, M. (2005) The Middle East Under Rome, tr. C. Porter & E. Rawlings with J. Routier-Pucci.

London.

Stein, A. (1938) ‘Note on Remains of the Roman Limes in North-Western Iraq’, Geographical Journal

92: 62–6.

Sykes, P. (1951) A History of Persia. London.
Wheeler, E.L. (1993) ‘Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I’, Journal of

Military History 57: 7–41.

Whittaker, C.R. (2004) Rome and Its Frontiers. London.
Williams, D. (1996) The Reach of Rome. London.

The following translations are used in this paper:

Appian = H. White, Loeb, 1912–13.
Augustus, Res Gestae = Frederick W. Shipley, Loeb, 1924.
Cassius Dio = Dio’s Rome, Herbert B. Foster, Troy, NY, 1906.
Fronto = C.R. Haines, Loeb, 1919.
Herodian = C.R. Whittaker, Loeb, 1969.
Josephus, AJ = William Whiston, London, 1963.
Josephus, BJ = G.A. Williamson, New York, 1981.
Plutarch = Dryden.
Scriptores Historiae Augustae, = David Magie, Loeb, 1921.
Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars = Catherine Edwards, New York, 2001.
al-Tabarī = C.E. Bosworth, Albany, NY, 1999.
Tacitus, Annales = C.H. Moore, Cambridge, 1925–37.
Velleius Paterculus = F.W. Shipley, Loeb, 1924.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

HROUGHOUT

their history, the Romans took numerous diplomatic actions

and embarked on countless military campaigns; however the motivation and,
ultimately, the policy that dictated these actions has not been fully understood.
It is possible to discern a diplomatic and military policy by looking through the
lens of the Roman East from 92

BCE

363. The Roman East provides us

with an almost ideal situation from which to examine Roman military and
diplomatic policy. As opposed to the West where the Romans faced unorga-
nized barbarian peoples, it was in the East that Rome faced the only other
existing organized empire in Parthia and later Persia. Conflicts between Rome
and Parthia occurred sporadically for centuries with increasing frequency during
the third century with the rise of the new and more aggressive Sassanid Persian
Empire. In order to provide an accurate interpretation of Roman policy we
must first take into account the varying interpretations that do exist.

(a) OLD AND NEW INTERPRETATIONS

The publication of Edward N. Luttwak’s The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire in
the mid-nineteen-seventies triggered a rigorous evaluation of Roman strategy.
Since that publication there have been numerous interpretations varying from
support of Luttwak’s views of Roman strategy to strong criticism that has gone as
far as a complete denial of any sort of strategy utilized by the Romans. Accord-
ing to Luttwak there were two models of empire: 1. A ‘hegemonic empire’
characterized by legions deployed in areas directly controlled by Rome and
capable of carrying out wars of conquest while client kingdoms were responsible
for the outer defense and 2. Later a ‘territorial empire’ which was characterized
by the legions deployed along fortified frontiers and directly responsible for
defense, although ‘disposable’ forces for wars of conquest were nonexistent.

Luttwak clearly believed that the Romans, especially in the second century and
later, mentally conceived and physically constructed barriers along the frontiers
to defend their empire. This interpretation of Roman strategy has been
challenged, principally by Benjamin Isaac. In his The Limits of Empire, Isaac
argues that no physical barriers/structures were ever organized as ‘lines of
defense’, Roman armies operated as armies of occupation and conquest and as
such were not necessarily responsible for guarding a defined frontier, but instead
protected roads from bandits and were in a state of readiness to move against
Parthia/Persia.

Isaac further claims that Rome’s wars against Parthia/Persia

were not defensive measures to protect the frontiers, but rather ‘[show] a

Luttwak

(1979)

22f.

Isaac (1992) 4, 41f.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

consistent pattern of Roman expansionism in Mesopotamia’.

Luttwak and

Isaac thus represent polar opposites on the spectrum of interpretation of Roman
strategy.
  In truth, both Luttwak and Isaac fall short of providing an accurate
interpretation of Roman strategy.  Isaac, entrenched in the belief that the wars
were undertaken for conquest and glory, fails to see the deeper meaning and
motivation for Roman military actions in the East and its interconnection with
the logical development of the frontiers. He also fails to realize that because of
the topographical differences between the northern and southern frontiers in the
East, the physical appearance and arrangement of those frontiers would be
different. Luttwak’s work too suffers from several faults. It is more of a
construction of Roman strategy using a modern military framework, often utiliz-
ing modern military jargon and concepts such as ‘economy of force’. Not that
the Romans were incapable of thinking strategically, far from that, but it seems
inaccurate to apply modern military concepts to ancient Roman strategy. In
order to have a better understanding of Roman strategy we must think more
along the lines of the Romans themselves. Susan Mattern’s Rome and the Enemy
provides us with exactly that in a new, fresh interpretation not just of Roman
strategy, but a wider and more relevant scope of policy, both military and
diplomatic.
  According to Mattern both the image of Rome and the Empire’s honor were
of paramount importance to Roman policy. Policy was therefore molded by

a concern for the empire’s status or ‘honor.’ What mattered most was how the
empire, and to some degree, the emperor, were perceived by foreigners and
subjects. Symbolic deference from the enemy was a policy goal; arrogance and
insult, described in exactly those words, were just and necessary causes for war.
Terror and vengeance were instruments for maintaining the empire’s image.
Roman strategy was thus partly moral and psychological in nature.

Because of this attitude a single major defeat could lead the Romans to
undertake great campaigns to exact vengeance on the enemy, with the
restoration of the image of Rome as the ultimate goal. The frontiers were one
way in which the image of Rome was projected. The function of frontier
structures was therefore not necessarily for physical defense; they served more as
symbols of Roman power and civilization used as a tool to intimidate and strike
terror into the potential enemy.

Furthermore, Mattern interprets the Eastern

frontiers not as uniform, but rather as characterized by variation and mutation.

This interpretation of Roman policy provides the basis for the present work and
when synthesized with relevant aspects of other interpretations, will create a
more precise picture of what Roman policy in the East was.

Isaac (1992) 31; see also Harris (1979) who shares similar views to Isaac on Roman expansionism.

Mattern

(1999)

22.

Mattern (1999) 114f.

Mattern (199) 114.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

  Also to be considered in relation to Luttwak, Isaac, and Mattern is Arthur
Eckstein’s  Senate and General and Ernst Badian’s Roman Imperialism in the Late
Republic.   Eckstein emphasizes the importance of decisions made by Roman
generals in the field and says that the senate did not make all decisions, but
rather was dependent on ad hoc decisions of the generals during the period of
the middle Republic.

Although Eckstein’s study only covers the period 264–194

BCE

, it can and will be applied in the present work to the period of the late

Republic during the first century

BCE

. Badian, a conservative, has championed

the theory of defensive imperialism. According to this theory the Romans during
the late Republic did not actively seek to conquer and add land to the Empire
and in fact the senate often attempted to avoid the responsibility of directly
controlling conquered land, especially in the case of Greece during the third
century

BCE

Instead, Rome’s expansion was due to a desire to protect the

Empire from potential threats, which meant conquering the land of the Empire’s
enemies. The theory of defensive imperialism, though applied by Badian to the
late Republican period can also be effectively applied to Rome’s policy in the
East in later times. Rome’s conquest and apparent desire to control northern
Mesopotamia can in fact be perceived and will be shown to have been a case of
defensive imperialism.

(b) ROME’S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY

POLICY IN THE EAST

Any historian who seeks to provide an accurate and unbiased interpretation of
Roman policy must take into account the varying interpretations that do exist as
outlined above. Mattern’s interpretation of Roman policy will form the bedrock
of that which is about to be presented. Badian’s interpretation will figure in
prominently, as will Eckstein’s to a somewhat lesser extent; select components of
the interpretations of Isaac and Luttwak will also be utilized, though to a
relatively limited extent. So now the question can be addressed: what was
Rome’s military and diplomatic policy in the east? Roman diplomatic and
military policy in the East consisted of several guiding principles which were
closely tied to the structure and development of the Eastern frontier.
Almost all Roman actions in the East were guided by the desire to maintain
the image of Rome as the dominant and superior power to be respected and
feared by all peoples outside of the Empire. Rome therefore expected all those
outside of the Empire to function, in a sense, like clients. The patron-client
relationship in Roman society required clients to give their loyalty, pay respect,
and render services to their patrons, for which they would receive protection in
return. Rome simply projected this patron-client relationship onto the inter-

Eckstein (1987) xii.

Badian (1968) 2–4.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

national scale of the ancient world. This meant that kingdoms that existed
outside of the Empire had to pay tribute, supply troops, send embassies and/or
hostages, and above all abide by the will of Rome. Thus, beginning in the first
century

BCE

Rome developed a network of client states in the East. Rome also

saw lands and kingdoms outside the Empire, whether or not they were formally
clients, as still within the orbit of Roman jurisdiction. Kingdoms that were not
clients, of which Parthia was the foremost, were still expected to function in a
fashion similar to a client kingdom, not necessarily paying tribute, but showing
deference and respect to Roman superiority, perhaps sending hostages or
embassies. It was this kind of relationship that Rome sought to establish and
maintain.
The will of Rome was to be respected, her power feared. Any disturbance to
this relationship meant to the Romans that the enemy no longer sufficiently
feared Rome. Defiance of Roman will, actions taken without the consultation of
Rome or defeat on the battlefield diminished the image of Rome and if unpun-
ished could lead to further defiance/aggressive action by Rome’s enemies, or so
the Romans thought. Further, because the Romans viewed their sovereignty as
extending even to the territory of outer peoples (gentes), they believed they had
the right to expect obedience or to intervene if challenged.

Therefore swift

Roman action was often the solution, restoring the patron-client relationship
and bringing about a restoration of the image of Rome. In some cases it was not
just the image of Rome that was at stake, but the honor of the Empire.
Disobedience or injury done to the Empire and its people had to be avenged and
therefore the concept of revenge was also a central principal that guided and
justified

Roman actions. Like the patron-client relationship, revenge was

another social phenomenon that was projected onto the international scale of
the ancient world. In Roman society revenge was an acceptable course of action
to uphold the honor of oneself and one’s family. Perhaps the best example of
this was Augustus avenging the murder of his adoptive father Caesar, an act
which he commemorated with the building of the Temple of Mars Ultor or
Mars Avenger. Vengeance as a guiding principle of Roman policy played a key
role in several of Rome’s decisions to invade Parthia/Persia, and was most
particularly associated with the beginning of the conflicts with Rome’s eastern
neighbor Parthia as well as its last great campaign in the East under Julian the
Apostate. The defeat of Crassus at Carrhae in 53

BCE

was a pivotal event that,

in the minds of the Romans, was never forgotten and required vengeance. It
was this single battle that created the rivalry between Rome and Parthia that was
to last for more than two hundred fifty years. Rome’s last great campaign East as
an empire united east and west, was that of Julian the Apostate who sought to
take revenge for Persian aggression in Roman Mesopotamia. Julian’s campaign,
as well as many others in the East, have been often criticized by historians as

Whittaker

(2004)

146.

See Whittaker (2004) 41 for discussion on the Roman ideology of bellum iustum (justified war).

I N T R O D U C T I O N

aimed at conquest and glory rather than the defense of the Empire.
Maintaining the image of Rome did not necessarily mean that the Romans
actively sought to conquer Parthia/Persia or parts of that empire just for the
sake of conquest and glory. From the time of Trajan Rome appears to have
developed a desire to extend its eastern frontier farther east into northern
Mesopotamia. The purpose holding northern Mesopotamia was twofold: 1. To
serve as a buffer zone between Syria and Parthia and 2. to curtail Parthian
influence in the kingdom of Armenia. So, like Rome’s expansion during the late
Republic, which by Badian has been described as defensive imperialism, Rome’s
expansion into northern Mesopotamia was also motivated by a desire to protect
and defend the Empire from her enemies. We trace not only defensive imper-
ialism back to the late third and second century

BCE

, but also the roots of the

development of the image of Rome, the patron-client relationship, and the last
major guiding principal of Roman policy, that of terror.
The Romans utilized terror as a deterrent to discourage potential enemies.
This was usually done by taking particularly brutal military action against an
enemy. Mattern points out that this was a tradition that extended back into the
Republic and the sack of New Carthage in 209

BCE

, carried out in part to

inspire terror, thus ‘the strategy of deterrence by terror was not a policy invented
by a particular emperor and his council. It was tradition; it was the Roman
way’.

Events of 146

BCE

in particular highlight the use of terror, as well as

other aspects of Roman policy. In 146

BCE

Rome leveled both Carthage and

Corinth, sending the message to the rest of the ancient world that the Romans
were a power to be feared. Thus terror was an instrument of Rome’s defense
and an integral part of military and diplomatic policy. The destruction of the
two cities was precipitated by a revolt in Greece and the perceived threat of a
resurgent Carthage, a kingdom against which Rome had already engaged in two
bloody wars in the third century

BCE

. Rome’s treatment of Carthage and

Corinth was particularly brutal and demonstrates that Roman military and
diplomatic policy was also guided by the concept of a patron-client relationship.
Corinth is an especially good example because the Greeks had defied Roman
will, which was equated with breaking the patron-client relationship, and
therefore punishment was swift. Carthage, which could be said to have posed
no real threat, did in the minds of the Romans because of previous wars fought
with that kingdom, so to eliminate the treat forever the city was leveled and the
land annexed by the Republic. The destruction of two major cities in the same
year did much to shape the image of Rome in the minds of the subjects of the
Empire and those living outside of it. Roman eastern policy was thus based on
the image of Rome, the patron-client relationship, revenge, and the use of
terror. That this policy was in the conscious minds of those within and out of the
Empire is made clear by a unique first century historian.
No ancient historian understood Roman policy better than Josephus, a Jewish

Mattern (1999) 119.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

writer of the first century

. When the Jewish revolt against the Romans broke

out in 66

, Josephus was given command of Galilee and fought against the

Romans, but eventually voluntarily turned himself over to the Romans when
defeat seemed inevitable. Because he had fought against the Romans Josephus
understood the power of Rome and further the image that it projected. Here is
what he said of Rome:

Even the Parthians, the most warlike race of all, rulers of so many nations and
protected by such vast forces, send hostages to Rome, and on Italian soil may
be seen, humbly submitting for the sake of peace, the aristocrats of the east. (BJ
2.379f.)

Almost every nation under the sun bows down before the might of Rome; and
will you alone go to war, not even considering the fate of the Carthaginians,
who boasted of their great Hannibal and their glorious Phoenician ancestors,
but fell beneath Scipio’s hands? The Cyrenians (Spartans by descent), the
Marmaridae (a race that extends to the waterless desert), Syrtes, whose very
mention terrifies, Nassamonians, Moors, Numidians with their vast numbers—
none of them could resist Roman arms. (BJ 2.380–82)

Whom, I ask you, will you find in the uninhabited wilds to be your allies in
war? for in the inhabited world all are Romans–unless you extend your hopes
beyond the Euphrates and imagine that your kinsmen from Adiabene will come
to your aid! But they will not without good reason get involved in a full-scale
war, and if they should decide on anything so foolish, the Parthian king would
put a stop to it; for he is anxious to preserve his armistice with the Romans, and
will consider it a breach of the truce if any of his tributaries takes the field
against them. ( BJ 2.388f.)

Josephus’ message to his audience was clear; don’t get in the way of the Romans,
do not defy Roman will, and don’t even think about challenging Roman power.
He presents the image of an unstoppable Empire and such an image was exactly
what the Romans sought to project.  One way in which the Romans projected
their image was on the frontiers, which, along with its structure and other
functions, will now be explained.
  The frontiers in the East were representative of Roman policy, as they were
designed to intimidate potential enemies and allow the Romans both to defend
the East and carry out retaliatory campaigns when necessary. The Eastern
frontier thus functioned both as an offensive and defensive zone from which the
Romans were capable of warding off attacks while at the same time maintaining
the ability to quickly move into enemy territory. The arrangement of the
eastern frontier evolved over time and was a logical development of Roman
policy in the East.  Initially the Roman army did in fact function as an army of
occupation during the first century

BCE

, but gradually it moved toward the

function of frontier defense with the legions strategically positioned to defend
entrances into Syria and Asia Minor. From these positions, they could strike
into enemy territory should the need arise. This development took place prin-

I N T R O D U C T I O N

cipally under Vespasian, a development which will be detailed in chapter two.
The eastern frontier further developed under Trajan and subsequent emperors
who sought to annex northern Mesopotamia for reasons outlined above. Ad-
ditionally the construction of roads under Trajan and later Diocletian as well as
the construction of numerous outposts in the southern half of the frontier was
also an important development that was in part aimed at intimidating Rome’s
nomadic enemies.
  The Eastern frontier was flexible, and as Mattern notes, displayed variation,
especially between the northern half which was mountainous and defined by the
Euphrates River and the southern half which was open desert. The southern
frontier in the East was, as Isaac says, less well defined and much more porous in
terms of Roman control and structure. The reason for this is twofold: 1. Rome
faced no organized empire or major power in the southern half of the frontier,
but rather nomadic peoples; and 2. The southeastern frontier was not defined by
any river but was rather an open desert frontier.  The southern frontier was
more of a zone that extended out as far east as Dumatha and protected Syria
from the threat of nomads.

It was in the southern area that the great roads of

Trajan and Diocletian were built, giving some semblance of definition to the
frontier, and also serving as symbols of power, projecting the image of Rome to
any nomad who saw them. The northeastern half as just alluded to was defined
by the Euphrates River and bordered the kingdom of Armenia and the Parthian
Empire.  Because Rome bordered Armenia and the Parthian Empire in the
north, legionary bases were established along the Euphrates during the first
century to defend Syria and Asia Minor from attack and provide points from
which Roman armies could move into Armenia or Parthia.  Armenia, being
located between the two great empires of Rome and Parthia/Persia, was often a
kingdom which both the Romans and Parthians/Persians sought to control and
thus deserves some comment.
  Because of its location Armenia was the most important of Rome’s client
kingdoms in the East.  Whichever empire controlled Armenia could control
movement into the other. That meant that Parthian/Persian control threatened
Asia Minor and Roman control threatened Media. Control of Armenia was
closely tied to Rome’s diplomatic and military policy in the East, as it played a
role in the arrangement and development of the eastern frontiers as well as the
image of Rome as control of that kingdom brought with it prestige. To the
Romans Parthian/Persian control of Armenia was unacceptable, especially if
Rome’s adversary were to take action in Armenia without Roman consent.
Such action was a violation of the patron-client relationship and could also
mean, at least to the Romans, that Parthia/Persia did not sufficiently fear Rome.
When such a situation existed, Roman policy dictated that swift action be taken
to reassert Rome’ superiority and image and further to ensure that the enemy
feared the Empire.

Millar (1993) 96.

I. T H E F I R S T C E N T U R Y B C E :

T H E R I V A L R Y B E G I N S

(a) SULLA, LUCULLUS AND POMPEY

NDER

Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey, Rome experienced her first major involve-

ment and subsequent expansion in the East. During the period in which these
three men shaped events in the East we can apply Eckstein’s belief that decisions
were being made by Rome’s generals in the field rather than the senate itself. At
the same time it is apparent that because of the seriousness of the wars with
Mithridates of Pontus Rome’s expansion in the East was a natural defensive
reaction. We can also detect the elements of the image of Rome, symbolic
deference, and the patron-client relationship at work. However, because
individual generals such as Lucullus, Pompey, and later Crassus were men who
wielded significant power and were in fact in competition with other great men
of their day, glory through military achievements was often sought. Because of
this, it is somewhat difficult to discern a uniform application of military and
diplomatic policy in the East. Rather, this period represents Rome’s Eastern
policy in its earliest stage of development.
Until the first century

BCE

there had been no contact between Rome and

Parthia. Then in 92

BCE

Sulla was sent east to settle affairs in Cappadocia and

to check the growing power of Mithridates. While staying on the Euphrates he
received an ambassador from the Parthians named Orobazus.  From the very
start it appears that relations between Rome and Parthia were destined to be
hostile.  According to Plutarch, when Sulla met with the Parthian ambassador
he ‘ordered three chairs of state to be set, one for Ariobarzanes, one for
Orobazus, and a third for himself, he placed himself in the middle, and so gave
audience’ (Sull. 5.4). Immediately we can detect from the setup of the meeting
that the Romans, by holding audience, expected symbolic deference from
Ariobarzanes and Orobazus. The Parthian king was apparently infuriated and
so put to death his ambassador Orobazus.  Despite the incident, Sulla’s meeting
with the Parthian ambassador appears to have resulted in some sort of treaty or
at least a mutual agreement with Parthia, the details of which are unknown.

Rome’s next interaction with Parthia came with the third and last war with
Mithridates of Pontus.
Command of the third Mithridatic War fell to Lucullus who was able to drive
Mithridates out of Asia Minor, into Armenia, and there to defeat both
Mithridates and his son-in-law, the king of Armenia, Tigranes. With Mithri-
dates and Tigranes defeated, Lucullus was approached by a Parthian embassy
seeking friendship and so he sent an embassy in return to the King of Parthia,

Debevoise (1968) 47.

F A R T H E R E A S T

‘the members of which discovered him to be a double-minded man, and to be
dealing privately at the same time with Tigranes, offering to take part with him,
upon the condition that Mesopotamia were delivered up to him’ (Plu. Luc. 30.1).
Dealing behind the backs of the Romans was not to be taken lightly and as a
result, Lucullus planned to invade Parthia, perhaps also being motivated by the
fame a successful campaign would bring.  However, the campaign never hap-
pened because Lucullus’ legions mutinied and he instead decided to move
against Tigranes.  Although no war between Rome and Parthia took place,
Lucullus’ planned campaign was certainly a step in that direction, which was
further hastened by Pompey, who was next given command in the East.
  With the command of the war against Mithridates and Tigranes, Pompey
finished the job nearly completed by Lucullus. Despite tensions, Pompey secured
a treaty with the Parthians convincing them to invade Armenia (Dio 36.45).
Mithridates was driven from Armenia and Tigranes surrendered to Pompey,
who dictated terms: Tigranes was to give up Syria Phoenicia, Cilicia, Galatia,
and Sophene and his son Tigranes the Younger was to receive Sophene (Plu.
Pomp. 33.4). In Essence, Armenia had become a client-kingdom.  Tigranes the
Younger was however displeased with the arrangement and was then taken as a
hostage by Pompey.  Not long after this occurred, Phraates, King of Parthia,
demanded that his son-in-law Tigranes be turned over to him and that the
Euphrates be recognized as the boundary between Rome and Parthia.
According to Plutarch, Pompey’s reply was something to the affect of, ‘for
Tigranes, he belonged more to his own natural father than his father-in-law, and
for the boundaries, he would take care that they should be according to right
and justice’ (Plu. Pomp. 33.6). Here again we can see elements of Roman policy.
Rome would not accept terms dictated by Parthia, which was perceived as a
lesser state; instead it was Rome that would decide what was just. Such high-
handedness by the Romans could not have been well received by the Parthians
and relations between the two powers further deteriorated when Pompey, in
response to an incursion by the Parthian king into Gordyene that ‘despoiled the
subjects of Tigranes’, sent an army under the command of Afranius who put the
Parthians to flight (Plu. Pomp. 36.2). The extent of fighting that took place is
unknown, but again the high-handedness of the Romans, who considered
Gordyene to be under the power of their client, Tigranes of Armenia, must have
been strongly resented by the Parthians. Although Pompey had made a treaty
with the Parthians, the two powers were on a collision course and it would only
be a matter of time before open war occurred.
  Despite the growing tension with Parthia, Rome’s star in the East continued
to rise. Pompey had subdued the Iberians and Albanians, entered Syria and
made it a province, conquering Judea and established a network of client-
kingdoms of which Syrian city-states formed the backbone.

This development

Sartre

(2005)

41–43.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

was of special significance because for the first time Rome, indirectly though
client-kingdoms, now bordered Parthia. This set the stage for both the future
development of the Roman frontier in the East and for Rome’s diplomatic and
military involvement with its Parthian neighbors. In fact one of Syria’s first
governors, Gabinius, became involved in Parthian affairs when he gave refuge to
the eldest son of Phraates III, Mithradates III, who was engaged in a struggle
with his brother Orodes over the Parthian throne. Gabinius intended to
intervene directly and install Mithradates as king of Parthia and set off on an
expedition into Parthia; however, he was approached by Ptolemy XII of Egypt,
who had recently lost his throne and subsequently convinced Gabinius to
abandon his Parthian expedition and to restore him to the Egyptian throne ( J.
BJ 1.175). Again, no war between Rome and Parthia ensued, but Gabinius’
aborted Parthian expedition was the next step on the road to war between the
two empires.

(b) CRASSUS, CARRHAE, AND ANTONY

Up to 53

BCE

the great generals, Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey had established an

aggressive diplomatic policy toward Parthia whereby Rome sought to operate
from a position of dominance, often treating Parthia as an insignificant, second-
rate power. This was the case, in part, because these generals were out to
strengthen their own reputations, to which end aggressive action was necessary.
Arthur Keaveney has argued that these generals engaged ‘in the fine art of
brinksmanship by bullying and insulting the Parthians in order to extract con-
cessions from them, but always stopping short of the point at which provocation
might lead to war’.

Keaveney is correct in that the Romans did clearly bully

and insult the Parthians, which did in fact result in Rome having the upper hand
and aquiring treaties that were desired; however, it is clearly an understatement
that they always stopped short of provocation, again, because generals were out
to win themselves a reputation. Had it not been for the mutiny among his
troops, Lucullus may well have invaded Parthia. Further, Gabinius would take
this policy a step forward by involving himself in Parthian politics backing
Mithradates III; however, as we have seen, Gabinius’ planned campaign into
Parthia was aborted in favor of backing Ptolemy XII. Rome’s policy in the East
would, however, be forever changed when one man’s ambition would bring
about one of Rome’s greatest military disasters, one that would remain in the
minds of the Romans for centuries.
Marcus Licinius Crassus had achieved wealth and power, but was, however,
overshadowed by the great victories of Caesar and Pompey. According to
Plutarch, ‘Crassus, adding to his old disease of covetousness, a new passion after

Keaveney

(1981)

211f.

F A R T H E R E A S T

trophies and triumphs, emulous of Caesar’s exploits, not content to be beneath
him in these points’ (Crass. 14.4). That Crassus’ ambition for fame was a motive
for his invasion of Parthia is almost certain, but whether his campaign was
sanctioned by the Senate is another matter. Crassus’ appointment to govern
Syria does not appear to have included a command from the senate to wage war
on Parthia. A passage from Plutarch demonstrates this point:

Not that he was called upon by the decree which appointed him to his office to
undertake any expedition against the Parthians, but it was well known that he
was eager for it, and Caesar wrote to him out of Gaul commending his
resolution, and inciting him to war. (Crass. 16.3)

In fact, opposition to Crassus’ planned Parthian expedition appears to have been
considerable, and Plutarch tells us that a tribune, Ateius, unsuccessfully
attempted to prevent Crassus from leaving Italy for the East to start an
unprovoked war.

The most convincing piece of evidence for this situation

again appears in Plutarch, when the Parthian king sends ambassadors to
Crassus:

When he drew his army out of winter quarters, ambassadors came to him from
Arsaces, with this short speech: If the army was sent by the people of Rome, he
denounced mortal war, but if, as he understood was the case, against the
consent of his country, Crassus for his own private profit had invaded their
territory, then their king would be more merciful, and taking pity on Crassus’s
dotage, would send those soldiers back who had been left not so truly to keep
guard on him as to be his prisoners. (Crass. 18.1)

So Crassus clearly embarked on a campaign for his own personal gain, an action
not inconsistent with previous policy, though it was against the general will in
Rome. The Parthians for their part attempted to negotiate a way out of the
impending invasion; unfortunately, their ambassadors were directing their
appeals to deaf ears.
Crassus’ army consisted of seven legions (35,000 legionaries), about four
thousand cavalry, a similar number of light troops, and an expected 16,000
cavalry and 30,000 infantry reinforcements from the Armenian king. (Plu. Crass.
19.1). However, after surrendering the initiative to the Parthians, who blocked
his Armenian reinforcements, Crassus was, according to Plutarch, tricked by an
Arab guide into marching his army into the plains of Mesopotamia.

This

proved to be a fatal mistake.  The Parthian army, consisting of light and heavy
cavalry, could outmaneuver the Romans, whose own cavalry force was less
numerous.  The most deadly weapon employed by the Parthians was their light
cavalry who were armed with bow and arrow, and in large numbers wreaked
havoc upon the Romans.  In the battle that ensued, known to us as Carrhae,

Debevoice (1968) 80.

Sykes (1951) 348.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

Crassus, along with some 20,000 men of his army, perished in the defeat.
Carrhae greatly increased the prestige of Parthia, signaling that the Parthians
were a serious threat to the Roman East.
The Parthians’ threat was confirmed when in 51

BCE

they invaded and

overran Syria and threatened Asia Minor. The general Cassius was able to
defeat and drive the Parthians from Syria (App. 2.5.35). The Parthians,
however, soon returned and invaded Syria again in 40

BCE

, breaking into two

forces, and succeeded in taking Antioch and advancing deep into Asia Minor.
The Romans were again able to fight off the Parthians, primarily through the
victories of Ventidius, who in two separate battles baited the Parthians into
ambushes, killing their commander Pharnastanes, and was victorious in a third
battle against another invading army under the Parthian Prince Pacorus, who
was killed during the battle (Fontinus 1.1.6, 2.5.36-37). The latter battle was of
special importance because Plutarch claims that ‘this victory was one of the most
renowned achievements of the Romans, and fully avenged the defeats under
Crassus’ (Ant. 34.3).
  The defeat of Crassus and the subsequent Parthian invasions did much to
polarize Roman policy in the East.  Crassus’ defeat had tarnished Rome’s image
and the Parthians apparently did not sufficiently fear the Romans since they
invaded the Roman East twice. Parthia’s actions and her increased prestige with
the victory over Crassus also represented a breach of the patron-client
relationship. Rome’s superiority had been challenged and action was required
to restore Roman dominance. Additionally, Crassus’ defeat and the loss of the
legionary standards were a loss of such magnitude that it had to be avenged.
According to Appian, Antony was to ‘make war against the Parthians to avenge
their treachery toward Crassus’ (App. 5.65).  Thus, Rome’s affairs with Parthia
from 53 to 39

BCE

demonstrate the coming together of the various principles

that constituted Rome’s diplomatic and military policy: the image of Rome, the
patron-client relationship, and revenge.  Antony’s Parthian campaign in 36 only
added fuel to the fire.
  Mark Antony’s Parthian campaign, though not a disaster to the degree that
befell Crassus, represented another bungled military action that further
damaged the image of Rome.  Antony marched his army from Armenia into
Media Atropatene, during the course of which his entire siege train was
destroyed during a Parthian attack, and as a result he was unable to execute an
effective siege of Praaspa, the capital of Media Atropatene. Unable to take this
city, Antony was forced to retreat back to Armenia, the entire time being
harassed by Parthian cavalry. Of his army numbering more than one hundred
thousand, Antony had lost twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse (Plu.
Ant. 50.1) and the Parthians, by driving Antony out of Media, achieved another
significant victory over an invading Roman army.
  Following his failed Parthian campaign, Antony seized the Armenian King
Artavasdes, who had withdrawn his support for that campaign, bringing

F A R T H E R E A S T

Armenia under Roman control (Plu. Ant. 50). Antony made an alliance with the
King of Media who was engaged in a dispute with Phraates over the division of
booty taken from the Romans and subsequently named his son Alexander king
of Armenia, Media, and Parthia (Plu. Ant. 52, 54.4). However, when the civil
war between Octavian and Antony broke out, Armenia fell into the hands of a
new king supported by the Parthians.

The loss of control of Armenia, in the

hands of a Parthian-supported king, constituted a significant threat to Rome.
The strategic importance of Armenia was demonstrated by Antony’s campaign
because it could be used as a backdoor right into Media. Likewise, with control
of Armenia, the Parthians could directly threaten Asia Minor. Further, control
of Armenia through client or installed kings signified dominance and superiority
of influence and power in the East. It is no surprise that Armenia would become
the bone of contention between Rome and Parthia, which will soon be seen
under the Emperor Augustus.
Though the Romans had achieved victories over the Parthians in 51 and 40–
39

BCE

, they were however unable to humble the Parthians to the point of

creating a sense of fear and terror in the enemy. This set Parthia on almost
equal footing with the Roman Empire, a relationship that was unacceptable to
the Romans. Antony was not the man who would bring about a relationship of
Roman dominance over Parthia, this was the destiny of Octavian. In 33
Octavian defeated Antony at Actium and in doing so gained control of the entire
Roman world. It would be under Augustus that we would see a solidification of
Rome’s diplomatic and military policy in the East.

The reign of Augustus ushered in an era of peace and stability for Rome and
marked the establishment of the Empire, ruled not by the senate, but by an
emperor. With power in the hands of one man, policy therefore became more
clear and defined, because the desire for glory stemming from competition
among the leading men of the state, seen  especially as the driving force behind
Crassus’ campaign, was no longer a major motive behind Roman actions in the
East. Under Augustus military and diplomatic policy in the East sought to
reestablish the image of Rome as a superior power to Parthia. This was
accomplished not necessarily through military action directly against Parthia,
but rather through the application of military and diplomatic pressure.   Threat
of the use of force would prove to be enough to intimidate the Parthian king into
accepting the will of Rome.
  Augustus sought to atone for Crassus’ disaster and proved able to do so
without resorting to war with Parthia. His opportunity materialized in 23

BCE

Debevoise

(1968)

134f.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

when a Parthian named Tiridates, who had unsuccessfully attempted to wrest
power form Phraates, the king of Parthia, arrived in Rome with the youngest son
of Phraates; at about the same time envoys from Phraates arrived demanding
the surrender of his son and his rival Tiridates (Dio 53.33). Augustus decided to
send back Phraates’ son on the condition that the military standards lost by
Crassus be returned, along with captives taken during both Crassus’ and
Antony’s campaigns (Dio 53.33). Phraates apparently demurred and so August
upped the stakes by sending his step-son Tiberius to the East to settle the matter,
along with the succession of the Armenian throne. Phraates, fearing a Roman
invasion, returned to the Romans the military standards along with the captives
in 20

BCE

. This achievement was widely celebrated by Augustus and marked a

return to Roman dominance. The return of the military standards was an act of
symbolic deference, an event of such importance that it was depicted on the
Prima Porta statue of Augustus. The situation in Armenia was also resolved by
Tiberius and Augustus’ Res Gestae (5.27) succinctly details the accomplishments
there:

In the case of Greater Armenia, though I might have made it a province after
the assassination of its King Artaxes, I preferred, following the precedents of
our fathers, to hand that kingdom over to Tigranes, the son of King Artavasdes,
and the grandson of king Tigranes, through Tiberius Nero who was then my
stepson.

By both recovering the military standards and regaining control of Armenia as a
client-kingdom Rome had reasserted superiority in the East and Parthia was
reduced to the status of a second-rate power rather than an equal of Rome.
That this was Rome’s intent is made clear by Augustus’ Res Gestae in which the
Parthians ‘seek as suppliants the friendship of the Roman people’ (5.29). This
relationship was reinforced when Phraates gave to the Romans as hostages his
four sons, and two of his wives along with four sons of these wives.

Augustus

not only received symbolic deference from the Parthians, but also from various
other peoples. The emperor records in his Res Gestae that ‘embassies were often
sent to me from the kings of India, a thing never seen before in the camp of any
general of the Romans’ and also that ‘our friendship was sought, through
ambassadors by the Bastarnae and Scythians, and by the kings of the Sarmatians
who live on either side of the river Tanais, and by the king of the Albani and of
the Hiberi and of the Medes’ (5.31). To Augustus and the Romans it must have
seemed as if the the entire inhabited world looked toward Rome. Despite the
reverse of fortunes, Parthia, under a new king, would challenge Rome’s power
by attempting to regain control of Armenia.
Tigranes’ reign in Armenia was brief and his two sons also ruled briefly so the
Romans placed Artavasdes II on the throne (Tac. An. 2.3f.). However, in 1

BCE

Cf. Dio 54.9.

Strabo 16.1.28; Velleius Paterculus 2. 94; Suet. Augustus 21.

F A R T H E R E A S T

the Armenians, with the cooperation of the Parthians, revolted and Augustus
therefore sent his grandson Gaius east with proconsular authority to set right
affairs in Armenia.

The threat of force intimidated the Parthian king Phrataces

and so he and Gaius met on an island in the Euphrates where the Parthian
agreed to withdraw from Armenia and to have his brothers remain as hostages
in Rome.

Gaius then subdued Armenia and placed a Mede, Ariobarzanes, on

the Armenian throne (Tac. An. 2.4). Rome had once again secured Armenia as
a client-kingdom and with that the image of Rome was also bolstered. The
Parthians again played the role as a second-rate power, obeying the will of
Rome by withdrawing from Armenia and paying deference to Rome by
permitting the king’s siblings to remain in Rome. All this was accomplished
without the use of force by the Romans; it was rather the fear and terror inspired
by the Roman army that forced Phrataces to give in and submit to the will of
Rome.  The situation in Armenia, as shall later be detailed, would not remain
stable for long and soon drifted into chaos.
  Although Augustus did not radically alter the frontiers, preserving in essence
the same organization that Pompey had established with client-kingdoms, he
was, however, not idle. He recognized the importance of Zeugma on the
Euphrates as a crossing point into northern Mesopotamia; it was after all used
by Crassus, and the Parthians could also likewise cross over from northern
Mesopotamia into Syria from this point.  With this strategic consideration in
mind, Zeugma was annexed from the kingdom of Commagene and would later
serve as a legionary base.

Legions during this period were not stationed directly

on the frontiers, but were rather located well within the province of Syria.
There were at least three legions originally under Augustus, but by 23

there

were four legions stationed in Syria: the III Gallica which we are unable to locate
during this period, VI Ferrata likely stationed at Apamea, X Fretensis at Cyrrhus,
and XII Fulminata at Raphaneae.

During this time the function of these legions

was not primarily offensive in nature, but rather defensive, to defend Syria from
Parthian invasion, and just as importantly, as pointed out by Benjamin Isaac,
these legions served as armies of occupation. As in many other conquered areas,
Spain perhaps being the best example, pacification of the native population was
not immediate, but rather a slow process. The Romans mainly faced trouble
from robbers who hid in mountain caves. Chief among these robbers were the
Ituraeans, who caused disturbances during Pompey’s time; a campaign against
these same brigands is attested in

In Judea too there were troubles with

robbers, and, as shall be seen later, in the first and early second centuries

, the

Romans had to contend with open Jewish revolts.

Dio

55.10;

Tac.

An. 2.4; Velleius Paterculus 2.100.

Velleius Paterculus 2.101; 102 Dio 55.10.

Sartre (2005) 56.

Knox M’Elderry (1909) 47.

Isaac (1992) 60–63.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

(d) ASSESSING THE STRENGTH OF PARTHIA

At the end of the first century

BCE

Parthia emerged as one of Rome’s most

formidable adversaries and was the only organized empire that the Romans
faced. At face value to the Romans, the Parthians appeared to be a dangerous
opponent. They had learned that to their dismay at Carrhae and the threat
became even more real when the Parthians twice invaded Syria. However, the
Parthians did face a host of internal problems that, to some historians, made it in
fact a non-threat to Rome.
Despite the fact that Parthia was ruled by a King of Kings, the empire was in
fact fragmented, and this is confirmed by a variety of sources. Civil wars were
relatively frequent, notably during the reign of Claudius and during Trajan’s
Parthian war.

Parthian kings also had to deal with revolts, particularly in

Hycrania, one of which occurred during the campaign of Corbulo against the
Parthians in Armenia. Another serious revolt is recorded by Josephus. He tells
us of two brothers, Asinai and Anilai, who attracted a large following and soon
ruled like lords the surrounding lands (somewhere in Babylonia) and word of
their power soon reached the Parthian king. The power of the two brothers was
such that they were able to defeat a Parthian army sent against them by the
governor of Babylonia and so Atrabanus, the Parthian king, afraid that the
brothers would cause widespread revolt resorted to diplomacy.

The Parthian

king in fact placed Asinai and Anilai in charge of Babylonia (J. AJ 18.9.4).  The
fact that Artabanus had resort to what amounted to appeasement of two men
who were considered rebels indicates the apparent weakness of the Parthian
state, particularly, the Parthians’ inability to control their subjects.  The History of
Al-Tabari  also provides insight by the identification by Ardashir of those who
ruled before him (primarily the Parthians) as ‘Party Kings’ (Al-Tabari 814). The
identification of Parthian kings as ‘Party Kings’ seems to be a dismissal of
Parthian civilization as inconsequential and perhaps points to the apparent
internal weakness from which the kingdom suffered.
  Weakness of the Parthian Empire can also be judged by smaller kingdoms
that it bordered. By the mid-first century

the kingdom of Elymais appears to

have gained control of the Parthian province of Susiana, as evidenced by the fact
that the issue of Parthian coins ceased at Susa around 45 and the first Elymaid
currency appears around 75.

Additionally the Characenians took advantage of

Parthian neglect of southern Babylonia and pushed their territorial claims
northward.

The greatest erosion of territory occurred between reigns of

Artabanus III and Vologases I, and as a result Vologases took steps to stabilize

Tacitus 11.8; Debevoise (1968) 228f. argues that coins struck at Seleucia-Ctesiphon demonstrates

that there was a power struggle between Vologases II and Osroes since control of the mint
appears to have changed hands several times.

Josephus Ant. 18.9.2-3; cf. Keall (1975) 623.

Keall (1975) 630.

Keall (1975) 623.

F A R T H E R E A S T

his empire. Nevertheless, the Parthian economy suffered because the Characen-
ians were prospering off of and controlled trade across the Syrian and Arabian
deserts, notably linked to trade with the city of Petra.

It is abundantly clear that Parthia did in fact face a plethora of internal
problems. However, as has been in part demonstrated and shall be further
demonstrated in the ensuing chapters, it would be Parthia, not Rome, that
initiated conflicts (with the exception of Caracalla’s campaign) despite the
numerous internal problems the Parthians faced. However weak Parthia may
have been, its kings made conscious decisions to mettle with Rome, most
especially in Armenia, and a pattern of such interference shall be demonstrated.
Given such provocations, Rome can not be expected not to have acted, just
because Parthia was internally weak. However weak an enemy was did not
matter; all that mattered was punishing that enemy, making that enemy
understand that he could not challenge the power of Rome.

Keall (1975) 624.

II. D E V E L O P M E N T O F T H E F R O N T I E R S

A N D P O L I C Y I N T H E F I R S T C E N T U R Y CE

(a) DIPLOMACY FROM AUGUSTUS TO CLAUDIUS

UGUSTUS

had revitalized the image of Rome which had been shaken by the

failures of Crassus and Antony. He also reasserted Roman control over
Armenia as a client-kingdom, but at the beginning of the first century order in
that strategic kingdom was quickly fading. According to Augustus’ Res Gestae,
when Ariobarzanes died the kingdom was given to his son Artavasdes, and
‘when he was murdered I sent into that kingdom Tigranes, who was sprung
from the royal family of the Armenians’ (5.27). This Tigranes did not last long
and the Armenian throne was left vacant. It was at this point that events in both
Armenia and Parthia seem to intersect as the situation during this time was also
chaotic in Parthia.
The Parthian king Phraataces was driven from the throne and was killed or
died shortly afterwards, giving way for one Orodes (III) who, because of his
violent temperament, was murdered after ruling for only a short time (J. AJ
18.4.2). The Parthians then sent ambassadors to the Romans requesting that
one of the sons of Phraates IV be sent to them to assume the throne; Augustus
sent Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates.

This situation in and of itself is of note

in that it is Rome that is producing a king for the Parthians, who have come to
the Romans in a manner befitting that of a client to a patron. Additionally,
Augustus’ acquisition of hostages from Phraates IV has at this point demon-
strated its utility to Rome.
Although Vonones was well received initially, his unfamiliarity with Parthian
customs due to his upbringing in Rome earned him the hatred of many and the
throne was usurped by Artabanus III, who, after an initial defeat, drove
Vonones out of Parthia (Tac. An 2.1f.). Vonones, a king without a kingdom,
took refuge in kingless Armenia, where he was accepted by its people as king
(Tac. An. 2.4). It seems that Vonones had little or no support from the Romans
and Artabanus appears to have threatened to invade, so Vonones abdicated and
Artabanus placed his son Orodes on the throne. Armenia was now under
Parthian control, a situation which did not take long for a response from the
Romans.
Tiberius, now emperor following the death of Augustus, dispatched his
adopted son Germanicus to settle affairs in the East. What exactly happened to
Orodes is unknown, but at a gathering at Artaxata Germanicus, with the
approval of the Armenian aristocracy, crowned Zeno (acclaimed Artaxias III),
the son of the King of Pontus, King of Armenia (Tac. An. 2.56). This once again

AJ 18.4.6; Tac. An. 2.1f.

F A R T H E R E A S T

brought Armenia under Roman control as a client-kingdom and Parthia bowed
to the will of Rome; rather than challenging the Romans, Artabanus sent an
embassy to Germanicus seeking friendship (Tac. An. 2.58). Germanicus’
presence, like that of Tiberius in 20

BCE

and that of Gaius in 1

BCE

, may have

evoked fear of a Roman invasion in the Parthians and thus forced them not only
to accept Roman control of Armenia, but to seek friendship to ensure that the
Romans would not invade. Tiberius’ response was clearly much the same as
Augustus’, sending the heir of the Empire to restore control though primarily
diplomatic means, but the very presence of such a high-profile figure also
implied the potential use of force to ensure Rome’s objectives were achieved.
Whereas prior to Augustus’ reign Roman policy, though its elements are
discernable, was less reactionary and more aggressive, being sometimes motiv-
ated by the desire for glory, Augustus established a coherent and consistent
policy whereby Rome sought to maintain control of Armenia and dominance
over Parthia.  With this situation established by Augustus, Tiberius and, as shall
be seen, his successors sought to maintain the status quo.
  Once again though, the Parthians would seek to regain control of Armenia
when Artaxias III died in 35/6

. Artabanus, still King of Parthia, placed his

son Arsaces on the Armenian throne.

To add fuel to the fire Artabanus sent

‘delegates with an insulting demand for the treasure the exiled King Vonones I
had left in [the Roman provinces of] Syria and Cilicia’ and he also ‘added
menacing boasts of the Persian and Macedonian empires, promising to seize the
lands that Cyrus and Alexander had ruled’ (Tac. An. 6.31). Whether or not
Artabanus’ claims to the lands of the former Persian and Macedonian empires
was empty boastfulness, to the Romans such claims could only be perceived as a
direct threat. As previously stated, Parthian control of Armenia meant that the
Parthians could invade Asia Minor through that strategic kingdom. After
receiving Artabanus’ delegates it seems plausible that Tiberius believed that the
Parthians, who at this point controlled Armenia, planned to invade Asia Minor.
Tiberius, however, also received another Parthian delegation that represented
elements discontented with Artabanus and sought Roman assistance to place a
new king on the Parthian throne. Tiberius’ response was immediate, and he sent
Phraates, a son of Phraates IV; this Phraates however died in Syria while he was
on his way to Parthia. Despite this setback, Tiberius, entrusting the eastern
situation to Lucius Vitellius, sent another royal prince, Tiridates III (grandson of
Phraates IV), to challenge Artabanus for the Parthian throne. Simultaneously,
Tiberius ingeniously incited the Iberians to invade Armenia.

The Iberains

succeeded in assassinating Arsaces, conquered Armenia, and defeated a Parthian
army commanded by Artabanus’ son Orodes (Tac. An. 6.33). The Parthians
mobilized to retaliate against the Iberians, but ‘were only induced to retire
because Lucius Vitellius concentrated his divisions [legions] in a feint against

Dio 58.26; Tac. An. 6.31.

Dio 58.26; Tac. An. 6.32.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

Mesopotamia. Artabanus could not face a war against Rome and he evacuated
Armenia’ (Tac. An. 6.36). Armenia’s new king was Mithridates, the brother of
the Iberian king Pharasmanes; Armenia was once again in the hands of those
Rome could trust to be loyal and carry out her will. Tiridates, with the backing
of significant elements of Parthia, initially defeated Artabanus, but failed to take
the Parthian throne and was eventually defeated and forced to flee to Syria (Tac.
An. 6.44).
  Although Tiridates had failed to take the Parthian throne, Rome had come
out of this latest dispute stronger and Parthia, ravaged by civil war, much
weaker.  Tiberius, judging that he would be acting from a position of strength,
ordered Vitellius to make peace with Artabanus, who agreed to a meeting on the
Euphrates. Vitellius and Artabanus met and terms of peace were reached
whereby the Parthian King sent his son Darius to Rome as a hostage along with
many gifts, most notably a seven-cubit-tall Jew named Eleazar ( J. AJ  18.4.5).
Once again Roman superiority had been reasserted and Parthia’s relationship to
Rome as a second-rate power was reinforced. Parthia had been reduced once
more to acting as the suppliant giving gifts to the master.  By obtaining yet
another Parthian hostage, the Romans had an ‘ace in the hole’ that could give
them diplomatic leverage.  Further, the utility of having Parthian hostages, as
has been seen, was significant.  First and foremost, they could be installed in
Armenia should the need arise. Secondly, hostages, as in the case of Tiridates,
could be sent to Parthia itself as contenders for the throne.

Although Tiridates

failed to take the Parthian throne, the civil war created by his presence
weakened Parthia, which in the big picture was beneficial to Rome.
Despite internal struggles, it seems that Parthia would again attempt to take
control of Armenia. After Tiberius’ death, his nephew Gaius, better know as
Caligula, assumed the throne. He was apparently unhappy with Armenia’s new
King Mithridates and imprisoned him.

Armenia, without a king, appears to

have been seized by the Parthians ( J. AJ 20.3.3). The reign of the delusional
Caligula did not last long, and with his murder in 41

the empire passed into

the steady hand of his uncle Claudius. Claudius released Mithridates to retake
Armenia. With the backing of Roman forces along with those of his brother,
Pharasmanes, King of Iberia, Mithridates succeeded in gaining control of
Armenia (Tac. An. 11.8f.). Meanwhile, there was civil war in Parthia, as the
throne was being contended for by two brothers, Vardanes and Gortarzes II
(Tac. An. 11.8). Because of the disorder in Parthia, Mithridates was largely
unopposed in Armenia. However, when Vardanes and Gortarzes reconciled
their differences, Vardanes attempted to enter Armenia, likely to remove
Mithridates, but was checked by the governor of Syria, Gaius Vibius Marsus,
who threatened war (Tac. An. 11.10). Armenia was thus secured. The peace

Wheeler (1993) 34, emphasizes the use of Parthian hostages under Augustus and Tiberius as an

important aspect of Roman policy ignored by Isaac.

Dio 60.8; Tac. An. 11.8.

F A R T H E R E A S T

between Vardanes and Gortarzes did not last long and Parthia once again
descended into civil war.
The internal conflict in Parthia brought with it opportunity to Rome, for
when Vardanes was assassinated and Gortarzes ruled with cruelty, the Parthians
appealed to Rome to send Meherdates, grandson of Phraates IV, to oust
Gortarzes and assume the throne (Tac. An. 11.10, 12.10). Tacitus’ account of the
request of the Parthian delegates is of note; according to him they say (An. 12.10):

You and we have an old, officially inaugurated friendship. We your allies, rival
you in power but take second place out of respect. Now we need your help.
That is why Parthian kings’ sons are given you as hostages: so that, if our rulers
at home become distasteful, we can apply to emperor and senate and receive a
monarch trained in your culture.

Tacitus adds that ‘in response to these and similar assertions Claudius spoke
about Roman supremacy and Parthian homage’ (Tac. An. 12.11). This event
demonstrates the core of Roman policy, as the Parthians accept their status as
second to Rome, which is subsequently reinforced by Claudius’ assertion of
Roman superiority. Also significant is ‘Parthian homage,’ which reinforced the
patron-client relationship; clients always paid homage to their patrons.  To the
Romans the fact that they could give their rival, Parthia, a king demonstrated
their superiority.  So Claudius sent Meherdates to battle Gortarzes. When
Meherdates entered Parthia Gortarzes refused battle until he was able to bribe
the monarchs of Adiabene and Edessa, and, with their help in a hotly contested
battle, he defeated Meherdates (Tac. An. 12.14). Although hopes for Meherdates
had failed, Rome had lost nothing, and the conflict had only weakened Parthia.
The victor, Gortarzes, did not reign long, as he fell ill and died. He was
succeeded by the king of Media Atropatene, Vonones II, whose reign was also
short, and he was in turn succeeded by his son Vologases I (Tac. An. 12.14). It
would be under Vologases that the Parthians would directly challenge Roman
arms in Armenia and threaten Syria with invasion. However, Roman super-
iority would be preserved thanks to the mettle of the general Corbulo.

(b) THE CAMPAIGN OF CORBULO

In 51 war broke out in Armenia when Pharasmanes of Iberia stirred rebellion in
that kingdom and sent his son Radamistus to invade it. Radamistus was
successful and the king of Armenia, Mithridates, was murdered, with his family.
With this situation in Armenia, Vologases of Parthia saw opportunity to gain
control of that kingdom. After his initial attempt to seize Armenia failed,
Parthian forces overran the country and Vologases installed his brother Tiridates
as king (Tac. An. 12.50, 13.6). In about 54, Nero, now emperor, responded by
dispatching Domitius Corbulo, widely regarded as the most gifted general of his

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

day, to the East to recover Armenia. Nero, guided by his advisors, Seneca and
Burrus, seems to have adopted a policy of nominal suzerainty whereby Tiridates
would be allowed to retain Armenia, so long as he agreed to receive the crown
from Nero.

Armenia would thus be a gift, given by the Romans to a loyal

client. However, should Parthians refuse  to  accept  this  offer,  Rome  was
prepared to use force and wrest Armenia from Tiridates.
  The Romans, as in past crises, sought to intimidate the Parthians into
evacuating Armenia through the application of diplomatic and military pressure;
however, they were fully prepared for war with Parthia. The Romans sent to
Vologases messengers advising him to choose peace and to demonstrate this by
handing over hostages; Vologases complied and sent hostages, however, Arm-
enia remained occupied by Tiridates (Tac. An. 13.9). The Romans demanded
that if Tiridates wished to retain his throne, he must receive it as a gift from the
emperor (Tac. An. 13.34). Tiridates and his Parthian supporters did not back
down and refused to evacuate Armenia or receive it as a gift from Rome.
Diplomacy had thus far proven to be ineffective, so Corbulo decided to exercise
the military option.  In the spring of 58 Corbulo began his campaign in
Armenia, instructing the king of Commagene to invade the region adjacent to
his border; the Iberians also lent their support to the Romans. Tiridates sent a
message to Corbulo, complaining that he was being unjustly expelled, Parthia
had taken no action and hostages had been handed over. To this Corbulo,
knowing that Vologases was occupied with a revolt in Hyrcania, replied that
Tiridates should petition the emperor (Tac. An. 13.37).  Nothing came of this
and Corbulo, not wanting a drawn-out war, himself took the fortress Volandum,
killing the entire male population, and his subordinates stormed two other
fortresses (Tac. An. 13.39). Corbulo then moved on to the capital Artaxata,
which voluntarily surrendered, but was burned to the ground by the Romans.

He then marched on Tigranocerta, devastating the lands of those who resisted
him, and sparing those who yielded.  Tigranocerta yielded, and another fortress,
Legerda, after initially resisting, surrendered (Tac. An. 14.23, 25). Corbulo’s
campaign was designed not just to defeat the enemy, but to instill terror and
ultimately to discourage Parthia from any attempt to retake Armenia. Tiridates
was driven from Armenia, but attempted to reenter from the east, but was forced
to withdraw when Corbulo quickly responded by sending a force against him
(Tac.  An. 14.26). Nero’s nominee for the Armenian throne, Tigranes V, was
installed as king and was given a guard of Roman troops.  Corbulo had thus
achieved a great victory for Rome, however, the Parthians were planning a
counterattack.
  Vologases ordered Tiridates to recover Armenia, while he would prepare to
attack Syria. Corbulo, now governor of Syria, responded by fortifying the
Euphrates and, according to Tacitus, ‘blocked every possible entrance-point

Hammond (1934) 82.

Dio 62.20; Tac. An. 13.41.

F A R T H E R E A S T

with troops. Water being so scarce in the area, he built forts to protect certain
springs, and destroyed others by filling them with sand’ (Tac. An. 15.3).
Tigranes was also prepared for the Parthian attack on the Armenian front and
took his position in the strongly fortified city of Tigranocerta. The Parthians laid
siege to Tigranocerta, but it was being successfully defended and Corbulo wrote
to Vologases protesting the invasion of Syria and the siege of a king allied to
Rome (Tac. An. 15.5). Vologases’ reply was conciliatory, stating that he would
raise the siege of Tigranocerta, himself wihdraw, and envoys would be sent to
Rome to discuss Parthian claims to Armenia.

It was at this time that Lucius

Paetus, sent by Nero, arrived to take command of matters in Armenia. The
conflict, however, resumed when the envoys failed to reach an agreement with
the Romans and the Parthians again moved against Syria and Armenia.
Corbulo was again well prepared, as Tacitus details (An. 15.9):

Corbulo had guarded the Euphrates vigilantly. Now he reinforced its pro-
tection. A bridge was also constructed. To prevent interference by enemy
cavalry—already maneauvering impressively nearby—he moved across the
river large ships joined by poles and fortified with turrets. On these were
stationed engines and catapults which repulsed the Parthians: their discharge of
stones and spears outranged the enemy’s arrows. The bridge was then
completed, and the hills opposite occupied, first by auxiliaries and then by a
brigade camp. The speed and power displayed were so imposing that the
Parthians abandoned their preparations for invading Syria and concentrated all
their hopes on Armenia.

It was indeed in Armenia that the hammer would fall. Paetus, the commander in
charge of Armenia, was unprepared for a Parthian offensive, his forces driven
back and he, along with his encamped army, was under siege. Paetus thus sent
messengers to Corbulo informing him of the grave situation and requesting
immediate help. Corbulo set out from Syria, but just days before he could arrive,
Paetus entered negotiations with Vologases and agreed to evacuate Armenia and
cede all forts to the Parthians.

  Despite the turn of events, Corbulo remained level headed, and rather than
rashly marching into Armenia, he returned to Syria where he received envoys
from Vologases requesting that Roman forts across the Euphrates be removed;
to this Corbulo wisely replied that he would oblige if the Parthians would
evacuate Armenia. These terms were agreed to and Armenia was evacuated
while Corbulo removed his troops from across the Euphrates. The Parthians
also sent a delegation to Rome saying that  they  were  willing  to  have  Tiridates
receive the diadem from the Romans, but because of taboos associated with his
priesthood, he would be unable to go to Rome to receive the diadem from Nero
himself (Tac. An. 15.24).  To Nero and his advisors Rome was not operating
from a strong enough position to accept such an agreement and so Corbulo was

Dio 62.20; Tac. An. 15.5.

Dio 62.21; Tac. An. 15.14.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

given complete command of the war against the Parthians. When he received
envoys from the Parthians to discuss peace he sent them back, but with the
message that it was in Parthia’s interest to be in alliance with Rome and that it
would be to Tiridates’ advantage to receive Armenia as a gift from the Romans
undevastated by war.

Corbulo had gathered his forces at Melitene and from

there marched into Armenia, where he proceeded to destroy fortresses of those
who had first revolted against Rome. This show of force was designed to
intimidate Tiridates and Vologases and further to allow Rome, when time came
to negotiate, to operate from a position of strength. Vologases requested a truce
and Tiridates requested a fixed day for a place for a meeting; Corbulo, judging
Rome’s position to be strong enough agreed to a meeting.
Negotiations took place at the site of Paetus’ surrender. According to Tacitus
the following was agreed upon (An. 15.29):

He [Tiridates] would go to Rome, he said, and bring the emperor an
unfamiliar distinction—the homage, following no Parthian reverse, of a
Parthian royal prince. It was then arranged that Tiridates should lay the royal
diadem before the emperor’s statue, to resume it only from Nero’s hand. The
interview ended with an embrace.

Although Rome had not won a decisive or overwhelming victory, the Romans
had gained the symbolic deference that was so desired. The agreement was
carried out faithfully by both sides and Tiridates traveled to Rome and
presented himself to Nero as a suppliant (Seut. Nero 13). Suetonius records this
important event (Nero 13):

When Tiridates approached the sloping platform, Nero first let him fall at his
feet but then raised him up with his right hand and kissed him. Next, while the
king made a speech of a suppliant (which was translated and relayed to the
crowd by a man of praetorian rank), Nero removed from his head the turban
and replaced it with the diadem.

As insurance, Tiridates handed over his daughter to the Romans as a hostage
and Vologases also handed over hostages.

This arrangement, convenient for

both Rome and Parthia, led to a peace that lasted until the time of Trajan.
During the interim, the Roman eastern frontier would undergo some important
changes, primarily as a result of the lesson learned from Corbulo’s campaign,
which will now be explained.

VESPASIAN

Dio 62.22-23; Tac. An. 15.27.

Dio 62.23; Tac. An. 15.30.

F A R T H E R E A S T

Prior to Corbulo’s campaign, the Euphrates frontier had remained unfortified,
save for Zeugma. As previously detailed, with the threat of a Parthian invasion
of Syria, Corbulo fortified the Euphrates and was twice able successfully to ward
off Parthian forces attempting to invade. Farther north, along the upper
Euphrates bordering Armenia, there was also no existing fortification. Here,
Corbulo utilized Melitene as a staging area for gathering his forces before
marching into Armenia. Corbulo’s use of Melitene as well as his fortifying of the
Euphrates served as a blueprint for the frontier development in the East that
would be put into practice by Vespasian.

  According to Suetonius, Vespasian annexed Commagene and assigned more
legions to Cappadocia (Seut. Vesp. 8).  Of the annexation of Commagene,
Josephus tells us that the king of Commagene, Antiochus, intended to revolt
from Rome and was collaborating with the Parthian king (BJ  7.219). The
Romans invaded Commagene and occupied Samosata, a city strategically
located on the Euphrates frontier. Samosata, along with Militene and Satala,
served as the focal points of a fortified upper Euphrates. Josephus confirms for
us that Melitene was in fact a legionary base, stating that the Twelfth Legion was
moved from Raphanaeae to there (BJ 7.18).  The remains of the legionary base
at Satala still stand in the form of Byzantine walls.

From these bases legions

could defend Syria and Cappadocia while at the same time having the ability to
move into Parthia, Armenia, or Media via Armenia.
This development was not undertaken out of a desire to conquer Parthia.
Rather the new fortified frontier’s function (as shown above) was both defensive
and offensive in nature. This interpretation of the eastern frontier is opposed by
Isaac, who has characterized it as designed for launching campaigns of
conquest.

A more accurate interpretation is provided by Mattern who states

that the new frontier could be ‘explained as a response to the threat posed by
barbarous Alani of the northern Caucaus region, or alternatively, by the
Parthians; or an attempt to secure strategic bases for aggression against Armenia
and Parthia’.

It should be remembered that despite the fact that Rome had

obtained symbolic deference from Parthia as a result of Corbulo’s campaign,
Armenia was nevertheless invested in the hands of a Parthian prince. In this
situation, a Parthian invasion of Cappadocia through Armenia was a real
possibility and the establishment of legionary bases at Melitene and Satala were
measures aimed at both deterring such Parthian ambitions and providing
positions from which Rome could defend itself and retaliate.
The southeastern frontier took on a very different look from that of the
northern Euphrates. Unlike the river frontier, the desert frontier of the south-
east was more porous in nature, consisting of numerous watchtowers and forts.
Derek Williams provides a telling description of the nature of these defenses:

Williams (1996) 31.

Williams (1996) 28; See also Knox M’Elderry (1909) 46f.

Isaac (1992) 4.

Mattern (1999) 112.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

These works were diffused, forming a web of surveillance based on a network of
secondary roads. Though the official boundary was probably the main road
closest to the enemy (the patrolled highway Sura-Palmyra-Bostra), it had little
validity in military terms.

Clearly, there was no river to define the frontier nor was there any line drawn in
the sand. Rather, we can characterize the southern frontier as a broad zone
over which the Romans kept close watch. Structurally, the frontier ‘consisted of
a patrol zone with a road network, some 65 miles deep, its guardposts roughly 10
miles apart and larger forts every 30 miles’.

These frontier defenses protected

the southeast in two ways: 1. frontier roads, guardposts, and forts were symbols
of Roman power and civilization, something foreign to nomads. Thus these
structures were designed to strike terror and fear into the nomad, discouraging
him from raiding into Roman territory; 2. ‘a desert is not a linear obstacle, but a
barrier in depth, able to wear down the invader by worsening his waterlessness
day after day. The defender has no need to fight on a line. Rather he lets the
width of the desert fight for him’.

Related to the second point is that forts and

smaller installations in the southeastern frontier seem to have protected water
sources; denying hostile nomads this resource in a desert environment would
force them to cease hostile incursions into Roman territory. A Roman fort at
Deir el-Kahf demonstrates this; within its walls was a large cistern and the fort
itself was strategically located near eight reservoirs/cisterns, one of which was
guarded by a tower.

Thus, Roman forces in the southeast functioned primarily

as defenders against hostile nomads. However, the function of the legions not
only included defensive/offensive posturing as it was along the northern
Euphrates, but they served as an army of occupation to police the population.

The Jewish revolt that occurred under the reign of Nero demonstrated the
need for an army of occupation to control and deter volatile populations which
existed primarily in Judea. The Jewish revolt proved to be difficult to put down
and it was only under the leadership of Vespasian and his son Titus that the
enemy was subdued. As such, the Legion X Fretensis, which had been dispatched
to Jerusalem during the Jewish revolt, remained there as a garrison.

Williams (1996) 33.

Williams (1996) 34.

Williams (1996) 33.

Kennedy (1995) 278, 280.

Isaac (1992) 54f.

Sartre (2005) 61.

III. F A R T H E R E A S T : C A M P A I G N S ,

P O L I C Y, A N D F R O N T I E R D E V E L O P M E N T

I N T H E S E C O N D C E N T U R Y

(a) TRAJAN: EARLY FRONTIER

WORKS/DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

106, just as Trajan was successfully completing his Dacian Wars, the client-

kingdom of Nabataea was annexed. The exact motives for the annexation are
unknown and all that we are told by Dio is that ‘Palma, who was governor if
Syria, subdued the portion of Arabia, near Petra, and made it subservient to the
Romans’ (68.14). It is possible that the kingdom was annexed upon the death of
its king Rabbel II, and represented ‘the last move of a century-long game in
which friendly Near Eastern kingdoms were removed from the board and their
vague defensive arrangements replaced with firm, Roman-run frontiers’.

In this

context, the annexation of Nabataea was a direct continuation of Flavian
frontier policy which saw the annexation of Commagene. And just as Vespasian
had developed the frontier of the upper Euphrates, Trajan would do the same
along the southeast frontier.
One of Trajan’s most impressive works was the construction of the Via Nova
Traiana, a great road from Bostra to the Aqaba on the Red Sea. Along the road
were small roadside towers at various points, usually coinciding with milestones,
such as remains that can still be observed at milestone fourteen.

This road

constituted the general outline of the Roman frontier zone, which, as Williams
has noted, was similar to the Syrian frontier, comprising a surveillance network
of towers reaching fifteen to twenty miles into the desert. It was thus ‘a zone of
control but not a line of exclusion; allowing the nomads to enter the province in
time of drought but ensuring that their movements would be supervised’.

The

road and its associated structures also served as a symbol of Rome’s power that
would have intimidated and discouraged aggression of hostile nomads.

Lastly,

Trajan’s road was significant in that, upon its completion, there was a
continuous road that went from the Black Sea to the Red Sea.
Also upon Trajan’s completion of the Second Dacian War and his return to
Rome Dio tells us that ‘the greatest imaginable number of embassies came to
him from the barbarians, even the Indi being represented’ (68.5). It seems clear
that the presence of such a large number of embassies was in connection to
Trajan’s victory over Dacia. It would then of course be expected that Rome’s

Williams (1996) 65f.

Kennedy & Riley (1990) 85.

Williams (1996) 68.

Ferrill (1991) 23, makes similar arguments for the function of fortresses and walls as symbols of

power.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

clients, as well as all other peoples who lay within the orbit of Roman control
and influence, would send embassies to congratulate and pay respect to the
victor of the Dacian Wars. Rome could boast that ‘even the Indi’ had come to
pay their respect to Rome.

(b) TRAJAN’S PARTHIAN WAR

The relative peace that had existed between Rome and Parthia for more than
forty years end abruptly when the Parthians, without Roman consent, placed
one Exedares on the Armenian throne; by tradition Armenian kings were to
receive the diadem from the Romans. The response of the emperor, Trajan,
was vigorous and unprecedented in the Roman East by an emperor. The
emperor himself traveled east, ordering preparations for a campaign into
Armenia and Parthia. The Parthians immediately sought to avert the pending
invasion by sending an embassy to Trajan while he was in Athens, bearing gifts;
they requested peace and suggested that one Parthomasiris (nephew of Osroes)
receive the Armenian throne. Trajan refused the gifts, and said that he would
do what was proper when he reached Syria (Dio 68.17). It was evident that war
could not be averted; Trajan was determined to end the Armenian question
once and for all.
  Trajan’s motives have been questioned by numerous historians who have
accused him of the glory motive. However, if we are to look closely at the
context of Trajan’s campaign, as well as aspects of the campaign itself, it is clear
that Trajan’s motive was not glory and outright conquest of Parthia, but rather
frontier stabilization. As detailed in chapter one, the first sixty years of the first
century saw frequent Parthian meddling in Armenia, so this most recent
infringement can be seen as ‘the last straw’.  In this context Roman action was
undertaken to end Parthian involvement in Armenia permanently by seizing
Armenia and extending the eastern frontier into northern Mesopotamia. While
this marks a shift to a more aggressive policy than we have seen during the first
century, it was however not unprecedented. Trajan took a similar approach to
neutralize the Dacian threat and in fact Trajan’s Dacians Wars may have
impacted his approach to the Parthians.
  Trajan’s Dacian Wars were undertaken to curtail the growing power of
Dacia, a client-kingdom north of the River Danube. Under the Emperor
Domitian the Romans had fought against the Dacians who invaded Moesia,
killing the governor of that province, and later under their new king Decebalus,
they had annihilated a Roman army of the Praetorian Prefect Fuscus.

This

conflict was ended with an agreement that was unusually advantageous to the
Dacians, in which they agreed to be a client kingdom, but would receive large

Bennett (1997) 86.

F A R T H E R E A S T

sums of money as well as artisans of every kind from Rome. The Romans
feared increasing Dacian power which exceeded acceptable limits of a client
kingdom and therefore Rome sought to reduce them to a tolerable level.

Additionally, the fact that it was Rome that had to pay off the Dacians rather
than the Dacians paying tribute to Rome was a break from the patron-client
relationship.  This is confirmed by Cassius Dio, who says that Trajan ‘was
irritated at the amount of money they were annually getting. He likewise saw
that their power and their pride were increasing’ (68.6). It was for these reasons
that Trajan undertook the First Dacian War, in which he was victorius.
However, Trajan only occupied parts of Dacia and permitted Decebalus to
remain king, requiring him to dismantle his fortresses. It was only when
Decebalus reneged on this agreement that Trajan decided to finish what he
began in the First Dacian War and went on to defeat and annex the whole of
Dacia. The fact that Trajan had not outright annexed Dacia after the first war
indicates that Trajan’s objective was to reduce Dacia’s power to a level fitting for
a client-kingdom. Glory and conquest were therefore not the primary motives.
  As he had eliminated the Dacian threat militarily, so Trajan thought he could
end that of the Parthians. Further, Trajan’s decision to ignore Parthian appeals
for peace may have been influenced by the fact that diplomacy with the Dacians
had failed when Decebalus broke from his agreement with Trajan following the
First Dacian War. From the very start, therefore, Trajan was determined to
defeat the enemy decisively rather than resorting to half measures. His intent
was to take Armenia, make war on Parthia, and extend the frontier into
northern Mesopotamia. Though according to Dio glory was Trajan’s primary
motive, this was in fact not the case (68.17).
  In 114 Trajan arrived at Antioch and there received gifts and a friendly
communication from Abgarus of Osroene. However, from Parthomasiris,
Parthia’s replacement for Exedares in Armenia, Trajan received a letter in
which Parthomasiris signed himself as king (Dio 68.19). Because Dio includes
this detail it seems likely that Trajan was angered by Parthomasiris’ presumption
that Rome approved of his installment as king of Armenia.  Trajan set out for
Armenia, stopping at Arsamosata and Satala, and finally arriving at Elegeia
where he awaited Parthomasiris. Dio continues, detailing the important
encounter:

He [Trajan] was seated upon a platform in the trenches. The prince greeted
him, took off his diadem from his head, and laid it at his feet. Then he stood
there in silence, expecting to receive it back.

Parthomasiris never received the diadem back, and after having a second private
audience in which he became angered, Trajan sent for him and Dio records the
general dialogue that ensued in this final encounter (68.20):

Opreanu

(2000)

389f.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

Parthomasiris no longer kept silent, but with great frankness made many
statements, some of them being to the effect that he had not been defeated or
captured, but he had come there voluntarily, believing that he should not be
wronged and should receive back the kingdom, as Tiridates had received it
from Nero. Trajan made appropriate replies to all his remarks and said that he
should abandon Armenia to no one. It belonged to the Romans and should
have a Roman governor.

Just as Vespasian had annexed Commagene to secure the upper Euphrates,
Trajan, as his statement indicates, intended to annex Armenia to ensure that
Parthian interference there would be forever terminated and, similarly, the
Parthian threat to Asia Minor would also be eliminated. Trajan likely reasoned
that giving the diadem to Parthomasiris would only be a temporary solution and
would not solve the problem of Parthian interference in Armenia. After all the
Parthians, especially in the first half of the first century, had constantly
attempted to gain control of Armenia, and while the arrangement under Nero
had brought some measure of peace, it had however not given the Romans
decisive control over that kingdom, especially in light of Parthia’s most recent
activity there. Seen in this context, Trajan’s annexation of Armenia was not
only historically justified, but a continuation of the policies of Vespasian.
By the end of 114 Trajan had secured Armenia and had begun securing
northern Mesopotamia. According to Dio, Trajan’s forces were unopposed and
they occupied the strategic fortress-city of Singara as well as several other points;
Trajan then went on to capture Nisibis and Batnae, for which he was given the
title Parthicus (Dio 68.23). The campaigning season of 114 ended and Trajan
wintered in Antioch, which was shaken by an earthquake. In the spring of 115
he resumed his campaign, crossing the Tigris and invading and taking possession
of Adiabene. According to F.A. Lepper, 115 was spent consolidating along the
line of the Chaboras river and Singara ridge in a manner similar to that
employed in Arabia Petraea.

Evidence for the development of this frontier is a

Trajanic milestone discovered one mile south of Singara at Karse, likely
belonging to a road running east to west along the southern slopes of the ridge.

Unfortunately the Rome frontier in northern Mesopotamia has been subject to
limited fieldwork and study, primarily done during the 1930s, and conditions
have been less than welcoming since. Aerial photography done during the
thirties is, however, of some assistance in providing evidence for the develop-
ment of a Roman frontier in northern Mesopotamia. His aerial reconnais-
sances, Sir Aurel Stein has observed, ‘in the plain to the south, now almost
wholly abandoned to the desert, disclosed a line of fortified Roman posts or
castella placed at distances of 20 to 30 miles from the foot of the Sinjar range’.

To the north-east of the Jebel Sinjar Stein photographed what appears to be a
rock wall, about which S. Gregory commented that ‘the general relationship of

Lepper

(1948)

120.

Lepper (1948) 118.

Stein (1938) 63; see also map on 65.

F A R T H E R E A S T

the rock formation to its surroundings is strongly reminiscent of the lay-out of
some of the more spectacular sections of Hadrian’s Wall.

Additionally, to the

west, between the Jebel Sinjar ridge and the Khabur River is a ditch as well as a
rock wall observed by Père Poidebard.

Because of the limited work done along

the Jebel Sinjar, dating of structures remains unclear. However, based on the
fact that the Jebel Sinjar was the basis of the Mesopotamian frontier from the
mid-second century onward, it seems believable that any work done under
Trajan formed the basis of later frontier works. In fact Dio’s statement that
‘thus were Singara and some other points occupied by Lusius’ can be taken as
evidence for the establishment of the Jebel Sinjar frontier under Trajan as the
campaign of 114 ended with the capture of these places along with Nisibis and
the establishment of Mesopotamia as a province, as attested by coins bearing the
legend ARMENIA ET MESOPOTAMIA IN POSTESTATEM P. R.
REDACTAE.

In essence this constituted the creation of a new frontier in northern
Mesopotamia and was Trajan’s solution to the old frontier. According to
Lepper, the Eastern frontier had two main problems: ‘It had too many powerful
and uncontrolled neighbors, and along the upper Euphrates, though protected
by a formidable series of gorges, it did not adequately dominate the country
beyond. Armenia not only remained a problem of prestige, but of geography’.

Indeed, Armenia had proven to be a chronic problem, subject to frequent
Parthian interference, but with the new frontier and control of the Tigris
crossing at Mosul, the Romans could neutralize Adiabene, Parthia’s military link
to Armenia.

Thus, with the new frontier established along the Jebel-Sinjar,

Rome had a buffer between Parthia and Syria, Asia Minor and Armenia.
Following the conquest of Armenia, Trajan came to Edessa where he was met
by Abgarus, the ruler of the city, who, as it may be recalled, had sent gifts and a
friendly message to the emperor when he first arrived at Antioch. A fragment of
Arrian’s Parthica appearing in the Suda details that ‘Abgar met him [Trajan] in
front of the city bringing as gifts 250 horses and 250 armoured breastplates for
the cavalrymen and their horses and sixty thousand missiles. But Trajan took
three breastplates and told him to keep all the rest’ (Suda s.v. eps. 207). Trajan
was however displeased with Abgarus for not appearing in person at Antioch as
well as his son which another Parthica fragment appearing in the Suda makes
clear (s.v. eps. 885):

Trajan said to the son of Abgar, 'I find fault with you, because you did not
come to me previously to join in my campaigns and take part in my suffering,
and for this reason I would gladly rip off one of those lobe ornaments of yours';
and at the same time he grabbed hold of one of his ears

Gregory (1986) 325–7.

Williams (1996) 188.

Debevoise (1968) 229; Eutropius 127.

Lepper (1948) 111.

Oates (1956) 194.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

Trajan’s anger stems from what he saw as a breach of the patron-client
relationship. Abgarus had sent gifts, yes, but failed to appear before his patron,
which was customary. Further, he and his son had failed to render appropriate
services to their patron by not assisting the emperor in his campaigns. The
emperor, however, pardoned Abgarus, but the incident demonstrates how
conscious the Romans were of the patron-client relationship. A failure to
enforce the patron-client relationship and see to it that clients conduct them-
selves in a fashion befitting their status in relation to Rome would have
diminished Rome’s image.
Although northern Mesopotamia had been secured, Trajan still believed the
Parthians to be a threat; Osroes, the Parthian king was still to be reckoned with
at Ctesiphon, and to ensure the security of the new frontier a preventative thrust
into enemy territory was necessary.

In 116 Trajan then marched down the

Euphrates, accompanied by a fleet of ships, and overland ‘conveyed the boats
across by means of hauling engines at the point where the space between the
rivers [Tigris and Euphrates] is the least’. With his fleet on the Tigris, Trajan
then crossed this river and captured Ctesiphon. With this victory achieved,
Trajan appears to have felt that the Parthians had been thoroughly defeated and
therefore, on more of a whim than anything else, desired to sail down to the
Persian Gulf. On his way down, Trajan does not appear to have been interested
in conquest, as Dio tells us that he ordered the island of Mesene to pay tribute,
thus indicating that the island was permitted to remain independent (Dio 68.28).
Following his trip to the Persian Gulf, while at Babylon, Trajan received word
that all his conquests were in revolt.
  Trajan sent his two of his best generals, Lusius and Maximus, against the
rebels and, although the latter died, the former was able to retake the strategic
fortress-city of Nisibis and besiege Edessa.  The Romans also captured, plund-
ered and then burned to the ground Seleucia. The fact that Nisibis was left
intact whereas Seleucia was destroyed is an indicator to the fact that northern
Mesopotamia was to be held while southern Mesopotamia was not; otherwise it
seems likely that the Romans would have destroyed Nisibis as well. At
Ctesiphon, Trajan, to ensure the stability and loyalty of the Parthians in
southern Mesopotamia, appointed one Parthamaspates as king of the Parth-ians
(Dio 68.30). By doing this Trajan effectively brought Parthia to the status of a
client-kingdom.
  With this done, Trajan moved against Hatra, which had also revolted, and
despite concerted efforts by the emperor and his army the city could not be
taken. It was at this time that Trajan’s health began to fail, and although he was
planning another campaign into Mesopotamia, likely to subdue any remaining
Parthian resistance, his condition worsened and he died in Cilicia while en route
for Rome (Dio 68.33). His successor would pull back from the new frontier in
northern Mesopotamia; however, Trajan’s Parthian war had set precedent. For

Lepper (1948) 130f.

F A R T H E R E A S T

the first time the emperor himself had directed a campaign in the East in person.
Further, Trajan’s Parthian campaign marked a more aggressive approach to
defending the Roman East that relied less on diplomacy and more on military
action.

Trajan was succeeded by one of his most trusted legates, Hadrian. It is
interesting that Hadrian, who had served in both Trajan’s Dacian Wars and the
Parthian War, would go on to reverse Trajan’s policy in the East by abandoning
what had been annexed. In fact C.R. Whittaker has characterized Hadrian as a
‘misfit’ among Roman emperors for the fact that, unlike almost all emperors
before and after him, no major expeditions occurred during his reign.

The

Historiae Augustae explain that ‘the nations which Trajan had conquered began to
revolt; the Moors, moreover, began to make attacks, and the Sarmatians to wage
war, the Britons could not be kept under Roman sway, Egypt was thrown into
disorder by riots, and finally Libya and Palestine showed the spirit of rebellion’;
for these reasons Hadrian abandoned Trajan’s conquests east of the Euphrates
(SHA Had. 5).  Likely, Hadrian believed that the Empire had overextended itself
and, with various internal problems, would have been best served by
withdrawing to the traditional Euphrates border. This involved evacuating
Armenia, which Hadrian permitted to have its own king, but would of course
serve Rome as a client-kingdom (SHA Had. 21). Hadrian also sought to improve
relations with Parthia and in fact made an offer of friendship to Osroes and even
restored to the king a daughter captured during Trajan’s campaign (SHA Had.
13).  Additionally, he removed tribute on the Mesopotamians that had been
imposed by Trajan (SHA Had. 21). Despite Hadrian’s pacifist approach to policy
in the East, his actions and apparent policy does fit the framework of Roman
policy.
  Hadrian was in fact guided by the tenents of the patron-client relationship.  In
fact, the role he played was that of the benevolent patron who looked after the
wellbeing of his clients. Further, receiving delegations and envoys from foreign
kings was still important to the Romans, as it represented their superiority to all
other peoples. The Historiae Augustae note that under Hadrian, ‘the kings of the
Bactrians send envoys to him to beg humbly for his friendship’ (SHA Had. 21).
Hadrian was in fact deeply concerned about the image that Rome projected to
her potential enemies as well as to her allies, to ensure that they stayed in line.
  Hadrian is perhaps best known for his travels around the Empire, during
which he oversaw even the minutest of matters. One of Hadrian’s principal
concerns during his travels was the state of the Roman army and, consequently,

Whittaker (2004) 8; SHA Hadrian 21.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

the image that that army projected to friend or foe. Dio states that ‘Hadrian
went from one province to another, visiting the districts and cities and observing
all the garrisons and fortifications’. As to Hadrian’s scrupulous attention to
detail, Dio says that ‘he personally oversaw and investigated absolutely
everything, not merely the usual appurtenances of camps,—I mean weapons
and engines and ditches and enclosures and palisades’ and that ‘so thoroughly by
action and exhortations did he train and discipline the whole military force
throughout the whole empire that even now the methods then introduced by
him are the soldiers’ law of campaigning. This best explains why he lived for the
most part at peace with foreign nations’ (69.9). By overseeing the army in this
way, Hadrian ensured that Rome projected an image of constant readiness
aimed at deterring aggression of hostile peoples.
Even under Hadrian, though, all was not at peace. Once again, a serious
revolt would arise in Judea in 132, which lasted roughly three years. As a result,
the Roman garrison there was strengthened to two legions along with a similar
number of auxiliaries, totaling nearly twenty thousand men, and, as Fergus
Millar had noted, this constituted the largest garrison of a province with no
external frontier.

Such a large force in a non-frontier province demonstrates,

as Isaac would claim, that one of the major roles of the army was, and continued
for some time to be, internal policing duties.

(d) PARTHIAN INVASION, ROMAN RESPONSE

Hadrian’s reign had marked an about-face from Trajan’s aggressive policy in the
East. He had improved relations with Parthia while maintaining the image of
Rome and there was peace between the two empires. This continued into the
reign of Antoninus Pius, but it appears that at some point during his reign the
rattling of swords had begun in Parthia. The Parthians were apparently
threatening Armenia. The Historiae Augustae tell us that Pius ‘induced the king of
the Parthians to forgo a campaign against the Armenians merely by writing him
a letter’ (SHA Ant. Pius 9). Although Pius’ letter must have been thoroughly
intimidating, as we are told the Parthians did back down, the aggressive intent of
the Parthians still remained. Despite the averted attack, the Parthian king
Vologases was actively planning to make war on Rome and it seems that he was
waiting until conditions were opportune (SHA M.Ant. 8). The peace that had
begun under Hadrian’s reign came to an abrupt end with the death of Pius and
the ascension of Marcus Aurelius and his colleague Lucius Verus in 161.
Exactly how long after the death of Pius the war began is unknown, but it
seems likely that in Pius’ death and the succession of a new emperor Vologases
saw his opportunity to take Armenia and invade Syria. The war began

Isaac (1992) 106; Millar (1993) 107f.

F A R T H E R E A S T

sometime in 162

with the Parthians invading Armenia and at Elegeia

annihilating a Roman force under the command of the governor of Cappadocia,
Severianus.

Having secured Armenia, the Parthians moved into Syria, where

the governor of that province, Attidius Cornelianus was routed (SHA M.Ant. 8).
Marcus dispatched his colleague Lucius Verus to take command of the Parthian
war.
Verus arrived in Antioch, collected an army, and, through his legates, Statius
Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and Martius Verus, prosecuted the war. The Romans
were able to drive the Parthians from Syria and in 163 we are told that ‘Dausara
and Nicephorium and Artaxata were taken by storm under your [Verus’]
leadership and auspices’ and that ‘the Armenian campaign was successfully
prosecuted under Statius Priscus, Artaxata being taken’ (SHA M.Ant. 9). With
Armenia secured, the Romans placed Sohaemus (Armenian king ousted by the
Parthians when they invaded) on the throne of that kingdom, reconstituting it as
a client-kingdom (Dio 71.2). Driving the Parthians from Syria and Armenia was,
however, not enough; the Romans had to exact revenge,

strike terror into the

enemy and ‘even the score’ (so to speak) to ensure that Parthia understood its
position as a second-rate power.  This ultimately meant restoring the image of
Rome.
  From the outset of the conflict with Parthia, we are given a clear indication
that the Romans intended to exact revenge and restore the image of Rome. In
addition to the fact that a Roman force under Severianus had been destroyed,
Fronto, in a letter to Marcus Aurelius says, ‘both the restoration of the prestige
of the Roman name, and the punishment of the enemies’ traps and treachery’.
(Princ. Hist. 2.17f.). Although fragmentary, Fronto’s passage clearly indicates the
need to restore Rome’s prestige and the conviction that punishment was
required. What this translated to in terms of Roman action was a campaign into
Parthian territory. The objective was not conquest, but rather, much like
Germanicus’ campaign against the Germans, to exact revenge. According to
the  Historiae Augustae Verus’ generals ‘Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and
Martius Verus for four years conducted the war until they advanced to Babylon
and Media,’ and Dio tells us that ‘Cassius pursued him [Vologases] as far as
Seleucia and destroyed it and razed to the ground the palace of Vologaesus at
Ctesiphon’.

The destruction wrought by Cassius not only served to exact

revenge, but it also was intended to instill fear into the Parthians reminiscent of
that unleashed on Carthage and Corinth. The success of Cassius’ campaign also
brought with it an expansion of the eastern frontier.
The Romans did in fact reconstitute the Mesopotamian frontier first
organized by Trajan, but abandoned by Hadrian.

Additionally, Dura was

Dating based on Fronto letter to Marcus Aurelius dated to 162.

Dio 71.2; SHA Marcus Antoninus 8.

Mattern (1999) 188f.

Dio 71. 2; SHA Verus 7.

That northern Mesopotamia was annexed at this time is evidenced by Dio 76. 1.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

seized. Like Trajan’s annexation of Mesopotamia, the addition was a defensive
measure to curtail Parthian influence in Armenia and to serve as a buffer to
protect Syria. We can judge the effectiveness of this arrangement by the fact
that from the end of the Parthian war in about 165/66 to the outbreak of civil
war in the time of the Persian king Shapur I (240’s), Syria and Armenia
remained untouched by the Parthians. Perhaps a result of Cassius’ campaign
was that the Parthians lost the constitution to challenge the Romans directly;
however, they did seek to undermine Rome’s grip on the province of
Mesopotamia, especially when the opportunity presented itself when the Empire
was engulfed by civil wars in 192/193 and 196/197.
The assassination of Commodus in 192 brought with it civil war. Before
emerging as the victor, Septimius Severus had to defeat a rival claimant in the
East, Pescennius Niger, who had gained as allies Parthia, Hatra, and Adiabene.

Additionaly, either while this conflict was occurring or shortly after, Dio tells us
that Osroene and Adiabene revolted; their forces were besieging Nisibis and
apparently some towns in Roman Mesopotamia were also taken.

It seems

likely that these revolts were the work of the Parthians .

To add insult to

injury, once Severus emerged as the victor of the civil war, Osroene and
Adiabene dispatched ambassadors to Severus; though bearing gifts, they ‘were
not willing either to abandon the walled towns they had captured or to accept
the imposition of tributes, but they desired those in existence to be lifted from
the country’ (Dio 76.1). From this several motives are discernable for the
campaign that Severus was to carry out against Osroene and Adiabene. First
and foremost, Roman Mesopotamia was in danger; the chief fortress-city Nisibis
was under siege, and for this Osroene and Adiabene would have to pay the
price. Similarly, their lack of respect for Roman power and authority had to be
punished in light of the refusal to pay tribute, surrender captured towns in
Mesopotamia, and the demanding of the elimination of existing tribute. Lastly,
though on a more personal level for Severus, Osroene, Adiabene, and Hatra had
to be punished for aiding his defeated rival Niger. Failure to take any action
would have likely resulted in the loss of Mesopotamia and would have served to
embolden Rome’s chief enemy, Parthia.
Severus conducted a successful campaign, crossing the Euphrates and reliev-
ing Nisibis. Following this success, he secured Mesopotamia and subdued those
who had revolted.

To exact revenge, Severus’ legates ‘proceeded to lay waste

to the land of the barbarians and to capture their cities’ (Dio 76.2). This brought
the campaign to a successful close and upon that, according to Dio, the emperor
proudly declared that he had ‘won a mighty territory and rendered it a bulwark

Herodian 3.1.2; SHA Severus 9.

Dio 76.1.

Debevoise (1968) 256; The Chronicle of Arbella 6, states that Vologases IV took many lands from the

Romans which Debevoise has interpreted to mean that the Parthian king had incited revolt in
Osroene and Adiabene.

Dio 76.3; SHA Severus 9.

F A R T H E R E A S T

of Syria’ (Dio 76.3).  Clearly Severus viewed the reestablishment of control of
northern Mesopotamia not merely as a conquest, but rather more importantly,
as an aggressive measure taken in the defense of Syria by providing it with a
buffer zone.
  Severus now also planned to invade Parthia for the part it had played in
fomenting revolt and aiding Niger.  However, before he could move against
Parthia, Clodius Albinus, Severus’ Caesar, revolted, and so the Empire once
again descended into civil war. This was a ripe opportunity for the Parthians,
under Vologases IV, to take action, and they invaded Mesopotamia and laid
siege to Nisibis (Dio 76.9). The Parthians appear to have succeeded in capturing
most of the province, as Dio states that they ‘had thus been able by an
expedition in full force to capture Mesopotamia. They also came very near
reducing Nisibis, and would have done so, had not Laetus, who was besieged
there, preserved the place’ (Dio 76.9).  Severus emerged from the civil war as the
victor once again, and traveled east to deal with the Parthians in Mesopotamia.
  The Parthians appear to have known of Severus’ approach and lifted the siege
of Nisibis and retreated from Mesopotamia. Severus received hostages from the
kings of both Armenia and Osroene, thus cementing them as reliable client
kingdoms (Hdn. 3.9.3f.). With Mesopotamia secured, Severus, like Trajan
before him, constructed a fleet of ships and, partly by marching, partly by
sailing, advanced down the Euphrates, taking Seleucia and Babylon, which had
been abandoned by the enemy.

Desiring retribution for the Parthian invasion

of Mesopotamia, and the Parthians’ likely role in fomenting revolt in Adiabene
and Osroene, Severus’ army ‘began to devastate the region, driving off the cattle
it came across for provisions, and burning down the villages in its way’ (Hdn.
3.9.10). The Romans then came to Ctesiphon, capturing and sacking the
Parthian capital. Both Dio and Herodian emphasize the slaughter that occurred
when Ctesiphon was sacked, as well as the large amount of booty with which the
Romans came away.

This was clearly not conquest, it was revenge,

punishment for Parthian aggression against Rome. Additionally, none of our
sources indicate any Roman attempt to occupy southern Mesopotamia. By
devastating the region and sacking the capital, Ctesiphon, the Romans sought
not only to weaken Parthia, but also to instill fear into the minds of the
Parthians, ensuring that they would accept their status as second to Rome. So
with his Parthian campaign a success, Severus withdrew from southern
Mesopotamia and moved against his next target, Hatra.
Marching north along the Tigris, Severus crossed Mesopotamia and laid siege
to Hatra. The defenses of this city were impressive, as is evidenced by both
ancient accounts and by modern archaeology. Herodian states that the city was
‘encircled by enormous, strong walls and teeming with archers’ (Hdn. 3.9.3f.)
and aerial photography has revealed an outer wall with numerous towers as well

Dio 76.9; Herodian 3.9.9f.

Dio 76.9; Herodian 3.9.10f.

R O M A N P O L I C Y I N T H E E A S T

as a modest inner wall.

The Romans made several attempts to take the city,

but against the formidable defenses and stout resistance of the population,
ultimately failed. Despite the failure to take Hatra, there is evidence that the city
aligned itself with Rome rather than Parthia and so some agreement may have
been reached before Severus left. Evidence appears on coins which depict an
eagle with wings spread and the symbol SC and a statue of Sanatruq II (King of
Hatra) carrying a shield depicting Hercules, who was the protector of the
imperial family.

Additionally, Latin inscriptions attest the presence of Roman

soldiers in Hatra during the time of Gordian III.

So what had seemingly

appeared to be a failure resulted in some measure of success with the acquisition
of Hatra as an ally, which, ultimately meant to the Romans client status.

(b) STRATEGIC SHIFT: MOVEMENT OF

LEGIONS FARTHER EAST

For his campaign against the Parthians, Severus had raised three new legions,
the I, II, and III Parthica legions. Given the apparent threat of Parthian invasion
and interference in Roman Mesopotamia, it only made sense that the defenses of
the province be strengthened. Severus recognized this reality (as previously
detailed, the Parthians had invaded Roman Mesopotamia while Severus was
fighting Albinus) and therefore gave the province its first permanent garrison,
stationing the legion I Parthica at Singara and III Parthica at Nisibis.

The II

Parthica was stationed just outside Rome following Severus’ campaigns in the
East, however, it would go on to serve under Caracalla, Severus Alexander, and
Gordian in the East and under each of these emperors, wintered in Apamea, as
indicated by inscriptions that bear the legion’s honorary titles Antoniniana,
Severiana, and Gordiana, as well as funerary monuments of legionaries.

It is also believed that at this time the legions stationed at Zeugma and
Samosata were moved to new bases. This seems a logical move since Roman
control of northern Mesopotamia eliminated the need to control the Euphrates
crossing at Zeugma and maintain the presence of a legion at Samosata. As such,
the legion XVI Flavia was moved from Samosata to Sura; there is disagreement
as to where the IV Scythica (originally at Zeugma) moved to, either to Oriza or
Oresa (Talibeh), the latter of which is recorded by the Notitia Dignitatum.

If the

IV Scythica was moved to Oriza it would have reinforced the legions at Nisibis
and Singara and could also easily stike into Parthia; if at Oresa it would serve
not only to defend Syria, but could march to Sura, Circesium, or Dura to
reinforce those points, or alternatively, from Circesium or Dura, strike into
Parthia. The XVI Flavia at Sura was also well positioned as it could protect

Kennedy (1990) 105f.

Sartre (2005) 345.

Kennedy (1990) 107.

Sartre (2005) 137; Kennedy (1990) 127.

Balty & van Rengen (1993) 13f.

Kennedy (1990) 116, 137; Millar (1993) 130; Williams (1996) 186.