WW1ATSEA

Writtenby

JamesTyrell

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproduced,storedinorintroducedintoa
retrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans(electronic.mechanical,
photocopying,recordingorotherwise)withoutthewrittenpermissionofthepublishers.

Contents

Introduction

TheWarBegins

TheBackgroundtotheBuildUptoWar

Th

e

NavalArmsRace1890

-

1914

TheEarlyStag

e

sofWar

TheBattleofHeligolandBight

TheSurfaceRaidersandtheBattlesofCoronelandtheFalklands

TheSurfaceRaiders

TheBattleofCoronel

TheBattleoftheFalklands

DoggerBank

TurkeyandMesopotamia

GermanyandTurkey1914

ForcingtheDardanelles

Mesopotamia1914-1918

SubmarinesandTheBaltic

TheCreationoftheBritishSubmarineService

TheBaltic

TheBattleofJutland

DefeatingtheU-BoatandtheFinalStagesofWar

UnrestrictedSubmarineWarfare

ZeebruggeandOstend

TheFinalStagesofWar

Profiles

Beatty,David,firstEarlBeatty(1871

-

1936)

Fish

e

r,JohnArbuthnot,fir

s

tBaronFi

s

h

e

r(1841

-

1920)

Hipper,Franzvon(1863-1932)

Jellicoe,JohnRushworth,firstEarlJellicoe(1859-1935)

Keyes,RogerJohnBrownlow,firstBaronKeyes(1872-1945)

Scheer,AdmiralReinhardt(1863

-

1928)

Spee,AdmiralMaximilianvon(1861-1914)

Tirpitz,AdmiralAlfredvan(1849-1930)

Tyrwhitt,SirReginaldYorke(1870-1951)

Chronology

Introduction

I

m

a

geso

fWWIinth

e

popular

c

on

sc

iou

s

n

ess

normall

yi

n

vo

l

ve

th

e

blood

y

attrit

i

onof

tr

e

n

c

h

w

arfar

e,

th

e

mil

es

ofmud

,

th

es

hatt

e

r

e

dearth,th

e

tangl

e

dmil

es

ofbarb

e

dwir

e.

H

oweve

r,th

e

r

e

wasanoth

e

r

s

ignifi

ca

ntar

e

n

ao

f

w

ar

-

th

e

battl

e

forcontrolofth

ese

a.Th

e

w

ar

a

t

se

ah

as

r

ece

i

ve

dl

ess

att

e

ntionpartlybecauseiti

s

l

e

ssimm

e

di

a

t

e

l

y

dr

a

mati

c

.Th

e

RoyalNavyhadtoplayalonggam

e

in

s

u

s

tainingth

e

distantblockadethatwould

eve

ntuall

yc

rippl

e

G

e

rman

y.

TheNavyprovidedthescr

ee

n,which

e

nabl

e

dth

e

waron

land.

In1914,atthebeginningofth

e

war,B

r

itain’

s

maritim

es

upr

e

ma

cy

hadremain

e

d

unchall

e

ng

e

df

o

raroundahundr

e

d

ye

ar

s

.Man

y

exp

e

ct

e

danoth

er

Battl

eo

fTrafal

g

arbut

adv

a

n

ces

intechnolog

y

sa

w

a

ve

r

y

diff

e

r

e

ntkindof

w

arfar

e

withthewidespr

e

adus

e

of

m

i

n

es

,

s

ubmarin

es

and

to

rp

e

d

oes.

Th

e

rewasast

ee

pl

e

arning

c

ur

ve

a

s

th

e

impa

c

t

oft

h

e

n

e

wtechnologywasinitiall

y

und

e

r

es

timat

e

dbyb

o

th

si

d

e

sandn

e

ith

e

rsidehadexp

e

ri

e

n

ce

of

co

mmandinfl

ee

t

actio

n

.

Th

eex

p

e

rien

ceo

fth

e

Fir

s

tW

or

l

d

Wa

rwo

ulddomu

c

hto

informtheSecondWorldWar,parti

c

ularl

y

intheu

seo

fa

v

iation.

Th

e

waratseaaffectedeveryoceanintheworld,andin

a

bookofthissiz

e

itisimpossible

toconsid

e

rallth

es

m

a

ll

e

r

c

onfli

c

tsin

e

ver

y

ar

e

na.Thebook

e

xamin

e

sth

eeve

nt

s

thatled

towarandthenavalarmsrac

e

b

e

t

wee

nBrit

a

inandG

e

rman

y.

Ittra

c

estheeventsofth

e

w

arat

se

a

,

.

l

oo

kingatth

e

majorbattl

e

s,theeffectsofunrestri

c

t

e

d

s

ubmarin

e

warfar

e

and

someofthekeyprotagonists

.

TheWarBegins

Vi

c

toryattheBattleofTrafalgarandthedefeatofNapoleonatWaterloosawth

e

startof

an

e

rainwhichBritain’smaritimesupremacywasvirtuallyunchallengedfornearlya

hundredyears.However,asthenineteenth

ce

nturydrewtoaclose,Britain’sEmpirewas

beginningtof

ee

lthestrain,withwarinSouthAfricaandincreasingt

e

nsionoverthe

questionofHomeRuleinIreland.Noneth

e

l

e

ss,Britainin1900wasstillthewealthiest

nationinth

e

world.Shewasdependentonhers

e

apowerforworldtradeandtoimport

sufficientfoodtof

ee

dadenselypopulat

e

disland.Itwasessentialthatsh

e

maintainedher

maritim

e

supremacyandfearoflosingitwastob

ec

om

e

adominantfeatureofthe

e

arly

tw

e

nti

e

thc

e

ntur

y

.

TheBackgroundtotheBuildUptoWar

T

e

nsionswerebeginningtomountthroughoutEurope

f

romthe1890sonwardsandth

e

s

e

y

e

ar

s

sawanint

e

nsifi

ca

ti

o

n

o

fambitiou

s

nationalismthatw

o

uldultimat

e

l

y

l

e

adtothe

outbreakofWorldWarOn

e

.Th

e

balanc

e

b

e

twe

e

nth

e

majorEuropeanpowersstart

e

dto

shiftwithth

e

riseofth

e

GermanEmpire.Successfulwarsin1866againstth

e

Austrian

EmpireandagainstFrancein1870sawth

e

unif

ic

at

i

onofGermanstateswithth

e

KingdomofPru

ss

iato

c

r

e

at

e

whatwasth

e

mostpowerfulempireinEurop

e.

Th

e

Dual

Monar

c

h

y

ofAustria

-

Hungarywasalsoanall

yo

f.G

e

rmany.

E

ve

na

s

lat

e

asth

e

1890s,Britainperceivedherold

e

n

e

m

y

Fran

c

easherbigg

e

strival.The

b

e

liefwasnot

e

ntir

e

lywithoutfoundation

.

Afteritshumiliatingloss

e

stoG

e

rm

a

n

y

,th

e

Fr

e

ncharmyturnedtoAfrica,whichbroughtitint

oc

onfli

c

twithBritishinterests.In

addition,th

e

Fr

e

n

c

hna

vy

hadbe

e

nkeepingabreastofnewtechnologyandin

s

om

ec

a

se

s

hadintroduceditaheadofBritain.Infact,th

e

RoyalNavywastheonlymajormaritim

e

pow

e

rnott

o

hav

es

ubmarin

es

b

y

1900,althoughtherewereplansf

o

rth

e

irintrodu

c

tion.

Britain’sotherfearintheninete

e

nth

ce

ntur

y

wasFran

ce’

smajorally,theRussianEmpire,

whos

ee

xpansion

e

ndangeredBritishroutesintoIndiathroughth

e

MiddleEast.Inorderto

protecttheseroutesintoIndia,Br

i

tainsupportedtheTurkishEmpire.Russia’sambiti

o

n

s

inth

e

Eastw

e

r

e

haltedwhentheyweredefeat

e

db

y

Japaninth

ew

arof1904-5andthe

y

turn

e

dinst

e

adtoward

s

th

e

OttomanEmpir

e

.SlavcommunitiesinGr

eece,

S

e

rbiaand

BulgariatraditionallylookedtoRussiafor

s

upport.Au

s

tri

a

-

Hungarybecameincreasingl

y

f

e

arfulofitsownmin

o

rit

y

SlavpopulationasRussia

e

ncourag

e

dSlavind

e

p

e

nd

e

n

ce.

.

Britainwasalarm

e

d

w

h

e

nRussiaandFrancesignedth

e

DualEnt

e

nt

e

in1891

.

Asolution

tothecountry’sanxieti

es

ma

y

hav

e

b

e

entoallyhers

e

lfwithGermanybutBritain

was

un

w

illingtomakesuchacommitm

e

nt,G

e

rmandiplo

macy

fail

e

dand,mostimportantl

y

,

G

e

rmany’snavalpr

ogra

mm

e

wasad

i

r

e

ctthr

e

attoBritain

.

Britainwa

saw

ar

e

thath

e

r

maritimesupr

e

ma

cy

wa

s

und

e

rthr

e

atandm

a

d

e

analliancewithJapanin1902

.

Thiswa

s

th

e

firstun

io

nthatBritainhadmadeforn

e

arlyahundr

e

d

ye

ars.In1

9

04,Britainputaside

herr

e

centprobl

e

mswithFranc

eove

rAfr

ic

aandenteredintotheso-call

e

dEntente

Cordiale,

a

lthoughthiswasnotaformalallianc

e

.In1907,aft

e

rJapand

e

f

e

at

e

dRussia,

Britainsettl

e

dth

e

bord

e

rdisput

e

sinP

e

rsiaandAfghanistanwithRussiaandform

e

dthe

TripleEnt

e

ntewiththeTsaristEmpireandwithFrance

.

Th

e

agr

ee

m

e

ntdidnotcommit

Britaintoprovidemilitarysupportintheeventofwarbut,whenGermanyatt

e

mptedto

undermineFrance’sinfluenceinMoroccowithashowofnavalmightin1911,Britain
mad

e

h

e

rbackingofFrancemoreexplicit.Asaresultitbecam

ec

lear

e

rthat,inthe

e

v

e

nt

ofwar,Britainwouldmostlik

e

lyprovid

e

militarysupporttotheEntente

.

WarbetweenGermanyandBritainbegantolookmorelik

e

l

y

,asGermanysteppedupits

naval

e

xpan

s

ionand,atthesametime,relationsbetweenRussiaandAustria-Hungary

worsened.In1908,AustriaannexedBosnia-H

e

rzegovinaandthethenSerbgovernment

setupaliberationmovementthatin

c

ludedthecovertt

e

rroristgroupcalledtheBlack

Hand.WithRussiansupport,Serbiaform

e

dtheBalkanLeaguewithGreece,Bulgariaand

Montenegro

.

Theprimaryaimwastor

e

movetheTurksfromth

e

Balkanpeninsulaandthe

firstBalkanwar

s

tart

e

d

i

n1912,atatim

e

wh

e

ntheTurkswerealsod

e

f

e

ndingth

e

irland

s

inLibyafromtheItalianswhohadgrandplan

s

t

oex

p

a

ndth

e

irown

e

mpire

.

Thecountries

inth

e

B

a

lkanL

eag

u

e

w

e

r

ev

i

c

toriousbut

,

in1913,the

y

foughta

seco

nd

w

a

r

b

e

tw

ee

n

them

s

elv

e

soverthegains

.

Serbia’ssucc

esses

l

e

dt

o

gr

ea

tf

e

arsinAustria,whichreached

theirz

e

nithwith

t

h

e

a

ss

assinationinSarajevooftheheirtotheAustrianthron

e,

Archduk

e

FranzFerdinand,on28July1914.Hisa

s

sa

s

sinwa

s

GavriloPrincip,ayoungmemberof

theBlackHand

.

Au

st

ria

‘s

primaryconcernnowwastodestroytheS

e

rbian

e

n

e

m

y

forgood.Knowingthat

Russiawouldcom

e

outinsupportofS

e

rbia,theAustriansfirstmadesur

e

thatG

e

rm

a

n

y

wo

uldsupportth

e

mandthentheyissuedanultimatumt

o

S

e

rbia.Th

e

ultimatumwas

ignoredandsoAu

s

t

ri

ad

e

c

lar

e

dwaron28July.Russia,unwillingtoabandonS

e

rbia,

mobiliz

e

don30JulyandherallyFrance,

e

quallyunwillingtoabandonRussia,plannedto

follow

s

uit.Ru

ss

i

a

nmobilizationwasfollowedbyGermanmobilizati

o

n

.

G

e

rman

y’s

plan

wa

s

toinvadeBelgiumandtohop

e

for

a

qui

c

k

v

i

c

t

o

r

y

o

ve

rFr

a

n

ces

othattheFrench

wouldb

e

un

a

bl

e

t

o

mobil

ize

insupportofRussia.Itwastheinvasion

o

fB

e

lgium

t

hat

dr

e

wBritainintothewar,becauseanimpli

c

itpart

o

fBritishnavalpolicysinceth

e

sixte

e

nthc

e

nturyhadb

ee

nthatth

e

LowCountri

e

sshouldnotfallint

oene

m

y

h

a

nd

s.

Wh

e

n

th

e

Brit

i

shgov

e

rnm

e

nt’

s

r

e

qu

es

tforBelgiann

e

utralit

y

t

o

b

e

r

e

spectedreceivedno

answer,Britaind

ec

lar

e

d

w

aronG

e

rman

y

on4August1914.

Th

e

NavalArmsRace1890

-

1914

Th

eye

arsl

e

adinguptoth

e

Fir

s

tWorldWars

a

wap

e

riod

o

fint

e

ns

e

navalismthroughout

Eur

o

p

e

,andBritainwasno

exce

ption.Therehadn

e

v

e

rb

ee

nap

e

riodwh

e

nth

eco

n

ce

rns

andarmamentofth

e

Ro

y

alNav

y

figur

e

dmor

e

highl

y

inth

e

publicsph

e

re

.

Organization

s

s

uchasth

e

Na

vy

R

ec

ordsSocietyandtheNavyL

e

agu

e

begantoflouri

s

hand

t

h

e

r

e

w

e

re

numerousnaval

ex

hibitions.Alfr

e

dTha

y

erMahan

’

sTheInfluence

o

fSeapoweron

Hi

s

torywaspublishedatthi

s

tim

e

,anditsideaspartlyaff

ec

tedthed

ec

isionsofoth

e

r

nationstobeginbuildingmod

e

rnfle

e

t

s

ofth

e

irowninthehop

e

thatthe

y

couldwi

e

ldthe

kindofinflu

e

nc

e

thatBritainhadacrosstheworld.Japanwasoneofth

e

firstn

a

tionsto

takeupthemaritim

e

chall

e

ngeandBritain

se

tupanavalmissioninTokyoin1882toaid

th

e

m

.

Th

e

odor

e

Roos

e

v

e

ltwasanenthusiasticsupport

e

rofMahanandsol

e

dAmericato

buildupherownnavy,s

e

eingitsexpansion

.

asthek

e

ytoworldpower

.

Howev

e

r,th

e

re

wasnok

ee

nerdis

c

ipl

e

ofMahanthanG

e

rmany’sKais

e

rWilh

e

lmwhohadlongen

v

ied

thenavyofhisgrandmoth

e

r,Qu

ee

nVi

c

toria

.

Th

ee

xperienceofth

e

Rus

s

o

-

Japan

ese

Warof1904-1905,whentheJapanes

e

wip

e

dout

th

e

Russianfl

ee

tatth

e

battleofTsuchima,d

e

monstrat

e

dtoth

e

worldthat,withth

e

threat

fromminesandtorp

e

do

es

,itmad

e

s

e

ns

e

togr

e

atlyext

e

ndtherang

e

atwhichbattl

e

ships

foughteachoth

e

r

.

ItwasseenthatRussianbattl

e

shipscoulda

cc

urat

e

lyfir

e

ov

e

r18,000

yards

.

Th

e

commonpra

c

ti

ce

atthi

s

tim

ei

nth

e

RoyalNavywastotarg

e

tataround3,000

y

ardsbut

f

utur

e

battl

e

s,itwas

c

l

e

ar,wouldbefoughtatrang

es

off

i

v

e

t

o

t

e

nmil

e

s,and

thism

e

antthatbattleshipswouldb

e

b

es

t

ar

m

e

d

w

ithlong

-

rang

e

12-inchguns

,

support

e

d

b

y

flot

i

lla

softo

rp

e

doboat

s

.AdmiralJohn(Jack

y

)Fish

e

r

,w

h

o

hadju

s

tb

ee

napp

o

int

e

d

Fir

s

tS

e

aLordin1904,almo

s

timm

e

di

a

t

e

l

yse

td

es

ign

e

rstoworktocreatewhatwould

b

ec

om

e

HM

S

Dr

e

adnought,laun

c

h

e

dinFebruary1906

.

Dr

e

adnough

tw

a

sar

m

e

d

w

itht

e

n

12-inchguns,doublethenumb

e

rof

a

n

yo

th

e

rv

esse

l,and

c

ouldr

e

a

c

hspeedsof21knots,

which

w

a

s,o

n

a

v

e

rag

e

,thr

ee

knotsfasterthanmostbattl

e

ships.Th

e

laun

c

h

o

fth

e

Dr

e

adnoughteffectivelymadealloth

e

rbattl

es

hip

so

b

s

ol

e

t

e

andforcedtheGerman

Admiral

,

von

Tirpit

z

,to

s

u

s

p

e

ndhis

s

hipbuildingprogrammesothatth

e

G

e

rm

a

nna

vyco

uldb

e

ginit

s

ownplansfordreadnought-

c

la

ssvesse

l

s

.Itultimat

e

l

y

intensifiedtheAnglo

-

G

e

rman

n

av

alr

ace.

Th

erew

a

sg

r

e

at

e

x

c

it

e

mentinBritainov

e

rth

e

Dreadn

o

ugh

t,

althoughFish

e

r’scritics

wereconc

e

rn

e

d

‘

ab

o

utnotonl

y

th

ee

normouscostofbuildingitbutalsoth

ec

o

s

tof

re

p

l

a

ce

m

e

nt

i

fitwaslost,especiall

y

sinc

e

Fish

e

rhad

ac

tu

a

ll

y

b

ee

n

a

ppoint

e

dtom

a

ke

c

uts

inna

v

alsp

e

nding

.

N

ever

th

e

l

esss

h

e

in

s

p

ire

d

ac

l

asso

f

ve

s

se

lthatb

ec

am

e

k

now

n

un

ivers

all

y

a

s

th

e

d

re

adnoughtandver

y

soonth

e

n

avieso

fth

ewor

ldw

e

r

e

designingtheir

ownv

e

rsions.

F

i

s

h

e

r

was

a

veryco

ntrover

s

ialfigureandth

e

man

y

r

e

f

o

rm

s

thath

e

intr

o

du

ce

db

e

tw

ee

n1904and1909

,

whi

c

h

esse

ntiall

y

m

o

d

er

niz

e

dth

e

R

oy

alNa

vy

,mad

e

himm

a

n

ye

n

e

mi

es.

H

e

wa

sr

uthl

ess

int

a

kingoldervess

e

lsoutof

se

r

v

i

ce

(man

yo

fth

e

m

we

r

e

u

se

dagainduringth

e

war)or

sc

rappingth

e

mbuthealsoreform

e

drecruitm

e

nt,

training

a

ndintr

o

du

c

ednavalreserv

e

s,all

o

fwhi

c

hwouldprov

e

importantinfighting

WorldWarOn

e

.H

e

wa

s

larg

e

l

y

r

es

p

o

n

s

ibl

e

forthec

r

eationofa

s

ubmarin

e

s

e

rvi

ce

ata

ti

m

ew

h

e

nmanyfeltthatsubmarin

e

sw

e

r

e

w

e

apon

s

ofdirt

yw

arfareandnotquite‘British’

.

Britainhadpr

e

viousl

y

m

a

intain

e

dhernavywiththe

e

xp

e

ctationthath

e

rmajor

riva

l

s

wouldbeFranceandRussia,butnowth

ey

wer

efo

r

ce

dtorespondtotheGerman

expansion.

Th

e

ris

e

oftheGermanNavywasremarkabl

e

.Th

e

firstN

avy

Actwaspassedin1898and,

withinlittl

e

mor

e

thanad

ec

ad

e

,th

e

Germansbuiltth

e

s

e

condlargestbattl

e

fle

e

tinth

e

worldfromscratch,larg

e

lyund

e

rAdmiralAlfr

e

dvonTirpitz.Therealizationofth

e

n

e

c

e

s

s

it

y

tor

es

pondtoG

e

rmanyculminatedin1909withth

e

bigg

e

stpeacetimena

v

al

scarethatBritainhadhadinherhistory

.

Int

e

lligenceinLondonreportedthatth

e

rewasto

beafurth

e

racc

e

l

e

r

a

tionintheGermanbuildingofdreadnoughts.Also,theimprov

e

m

e

nts

andexpansionofG

e

rmanshipbuildingm

e

antthattheycouldbuildapproximat

e

l

ye

ight

dr

e

adn

o

ught

s

p

e

ryear,thusequalingth

e

Brit

is

hcapa

c

ity

.

Thisinf

o

rmationledtoahug

e

d

e

bateinParliam

e

nt

ove

rth

e

1909na

v

al

e

stimates(budget)ando

ve

rth

e

qu

e

sti

o

nof

w

h

e

th

e

rfourorsixnewdr

ea

dnought

s

shouldb

e

built

.

Th

era

di

c

alLiberals,including

Llo

y

dG

eo

rg

e

andWin

s

ton

C

hur

c

hill,arguedthatthenation

co

uldonl

y

affordfour

s

hip

s

,

andthattheAdmiralt

y

wa

s

b

e

ingala

r

mi

s

tinw

a

nting

mo

r

e

.Th

e

Conservativesfoughtf

o

r

s

ixships.PrimeMini

s

t

e

rAsquithbroker

e

dasolutionthatironi

c

all

y

w

o

uldprovid

e

for

e

ightnewv

es

s

e

ls

-

fourtobebuiltin1909

-

10

a

ndprovisionforafurtherfourv

e

ss

e

lsifit

prov

e

dn

ecessa

r

y.

Thed

ec

i

s

ionwasprompt

e

dbyfurth

e

rint

e

lli

ge

n

ce

thatG

e

rmany’sally,

Austria,hadbegunplan

s

f

o

rthr

ee

orf

o

urdr

e

adnoughts

.

This,inturn,hadcaus

e

d

c

on

ce

rn

inItal

y,which

hadimm

e

diat

e

lybegunitsownbuildin

g

p

rogr

amm

e

.

F

o

rFish

e

r,how

e

ver,dreadnoughtswerev

e

r

y

mu

c

had

e

t

e

rr

e

nttoth

e

G

e

rmansrath

e

rthan

necessarilyad

ec

i

s

iv

e

in

s

trum

e

nto

f

warandhewasperceptiveinr

e

alizingthatth

e

s

ubmarin

e

andtorp

e

dowouldcometobeasimportantinna

v

al

w

arfar

e

.Fisherwas

confidentthatBritaincouldmain

t

ainh

e

rad

va

ntag

e

ov

e

rGermanyinthestr

e

n

g

thofh

e

r

fl

ee

tand

,

ind

ee

d,thiswastrue

.

However,itwas

c

l

e

arth

a

t

i

t

w

a

s

b

ec

omingtoocostlyfor

Britaintomaintainh

e

rfl

ee

t

s

thr

o

ughoutth

e

wo

r

ldandFisherbegantoconc

e

ntrat

eo

n

d

e

pl

oy

m

e

ntsinhomewaters

.

TheMediterraneanFl

ee

twa

s

v

e

rymuchr

e

duc

e

dand,when

Churchillb

e

cam

e

Fir

s

tLordofth

e

AdmiraltyinOctober1911,heint

e

ndedtotak

e

thi

s

r

e

du

c

tionev

e

nfurther.TheFrenchmov

e

dth

e

ironl

y

battl

es

hipsquadronfromBresttoth

e

M

e

dit

e

rran

e

an.Man

y

t

oo

kthi

s

t

o

b

e

th

e

r

es

ultofanagre

e

m

e

ntBritainhadmad

e

in

ad

va

n

cew

ithFran

ce

undertheEntenteCordialebut

,

inr

e

alit

y,

th

e

Fr

e

nchhadreachedthe

decisionseparat

e

ly

.Esse

ntiall

y

,th

e

movelefttheFrenchtoguardth

e

M

e

dit

e

rran

e

anand

th

e

Britishwithonlyasmallfor

ce

atGibraltar,though

e

noughthatth

ec

ombin

e

dAnglo

-

Fr

e

nchforc

e

wouldoutnumb

e

rth

e

ItalianandAustrianfle

e

t

s.

In1912

,

Chur

c

hillr

eve

al

e

dinParliamentthatBritain

was

n

o

long

e

rmaintainingth

e

long-

h

e

ldpolicyofth

e

two-p

owe

r

s

tandard,meaningthatth

e

Britishfl

ee

tshouldbe

s

up

e

r

ior

to

thecombinedforceofh

e

rt

w

omo

s

tpow

e

rful

r

i

va

l

s.

Nowthefleetwa

s

tob

e

builtto

en

s

ur

es

up

e

riorit

yove

rG

e

rmanyalone.Th

e

r

e

w

e

r

es

om

ee

ffortsaroundthist

i

m

e

tohalt

thenavalrac

e

withG

e

rman

y

(for

e

xampl

e

,

C

hur

c

hill

’

sproposalthatbothcountri

ess

hould

su

s

p

e

nd

f

urth

e

rshipbuildingforay

e

ar)butalldiploma

cye

v

e

ntu

a

ll

y

fail

e

d

.

Infact,

technologicaladvan

ce

sint

e

nsifiedthe

r

a

cee

v

e

nfurtherwiththedev

e

lopm

e

ntofth

e

sup

e

r

dr

e

adn

o

ught,whichcarriedIS-inchguns.

TheEarlyStag

e

sofWar

Th

e

mobilisationoftheNavywentv

e

ry

e

fficientlyandth

e

rewastheaddedbonusthat

th

e

rehadb

ee

namajor

e

x

e

rcis

e

forreservistsinthe

s

umm

e

rof1914.Theyw

e

reaboutto

bedispersedbut,withth

e

outbreakofwar,theyw

e

r

e

detainedandthereforereadyfor

actionalmostimm

e

diatel

y.

TheBritishGrandFle

e

t(previouslyknownasthe

\

FirstFl

ee

t)

withtwentydreadnoughtsandfourbattle

c

rui

se

rswassenttoitswarstation,S

c

apaFlow

intheOrkneys,topreventGerman

e

ntryintotheNorthS

e

a.The

c

ommander-in-chiefwas

thenewlyappointedSirJohnJ

e

llicoewhohadbeenapr

e

viousDir

e

ctorofNaval

OrdnanceandControlleroftheNavy

.

Hereplac

e

dadevastat

e

dSirJohnCallaghanatthe

lastminuteon4August,andhadb

ee

nFisher’spreferredcandidat

e

forsom

e

time.Alsoto

th

e

norththereweretwopatrols,th

e

SixthCruiser

S

quadronwithfourDrake

c

lassvess

e

ls

andth

e

T

e

nth

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ui

se

rSquadronwith

e

ightEdqar

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lasscrui

s

er

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e

lwasVi

ce

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c

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ey

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eig

ht

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npr

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i

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in

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rs

andtwolightcruisers,a

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nD

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lasssubmarinesunderComm

o

dor

e

R

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er

K

eyes

inth

e

EighthSubmarineFlotilla.Inaddition,K

eyes

wa

s

incommandofthe

SixthSubmar

i

n

e

Flotilla

co

mp

r

i

s

ing

s

i

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old

e

rv

e

ss

e

ls

.

Therewerealso

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mall

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rf

orces

at

th

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R

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lG

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org

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patrolsand

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madeupofolderv

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ls,topr

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astandth

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shippinglanestoandfromFran

ce.

H

oweve

r

,

th

e

majorityofcruisersinth

e

Channel

wereF

r

e

n

c

h,andithadbe

e

nagreedin1913that,shouldFran

cea

ndBritainb

e

alli

e

sinwar,theFrenchwouldprot

ec

tth

e

w

e

sternsideb

e

tweentheContentinP

e

ninsula

andEnglandandth

e

RoyalNavywouldberesponsibl

e

forth

es

t

r

ait

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fDov

e

r.

M

erc

hant

s

hip

s

w

e

r

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oanimportantpartofBritishd

e

f

e

n

ses

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o

r

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th

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00

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e

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quisitionedforbl

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k

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e

duti

es

,in

a

dditiontoasmallnumb

e

rofarm

o

re

d

vesse

l

s,

inth

e

firstmonthsofthewar

.

Byth

e

endofth

ew

arth

e

numb

e

rhadgrownto3,700m

e

r

c

hant

v

es

s

e

l

s

inv

o

lv

e

d

i

nauxilia

r

ypatrol.

Th

e

Hi

g

hS

eas

Fl

ee

t,G

er

man

y

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e

stnavalfor

ce,

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se

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e

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r

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e

nohl.Two

s

quadrons(1stand3rd),comprising

e

ight

o

ld

e

r

d

r

e

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c

la

s

sdr

e

adnoughts

(w

ithplansforanothertwotojoin),

w

e

r

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e

datthem

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uth

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fth

e

JadeRiv

e

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e

stG

e

rman

y

with

e

ntry

i

nt

o

th

e

North

Sea.Alsoba

s

edatJad

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Ri

ve

rwa

s

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fo

urb

a

ttl

e

cruiser

s

underth

ec

ommandof

R

e

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Fr

an

z

Hipp

e

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s

enioroffic

e

rincharg

e

of

sco

utinggroups.The

SecondSquadron,with

e

ightpr

e-drea

dn

o

ughts,wasbasedatth

e

mouthofElb

e.

Both

ri

ve

r

mo

uth

s

w

e

r

e

protectedbyanumb

e

roflight

e

rv

es

s

e

lsand

twos

ubmarineflotillas,

mad

e

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e

t

ee

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e

ss

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l

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,w

e

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ea

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h

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ee

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Oth

e

rgroup

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e

n

e

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ithold

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e

ssels,wer

e

b

e

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commandedseparat

e

l

y

b

y

Prin

ce

Heinri

c

hofP

r

ussia,brothertotheKais

e

r

.

At

,

th

e

beginningofwar,man

y

p

e

opl

ee

xp

ec

t

e

dthatth

e

rewouldbeamajorseabattl

e

withinth

e

firstf

e

wda

y

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w

ithadecisivevictorytorivalTrafalgar.Howev

e

r,itwas

immediatelyobviousattheouts

e

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c

lose

blockad

e

wa

s

impracti

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al.The

te

chnologicalbreakthroughsoftorp

e

do

es

,

s

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s,

min

e

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s

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e

n

ses

m

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antthatitwast

o

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s

toblockad

e

at

c

lo

se

qua

r

t

e

r

s.

Inaddition,

s

hips

w

ouldhav

e

toreturntoport

eve

r

y

thr

ee

tofourda

y

st

o

c

oaland,d

e

pendingonth

e

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ce

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port,ablo

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mightrequir

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ee

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n

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e

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,

o

n

e

inportandoneintransit

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whichwouldhav

e

n

ee

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e

d

mor

e

shipsthanwereavailabl

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.Th

es

trat

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e

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e

r

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e

.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

w

e

r

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surprisedb

o

thb

y

th

e

speedoftheBriti

s

hmobili

z

ationandb

y

thefact

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c

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e

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ce

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c

h

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e

ir

s

trategyhadb

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n

pr

e

dicatedonthat

e

v

e

ntuality.Th

ey

h

a

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s

onotb

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npr

e

paredforthefactthatth

e

Briti

s

h

d

i

d

no

th

ave

asquadronpatrollingHeligoland.Th

e

G

e

rman

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hadint

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nd

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theanti

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ipat

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hFl

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r

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ri

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,a

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ct

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dthatth

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r

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F

l

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izeuponthemas

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l

e

ftp

o

rt

.

Th

ey

w

e

r

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e

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e

whil

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th

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h

mai

n

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irnumericaladvantageinships

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Th

e

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ll

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tradingwithth

e

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orld

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r

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b

y

alsoprotectedBritain’sm

e

rchantfl

ee

t

w

hi

c

h

,

at

a

r

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und19milliontons,account

e

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e

arl

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50

%o

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orld’stotal.The

Chann

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andit

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a

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e

n

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m

y

t

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mplat

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akingthroughandthisleftth

e

north

e

rn

e

ntrytotheNorthSeaastheonly

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e

rmanstog

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tout.Therewereweaknessesinth

e

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e

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apa

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cause,shouldtheFleetv

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,

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etos

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Th

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e

Briti

s

h

Expeditionar

y

F

o

r

ce

(BEF)to

F

ran

cew

h

ic

h

s

tart

e

don7August.

.

Squadron

s

blo

c

king

rout

es

int

o

th

e

Chann

e

lprotectedthem.B

e

for

e

th

ew

arth

e

Germanshadhop

e

dthatth

e

y

mighthamp

e

r

s

u

c

ht

r

ansportsbyattacksonaBritishFl

ee

tin

c

losebl

oc

kad

e,

butwhen

thatdidnotmat

e

rial

ize

th

e

onl

y

wayth

a

tth

e

ycouldha

ve

mad

e

an

y

impa

c

twastou

se

th

e

irbattl

e

fleet.Thistheyw

e

r

e

notpr

e

par

e

dtori

s

k.Inaddit

io

n,th

e

Germanshadgreat

c

onfid

e

nc

e

inth

e

irSchlieff

e

nPlanonland,whichwasessentiall

y

to

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onqu

e

rFrance

sw

i

f

tlyb

e

foreRussiacouldcometoh

e

raid

,

andth

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o

t

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onsiderthattherelatively

smallBEFwouldsignifi

c

antlyaffecttheoutcome.Sothetroopsw

e

r

e

land

e

dinFranc

e

unimpeded.

Thefirstskirmishatseaoccurr

e

don5Augustwh

e

nth

e

G

e

rmanminelayerKoniginLui

se

,

disguis

e

da

s

apass

e

nger

ves

s

e

l(whichinfactsh

e

hadb

ee

nb

e

for

e

th

e

war),wasona

missiontolayminesofftheportofHarwi

c

h.AdmiralTyrwhittwaspatrollingthelin

e

b

e

tw

ee

nHarwichandTersch

e

lling(inDutchwaters)and,onh

e

aringintelligenc

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ofthe

minelayer’spresenc

e

,dispatchedth

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d

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stroyersLanceandLandrailtoinvestigate.The

AmphionalsojoinedthembutitwasLancethatfir

e

dth

e

firstshotofthewaratsea.The

min

e

la

ye

rwa

s

outnumb

e

red,lightlyarm

e

dandstoodlittlechanc

e.

Sh

e

wa

s

sunkwitha

lossof54outofher100crew

.

Theveryn

e

xtday,Amphionwas

s

unkbyoneofthemines

thathadb

ee

nlaidb

y

th

e

KoniginLuise

.

InthefirstweeksofthewarU-boatsw

e

r

e

reachingS

c

apaFlowandasfarasthe

Norw

e

giancoast.Th

e

capacity

o

fthesubmarinestotravelsuchdistanc

e

shadb

e

en

seri

o

u

s

l

y

und

e

rrated.Therewasawak

e

upcallfortheRoyalNavywhenasubmarine

attackedtheMonarchongunnerypracticelessthan500milesfromHeligoland.Whenthe
GermanFirstSubmarineFlotillaheadedintotheNorthSeaon6August,itsmenwerestill
unawareoftheexactlocationoftheshipsoftheGrandFleetwhichhadnotappeared,as
expected,atHeligolandBight.TwoofthetenGermansubmarineswerelost,one
disappearedandanotherrammedbythecruiserBirminghamandsunkwiththelossofall
crew.Withawarenessofthesubmarinedangerheightened,therewerefalsesightingsand
acoupleofmajorscaresthat,injest,cametobereferredtoasthefirstandsecondBattles
ofScapa,However,therewasgenuinedangeratScapaFlow.InNovemberU18managed
toenterHoxaSound,oneoftheentrypointstotheanchorage,althoughitwasforcedbya
trawlertoscuttleitselfbeforeitcouldattack.Throughthesubmarinepatrols,Admiral
IngenohlrealizedthatBritishForceswereatthenorthernentrancetotheNorthSeaandhe
decidedonapolicyofguerrilla-typewarfareofraidsintothe

Britishareas.ThiswasnotdissimilartooriginalGermanideas,whentheyexpecteda
closeblockade,inthattheyintendedtoweardowntheenemygradually.

On15and16AugusttheGermanlightcruisersKolnandStuttgart,accompaniedby
torpedoboats,weresentonreconnaissancearoundHeligolandBightwithamissionto
attackBritishsubmarinesthoughttobeinthearea.Nothingcameofthismissionbutthe
Germansweremoresuccessfulon18AugustwhenthelightcruisersStralsundand
Strassburg,withsubmarinesupport,againwenttoseekoutBritishforces.Theycame
acrossthelightcruiserFearlessaswellas16destroyersoftheFirstFlotillafromthe
Harwichlightforce.TheBritishsightedtheStralsundbuttheymistookherforthemuch
moreheavily-armedGermanvesselYorckand,asaconsequence,CaptainBluntcalledfor
backup.AlthoughtheGermanvesselswereoutnumbered,Bluntwasworriedaboutthe
vulnerabilityofhislightvesselsinthefaceoftheYorck,andsoTyrwhittcameoutwith
therestoftheHarwich-basedforce.Inthemeantime,Stralsundhadgotwindofthetrap
intowhichshewasbeinglured,reversedcourseandgotaway.

TheBattleofHeligolandBight

ItwasafrustratingincidentandtherewasconsiderablefrustrationthroughouttheBritish
fleetwiththelackofactionsofaratsea.Inthemeantime,Keyeshadbeenmaking
reconnaissancearoundtheBightandhadbuiltupagoodpictureofthepatternsofGerman
defense.HemadeaproposaltoattackandattempttoeliminateGermanpatrolsaroundthe
Bight.Consequently,on12August,ChurchillorderedCaptainHerbertRichmond(the
AssistantDirectoroftheOperationsDivisionoftheNavalWarStaff)andAdmiral
Christian(CommanderoftheSouthernForce)toplanaraidonHeligolandBight.The
BightwasofstrategicimportancetotheGermansbecauseofitsproximitytotheirmajor
waterways-theElbe,Jade,WeserandEiderriverswheretheHighSeasFleetwas

s

tation

e

d.Itwasnotthefirsttimesuchaplanhadb

ee

n

s

u

gge

st

e

dbut,ashadhappened

before,nothingcam

e

ofit

.

J

e

lli

c

o

e

,a

se

ag

e

rfora

c

tionasKe

y

esandT

y

rwhitt

,

al

s

o

s

ubmitt

e

danoth

e

rsuchplan,onethatwasmor

e

ambit

i

ou

sa

nd

w

a

s

toin

c

ludeth

e

Grand

Fleetinasw

ee

p

o

f.H

e

ligolandBight.How

e

ver,itwasdecidedtopostpon

e

an

y

plan

s

f

o

r

th

e

mom

e

ntb

e

causethetransportsofth

e

BEF

we

r

es

t

i

llgoinga

c

rossth

e

Channeland

Keyeswasne

e

d

e

dtopr

o

t

ec

tth

e

m

.

Itwa

s

onlyon24AugustthatChurchillcall

e

danoth

e

rm

ee

t

i

ngtoputtog

e

th

e

rfinalplansfor

theraid

.

Thecor

e

for

cew

ouldin

c

lud

e

T

y

rwhitt’sentireHarwichForceandK

eyes’e

ight

s

ubmarin

e

sandtwodestroyers.Supportwastob

e

pr

ov

id

e

db

y

th

e

battl

e

cruis

e

rs

InvincibleandNewZ

e

aland,

s

tation

e

datth

e

HumberunderthecommandofR

e

a

r

Admiral

SirAr

c

hibaldMoore,andRearAdmiralChri

s

ti

a

n

‘s

S

e

v

e

nthCruiserSquadron.Thislast

squadronwasofconc

e

rntoKeyesandTyrwhittbecaus

e

itcomprisedofoldBacchant

e

c

lassships,whichweretobestationedoffT

e

r

sc

h

e

llin

g

toint

e

rc

e

ptanyenemyvessels.

Thesewereso

s

l

ow

thatth

e

Adm

i

ral

s

doubt

e

dthattheywouldbeeffecti

vea

nd

w

orri

e

d

ab

o

utth

e

ir

v

uln

e

rabilit

y.

K

e

y

e

sr

e

qu

es

t

e

dth

es

upp

o

rt

o

fth

e

strong

e

runits

-

Commodore

WilliamG

o

od

e

nough’

s

Fir

s

tLightCruiserSquadronandVi

ce

AdmiralDa

v

idB

e

att

y

’

s

FirstBattleCruiserSquadron.Hisrequestsforbothw

e

r

e

turned

down

.

Asaresult,TyrwhittandK

eyes

,bri

e

fingth

e

ircaptainsabouttheforthcomingraid,

inform

e

dth

e

mthattheonlyBritishshipslargerthanade

s

troyerinvolv

e

dwouldbe

T

y

rwhitt’slightcruisers.Thi

s

wa

s

tohavenear-fatalconsequence

s

duringth

ee

ven

t

u

a

l

b

a

ttl

e.

O

n25August,ade

c

isionwastakentotransport3,000R

oy

alMarinestoOstendtoprot

e

ct

theB

e

lgiancoastfrom

t

h

e

fa

s

t-approachingGermanArm

y.

Churchillsawthatth

er

aidon

Heligolandcouldalsoactasadiversiontoan

yres

pons

e

thattheHighSeasFl

ee

tmight

mak

e

toth

e

mov

e

m

e

ntofthemarines.Theraidther

e

for

e

b

e

cam

e

amor

es

ignificant

operation.Communicationsbetw

e

enth

e

Admiralty,NavalWarStaffandtheCommander-

in

-

Chi

e

fofNavywereslowandinefficientandthesourceof

c

onstantcriticismduringthe

firsty

e

arsofthewar.J

e

lli

c

oedidnothearof

theplansfortheraiduntil26August,which

wasthesamedaythattheforc

e

sw

e

r

e

to

s

orti

e

inpr

e

parationforattack.Hisopinionwas

thatther

e

wouldnotbesuffi

c

ientstrengthtocounteractanattackfromaheavyGerman

warshipandsoheofferedhissupport;theAdmiraltyturnedthisdownbutsaidthathe
mightsendsomebattlecruisersifitwasconvenient.Jellicoewentalittlefurtherin

dispatchingBeatty’sFirstBattleCruiserSquadronaswellasCommodor

e

Goodenough’s

light

c

ruis

e

rs,thesupportthatKeyeshadoriginallywanted.However,TyrwhittandKey

e

s

didnotr

e

ceiv

e

th

e

informationintimeforthestartoftheBattleofHeligolandon28

August.

Tyrwhittwastoleadhis1

s

tand2

nd

Flotillas(32cruis

e

rs)andhistwolightcruisers

Fearl

e

ssandArethusa(hisflagshipthathadbeencommissionedonlytwodaysbefore)in

attack.Keyeswastoformhissubmarinesintotwolines,

o

n

e

toattackG

e

rmancruisers

andonetodraw

c

rui

se

rs

aw

a

y

fromth

e

Bightandouttosea

.

Ano

t

h

e

rp

a

irof

s

ubmarin

es

wastoguardthemouthofth

e

Em

s

.R

e

ar

A

dmiralArchibaldMoorewastocruisetoth

e

north

w

ith

New

Z

e

alandandInvin

c

ible,shouldheavier

s

upp

o

rtb

e

,

re

quir

e

d

,

andth

e

old

BacchanteswereoffTer

sc

h

e

lling

as

pl

a

n

ne

d

.

Forth

e

durationofth

e

battle,whichtook

plac

e

inhaz

e

andfog,

v

isibilitywaspoorand,toaddtotheconfusion,th

e

r

e

wasth

e

mix

-

upincommunications.Inlightoftheinstru

c

tionsr

ece

ivedthattherewouldonlybe

Tyrwhitt’s

c

ruis

e

r

s

inth

e

vi

c

inity,therewasenormousbewilderm

e

ntatth

e

arri

va

lof

Goodenough’scruisers

.

Tyrwhittrecognis

e

dth

e

ma

s

h

e

wa

s

b

e

ginninghissweepofthe

BightbutK

e

y

esi

nitiall

y

r

e

port

e

dth

e

mashostile.Itwasevenhard

e

rfor

t

h

es

ubmarin

es

to

di

s

tinguishfriendfromfoeandone

o

fth

e

mwa

s

r

e

ad

y

t

o

f

i

r

e

b

e

for

e

noticingaBritish

ensign

.

Anoth

e

rE

.

6didactuallyfireattheSouthampton,which,inturn,att

e

mpt

e

dtoram

thesubmarine,assumingittob

e

aG

e

rm

a

n

.

Th

efogc

au

se

dpr

o

bl

e

m

s

fortheGerman

s

,asthe

y

w

e

r

e

unabl

eto

mak

e

fullu

seo

fth

e

coa

s

talbatt

e

ri

es

onH

e

li

go

l

a

nd

.

Th

e

ir

o

th

e

rmainprobl

e

mwasthatitwaslow

wa

t

er,

which

mea

ntthatth

ey

wer

e

unabletocalluponth

e

ir

c

ap

i

tal

s

h

i

p

sas

b

ac

kupb

ec

aus

e

they

wereb

e

hindth

e

Jad

e

b

a

ratth

e

m

o

uth

o

fth

e

J

a

d

e.

Th

e

barwasverydif

f

i

c

ultfor

s

ubmarin

es

t

o

n

ego

t

i

at

e

an

dt

h

ere

f

o

rea

c

t

e

da

sa

natur

a

lprot

ec

tion,butwithth

e

di

s

advantagethatth

ey

w

e

r

e

n

ow

facingit.Th

ey

hadatth

e

irdi

s

posalninedestro

yers

and

nin

e

min

es

weeperspatrollingtheBight,andanothermin

eswee

pingdivision,fourcruis

e

rs

,

fiv

e

small

e

r

c

ruisersandfi

ve

torp

e

do-boatflotillas

.

Th

e

r

e

w

e

res

e

v

e

ncruis

e

rsth

a

t

s

upportedpatrolsbutthe

se

w

e

r

e

inportandsowouldt

a

k

es

om

e

timetobeofanyus

e

in

th

e

battl

e.

AsthesweepofHeligolandb

e

gan,th

e

G

e

rmand

es

tro

ye

rsdispersedintoth

e

mist

,

limiting

th

ee

ffective-n

esso

fBritishfirepower

.

Tyrwhittwashavingprobl

e

ms

w

ithhisnew

flagshipastwoofh

e

rgunsfail

e

dandshewash

i

tbyaGermancruiser,r

e

strictingh

e

r

sp

ee

dcapacity.M

o

r

e

Germancruiserscamepouringoutofth

e

harborsbutth

e

British

werelucky.Ratherthanwaitingforhis

ves

s

e

lstogrouptogether,th

e

GermanAdmiral

s

entthem

e

ag

e

rlyforwardtotryandengag

e

.N

e

v

e

rth

e

less,asTvrwhittbegantowithdraw

fromhisswe

e

pw

e

stwards,th

e

Britishhadnotperformedaswellastheyhadhoped

.

Only

oneGermandestroyerhadbeensunk.

Beatty,whowasabout40milestothenorth,respondedtoarequestforsupportfromth

e

flotillas,becausehewas

c

oncernedthatGoodenough’slightcruisersdidnothav

e

·

s

ufficientstrengthifheavilyarm

e

dGerman

ves

selscameoutfromtheirnearbybas

e

s

.

‘

It

wasariskyd

e

cision,not

s

implybecauseofthedangerofrunningintoG

e

rman

c

apital

ships,submarinesandmines,butbecaus

e

ofthepoorvisibility.However,thesupportof

Good

e

noughandB

e

attyproveddecisiveand,whentheBritishpulledbackfr

o

mthe

island,theyhadsunkthr

e

eG

e

rmanlightcruis

e

rs.

On

e

ofthemwasAdmiralMaas’sflagship,Koln,thatwentdownwiththelossofthe

Admiral.NoBritishshipswerelost,althoughtheArethusaandtwootherd

e

str

o

y

e

r

s

w

e

r

e

s

ignificantlydamag

e

dandhadtobetowedint

o

port.35m

e

nw

e

rekill

e

dtoaG

e

rman

deathtollof712

.

B

y

th

e

tim

et

hatAdmiralHipp

e

rarri

v

edwithhisbattl

ec

ruis

e

r

s,

th

e

Briti

s

hhadalr

e

ad

y

l

e

ft.

Itwa

s

aBriti

s

hvi

c

torythatwasmor

e

importantint

e

rm

sof

moralethanstrateg

y

.They

hadwonth

e

firstbattl

eof

th

e

waranditwasinthe

e

nemy’shomet

e

rritor

y

.Th

e

Kai

se

r,

how

eve

r,wasfuriousandfailedtounderstandwhyhis

e

ntir

e

fl

ee

thadnotb

ee

nordered

outwhenth

e

British

we

r

es

i

g

ht

e

d

.

Hipp

e

rmad

e

changesinhisstrategyforth

e

d

e

f

e

n

seo

f

th

e

Bight,d

e

cidingthatatleastfourcapitalships

wo

uldb

e

po

s

ition

e

doutsid

e

theJadebar

infutureandthatlarg

e

min

e

fi

e

ld

s

wouldb

e

laidtothewestofHeligoland.Th

ev

i

c

t

o

r

y

al

so

mad

e

th

e

Kaiser,fearfulforhisHighS

e

as

Fl

ee

t

,eve

nmor

e

d

e

f

e

nsiveandheinstruct

e

dhis

co

m

ma

nd

er-

in

-c

hi

e

fthath

e

musthavehis

consentb

e

for

ec

ommitt

i

ngth

e

fl

ee

ttoaction.

Th

e

Britishmad

e

anotherattemptonHeligolandon11

Se

pt

e

mb

er

but

,es

p

ec

iallynowthat

highlydang

e

rousmin

e-

f

ie

ld

s

h

a

db

ee

nlaid

,

it

w

a

s

t

o

noa

v

ail.Th

e

highmoral

e

thatth

e

B

ri

ti

s

hh

a

d

wo

n

s

t

a

rt

e

dt

o

b

eer

od

e

da

s

th

e

G

e

rman

s

int

ens

i

fie

dth

ei

r

s

ubmarin

e

warfare

.

Th

e

scoutcrui

se

rPa

t

J

iflnde

r

of

th

eE

igh

t

hD

es

tro

ye

rFlotillawastorp

e

do

e

dand

s

u

nk

b

y

U

.2

1

i

nth

e

first

s

ucces

s

fulsubmarin

e

atta

c

kofth

ewa

r

.

Th

e

Briti

s

hf

o

ughtbackand

Li

e

ut

e

nantC

o

mm

a

nd

e

rMaxH

o

rt

o

n

s

ank

t

h

ec

rui

se

rH

e

la

o

n1

3

S

e

pt

e

mb

er

and

a

d

es

tr

oye

ron6Octob

e

r.Ho

weve

r

,

di

s

ast

e

r

s

tru

c

k

o

n

2

2

Se

pt

e

mb

er

wh

e

ntheG

e

rmans

sankthecrui

se

rsCressy,Aboukir

,

andHoque

-

thr

e

eofthesixoldBa

cc

hant

es

about

whichKeyesandTyrwhitthadb

ee

nsoworri

e

d

-

n

e

artheDutchcoastth

e

yw

e

r

e

patrolling.62offi

ce

rsand1,397menwerelost.Th

e

Navywa

s

nowjusta

s

afraid

,

ifnot

moreso

,

ofth

e

thr

e

atfromsubmarin

es

asit

w

asoftheHighSeasFleet.

Ju

s

tasthethreatofthesubmarin

e

hadb

e

ensomewhatun

de

r

e

stimatedintheBritish

pr

e

parationsforwar,sohadth

ee

ff

e

ctofmines.Thismayhavebe

e

ninpartduetothe

1907Hagu

e

Convention,whichruledagainstthelayingofmin

e

sindiscriminately.

Minesweeperswereaneglectedar

e

awithintheNavyandhadlittl

e

prestige.Th

e

r

e

were

onl

y

t

e

ntorpedogunboatsandthirteentrawlersthatwerefitt

e

dwithsweeps.Bytheendof

thewarth

e

rewouldbe7

2

6minesweepersand,by1917,allv

e

ss

e

lsw

e

refittedwitha

parvanethatworkedbycuttingminemoorings.However,atthebeginning,noneofthis
wasinplace.

Jellicoe,believingittobesaf

e

r,movedthefleetfromanchorageinLochEwetoLochna

K

e

alfurth

e

rsouthandth

e

ntoLoughSwillyonthenorthcoastofIreland.InOctober,

threeGermanminelayerswer

e

sentwithorderstominearoundtheFirthofForthandth

e

Ri

v

erClyde.Not

e

verythingwenttoplanandtheeastcoastpartofthemissionhadtobe

aborted.However,thecaptainoftheminelayerBerlin,realizingthathewouldnotb

e

able

tor

e

achtheClyde,insteadlaidminesoffToryIsland,tothenorthwestofLoughSwilly,

althoughhehadnoideathattheGrandFleetwassocloseby.On26October,amerchant

ve

sselfellfoulofthemines

.

Thefollowingday,oneoftheup

-

to-datesup

e

rdreadnoughts,

theAudacious,wasoutwith

t

h

eSe

condBattleSquadrononfiringexercise

s

.Sh

e

washit

b

y

amin

e

.For12hoursther

e

werefranti

ce

ffort

s

to

s

a

vet

h

es

hip.Th

e

Whit

e

StarLiner

Olympictriedtotak

e

h

e

rint

ow

butitwa

s

alltonoavail.Shockinglyforth

e

Briti

s

h

,

th

e

,

m

ig

ht

yA

uda

c

iou

s

w

e

ntdown,although,untilthe

e

nd

o

fth

ew

ar,th

e

Admiralt

y

maintainedthatshehadonlyb

ee

ndama

ge

d

.

J

e

lli

c

o

e

f

e

aredthathisnumericadvantag

e

ov

e

rth

e

G

e

rmanFl

ee

twasfastdisappearing.

Britishstrat

e

gywasagainstlayingminesinretaliation,b

ec

aus

e

th

ey

want

e

dtoforcethe

GermanFleetoutofportand

e

ngag

e

itrath

e

rthanhemitinwithmines.Another

c

on

s

id

e

rationwasthatminesmightimpedeBritishtraders.Th

e

r

e

wa

s

anadditional

probleminthat,justasmin

es

w

ee

p

e

r

s

hadb

ee

n

e

ssentiallyignored,sohadth

e

t

ec

hnolog

y

forth

e

min

e

sth

e

ms

e

lves

.

Itwouldnotbeuntil1917thatth

e

Briti

s

hw

e

r

e

abletoproduce

aminethatoperatedr

e

liably,andev

e

nthiswascopiedfromar

e

tri

e

v

e

dG

e

rmanmine.

D

es

pond

e

n

cy

wasbeginningtosetin.Therewasfrustration

a

tth

e

la

c

kofopportunit

y

to

engagetheG

e

rmanFl

ee

tandth

e

g

e

n

e

r

a

lpublicwa

s

wonderingwhatth

e

na

v

ywasd

o

in

g

a

s

th

e

G

e

rmanarm

y

pushedalongtheB

e

lgian

c

oa

s

t.G

e

n

era

lJ

o

ffr

e

(chiefoftheFrench

generalstaff)r

e

qu

e

st

e

d

s

upporttoprotecttheportsatDunkirkandNi

e

uwport

.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

immediat

e

lytriedtotakeadvantag

e

by

se

ndingv

e

ss

e

lstolaymin

e

satthemouth

ofth

e

Tham

e

son17O

c

tob

e

r

.

Th

e

boatswereint

e

rceptedandsunk,althoughth

es

ucc

es

s

wasshort-livedandHermes,a

c

t

i

ng

as

anaircraftcarrier

,

waslosttoasubmarin

e

near

Ca

l

a

i

s.

Thi

s

promptedtheAdmiraltytowithdrawany

vess

e

l

s

bigg

e

rthanadestroy

e

rfrom

th

e

Chann

e

leastofGr

ee

n

w

i

c

h,andtoissu

e

anord

e

rthatsuchv

e

ss

e

l

ss

hould

notc

r

oss

in

thedaylight

.

28Octob

e

rsawthereturnofJa

c

k

y

FisherasFirstS

e

a

Lo

rd,nowinhisseventiesand

r

e

call

e

dfromr

e

tir

e

m

e

nt

.

Hi

s

appointmentwasaresultofther

e

signationofPrinc

eLo

u

is

ofBattenberg,mostlyb

e

causeofpublicill

feeling

a

b

o

uthisGermanbirthandfamilyties.

Fish

e

rand

C

hur

c

hill(asFirstLordoftheAdmiralty)wer

e

aformi

da

bl

e

,volatileandnot

infalliblecombinationthatwouldultimat

e

lyresultinthembothlosingoffice.Fish

e

r,

r

e

ali

z

ingth

e

possibilityofaprolong

e

dwar,b

e

gananambitiousbuildingprogramme.

TheSurfaceRaidersandtheBattlesofCoronelandtheFalklands

TheSurfaceRaiders

Atthebeginningofthewar,Britain’smerchantfleetwasbyfarthelargestintheworld
andBritainwasreliantuponherimports,whichincludedtwothirdsofherfoodaswellas
essentialssuchasironore.SuchreliancenecessarilymadeBritainvulnerabletoattackson
hermerchantfleet.Thesheersizeofthefleetmeantthatprotectionforithadtobe
stretchedworldwide.CommercewasanobvioustargetfortheGermansand,laterinthe
war,theywouldmakeextensiveuseofsubmarinesinattackingalliedshipping.Overthe
firstsixmonthsorso,however,theyusedsurfaceraiders.Thesinkingofmerchantvessels
wasnottheonlyaiminstrikingatcommercialshipping.Itwasalsohopedthatitwould
forcemarineinsurancecostssohighthattheywouldbecomeprohibitiveandhalttrade.

TheBritishdevisedacontingencyplanforthiseventualitybeforethewar,theessenceof
whichwasthatthegovernmentwouldreinsure80%ofallrisksduringthewarandreceive
80%ofthepremiums.ItalsomeantthatmerchantvesselsweresubjecttoAdmiralty
directionsinresp

e

ctofallroutesandportsof

c

all

.

Th

e

Britisheffortsto

c

loseoffexits

fromtheNorthS

e

aatth

e

outbr

e

akofwarwer

e

alsopartoftheplant

o

pr

o

t

ec

t

c

omm

e

r

c

ial

shippingsothathostilevess

e

lscouldn

o

tr

e

a

c

hth

e

maintrad

e

rout

e

sandonl

y

German

v

e

ss

e

l

s

alr

e

ad

ys

tati

o

n

e

dabr

o

adcouldbeutilised

.

Inaddition,m

e

r

c

hant

s

hip

s

w

e

r

e

in

s

tructedtodispersefromtheirusualrout

e

s

,so

it

w

as

c

l

e

arthattherewasnointentionof

prot

ec

tingth

e

mb

yc

onvoy,th

e

traditionalpolicy

.

Itwasfeltthat,with

s

t

e

am

i

n

s

t

e

adof

s

ail,merchantmenhadabetterchan

ce

offl

ee

in

g

an

e

n

e

myb

y

takingarouteoftheirown

choic

e

,asth

ey

didnothavetor

e

lyonwinddirections.Inaddition

,

th

e

d

e

v

e

lopm

e

ntofthe

t

e

legraphmadeitmuchmoredifficultt

o

k

ee

pa

c

onvo

y

secr

e

tandcouldgiveth

e

en

e

m

y

a

chan

ce

topr

e

par

e

anattack.Thesmokegeneratedb

y

alarg

e

numb

e

rof

s

hipstog

e

ther

wouldalsomaketh

e

mmuchmor

e

vi

s

ibl

e

.Th

e

onlyexceptionwastheuseofconvoy

s

to

prot

e

cttroopshipstransportingsoldiersfromCanada,India,AustraliaandNewZealand,

andthiswasmo

s

tl

y

th

e

r

es

ultofpressurefromthedominiongovernm

e

nt

s

.Th

e

Admiralt

y

maywellhav

e

preferr

e

dtod

e

ployth

e

ir

s

hip

s

huntingth

e

G

e

rmancruisers

.

Infact,th

e

G

e

rman

s

had

ve

r

y

f

e

wship

s

abroadatthestartofthewarandth

esewe

r

ew

id

e

l

y

s

c

attered

intheAtlanticandPacific.

Alth

o

u

g

hth

e

G

e

rman

s

hadthesecondlarge

s

tmerchantmarin

e

inth

e

worlditwasway

b

e

lowthesizeofth

e

Britishfle

e

tandth

ey

al

s

o

s

uffer

e

damajordisadvantag

e

intheir

gr

e

atlackofov

e

rs

e

asbas

e

s.ThispresentedaproblemincoalingforGermanv

e

ss

e

ls

,

sinc

e

theregulationsofth

e

1

9

07Hagu

e

Conventionlimitedth

e

amountofcoalthat

co

uld

b

e

obtainedinaneutralporttothatsuffi

c

i

e

ntto

a

ll

ow

a

s

hiptoreachth

e

near

e

stportof

herowncountry.

S

hip

s

w

e

rethennotallowedtous

e

th

es

am

e

n

e

utralarea

aga

inforthree

months

.

Attheoutbreakofwartherewer

e

twoG

e

rmanlight

c

ruis

e

rs,DresdenandKarlsruhe,in

theWestIndi

es

,th

e

light

cr

uiserLeipzigwasoffth

e

Americanw

e

stcoast,andthelight

cruiserKonigsbergwasonth

e

ea

s

tcoastofAfrica.Inadditiontherewereotherminor

craft,suchasgunboatsandsurveyvessels,whichwouldnotreallyb

e

ofanyus

e

inan

e

ngagement.Howeverthemostdang

e

rousforc

e

wasth

e

h

e

avy-armoredGermanEast

Asiati

c

Squadron,basedatTsingtao,China,underthecommandofVic

e

AdmiralCount

MaximilianvonSpee.Th

e

squadronwasmad

e

upoftwoarmouredcruisers,Spee

’

s

flagshiptheScbamhorstandth

e

Gneisenau,andthelightcruisersEroden,Leipzigand

Numberq.ScharnhorstandGneisenauwer

e

newsisterships

e

achwitheight8.2inchand

six5.9in

c

hguns,andtheyhadwonImperialNavyprizesfortheirgunn

e

ry.Thesquadron

wasspreadoutwhenthewarbegan.Sp

e

ewasinth

e

CarolineIslandswithScharnhor

s

t

andGneisenau

,

theErodenwasinTsingtaoandtheLeipzigwasoffthePacific

c

oastof

MexicowithNumberqonherwaytoreliev

e

her.

ThedispersedGermanforcedidnotapp

e

arparti

c

ularlythreatening,especiallysince

Britainandherallieshadfarlargerresourcestocallupon,in

c

ludinganup

-

to-date

dreadnought,theAustralia,about12armoredcruisers,andsome20lightcruisers.The
entryofJapanintothewaron23Augustonth

e

sideoftheA

l

liessign

i

f

ic

antlyin

c

r

e

a

se

d

thispow

e

r.However,evenaloneen

e

m

yc

ruis

e

r

co

uld

c

au

se

havo

c

b

y

turninguptoattack

anun

s

u

s

p

ec

t

i

ngm

erc

hant

ve

ss

e

l.InthevastarenasofthePa

ci

f

ic

andAtlanti

c

O

ce

ans,it

n

e

ededaconsiderabl

y

larg

e

rf

o

r

ce

tot

r

a

c

kth

ee

n

e

m

y

down.TheBritishwereal

s

o

n

e

r

v

ou

s

ab

o

utth

e

largenumberofGermanmerchant

v

e

sse

lsthatw

e

r

e

abroadatth

e

start

ofthewarinneutralportsallov

e

rth

e

world

;

andaboutthepossibilitythattheycould

‘

b

e

c

onv

e

rt

e

dandputtosea,orusedascollierstosupplyG

e

rman

c

ruis

e

rs.Th

e

dangerfrom

thesepotentialauxiliar

yc

rui

se

r

s

turnedouttobeoverestimatedalthoughsom

e

didg

e

t

throughandcauselossestotheAllies

.

Theselossesmightha

ve

b

ee

nmuchworseifithad

notbe

e

nforth

e

ir

s

ur

ve

illan

ce.

Atth

eo

utbreakofwarSpeerecalledNumbergandh

e

ad

ed

forth

e

Ma

r

ianasinthe

northwesternPacific,wher

e

h

e

m

e

twiththeEmdenanddecidedtodispatchhertoth

e

IndianOc

e

antohampertrade.EmdenleftthebaseatT

s

ingta

o

t

o

a

v

oidb

e

ingtrapped

thereand,infact,sh

e

mi

g

ht

we

llha

ve

b

ee

n,hadtheAdmiralt

y

notov

e

rturn

e

dth

eo

r

ig

inal

wa

rpl

a

n

so

fVi

ce

AdmiralSirMart

y

nJ

e

rram

’

sChin

a

Squadr

o

n

.

H

e

wa

s

tohavebeen

station

e

datthem

o

utho

f

th

eYa

n

g

t

ze

wh

e

rehewouldhavealsobeeninapo

s

iti

o

nt

o

pr

e

v

e

ntScharnhorstandGnei

s

enaufromr

e

turningt

o

T

s

ingtaofromthesouth.The

Admiraltysenthimt

o

H

o

n

g

K

o

n

g

in

s

t

e

ad

,

muchtoth

e

disma

y

ofJ

e

rramwho

e

v

e

n

c

on

s

id

e

r

e

dignoringtheorder.Subs

e

quently,for

ces

w

e

r

ese

ntto

c

overJerram’soriginal

positionbutit

wasacase

ofshuttingthestabledooraft

e

rth

e

hors

e

hadb

o

lt

e

d.Ultimately,

British,Japan

e

se,FrenchandRussian

forcesw

ouldallbeemployedtohuntdo

w

nth

e

Emd

e

n

.

S

p

ee

wantedtodistan

ce

him

se

lffromJapan,f

e

aringh

e

r

e

ntr

y

intothewar,andsailedwith

th

e

r

e

stofhi

s

squadron

eas

t

w

ardstorendezvouswiththeLeip

z

igatEasterIslandas

E

md

e

nl

e

ftforhermission.Emdenwasund

e

rth

e

command

ofa

n

e

xceptionallytalented

offic

e

r,KarlvonMull

e

r,andhi

s

pr

ese

nceintheIndianOcean,atth

e

BayofB

e

ngal(on

th

e

Colombo-Calcuttaroute)cameasatotalsurpris

e

to

t

h

e

Alli

e

swhopresumedthathe

wastog

e

th

e

rwithSp

eea

ndth

e

restofthesquadron.Th

e

Emd

e

nwasamod

e

rn

c

rui

se

r,

capableofspeedsupto24knots,andhadt

e

n4.1in

c

hgunsandtwotorp

e

dotub

e

s.Mull

e

r

att

e

mpt

e

dtodi

s

guis

e

hisshipwithadummyfourthfunn

e

lwhichwas

o

nlytwo-

dimensionalbut,fromadistanc

e

,r

e

s

e

mbl

e

d

f

our

-

funn

e

ledBritishcruis

e

rs

.

Hewast

e

dno

timein

c

arryingouthismissionand,b

e

tw

e

en10and14

Se

ptember1914,hemanagedto

sinksixst

e

amers,caughttwotoserv

e

ascolliersandathirdtocarr

y

captur

e

dcr

e

ws

.

N

ormall

y

itwouldhavefallentoR

e

arAdmiralP

e

irseof

t

h

e

Ea

s

tIndi

e

sStationtopursu

e

Mull

e

rbuth

e

waso

c

cupi

e

dwithtransportsfromIndiaandth

e

G

e

rmanlight

c

rui

se

r

Konigsberginthew

es

tofth

e

IndianO

ce

an.Th

e

r

e

for

e

itwastheshipsMinotaur

,

Hamp

s

hireandYarmouth

fr

omJ

e

rram’ssquadron,Ibuki,ChihumaandYahagiofth

e

J

a

pan

e

seNavy,ZhemchugandAskoldofth

e

RussianNavy

a

ndth

e

Fr

e

nchD’Ibervillethat

we

r

e

gath

e

ringtopursu

eE

mden.

Mullerwastenaciousandon22SeptemberhebombardedthePortofMadras,destroying
twooil-storagetankers,beforesailingtotheMinikoi400mileswestofColombo,sinking
anotherfourshipsandtakingoneotherasacollier.Againasixthwascapturedand
releasedwithcrewsfromtheprizevessels.Emdenthenhidfurthersouthattheislandof
DiegoGarcia(soremotethatnewsoftheoutbreakofwarhadnotyetreachedthe
inhabitants)toattendtorepairsandtocoal.ShehadeludedtheBritish,althoughYarmouth
managedtosinkoneoftheGermancolliersandrescueaGreekshipthathadbeentaken
underenemycontrol.ItwasnotlongbeforeMullerwasatlargeagain,returningtothe
Minikoiareaandrepeatinghispatternofsinkingsandcaptures.Thistimehesankfive
steamers,retainingoneasacollierandreleasinganotherwiththecrews.Brimmingwith
confidence,MullerheadedforPenangandraidedtheentrancetotheMalaccaStrait.Using
thefalsefunnel,hesanktheunsuspectingRussianlightcruiserZhemtchupandwasabout
toseizeaBritish

‘

steamercarryingexplosiveswhenhewasdistractedbythereturnofthe

FrenchdestroyerMousquet,whichheimmediat

e

lysank.Asaconsequenceofthislatest

incidentthetroopconvoysfromAustraliaandNewZealandweredelayedsothatamore
powerfulescortcouldbeassembledtoprotectthem.Mullermovedonwithamissionto
raidanddestroythecableandwirelessstationonDirectionIsland,andtheEmdenduly
arrivedon9November

.

Apartywassentashoretosabotagethewirelessbut,unknownto

Muller,theAustralianconvoywasonly52milesaway,andawarningmessagehad
alreadygoneoutfromtheisland.TheAustralianlightcruiserSydney,underthecommand
ofCaptainJohnGlossop,wassentfromtheconvoyandsaileddirectlytoDirectionIsland.
Whenthetwoshipsengaged,theSydneyhadtheadvantagewithhereight6-inchgunsand
theEmdenwasrunashoreonKeelingIslandandburntout.Thelandingpartyhadbeen
leftbehindandmanagedtoescapeinasmallschooner.TheysailedfirsttoPadangwhere
theyboardedaGermansteamerforthe

.

Yemen.Theythentravelledoverland,besetby

attacksfromBedouins,anddidnotreachsafetyinConstantinopleuntilJune1915.In
retrospect,theAdmiraltyfeltthatconvoyprotection,despiteitsinherentproblems,would
havebeenabettersolutiontothethreatoftheEmden.

IntheIndianOceanatthestartofthewartheAllieswerefacingasimilarthreatfromthe
Konigsberg,alightcruiserwithten4.1-inchguns,underthecommandofCaptainLooff,
basedontheEastAfricastation.Looff’smissionwastohindertradeattheentrancetothe
RedSea.On31JulyhesetsailandmanagedtoavoidaBritishpatrolunderthecommand
ofAdmiralKing-Hall,CommanderoftheCapeSquadron.UnfortunatelyKing-HaIl’s
cruiserswereoldervesselsandtheirspeedcapacitycouldnotmatchthe24knotsofthe
moremodernKonigsberg.However,theGermancruiserwasnotnearlyassuccessfulas
theEmden,largelybecausetheBritishhamperedherabilitytocoal.Hercollierwaskept
fromleavingportandtheBritish,withsomeforesight,preventedherfromsourcingcoal
inPortugueseEastAfricabybuyingitupin

a

d

v

anc

e

.Asar

e

sult

,

onlyonemerchant

v

es

s

e

lwa

ss

unkb

e

for

e

th

e

monso

o

n

se

a

so

nlimit

e

dtheKoni8sberg’

se

ff

ect

i

ve

n

ess

e

ve

n

furth

e

r

.

Sh

e

wasforcedtohid

e

onth

e

Afri

c

an

coas

t,b

e

gging

c

oalfroman

y

friendl

y

c

olli

e

r

s

that

s

h

ee

n

c

ount

e

r

e

d.On20S

e

pt

e

mber

,

sheneverth

e

l

ess

man

age

d

tos

inkanold

lightcruis

e

r,th

e

Pegasus,low

e

ringm

o

ral

ea

ndpr

ov

ingthat

s

h

e

wasstillathreat.On30

Octob

e

r,th

e

D

a

rtmou

t

h,makinguseofintelligencegath

e

redfroma

c

aptur

e

dsupplyship,

discoveredtheKonigsberg

s

ixmil

e

supth

e

Ruf

g

iRiv

e

r

.

Acollierwassunktoblockthe

e

xitofth

e

ri

ver

butth

e

gunrang

e

oftheBritishshipcouldnotr

e

achKoni8

s

b

e

r8and

,

as

therewereotherroutesof

e

scap

e

,an

e

xp

e

diti

o

nhadtob

e

organizedtofinallydestro

y

h

e

r

.

Th

e

Ro

y

alNa

v

alAirS

e

rvic

e

attemptedtobombtheshipbutdidnotm

a

nag

e

t

o

hith

e

r

and,inanycase,th

e

siz

e

ofb

o

mb

s

thatitwa

s

possibl

e

fortheplanestocarrywas

s

impl

y

to

os

mall.Twomonitors,MerseyandSevern,whichw

e

r

e

d

e

sign

e

dforriveruse,weresent

inon16July1915

w

ithair

c

raftcov

e

randmanagedtoinflictsom

e

damagebut

,

alth

o

u

g

h

th

e

G

e

rmanshiphadbeenoutofactionfor

so

m

e

t

i

m

e,s

h

e

wa

ss

tillabl

e

tofireandh

e

ld

offth

e

monit

o

r

s.

It

t

o

o

k

aseco

ndatt

e

mpton12Jul

y

tofinall

y

d

e

stro

y

K

o

n

igs

b

e

rg

‘

Althoughultimat

e

l

y

theKoni8sber8didnotcausemu

c

hph

ysica

ldamag

e

,sh

e

n

e

verthelesstiedupanumber

o

fv

esse

l

s

that

co

uldha

ve

beenuseful

e

lsewh

e

r

e

andth

e

thr

e

atofh

e

rpr

ese

n

ce

hadalsod

e

lay

e

dtroopconvoysfromN

e

wZ

ea

la

n

d

.

Inth

e

Caribb

e

an,asth

e

waropen

e

d,th

e

Britishwer

e

tr

o

ubl

e

db

y

th

e

pr

ese

n

ce

ofth

e

Karlsruhe

,

anoth

e

rn

e

w

vesse

l

c

apabl

e

ofgoodspeedandarmedwithtw

e

lv

e

4.1

inc

h

g

un

s.

InNovember1914,th

e

Karlsruh

e

sankasth

eres

ult

o

faninternalexplo

s

ionwhich

wasastrok

e

ofluck

fro

mth

e

Alliedp

e

rsp

e

cti

ve

butitw

a

sn

o

tb

e

for

e

th

eGe

rmanshiphad

sunk15Briti

s

hm

e

rchant

s

hip

s

andon

eD

ut

c

hmerchantvess

e

l.

Th

e

abov

e

werethemajorthr

e

at

s

toBriti

s

h

s

hipping,

a

lth

o

ughitisnotanexhaustiv

e

list

.

Th

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

oth

e

r

Ge

rmanauxiliaryvess

e

lsthatwer

e

abl

e

toinflictcasual-

ties.

However,

themostpowerfulanddang

e

rousG

e

rmant

h

r

e

atwa

s

Spec’sSquadron.

TheBattleofCoronel

A

ftertheEmdenleftthesquadron,Sp

ee

tookacours

ee

ast

a

nd,inordertoprepareforhis

arrivalinSouthAmerica,

se

nttheNurnberqontoHonoluluwithinstructionsforG

e

rman

agentsinSouthAmeri

c

atoarrangecoalandprovisions.WhentheJapanesede

c

lar

e

dwar

th

e

r

e

was,of

c

ourse,nopossibilityofareturntoTsingtao

.

On30

Se

pt

e

mber,hearrivedat

Papeet

e

inTahitiandshelled

F

r

e

nchinstallationsand,inaddition,sankagunboatb

e

for

e

fe

intingacoursenortheast.

On4OctoberSpeewasbeinghunt

e

dbyBritish,Australian,NewZealand,Frenchand

Japan

e

s

e

forcesanda

c

luewasnowgiventohiswh

e

reabouts.AnAlliedshippick

e

dupa

wirelessmessagefromtheScharnhorst,indi

c

atingacourseforMarquesasandEaster

Acc

ordingly,theAlliedforceswererearrang

e

d.

Oneofth

e

stronge

s

tBritishsquadronsinth

e

huntwasfromth

e

SouthAmeri

c

anStation

underthe

c

ommand

o

fth

e

popularR

e

ar

-

AdmiralSirChristopherCrad

oc

k,who

se

res

pon

s

ibilitywastoguardth

e

MagellanStraits

.

Cr

a

d

o

ck

‘s

ba

se

wa

s

th

e

FalklandIslands

wherehehadtwoarm

o

re

d

cr

u

ise

rs,GoodHopeandMonmouth,bothofwhi

c

hw

e

r

e

o

ve

r

t

e

n

yea

r

s

oldandhadad

e

signfaultinthatth

e

ircas

e

mat

eswe

r

es

o

c

los

e

toth

e

waterline

thattheyoftencouldnotb

e

f

i

r

e

d

.

Ev

e

nwh

e

ntheycouldb

e

fired,th

e

ircapa

c

itywas

o

nl

y

about50p

e

rcentofthecapacityofth

e

G

e

rmancrui

se

r

s.

Inadditiontotheseproblems,the

majorityofhis

c

r

ewswe

r

e

r

e

s

e

rvistswhohadnotbeentogetherverylong

a

ndla

c

k

e

d

g

unn

e

rypractice

.

Aswellasth

e

armore

d

c

rui

se

r

s,

Crado

c

khadonemodernlightcruis

e

r,

Glasgow,anda

co

n

ve

rt

e

dlin

e

r,Otranto,withsome4.7-inchguns

.C

rad

oc

k

w

a

s

tok

ee

p

hisforcereadytoengageS

c

ha

r

nh

o

r

s

tand

G

n

e

i

s

enauandhewaspromisedreinforc

e

ments

inth

e

shap

e

ofthebattleshipCanopusandth

ec

rui

se

rD

e

f

e

nc

e

fromtheMediterranean.

Theintend

e

dr

e

inforc

e

m

e

nt,D

e

f

e

nce,wasequaltooneofSpec’scruis

e

rsbut

t

h

e

r

es

tof

Crado

c

k’

ss

quadronwouldstillhav

e

b

ee

nat

a

d

isa

d

v

antag

e.

H

o

w

eve

r

,

itwasdecidedthat

D

e

f

e

n

ce

wouldb

e

b

e

tt

e

rd

e

pl

oye

dwithacruisersquadronop

e

r

a

tin

g

furth

e

rnorthinthe

Atlantic.Finally,sh

e

wouldbeord

ere

dt

o

joinCrado

c

k,althoughshewouldnotarrive

untilth

e

battl

e

hadb

ee

nfought.Thisleftth

e

Canopus,abattl

e

shipw

i

th12

-

in

c

hguns.

Spe

e

’

s

shipsw

e

r

e

muchfast

e

rthanCanopusand,althoughSpeewasnottoknowit,hi

s

s

mall

e

rgunscould,infact

,

outrangethoseonth

eBr

i

tis

h

s

hip.OnceCradockhadth

e

sup

e

riorfor

ce

,h

e

wast

osea

r

c

hthestraits,thoughhewasalsotob

e

pr

e

par

e

d

ei

th

e

rt

o

comebacktocoverth

e

Riv

er

Plat

e

ortos

e

archas

fa

ra

s

Valparaiso,dependingupon

int

e

llig

e

n

ce

r

ece

iv

e

d.

His

missionwastohamp

e

rGermantrad

e

a

s

w

e

llasto

des

t

r

o

y

th

e

Germancruisers.

On18October1914,Sp

ees

ail

e

dfromEa

s

t

e

rIsland,

w

h

e

r

e

h

e

hadcoaled,toMasAfu

e

ra,

whichwasmore

re

m

o

t

e

andhalfwaytotheChileancoast.H

e

nowhadthr

e

el

ig

ht

c

ruis

e

rs

inhiscompanyinadditiontohisarmore

d

vesse

ls

.

Cradock,atPortStanley,heardonth

e

s

am

e

daythatthearrivalofCanopuswouldbedelay

e

db

y

aw

ee

kandthath

e

r

s

peed

capacit

y

wasnotth

e

15knotsthath

e

was

-

e

xp

e

ctingbutabout12,whichwould

s

low

downhi

ss

quadron

.

Onceshearriv

e

d,h

e

l

e

ftPortStanle

y

andh

e

adedthroughthe

MagellanStraitsandupth

e

w

e

stcoast

o

fChile.Canopusfollowedbehind,convoyingth

e