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JAPAN AND THE ARCTIC：

NOT SO POLES APART

　Within the last two decades, the Arctic has
transformed from a forgotten backwater at the
end of the Cold War to becoming a focus of
increased international attention. The Arctic
Council was set up in Ottawa, Canada in 1996
among the eight Arctic states： Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the
U.S.. Its own history cites its formation as to serve

“as a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide

a means for promoting cooperation, coordination
and interaction among the Arctic States, with the
involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities
and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic
issues; in particular, issues of sustainable development
and environmental protection in the Arctic.”

＊1

In short,

it had a limited mandate, only to issues pertaining to
protection of the environment and the indigenous
peoples. In fact, during its formative years, it garnered
little attention, and was even ignored by its eight
creators. The Arctic Council toiled in the margins of
international affairs, its membership described as cozy
and club-like.

＊2

　After all the Arctic was a remote and foreboding
place, attracting the attention of only “cranks,
visionaries and dictators.”

＊ 3

U.S. President William

Taft（1909-1913） thought ownership of the North Pole
to be useless. By the mid-20th century, the region
became a major theater of the Cold War. In the former
Soviet Union, Stalin（leader of the Soviet Union from
1 9 2 4 t o 1 9 5 3）, i n h i s r e l e n t l e s s d r i v e f o r

JOGMEC Washington Office

Jasmin Sinclair

　この20年間で、北極地帯は冷戦終結以来の“忘れ去られた僻地”から国際的関心が集まる地域へと変
貌を遂げた。2013年5月15日、北極評議会は、その設立から17年後に、明らかに北極地帯の国家とは
言えないアジア諸国である中国、インド、日本、韓国、シンガポールに対して恒久的オブザーバーとし
ての参加を認めた。これら非北極・非西洋諸国からの関心と参加は、この地域の重要性の高まりを裏付
け、反映させるものとなっている。特に、中国、日本、韓国からの関心は、経済的可能性によって動機
付けられている。本稿では、北極評議会参加諸国間の外交的・協調的取り組みとともに、日本独自の取
り組みや、炭化水素資源採掘・北極航路に関わる潜在的な角逐あるいは協力可能な分野に関して焦点を
当てる。

は

じめに

The Arctic Council evolving

Table

The Arctic Council

Member States

Observer States

Canada

Denmark（Greenland）

Iceland

Finland

Norway

Russia

Sweden

U.S.A.

China

＊

France

Germany

India

＊

Italy

＊

Japan

＊

The Netherlands

Poland

South Korea

＊

Singapore

＊

Spain

United Kingdom

＊：Admitted in May 2013

Source：The Arctic Council, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/

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industrialization, created gulags and mines in the
Russian Arctic. The 1970s saw the opening up of the
North Slope of Alaska to oil development. At the end
of the Cold War, the Arctic was relegated as an
afterthought on the international stage.

　Seemingly, in the blink of an eye, everything
changed. In 2006, NASA showed pictures of melting
polar ice caps. In 2007, a Russian Arctic scientist laid
claim to the North Pole by planting his nation’s flag on
the seabed in an election campaign publicity stunt.

＊ 4

The geopolitical race was on as accessibility to the
Arctic became a tangible reality. The Arctic Council
was soon thrust in the international arena. Seventeen
years after its founding, the Arctic Council granted

permanent observer status to five decidedly non-polar
Asian nations： China, India, Japan, Singapore, and
South Korea.

＊ 5

The Arctic was once the province of

the five littoral states（Canada, Greenland, Norway,
Russia, and the U.S.）. But attention of and participation
from non-Arctic European nations and now Asian
nations underscore and reflect the growing importance
of the region.

＊6

The Arctic is now global.

　The Arctic Council’s visibility has ascended hand-in-
hand with the increased changes in the Arctic due to
accelerated climate change.

＊ 7

In granting non-Arctic

nations the status of permanent observers, the Arctic
Council has broadened the emphasis of its raison d’être.
In addition to its prior emphasis on advancing

Source： Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/GRID-Arendal, http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-topography-and-bathymetry-

topographic-map_d003

Fig1

Political topographic map of the Arctic

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sustainable development of the Arctic while preserving
and conserving its unique ecosystems, the Arctic
Council placed a new emphasis on increased cooperation
and interaction with business.

＊8

This development also

reflects how the future of Arctic affairs will more than
likely be influenced by Asian nations. The main drivers
are economic in nature. New sea routes in the Arctic—
the North West Passage（NWP）and the Northern Sea

Route（NSR）cut travel time and distance by 30％ and
offer cheaper transit, compared to the traditional
southern route whereby ships pass through the Strait
of Malacca and the Suez Canal.（South Korea has
dubbed the NSR as the “Silk Road of the Twenty-First
Century.”）The second economic driver for the nations
of East Asia is the Arctic’s abundant resources.

＊9

　The effects of climate change on the Arctic means
that the Arctic’s geography is changing. One of the
more tangible effects of this change is that Arctic
waters are open for passage during most of the
summer months. The effects of climate change happen
more rapidly than anywhere else in the world.

＊ 10

Melting sea ice will soon allow extended navigation
periods in the Arctic Ocean, with the potential to
transform commercial shipping

＊ 11

, giving rise to new,

shorter sea lanes. Shipping traffic in the Arctic could
rise dramatically.

　The Arctic also holds 13％ of the world’s undiscovered
oil, along with 30 ％ of undiscovered natural gas and
20％ of undiscovered natural gas liquids.

＊12

Furthermore,

according to the U.S. Geological Survey, 84 ％ of the
undiscovered oil and gas occurs offshore of the Arctic
littoral states.

＊13

　It is no wonder that industry and government
representatives are full of high hopes. But despite large

ocean stretches, the Arctic remains inhospitable, with
long and dark winters, and areas far from search and
rescue facilities.

＊ 14

Indeed, the Arctic represents

special hazards, such as the danger of icing on
installations, long distances between offshore fields and
land and lack of infrastructure.

＊15

And yet, despite the

bleakness, the prospect of the Arctic as a resource
base has opened new economic potential.

　It is against this backdrop that this paper will
explore Japan’s increased interest in the Arctic.
Having succeeded to permanent observer status in the
Arctic Council, Japan has the potential to help shape
the challenges emerging as the Arctic changes. Japan
brings “considerable financial, scientific and legitimating
capacity to the Council.”

＊ 16

As do its two competing

East Asian neighbors, China and South Korea, also
newly-minted permanent observers to the Arctic
Council. All three countries are deeply dependent on
foreign trade. Their aims of establishing partnerships
among the Arctic states are understandable.

a） Formative Years in Developing an Arctic

Strategy

　In August 2012, one of Japan’s top newspapers, the
Yomiuri Shimbun, wrote that “Japan has started out

late in the game［of Arctic affairs］.” The article
excoriated Japan’s governance, saying it was at risk of
lagging behind, in contrast to China and South Korea.
Indeed, of its two neighbors, Japan was the last to file

The Arctic itself evolving

JAPAN IN THE ARCTIC

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its application to obtain observer status to the Arctic
Council.

＊ 17

As recently as four years ago, Japanese

policymakers paid scant attention to the Arctic.

＊ 18

reality, Japan has a long history in polar research,
acknowledged and encouraged by the Japanese
government, predating its two neighbors.

＊ 19

Its early

focus was on Antarctica in 1957. In the 1990s, the
Nippon Foundation and the Ship & Ocean Foundation

（now the Ocean Policy Research Foundation）, worked

with Norway and Russia. Together they formed the
International Northern Sea Route Program（INSROP）,
a six-year project, whose purpose was to study the
viability and feasibility of Arctic shipping lanes.

＊ 20

INSROP morphed into the Japan Northern Sea Route
Program（JANSROP）and JANSROP II. Covering a
three-year span（2002-2005）, its aim was to study the
NSR for the Japanese shipping industry.

＊21

But due to

Japanese companies’ skepticism of Arctic shipping
routes, combined with Japan’s economic decline
starting in the 1990s, shipping companies concluded
the risks far outweighed potential benefits.

　Japanese companies backed off, but government
efforts on formulation of an Arctic policy continued
apace. In 2009, Japan officially submitted its application
for Permanent Observer status to the Arctic Council.

＊22

In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs（MOFA）
established an Arctic Task Force under the Ocean
Division, International Legal Affairs Bureau, “in order
to make cross-sectoral approach towards the foreign
policy on the Arctic including the aspect of international
law.”

＊ 23

Since November 2012, officials from MOFA

have attended Arctic Council meetings. And in 2012, a
major think-tank, the Japan Institute of International
Affairs（JIIA）, released a research project entitled,
"Arctic Governance and Japan's Diplomatic Strategy",
bolstering government efforts.

＊24

b） Japan’s Movers and Shakers in Arctic

Affairs

　Japan’s process in formulating public policy has been
described as being an “iron triangle,” consisting of the
civil service, politicians, and business interests.

＊25

It can

be characterized as symbiotic or parasitic, depending
o n o n e’s p o i n t o f v i e w . B u s i n e s s e s l o b b y t h e

government. The civil service looks to business for
information. Businesses look to the government on
trade issues. This process also applies to formulation of
Arctic policy.

　i）Ministerial Level
　　▪Ministry of Foreign Affairs（MOFA）
　　▪ Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and

Tourism（MLIT）

　　▪ Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science

and Technology（MEXT）

　　▪ Ministry of Defense（MOD）

　ii） Research Organizations, Think-Tanks,

Independent Agencies

＊26

　　▪ The Ocean Policy Research Foundation（OPRF）
　　▪ National Institute for Polar Research（NIPR）
　　▪ Japan Institute of International Affairs（JIIA）
　　▪ Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation

（JOGMEC）

　　▪ Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and

Technology（JAMSTEC）

　　▪ Institute of Low Temperature Science（ILTS）
　　▪ Japan Consortium for Arctic Environmental

Research（JCAR）

　　▪ Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency（JAXA）

　iii）Private Institutions
　　▪ Energy and Shipping Companies

c）The Attraction of the Arctic for Japan
　As a maritime nation, the Japanese government
understandably has a deep interest in the promotion
and usage of Arctic passageways. One shipping route,
the NSR, passes through the Arctic Ocean connecting
the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean.

＊ 27

With

melting sea ice resulting from global climate change,
the commercial potential of the route is becoming more
tangible. Traffic is certainly increasing. According to
Rosatomflot, a Russian state-run corporation that
guides ships through the Arctic with nuclear-powered
icebreakers, the number of cargo ships taking the NSR
has jumped from 4 in 2010 to 34 in 2011, representing
a more than eight-fold increase.（In contrast, the Suez
Canal handled 17,799 trips in the same year.）

＊28

But

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because the navigation season has now lengthened to
four months a year, from July to mid-November, NSR
traffic can only grow. As of mid-September 2013, 531
vessels received transit permits.

＊29

　i）Shipping
　　　The NSR has long been viewed as a short-cut

linking Asia to Europe via Russia’s Arctic coast.
Japanese and South Korean energy companies are
already shipping oil products through the ice. Last
year, Gazprom shipped liquefied natural gas（LNG）
to Japan. In August 2013, Norway sent two
shipments of oil products（one of them naphtha）to
Japan. Using the NSR on a return trip from Asia
to Europe, South Korea sent high-quality diesel to

Europe.

＊30

　　　Utilizing the NSR has obvious advantages than

the traditional southern route through the Strait of
Malacca and Suez Canal. The first advantage is
distance. The NSR is 3,900 nautical miles（7,223
km）shorter than the southern route which is over
11,000 nautical miles（20,372 km）. Along with
shaving distance, the second advantage is that
voyage time is also saved. Cargoes transiting
through the Suez Canal can take approximately 35
days. The NSR cuts the travel time by up to 20
days.

＊31

　　　The NSR’s third advantage lies in saving money

Source： https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File：Sevmorput%27.jpg

Fig2

Comparing the Northern Sea Route in red

and transit via the Suez Canal in blue

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and lives by avoiding security risks. By transiting
through the NSR, ships can effectively lower the
possibility of pirate encounters. The Strait of
Malacca and the Gulf of Aden are notorious havens
for pirates, who board ships and kidnap their
crews for ransom. This translates into higher in-
surance premiums for carriers and the risk of
losing lives. Rounding the Africa’s Cape of Good
Hope is available, but this route would be longer in
terms of distance and time, and again, would add
to shipping costs.

＊32

　　　To sum up the costs and benefits of the NSR for

commercial shipping, the time and distance saved
transiting through the NSR is offset by higher
costs. Despite saving fuel, carriers still have to pay
higher transit fees to Russia, along with ensuring
the use of icebreakers. Foreign ships are also
required to notify the Russian government three
months in advance. Some Japanese observers see
Russian bureaucracy as more formidable than
Arctic ice.

＊33

One CEO predicts that the NSR will

take another 10 to 20 years to become truly viable
for container ships.

＊ 34

The Secretary-General of

the International Maritime Organization, Koji
Sekimizu states that icebreaker support is more
than necessary, as ice will remain a big issue even
during summer. Safety protocols and mitigation of
oil spills and accidents will also grow as the
volume of traffic increases.

＊ 35

The most likely

scenario for the NSR is that it will be dominated
by transport of oil and gas instead of cargo ships.
Indeed the energy sector stands to profit from use
of the NSR, as Asian LNG markets are best
positioned for European exporters. Japan can take
advantage of being a hub port due to its close
proximity to the Bering Strait.

＊36

　ii）Energy
　　　Japan’s energy imports surged in the wake of

the Fukushima crisis in March 2011. The nuclear
plant meltdown led to the shutdown of the nation’s
48 reactors.

＊ 37

Japan’s nuclear industry once

supplied one-third of the nation’s power, with
p l a n s t o i n c r e a s e i t u p t o 5 0％ b y 2 0 3 0 .

＊ 3 8

Implementation of these plans is doubtful, as
nuclear power supplied only 2％ of electric
generation in 2012.

＊39

Nuclear energy will remain

a key source of base-load power, as a December
2013 draft of the new Basic Energy Plan states.

＊40

Once Asia’s largest nuclear power producer, Japan
recorded its first trade deficit since 1980 due to
increased reliance on imported LNG to offset the
loss of its nuclear capacity. The 2011 trade deficit
totaled ¥2.49 trillion（US$32 billion）.

＊ 41

Japan

imported 79.4 million tons of LNG from January to
November 2013.

＊ 42

Japan has diversified its

energy mix, importing crude from Iran. But this
entails political risk, with U.S. sanctions ever-
looming on banks companies conducting business
with Iran. In May 2013, crude imports from Iran
more than doubled compared to the previous year.
The U.S. extended Japan’s exemption for another
six months.

＊43

　　　Japan lacks sufficient domestic hydrocarbon

resources, meeting less than 15 ％ of its primary
energy usagge from domestic resources. It is the
world’s largest LNG importer, ranking second
behind China in coal imports, and third in oil imports
behind the U.S. and China.

＊44

It is thus in Japan’s

best interest to “cultivate a diversity of resource
exporting partners.”

＊ 45

For Japan, then, the NSR

could spell a boon in terms of diversifying its energy
mix, in part, due to its large northern ports in
Hokkaido. The business community is finally seeing
the potential of the Arctic. Indeed, Japan received
its first tranche of LNG via the Arctic from
Norway’s Snohvit LNG project in Hammerfest. It
arrived in Kitakyushu City on December 5, 2012.

＊46

Thus, Japan’s domestic energy security is a major
driver in its attraction to the Arctic as it seeks to
diversify its supplies and suppliers.

　　　With this aim in mind, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals

National Corporation（JOGMEC）, an independent
administrative agency tendered a bid in 2011 for
the right to develop an oil field off the coast of
Greenland. On December 24, 2013, JOGMEC was
awarded this right.

＊ 47

JOGMEC has teamed up

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w i t h I N P E X , J X , J A P E X a n d M i t s u i O i l
Exploration to explore two blocks of total 5,000
square kilometers.

＊ 48

It is a joint project with

Chevron and Shell. In addition, JOGMEC and

ConocoPhillips and the U.S. Department of Energy
conducted successful tests off Alaska's North Slope
for the extraction of natural gas from methane
hydrates.

＊49

　In a nexus of business interests combining with
government aims, MOFA appointed Masuo Nishibayashi
as Ambassador to the Arctic in March 2013.

＊50

Amb.

Nishibayashi is only one of two specially appointed
from Asia. The second is Kemal Siddique from
Singapore. The Japanese position is a newly-created
post, which speaks to Japan’s attempts to demonstrate
its commitment to the Arctic.

＊ 51

Amb. Nishibayashi

s t a t e s t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r J a p a n t o b e

“appropriately involved” in Arctic discussions. He

continues： “The ice is melting and this means ships
will be able to pass through. We have to see if this is
commercially viable.”

＊52

　Japan will need this engagement with the Arctic
Council as it strives to secure diverse energy resources.
The Arctic can provide that for Japan. Its diplomatic
contacts with Nordic and Baltic nations will ensure its
involvement in developing the riches of the Arctic.

＊53

Japan has also established bilateral relations with
Finland to promote development of the Arctic.

＊54

　Japan’s open relations with the Arctic nations will put
i t i n g o o d s t e a d i n t e r m s o f e n e r g y r e s o u r c e
development. In particular, talks with Russia could result
in ameliorating tensions over the Kuril Island, which
have prevented Russia and Japan from signing a peace
treaty formally ending WW II hostilities.

＊ 55

Another

reason for their cooperation is to compete with China.

＊56

　China’s assertive policies in the Arctic notwithstanding,

Japan and Russia are moving closer to one another in
earnest. In early February 2014 Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
met. This was the fifth high-level meeting between the
two countries in less than a year. Russia’s foray into
Asia is for diplomatic purposes and for securing a
diversified energy client base. Closer ties to Japan would
ensure Russia leverage in Asian relations before China’s
ascendancy is cemented. As for energy, China is Russia’s
biggest Asian customer. Should Japan also become a
Russian customer, Russia could use energy both as a
diplomatic and commodity bargaining chip.

＊57

Russia’s

East Asian customer base would be solidified.
　The advantages for Japan lie in resources, shipping
routes, and diplomacy. Japan has already scored a plus
in resources. In May 2013, INPEX Corporation secured
a partnership with Rosneft to explore two Arctic oil
fields.

＊58

In terms of diplomacy and alliances, Russia lent

its weight to support Japan’s bid to become a permanent
observer in the Arctic Council, ignoring China. Moscow
also supported Tokyo’s application to hold the 2020
Olympic Games.
　Although China and Japan are currently involved in
escalating spats in the East China Sea, it should be
noted that while Moscow and Tokyo are warming to
each other, neither would overtly do something to mar
their relations with Beijing. In spite of recent heated
rhetoric in Sino-Japanese relations, Prime Minister Abe
reiterated that “the two countries could never clash. We
must not let that happen.”

＊59

CONCLUSION

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<注・解説>
＊1： http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/history
＊2： Waldie, Paul, “Arctic Council seeks balance as commerce beckons in the Far North,” The Globe and Mail,

October 16, 2013, accessed at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/looking-up-the-far-norths-
global-appeal/article14898080/

＊3： Emmerson, Charles, “The Cold Rush： Attraction of the North Pole,” Chatham House, The World Today, Volume

69, Number 7, accessed at hhttp://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/The%20World%20
Today/2013/AugSep/WT0413Emmerson.pdf

＊4： Byers, Michael, “Great Powers Shall Not in the Arctic Clash,” Global Brief, November 11, 2013, accessed at

http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2013/11/11/great-powers-shall/

＊5： http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. The European Union also applied

as a permanent observer, but its application is being upheld due to the EU's dispute with Canada over an EU ban
on trade in seal products.

＊6： Jegorova, Natalja, “Regionalisation and Globalisation: The Case of the Arctic, Arctic Yearbook 2012, accessed at

http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2013/JEGOROVA％ 20AY13％ 20FINAL.pdf, p. 125

＊7： Jakobson, Linda, “Northeast Asia Turns Its Attention to the Arctic,” NBR Analysis Brief, December 17, 2012,

accessed at http://nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Brief/121712_Jakobson_ArcticCouncil.pdf

＊8： Käpylä, Juha and Harri Mikkola, “The Global Arctic： The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United

States and the European Union,” November 8, 2013, Finnish Institute of International Affairs（FIAA）, accessed
at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/layout/set/print/content/view/full/24620?lng=en&id=172671

＊9： Wilson, Page, “Asia Eyes the Arctic,” The Diplomat, August 26, 2013, accessed at http://thediplomat.

com/2013/08/asia-eyes-the-arctic/

＊10： Emmerson, Charles, Glada Lahn, “Arctic Opening： Opportunity and Risk in the High North,” http://www.

chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20
Development/0412arctic.pdf, p. 8

＊11： Humpert, Malte, and Andreas Raspotnik, “The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route,” The

Arctic Yearbook 2012, accessed at http://arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Humpert_and_Raspotnik.
pdf, p. 299

＊12： The subject of the Arctic’s oil and gas potential was explored in an earlier paper. The numbers are based upon

USGS, July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home

＊13： USGS, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf, p. 4
＊14： Simon, Bernard, “The Arctic： Through icy waters,” Financial Times, August 18, 2011, accessed at http://

www.ft.com/cms/s/2/7f2c025e-c731-11e0-a9ef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2sw2Qftar

＊15： Fouche, Gwladys, “Oil firms must speed up efforts on Arctic safety – Norway watchdog,” Reuters, November 21,

2013, accessed at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/norway-exploration-safety-
idUKL5N0J53YR20131121. The safety watchdog is the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway.

＊16： Manicom, James and Whitney Lackenbauer, “East Asian States, The Arctic Council and International Relations

in the Arctic,” CIGI Policy Brief No.26, accessed at http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no26.pdf, p. 5

＊17： The article was cited by Jakobosn, Linda and Syong-Hong Lee,”The Northeast Asian States’ Interests in the

Arctic and Possible Cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark,” SIPRI, April 2013, accessed at http://www.
sipri.org/research/security/arctic/arcticpublications/NEAsia-Arctic%20130415%20full.pdf, p. 19

＊18： Ibid.
＊19： Tonami, Aki and Stewart Watters, “Japan’s Arctic Policy： The Sum of Many Parts,” Arctic Yearbook 2012,

accessed at http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Tonami_and_Watters.pdf, p. 93

＊20： Tulupov, Dmitry, “Towards The Arctic Ocean through the Kuril Islands,” Russian International Affairs Council,

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April 15, 2013, accessed at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=1711#top

＊21：  Tonami, A. and Watters, S., p. 95
＊22：  Tonami, A. and Watters, S., p. 96
＊23：  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. （2010）. Launching of the "Arctic Task Force （ATF）". ［Press Release］

accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0902_01.html

＊24：  Tulupov, C.
＊25：  Tonami, A. and Watters, S., p. 94
＊26：  Jakobson, L. and Lee, S., pp. 20-23
＊27：  Toriumi, Shigeki, “The Potential of the Northern Sea Route,” Yomiuri Shimbun, February 28, 2011, accessed at

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/dy/opinion/20110228.htm

＊28： Matsuo, Ichiro and Takashi Kida, “Northern Sea Route heats up between Europe, East Asia,” Asahi Shimbun,

August 21, 2012, accessed at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201208210040

＊29： Rodova, Nadia, “Russia’s Northern Sea Route： Global Implications,” Platts Commodity News, September 26,

2013, accessed at http://www.platts.com/news-feature/2013/oil/euro-nsr/index

＊30： Yep, Eric, “Energy Companies Try Arctic Shipping Shortcut Between Europe and Asia,” The Wall Street

Journal, August 21, 2013, accessed at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324619504579026031
203525734

＊31：  Rodova, N. and Yep, E.
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＊44： See No. 39.
＊45： Toriumi, S

2014.3 Vol.48 No.2

JOGMEC

K Y M C

アナリシス

執筆者紹介

Jasmin Sinclair（ヤスミン　シンクレア）
College of Charleston, Political Science/International Relations 卒業（B.A.）。
JET プログラム（The Japan Exchange and Teaching Program）で来日し、鹿児島県で 3 年間英語教育に携わる。帰米後、在米国日
本大使館（ワシントン）勤務を経て、2001 年 1 月に JNOC（石油公団）ワシントン事務所の調査員として任用、現在に至る。休日は
家族とともに古武術の道場で鍛錬に励む。その他の趣味は料理と映画鑑賞。

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＊48： See No.47.
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field-trial-methane-hydrate-production-technologies

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html

＊53：

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＊54：

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at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/131018/japan-finland-agree-cooperate-
developing-arctic

＊55：

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at http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_02_07/Russia-and-Japan-may-join-forces-in-business-battle-for-Arctic-3898/.

＊56：

“Japan, Russia plan commercial use for Arctic Ocean sea lane,” Mainichi Shimbun, October 2, 2013 , accessed at

http://www.houseofjapan.com/local/japan-russia-plan-commercial-use-for-arctic-ocean-sea-lane

＊57： McGwin, Kevin, “My rival’s rival,” The Arctic Journal, February 12, 2014, accessed at http://arcticjournal.com/

politics/my-rivals-rival

＊58： Pourzitakis, Stratos, “Japan and Russia: Arctic Friends,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2014, accessed at http://

thediplomat.com/2014/02/japan-and-russia-arctic-friends/

＊59： McGwin, K.