Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann, Georgi Derluguian and Craig

Calhoun, Does Capitalism Have a Future?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN:

9780199330843 (cloth); ISBN: 9780199330850 (paper)

In Does Capitalism Have a Future? Immanuel Wallerstein, Randall Collins, Michael Mann,

Georgi Derluguian and Craig Calhoun superbly accomplish their main objective: to draw on their

accumulated scholarship in macrohistorical sociology to generate a productive and wide-ranging

debate–full of disagreement, insight, and provocation–on whether the “deeper structural

dynamics” of capitalism give it the capacity to remain viable over the next few decades. To be

clear, the debate “is not whether capitalism is better or worse than any hitherto existing society.

The question is: Does it have a future?” (p.3).

In pursuing this question, the authors start from a common intellectual foundation of

broadly Marxian and Weberian scholarship focusing on the structures of social power and

conflict (p.164). But they didn’t congregate to simply agree with each other. Indeed, although

they agree on a number of major points, a few of which are mentioned below, they ultimately

significantly differ in their conclusions. In making their arguments, they also address a number

of related questions, including: what might replace capitalism; what must occur if it is to survive;

whether capitalism’s ontology is that of a system or that of one social network interacting with

others; whether the rise of the BRICS strengthens and creates a more egalitarian capitalism or

whether it instead compounds its problems and accelerates its demise; what the significance of

the environmental crisis, viz. climate change, is to capitalism’s future; whether capitalism’s

displacement of labour through technology will now render two-thirds of the global middle class

structurally unemployed; and what the relatively fast unravelling of the Soviet system suggests

about the fate of capitalism.

The stakes are clearly high. Having emerged some five centuries ago, the capitalist

world-economy is today not just dominant, but the first to encompass the entire globe and

virtually all of humanity. As a result, the ability–or lack thereof–of capitalism to persist becomes

central to any future approximation of human, and indeed nonhuman, life on Earth. Thus Does

Capitalism Have a Future? should prove valuable to a wide group of scholars in the social

sciences and humanities–not simply those in political economy and sociology–as well as activists

and the general public. Indeed, reaching an audience wider than the university is the authors’

larger goal and the book’s accessible style makes it as readable as it is thought-provoking.

If there’s a criticism of the book as a whole, it’s that the reader may be left wanting more.

Although keeping the book under 200 pages likely increases its non-academic appeal, another

100 pages would have enabled the authors to more robustly justify their arguments. Additionally,

adding more citations and references, including to the authors’ relevant monographs, would

considerably aid the reader in further pursuing their provocative arguments. All this said, the

book is meant to serve as an introduction and spark for further dialogue and research. Evaluated

as such, it excels.

Immanuel Wallerstein and Randall Collins both argue, in different but mutually compatible

ways, that capitalism is nearing its structural limits and will cease to exist c. 2040. Wallerstein is

a leading scholar of world-systems analysis. A key premise for Wallerstein is that capitalism is a

system, and like all systems it has a (finite) life during which it operates according to a specific

set of rules. When it inevitably reaches the maximum extent to which it can execute these rules,

it enters a structural and terminal crisis which concludes with the system going out of existence.

The defining objective of the capitalist system is “the persistent search for the endless

accumulation of capital–the accumulation of capital in order to accumulate more capital” (p.10).

As Wallerstein sees it, capitalists are increasingly finding it difficult to accumulate capital.

What’s causing these difficulties? Wallerstein argues that capitalism features, and has

featured from its crystallization 500 years ago in the “long 16

century”, three long-term trends.

Specifically, the fundamental costs to capitalists–personnel, inputs, and taxation–have all steadily

increased as a percentage of revenue. Wallerstein argues that these trends neared their asymptotes

c. 1970, triggering an increasing structural profit squeeze and capitalism’s terminal crisis. The

crisis has been compounded by a massive cultural change, also precipitating c. 1970, which

dislodged the dominance of centrist liberalism and therefore increased the system’s political

instability. Rather than alleviate capitalism’s difficulties, the rise of the BRICS only acts to

further destabilize the system and intensify the challenges in accumulating capital. The terminal

crisis will persist for the next few decades and by c. 2040 the world will be organised in some

non-capitalist system(s). Whether the successor system(s) repeats the hierarchy, exploitation, and

polarization characteristic of capitalism, or whether it will instead be relatively democratic and

egalitarian, will largely be determined through the political struggle taking place now and in the

remaining decades of the terminal crisis.

Whereas Wallerstein sees rising costs producing a structural profit squeeze, Collins sees

the end of capitalism developing through a different mechanism over the next few decades. The

displacement of labour by technology–robotics, artificial intelligence, and information

technology–will increasingly render the majority of the middle class structurally unemployed

and, in doing so, will create unsustainable political agitation and extinguish the effective demand

needed for capitalism’s reproduction. Collins argues that the five “escapes” which have thus far

prevented the technological displacement of labour from completely undermining capitalism are

now becoming blocked, and, as a result, are increasing structural unemployment. These five

escapes are: the creation of new jobs and employment sectors; new geographical markets; meta-

markets in finance; Keynesianism in the form of government employment and investment; and

educational credential inflation.

Whatever their successes up to now, Collins argues that ultimately none of the five

escapes can prevent capitalism’s competitively-induced technological displacement of labour

from driving increasing structural unemployment. More jobs are now being destroyed than

created; there are ever fewer “peripheries” to be integrated; financialisation is increasing

systemic risk and volatility; the ability of nation states to sustain Keynesianism has been severely

strained; and rising student debt is increasingly squeezing the middle classes. For Collins, then,

capitalism’s end is a question of when, not if, and the answer depends on the rate at which

structural unemployment rises. He figures structural unemployment could grow to 50% by 2040

and that once 50%-70% of the human population capable of working is unemployed, capitalism

would be under too much pressure from insufficient effective demand and too much political

agitation to survive. Thus, like Wallerstein, Collins thinks the only possible outcome will be the

formation of some non-capitalist system. Unlike Wallerstein, Collins further speculates that the

world might thereafter oscillate between periods of capitalism and socialism.

Whereas Wallerstein and Collins both predict the end of capitalism, Michael Mann argues

that capitalism can survive. Unlike Wallerstein and Collins, Mann argues that nothing internal to

capitalism can generate its demise because capitalism has virtually limitless capacity for

productive intensification. For Mann, the biggest threat capitalism faces is “external” to it: the

intersection of the environmental crisis and inadequate political mobilization. Barring such an

externally-driven end to capitalism, Mann offers two schematic alternatives to how capitalism

may unfold. The first–the “pessimistic” and least likely of the two–is the development of a “2/3-

1/3” society in which two-thirds do well and have regular employment while the other third are

unemployed and excluded. The second–more “optimistic” and likely–is a low-growing and more

equal global capitalism, albeit with an excluded class of 10%-20% of the population. Mann

argues that low-growth capitalism has a precedent in the UK in the 18

and 19

centuries when it

achieved only 1% annual growth. It happened before, he argues, so it can happen again.

Craig Calhoun sits somewhere between Wallerstein and Collins on the one side and Mann

on the other. He agrees with Mann about the importance of “external” threats to capitalism,

namely, the environmental crisis, but views capitalism’s internal contradictions as more serious

than Mann allows. His main argument is that capitalism’s survival is largely contingent on the

renewal of its social institutions. In other words, Calhoun’s view suggests neoliberalism is an

unsustainable mode of capitalist development because capitalism necessarily requires an

institutional support network of states, non-profit organizations, families, and so on to both

reproduce its preconditions–for example, infrastructure–as well as bear the costs of its damages,

including pollution and environmental degradation, and unemployment. This is because

capitalism is an “externalization regime” (p.147) that depends on expelling costs from capital’s

income statement, exporting them to the rest of the socioecological formation, so “issues like

pollution and unemployment in volatile markets demand the attention of governments or other

social institutions” (p.132). In short, Calhoun argues that capitalism requires organizations other

than firms to do considerable work in making continuous capital accumulation possible, and

because neoliberalism has eroded these very social institutions and exacerbated associated

damages the question is now, in Wallerstein and Collins’ language, “whether such globally-

escalating costs can be at all sustained by capitalism” (p.177).

Unlike the others, Georgi Derluguian does not develop an argument as to whether

capitalism has a future. Instead, he mainly charts the history of the formation of the USSR and its

sudden end in 1989 to understand what broad mobilizations from below, and panic among elites,

might tell us about the political future of capitalism. In doing so, he also notes that Collins and

Wallerstein both correctly predicted the fall of the Soviet Union and that, like their predictions

about capitalism’s future, their predictions about the USSR’s end focused on different but

mutually compatible mechanisms: Collins focused on its military overextension (the struggle to

control allies and confront rivals); Wallerstein on its structural relationship with the capitalist

world-economy (“socialism in one country…may not last unless the whole capitalist world-

system is replaced by a different historical system where capital accumulation is no longer the

paramount priority” [p.112-113]).

So, what does Derluguian see in capitalism’s future? Although his comments suggest he’s

persuaded by Wallerstein and Collins, he doesn’t make specific predictions about whether

capitalism is at the end of its rope. Instead, he thinks the crisis of capitalism in the 21

century

will primarily unfold in the world-economy as a class struggle over public control of economic

institutions, as contrasted with its 20

century crisis which unfolded as a military struggle

between states. This class struggle will mostly take place in the core, i.e. wealthy, states where

social movements have a greater historical legacy and where democratic politics have stronger

institutions. As in the past, racism and nationalism will return and be a major danger. In sum,

Derluguian suggests the enduring lesson of the rise and demise of the USSR is that insurgent

movements from below failed to take advantage of the deadlock and disorganisation of political

elites. Thinking smartly about building coalitions and the trade-offs involved will be crucial as

the 21

century crisis of capitalism unfolds.

The authors’ arguments indicate two points of agreement worth highlighting. First, they

agree the world has entered a “stormy and murky” period which will last a few decades. The

familiar configurations of global political economy will change in significant ways not yet

evident, and three outcomes are possible. Broadly outlined they are: the terminal crisis of

capitalism as world-system; replacement of the older, Western core states by newer ones, i.e. the

BRICS; and a global-scale environmental shock with uncertain transformations. Second, they

agree that despite, or perhaps in part because of, the tumult and uncertainty, the future remains

considerably open. The political struggle and construction and timing of new political structures

will crucially determine our collective trajectory and destination.

Before turning to the book’s main contributions and suggestions for further research, two

criticisms are worth making. The first deals with Mann’s assessment that the most likely future is

that of a low-growth capitalism which, through the rise of the BRICS, becomes more globally

equal and is forced to rely on high labour productivity and consumer demand rather than highly

exploited labour. As historical evidence, he claims that post-WWII capitalism in North America

and Western Europe featured such a reliance on high labour productivity and consumer demand

rather than highly exploited (Southern) labour. Capitalism did it then, and it can do it again. The

first problem is that Mann’s view is in significant tension with the notion of core-periphery in

world-systems analysis. Core-periphery theory sees the accumulation of capital as necessarily

relying on a significantly unequal geographical relation between the core–where relatively

monopolized and thus profitable firms are located–and the periphery–where relatively

competitive and thus minimally profitable firms are located. The challenge, then, for Mann is to

show that post-WWII capital in North America and Western Europe, where most core firms were

located, did not rely upon the unequal core-periphery relation with firms in the South. The

second problem is that the past few decades seem to challenge the view that the BRICS will

usher in greater global equality as they rise: greater equality amongst states has been

accompanied by greater inequality within states.

The second is an issue in Calhoun’s prognosis that rather than collapse, capitalism “may

organize less of social, economic, and political life” (p.135). This is confusing because Calhoun

affirms that capitalism “is in the end a growth machine” (p.160) and so the only way it could

organize less of social, economic, and political life is if the total amount of such activity grew

faster than that organized by capitalism. Historically, the opposite seems to have happened:

rather than organize less, capitalism’s relentless expansion-through-commodification has brought

more and more hitherto non-capitalist activity into its fold. Calhoun may be suggesting that

capitalism in the future will grow at a slower rate that lags behind the rate of growth in non-

capitalist activity yet this doesn’t seem to be a likely interpretation because he makes no

reference to capitalism growing slowly in the future. Instead, Calhoun might be suggesting that

capitalism, which could be understood as a social formation in which capital forms the dominant

set of rules, would end but that capital itself would persist in a delimited fashion, as it had prior

to capitalism’s formation (p.10-11; see also Karatani 2014: 25). Such an interpretation also fits

more closely with the authors’ speculations about whether different sectors of a postcapitalist

world economy could function on different principles (p.191).

Overall, the book makes a number of valuable contributions and suggestions for further research.

First and foremost, it persuasively argues that capitalism’s future is not as secure as it might

seem: whether it will survive, not just over the long-run, but in the medium term of the next few

decades, is an open question. In making their arguments, the authors demonstrate that asking

such “big-picture” questions about capitalism and world-society are not necessarily fruitless

endeavours and can instead produce substantial insight and open new lines of research.

Secondly, the arguments, and particularly Collins’, force us to reconsider, both on

theoretical and empirical grounds, the relationships between technology, employment

effective

demand, and the

state

in capitalism’s development. As Collins exemplifies, there i

s a growing

discourse, and not just from the Left, that capitalism’s continual technological development in

the form of robotics, information technology, and artificial intelligence may now finally destroy

more jobs than it creates. Indeed, Marxist geographer David Harvey makes arguments similar to

Collins in his recently published book, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. In a

chapter on the contradiction of “technology, work, and human disposability”, he notes that

although labour-saving technological development is central to capital accumulation, “the

contradiction between value production on the one hand and runaway labour-saving

technological innovation on the other is headed into more and more dangerous territory. This

danger confronts not only an increasingly disposable population facing no foreseeable

employment opportunities but also (as even Ford clearly sees) the reproduction of capital itself”

(Harvey 2014: 108).

Harvey labels labour-saving technological development technology with six others as a

“moving” contradiction, that is, one which changes over time and space (as he sees things, there

are three contradictions posing a danger to the reproduction of capital itself–namely, endless

compound growth, capital’s relation to nature, and universal alienation). Whether this suggests

some ambiguity or hesitation about whether capital’s drive to save labour will terminate

capitalism is unclear. What is clear enough, however, is that ongoing advancements in robotics,

1 Harvey is here referring to the writer and software-developer Martin Ford (2009).

information technology, and artificial intelligence make more pressing further theoretical work

on capitalism’s interrelation of technology, employment, effective demand, and the state.

Finally, and particularly relevant to geographers, the book indicates that m

uch work

remains to be done to theorize the materiality of capitalism. The authors highlight the

significance of extra-human natures to capitalism in different ways. Yet despite the close

temporal proximity between the alleged end of capitalism and the onset of a global-scale

environmental crisis, the authors do not provide a robust theorization of what appears to be

something more than a mere contingent relation between these two massive, both spatially and

temporally, events.

David Harvey gets its right when on his back-cover endorsement he says “This should be

mandatory reading for every college student in the world, not because it furnishes the answers

but because it opens up all the most important questions.” Not just for undergraduates, Does

Capitalism Have a Future? has the potential to re-orientate and re-situate the thinking, work, and

everyday engagement of scholars and the wider public alike with its vision that a new political

horizon may be emerging–one in which capitalism has an uncertain place, if a place at all.

References

Ford M (2009) The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology, and the

Economy of the Future. New York: Acculant

Harvey D (2014) Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. New York: Oxford

University Press

Karatani K (2014) The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of

Exchange (trans M K Bourdaghs). Durham: Duke University Press