plik

193

The Idea of Dh„tu-v„da in
Yogacara and Tath„gata-garbha Texts

AMABE

Nobuyoshi

AKAMAYA NORIAKI AND

Matsumoto Shirõ are convinced that

tath„gatagarbha theory and the Yogacara school share a com-
mon framework that they call dh„tu-v„da or “locus theory.”

The word dh„tu-v„da itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto

and adopted by Hakamaya.

They argue that the dh„tu-v„da idea stands

in  direct  contradiction  to  the  authentic  Buddhist  theory  of  prat‡tya-
samutp„da or “dependent origination,” which in turn leads them to con-
sider  tath„gata-garbha and  Yogacara  theories  to  be  non-Buddhist.  In
their opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of “orig-
inal enlightenment thought” (hongaku shisõ) in East Asia fell under the
shadow  of  the  dh„tu-v„da  idea,

with the result that most of its

Buddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.

The idea of dh„tu-v„da is thus an integral part of the Critical

Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evalua-
tion of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto ³rst found the dh„tu-
v„da structure in Indian tath„gata-garbha and Yogacara literature, we
need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will
be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (sastras).

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE DHÃTU-VÃDA THEORY

For Hakamaya and Matsumoto, the cardinal tenet of Buddhism is
prat‡tyasamutp„da, which they understand as consisting of a temporal
sequence of causally linked dharmas or “phenomena” that lack any solid
basis in reality. Matsumoto illustrates this by means of the following
chart.

HART

➛ dharma ➛ dharma ➛ dharma ➛

dh„tu

Chart 2, in contrast, illustrates the basic structure of dh„tu-v„da.

This second model, in contrast to the prat‡tyasamutp„da model,

introduces a universal, solid basis under such names as dharmadh„tu and
buddhadh„tu. In Matsumoto’s terminology, this universal dh„tu is a
“locus” that supports phenomenal dharmas as “super-loci.” He enumer-
ates the characteristic features of this dh„tu-v„da model as follows:

1. “Locus” is the basis for “super-loci.”

2. “Locus” gives rise to “super-loci.”

3. “Locus” is one, “super-loci” are many.

4. “Locus” is real, “super-loci” are not real.

5. “Locus” is the essential nature of “super-loci.”

6. “Super-loci” are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that

they have arisen from the “locus” and share its nature.

Thus, the dh„tu-v„da model is essentially a monism (or, according to
Matsumoto’s own terminology, a “generative monism” n´ÇísâÇ).

194

YAMABE NOBUYOSHI

HART

šr„vaka-dharma pratyekabuddha-dharma tath„gata-dharma

dharmadh„tu = ekay„na

= super-locus

= locus

Hakamaya and Matsumoto take this to be an Upani¤adic model and thus
not authentically Buddhist. Particularly problematic for them is the fact
that this dh„tu-v„da framework is not as egalitarian as it appears. As they
see it, one can classify any number of different elements—from the three
vehicles to social castes—as “super-loci” resting on the universal “locus.”
Since the diversity of the “super-loci” is an essential element of the dh„tu-
v„da structure, the distinction among “super-loci” remains unaffected.
On the other hand, the apparent equality that obtains on the absolute
level serves at once to justify, obscure, and con³rm the discrimination that
appears on the phenomenal level.

In Matsumoto’s opinion, this essen-

tially discriminatory nature of the dh„tu-v„da structure is clearly
expressed in verse

.39 of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra:

Because the dharmadh„tu has no distinction, any distinction among
gotra is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited
[on the “locus” of dharmadh„tu] are distinct, a distinction [among
gotra] is proclaimed.

In the same way, the ideas of universal “Buddha-nature” and icchan-

tika in the Mahayana Mah„parinirv„«a Sutra do not contradict each
other but combine to form a harmonious whole. The Mah„y„nasðtr„-
la½k„ra asserts, on the one hand, that all sentient beings have tath„gata-
garbha (verse

.37)

and, on the other hand, admits that some people

will never be able to attain nirvana (verse

III

.11). Hence the dh„tu-v„da

structure also represents a principle supporting the discriminatory gotra
theory of the Yogacara school.

MONISM OR PLURALISM?

Matsumoto’s arguments are well prepared, and the coexistence of a univer-
sal “Buddha-nature”

and unequal attainments is indeed problematic.

Still, it may well be possible to explain this coexistence in somewhat dif-
ferent terms.

A good place to begin is the famous de³nition of gotra in the

Bodhisattvabhðmi section of the Yog„c„rabhðmi :

What is gotra? In brief, gotra is twofold: the one existing by nature
(prak£tistha) and the attained one (samud„n‡ta).

The gotra existing by nature is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis

(¤a^„yatana-više¤a ) of bodhisattvas. That [distinct state] was naturally

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

195

acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [to
the present].

The attained gotra is what is acquired through the practice of merits

in the past [lives].

In this case, both meanings are intended. Further, this gotra is also

called seed (b‡ja), dh„tu, and origin (prak£ti ).

Since Hakamaya himself quotes this last sentence as an example of the
monistic dh„tu model,

it is clear that he considers the gotra theory of

the Bodhisattvabhðmi to be a form of monism. His argument is based on
the fact that all the terms given (gotra, b‡ja, dh„tu, prak£ti) appear in sin-
gular forms.

But the argument is not without its weaknesses.

First, the paired terms prak£tistha-gotra and samud„n‡ta-gotra have a

close analogue in the Vastusa½graha«‡ section of the Yog„c„rabhðmi:

In sum, dh„tus are twofold: the ones existing by nature (rang-bzhin gyis
gnas pa, W

À§ƒ, *prak£tistha

) and the ones enhanced through habitu-

al practice (goms-pas yongs-su-brtas-pa, H†˜ƒ, *abhy„sa-paripu¤¦a).

The ones existing by nature are, for example, the eighteen dh„tus

(khams), which are seeds (sa-bon, *b‡ja) staying in their own respective
continuities.

The dh„tus enhanced through habitual practice are enhanced seeds

resting in the body (rten, *„šraya) so that the good or bad dharmas
habitually practiced in other, former lives might arise [easily]….

In these two passages, it is clear that the prak£tistha-gotra of the Bodhi-
sattvabhðmi corresponds to the *prak£tistha-dh„tu of the Vastusa½-
graha«‡. The correspondence between the samud„n‡ta-gotra, “attained
gotra,” of the Bodhisattvabhðmi and the *abhy„sa-paripu¤¦a-dh„tu, “the
dh„tu enhanced through habitual practice,” of the Vastusa½graha«‡ may
not be immediately evident, but is con³rmed by the Mah„y„na-
sðtr„la½k„ra-bh„¤ya, which equates samud„n‡tam [gotram], “attained
gotra,” and paripu¤¦a½ [gotra½], “enhanced gotra.”

Consequently, a

correspondence between this portion of the Vastusa½graha«‡ and the
aforementioned portion of the Bodhisattvabhðmi seems beyond dispute.

The basic message of the passage of the Vastusa½graha«‡ is that

there are innumerable good and bad elements (dh„tu) in sentient beings
that correspond to good and bad mental functions, and that one must
accordingly cultivate the good elements in order to realize good mental
states.

In other words, here the dh„tu theory is clearly of a pluralistic

sort. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the pluralistic structure of this

196

YAMABE NOBUYOSHI

HART

sravaka pratyekabuddha

bodhisattva

šr„vaka-dh„tu pratyekabuddha-dh„tu bodhisattva-dh„tu

(gotra)

197

SA¢SKR

. TA OR ASA¢SKR

. TA?

There is more involved in what has been discussed above than merely
whether dh„tu is singular or plural. It has to do with the foundation for
supramundane attainment. If there is any possibility at all for us to acquire
supramundane wisdom, on what does such a possibility rest? The
Bodhisattvabhðmi responds by referring to inherent gotra and de³nes the
foundation as ¤a^„yatana-više¤a, or “the distinct state of the six-sense-
basis.” But just what does this ¤a^„yatana-više¤a mean? We get a clue, I
believe, from the following passage of the Abhidharmakoša-bh„¤ya:

The [distinction between noble ones and ordinary ones] is made in terms
of the distinct states of bodies („šraya-više¤a). [This distinction is possi-

passage was recognized by Hakamaya himself in an earlier essay.

At the

same time, we have established that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattva-
bhðmi was closely related to the dh„tu theory of the Vastusa½graha«‡.
This being the case, it is likely that the gotra theory of the Bodhisattva-
bhðmi itself was pluralistic in structure.

The pluralistic dh„tu model and the gotra theory are intrinsically

related to one another. In the same way that the dh„tu of desire is inca-
pable of generating hatred, the gotra of sravakas is unable to generate the
supreme wisdom of the Buddha. Without such distinct gotras, therefore,
it would not be possible to establish a distinction among the three vehi-
cles.

Accordingly, at least as far as these passages are concerned, the only

chart we are able to draw is the one below (Chart 3). Obviously the plu-
ralism it presents is not the same as the “generative monism” that
Matsumoto offers.

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

ble] because the body („šraya) of noble ones is transformed (par„v£tta)
by  the  power  of  the  paths  of  seeing  and  practice  (daršana-bh„van„-
m„rga),  so  that  [the  body]  is  no  more  capable  of  generating  the
de³lements  to  be  abandoned  by  the  [paths  of  seeing  and  practice].
Therefore, when one’s body has ceased to be the seed of de³lements
(ab‡j‡-bhðte „šraye kleš„n„½), like a grain of rice consumed by the ³re,
one is called [a noble person] who has abandoned de³lements.

In the body of literature to which this text belongs, „šraya usually means,
in the absence of further contextual speci³cation, “body,” or perhaps
more precisely, our personal existence centered on the body. This makes
it virtually synonymous with ¤a^„yatana, which makes ¤a^„yatana-više¤a
and „šraya-više¤a equivalent.

In the passage cited, the body of a noble person is distinguished from

the body of an unenlightened person in that the former no longer pro-
duces de³lements. In other words, the bodies of the unenlightened
remain in a state that produces de³lements and such bodies are conceived
of as the b‡ja of de³lements.

In the passage from the Bodhisattvabhðmi, the six-sense-basis (¤a^-

„yatana) of a bodhisattva is distinguished from that of a sravaka and a
pratyekabuddha in that the ¤a^„yatana of a bodhisattva is capable, even-
tually, of generating the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. The six-sense-
basis of a bodhisattva who has the potentiality to give rise to the highest
wisdom of the Buddha is considered to be the bodhisattva-gotra.

The important point here is that the gotra is taken to represent a par-

ticular state of concrete physical-mental existence. In other words, the
basis for deliverance is posited on the phenomenal level—namely,
sa½sk£ta—and not on the absolute level of asa½sk£ta.

We are reminded here of an important theoretical requirement of

abhidharma Buddhism, namely that an asa½sk£ta or “unconditioned”
dharma cannot be a generative cause of anything

and therefore cannot

directly generate supramundane wisdom.

This same pattern is followed

by the Yog„c„rabhðmi.

Tathat„ is synonymous with dharmadh„tu, which, according to

Hakamaya and Matsumoto, gives rise to all the mundane and supramun-
dane elements. It should be noted, however, that the role of tathat„ in
soteriological contexts of the Yogacara system (especially in the Yog„c„ra-
bhðmi ) is rather limited. If it is sometimes called the cause of holy dharmas
(namely supramundane wisdom), it is because tathat„ assists the arising of

198

YAMABE NOBUYOSHI

supramundane wisdom by becoming its cognitive object or „lambana-
pratyaya. In other words, meditation on tathat„ in the preliminary stages
eventually induces supramundane wisdom.

But tathat„, in principle,

does not become a generative cause,

which means that once again the

suitability of the dh„tu-v„da model as “generative monism” to the
Yogacara literature is suspect.

Classical Yogacara theory regarding gotra maintains that the diver-

gent attainments of the three vehicles are each based on their own dh„tu
or gotra. Needless to say, this is a highly problematic position, and one
needs to consider carefully why they were driven to take it. Merely in
terms of the formal logic involved, however, the argument is rather
straightforward: divergent effects must have divergent causes. This is
much easier to understand than the idea of divergent effects based on a
single cause, as the dh„tu-v„da model suggests.

I do not believe that

the universal dharmadh„tu was the leading principle that supported the
gotra theory of the Yogacara school.

GOTRA AND DHARMADHÃTU

The theory does not, however, hold universally. If we consider a typical
tath„gata-garbha text, the Ratnagotravibh„ga, we ³nd that such a clear
distinction between sa½sk£ta and asa½sk£ta is not strictly observed.

The

text does not hesitate to assert that the actions of the Buddha arise from
asa½sk£ta.

Even the prak£tistha-gotra of the Bodhisattvabhðmi is linked

to the tath„gata-garbha, which is equivalent to tathat„.

But if

prak£tistha-gotra is equated with the omnipresent tathat„, no theoretical
basis remains to support the absolute distinction among the three vehi-
cles. Thus, the Ratnagotravibh„ga states:

Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tath„gata fall even on the
bodies  of  sentient  beings  ³xed  in  state  of  evil  (mithy„tva-niyata-
sa½t„na)…. The statement that an icchantika never attains nirvana was
made to remove the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana, because
the hatred against the teachings of  Mahayana is the cause of one’s being
icchantika. [In other words, this statement has] a hidden intention [that
even icchantikas will attain nirvana] at another, [later] time [if they aban-
don their hatred of Mahayana]. Indeed, because the originally pure gotra
exists (prak£ti-višuddha-gotra-sa½bhav„d),  no  one  can  be  ultimately
impure by nature.

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

199

The dh„tu-v„da model of ultimate discrimination based on universal

buddhadh„tu does not seem to work very well on this end either. Logic
requires that divergent phenomena must have divergent bases. If the basis
is universal, there is no logical reason to maintain an ultimate discrimina-
tion among the “super-loci.” This structure is presented graphically in
Chart 4. Note that the “super-loci” here are no longer discriminatory:

DHÃTU-VÃDA

On the basis of the above arguments, I am persuaded that the classical
gotra theory of the Yogacara school was based on pluralistic dh„tus or
gotras. Once the gotra is reinterpreted as universal dharmadh„tu or
tathat„, it loses the theoretical basis that supports the absolute distinc-
tion among the three vehicles.

There is yet another factor to be taken into account. India is a coun-

try in which tradition holds great authority. Old theories are not directly
discarded when new ones come along, but are often retained and attempts
are made to reconcile the old with the new. Something like this seems to
have happened in the case of the gotra theory of the Yogacara school.

Actually, even within the Yog„c„rabhðmi the idea of tathat„ was

coming to play an ever greater role in the soteriological context. For
example, a portion of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡ section of the Yog„c„ra-
bhðmi says that the cause of supramundane dharmas does not lie in ordi-
nary seeds but in tathat„ as a cognitive object.

The theoretical limitation

of tathat„ to the realm of a cognitive object, and hence its exclusion from
the realm of generative causes, seems still to be in force. And yet at the
same time one senses a dissatisfaction with the gotra theory of the
Bodhisattvabhðmi, which grounds supramundane attainment on the phe-

HART

attainment of nirvana attainment of nirvana attainment of nirvana

prak£tistha-gotra = dharmadh„tu

200

YAMABE NOBUYOSHI

nomenal ¤a^„yatana-više¤a. This appears to indicate an expansion of the
role of tathat„ into the realm of the soteriological.

Now if the source of supramundane attainment is not individual seeds

but universal tathat„, there seems no reason to sustain the idea of indi-
viduals being predestined to a particular level of attainment.

Never-

theless, the idea of distinct gotras is not abandoned, and the attempt is
made to defend distinct, predestined goals by claiming that some people
are faced with an ultimate obstacle that blocks the way into tathat„, while
others are not.

At this point the argument, it seems to me, has ceased to be rational

and is simply concerned with preserving tradition. The Yog„c„rabhðmi is
not a coherent text but a composite of heterogeneous elements, some
more traditional, others more progressive. In general the material in the
Vinišcayasa½graha«‡ is more developed than what we ³nd in the basic
seventeen sections of the Yog„c„rabhðmi. Still, the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡
is part of the Yog„c„rabhðmi and presupposes what is contained in its
basic sections. And since the basic sections clearly present the traditional
gotra theory, the authors of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡ were not at liberty
directly to contradict or ignore that theory. This would appear to be the
historical dynamic at work behind the inconsistency between the monis-
tic tathat„ and the pluralistic three vehicles.

True, certain passages do suggest a dh„tu-v„da-type structure. A

good example is the verse of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra that we referred to
at the outset:

Because the dharmadh„tu has no distinction, any distinction among
gotras is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited
[on the “locus” of dharmadh„tu] are distinct, a distinction [among
gotras] is proclaimed.

The earliest extant commentary on the work, the Abhisamay„la½k„ra-
v£tti of Ãrya-Vimuktisena, explains the meaning of the latter half of the
verse as follows:

[Gotras are differentiated, just as the vessels] made from the same clay
and baked in the same ³re [are differentiated] by the distinct names
“honey pot,” “candy pot,” and so forth [according to what is put in
them].

In Matsumoto’s phraseology, the V£tti would clearly hold that the

manifold “super-loci” are posited on a single “locus,” and that this

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

201

homogeneous “locus” is differentiated only in the sense that the hetero-
geneous “super-loci” are differentiated one from another. It is precisely
this that he has chosen to name dh„tu-v„da. But if the distinction among
gotra amounts to no more than the super³cial temporary distinction
between a “honey pot” and a “candy pot,” it has ceased to characterize
anything essential. This is clearly different from the stringent gotra theory
of the Yogacara school.

The great possibility for the conversion of

šr„vaka allowed for in the V£tti seems to justify my suspicions.

It seems

certain that the distinction among the three vehicles in the V£tti is not
the absolute predestination of the Yogacara school.

In addition, we might mention the following arguments:

Therefore, [the k„rik„

.5cd of the Abhisamay„la½k„ra]

teaches that

the dharmadh„tu itself, [namely] the gotra existing by nature
(prak£tistha½ gotra½), is the basis for practice, because [the dharma-
dh„tu is] the cause of the holy dharmas….

Others hold that gotra is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis

(¤a^„yatana-više¤a), which is twofold: one attained by conditions
(pratyaya-samud„n‡ta) and one existing by nature (prak£ty-avasthita)….
[This opinion is rejected.]

[Objection:] If dharmadh„tu is gotra, does it not follow that all [the

sentient beings] are [equally] established in the gotra (gotra-stha),

since

the [dharmadh„tu] is omnipresent?

[Answer: The dharmadh„tu] is called gotra [only] to the extent that

it is recognized („lambyam„na) and becomes the cause of holy dhar-
mas….

The context here is very similar to that of the Vinišcayasa½graha«‡

on a number of points. First, the entire argument is necessitated by the
rejection of the classical Yogacara theory of gotra and the adoption of
tathat„ or dharmadh„tu as the basis for supramundane attainment.
Second, tathat„ or dharmadh„tu thus adopted aids the arising of supra-
mundane wisdom by serving as its cognitive object. Third, in spite of the
adoption of such a universal basis, the author does not discard the tradi-
tional distinction among the three vehicles outright, but strives somehow
to retain it.

Most likely the crucial factor once again was the authority of the pre-

ceding tradition. The Abhisamay„la½k„ra had close ties with certain
Yogacara texts,

which makes it easy to understand how the Abhisamay„-

la½k„ra and its V£tti could not completely neglect the traditional gotra

202

YAMABE NOBUYOSHI

distinction of the Yogacara school. At the same time, the Yogacara tradi-
tion seems not to have been so closely binding on the V£tti as the Viniš-
cayasa½graha«‡. The logic of the V£tti that supports the differentiation
of gotras is very weak. Hence, as we saw earlier, the distinction among
gotras in this text cannot be considered ³nal.

CONCLUSION

In the compass of this essay I have only been able to cover a small portion
of the large number of texts analyzed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, and
have had to exclude mention of any of the sutras. Obviously so limited an
examination cannot claim to have taken into account all the aspects of
tath„gata-garbha thought. However, we can say that at least as far as the
sastra texts we have discussed are concerned, the applicability of the
dh„tu-v„da model of discrimination based on monism is questionable at
best. The Yogacara theory of gotra is indeed discriminatory, but it is not
based on monism. Tath„gata-garbha thought is clearly monistic, but the
gotra distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts,
such as the Abhisamay„la½k„ra-v£tti, show an apparent dh„tu-v„da
structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought
about by a reinterpretation of the gotra theory. That is, replacing the plu-
ralistic gotras with monistic dharmadh„tu did not entirely do away with
the traditional distinction among the three vehicles.

I have tried to illustrate this in Chart 5, which presents my under-

standing of the dh„tu-v„da structure. While it may look very similar to
Matsumoto’s scheme, it is really a clumsy patchwork of the super-structure
of Chart 3 with the infra-structure of Chart 4, aimed at showing how the
infrastructure and superstructure of Chart 5 contradict one another. I

THE IDEA OF DHÃTU-VÃDA

203

HART

sravaka pratyekabuddha bodhisattva

dharmadh„tu = prak£tistha-gotra

uperstructure of

Yogacara

inconsistent with

infrastructure of

tath„gatagarbha

➛