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AmericanObserversontheBattlefieldsoftheWesternFront
andtheTacticalEvolutionoftheAmericanExpeditionary
ForcesinWorldWarI
by
MajorJamesA.Vohr,UnitedStatesMarineCorps
TABLEOFCONTENTS
Contents
TheEvolutioninTactics-EuropeanArmiesandtheWesternFront1914-1917
BelleauWood:AnExampleoftheFailureofU.S.TacticsintheInitialEngagements.
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Thesis: Although during World War I the United States employed observers on the
battlefieldsoftheWesternFront,theinformationtheyprovidedlackedthesubstanceand
conclusionsrequiredtoevolvethetacticaldoctrineoftheAmericanExpeditionaryForces
(AEF). In initial engagements, the AEF was largely forced to rely, with predictable
negative outcome, upon outdated concepts founded largely upon the prejudices of the
Army’sleadership.
Discussion:InAugustof1914theUnitedStatesArmyandMarineCorpsdemonstrated
strongforesight,consideringtheisolationistperspectiveofthenation,indetailingofficers
to the battlefields of Europe. These officers were given little guidance, but their mission
was clearly to report on military actions and developments in what was becoming the
largeststruggleinhistory.AsignificantmilitarydevelopmentofWorldWarInotedbythe
U.S. was the advance of offensive infantry tactics to cope effectively with the
characteristicsandlethalityofthemodernbattlefield.
TheUnitedStates,withatwoandone-halfyearopportunitytoobservetacticspriorto
theengagementoftheAEF,arguablyshouldhavebenefitedfromtheexperienceofothers.
However,thiswasnotthecase.TheAEFinitsinitialengagements,performedmuchasits
European counterparts did at the onset of the war. Eventually the AEF performance
improved,butonlyasU.S.soldiersandMarinesgainedpersonalbattlefieldexperience.
Conclusions:Acombinationoffoursignificantfactorscontributedtothefailureofthe
AEF to evolve its tactical doctrine from the reports of battlefield observers. First, the
observers were exposed to a wide variety of often opposing opinions and perspectives
regarding the foundation for successful tactical doctrine. European tactical doctrine was
evolvingwitheachpassingdayandinthisclimateitwasnearlyimpossibleforobservers
topassconsistentinformationfromwhichsolidconclusionscouldbeformed.Successful
European tactical doctrine emerged concurrent with the employment of the AEF.
Secondly, the initial doctrine of the AEF was largely influenced by the prejudices of its
aging leadership, principally General John Pershing. General Pershing wielded powerful
influence in the training of the soldiers and Marines of the AEF and many of his ideas
weremisalignedwiththerealityofthemodernbattlefield.Third,theAEF,aforceofover
1millionmen,wasformedinanextremelyshorttime.Itwasacitizenarmyasopposedto
professionals and its lack of tactical expertise reflected this fact. Finally, as always,
experience is the best teacher. The AEF did not mature tactically until it gained its own
combatexperience.
The lesson to be learned from the observer’s experience of World War I is relevant
today. Technology arguably has the potential to again dictate the need for change in
tactical doctrine. Observers need to be trained to accurately report events. Doctrine
developmentcentersmustbeequippedtoformconclusionsandtoimplementaccurateand
meaningfulchange.
AmericanObserversontheBattlefieldsoftheWesternFrontandtheTactical
EvolutionoftheAmericanExpeditionaryForcesinWorldWarI
“For any life, for any profession, an environment of that life or profession is necessary for its full progress of
development.TheUnitedStatesArmyinpeacehadbeenfarfromanyarmiesoftheworldandespeciallyinthisgreat
warbytheactionofourowngovernment,itsofficershadbeenkeptfromknowledgeoftheprogressofmilitaryartand
thedevelopmentofmilitaryspecialties.”—MajorGeneralRobertLeeBullard
FromtheonsetoffightingontheWesternFrontofWorldWarI,characterizedbythe
rapidtransitionfromawarofmovementtooneofstalemateandtrenchwarfare,itbecame
cleartotheBritish,French,andGermansthatthenatureofwarfarehadchanged.Onthe
operational level, rail lines facilitated the concentration of forces at a rate far outpacing
any army’s ability to exploit tactical success. Interlocked machine guns, deeply massed
modern artillery, and emerging aviation capabilities added incredible lethality to the
seeminglylimitlessdepthoftheunbrokendefensesalongtheentirelengthofthefront.
Thisuniquetypeoffightingrequiredanewapproachtoachievesuccess.Thetenetsofthis
approachwereslowlyandpainfullylearnedbytheantagonistsonbothsidesofthefront
throughthehardlessonsofexperience.
As the British, French and Germans fought, gained experience, and shifted tactical
paradigmsduringthefirsttwoandahalfyearsofconflict,Americabaskedinherneutral
status. The small and professional American Army’s main focus from 1914-1916
amounted to little more than a police action in Mexico. The Army’s perspective and
traditions were those of a frontier force where the rifleman was supreme. The Army’s
mission,onaday-to-daybasis,waslargelythatofagarrisonforce.
“ExceptfortheSpanish-AmericanWar,nearlytwentyyearsbefore,actualcombatexperienceoftheRegularArmy
hadbeenlimitedtotheindependentactionofminorcommandsinthePhilippinesandthetwoexpeditionsintoMexico,
eachwithforcessmallerthanamodernAmericandivision.”
While the events in Europe were likely followed out of professional interest by U.S.
Armyofficers,therewaslittleifanyindicationintheearlydaysofthewarthatAmerica
wouldeventuallybecomeinvolved.
Therecertainlywerenoindicatorsthatwithinthe
nextfouryearstheArmyoftheUnitedStateswouldgrowtooveramillionmeninEurope
alone.Withthisperspective,therewaslittleemphasis,asitrelatedtotheAmericanArmy,
placed on the potential value of a careful analysis of information emerging from the
fightinginEurope.TheArmy’stacticalbible,InfantryDrillRegulations,wasinits1911
editionattheonsetofAmerica’sinvolvementinthewar;itseemsunlikelyaseriousand
comprehensive review of current tactical doctrine based upon lessons being learned in
Europe’swaroccurred.
In contrast to a general American perspective of ignorance of events in Europe, the
ArmyandtheMarineCorpsdidtakeactionattheonsetofhostilitiesontheWesternFront
whichcouldhavesecuredaccesstoinformationregardingchangingwarfareandtacticsin
Europe. With the declaration of war in 1914, the United States Army and Marine Corps
rushedtoidentifyandsendofficerstoobservetheactionsofthevariousarmiesinvolved
in the fighting.
Serving with the armies of the British, French and Germans were
companyandjuniorfieldgradeofficerswhopreparedreportsontheirobservationsofthe
warandforwardedthemtotheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeDivisionoftheWarDepartment.
Unfortunately,theopportunitytheU.S.Armymighthaveexploitedthroughbattlefield
observers to gain an understanding of the evolution of offensive tactics occurring in
Europe was never realized. There was no focused effort to translate the content of the
observer’s reports into U.S. Army doctrine. Additionally, due to largely unavoidable
shortfalls in the observer’s analysis and conclusions, had this effort been consciously
undertaken,itisunlikelytheresultswouldhavebeeneffectiveintermsofaligningU.S.
tactical maturity with requirements of the modern battlefield. In other words, the
information regarding offensive tactics compiled by the observers lacked the substance
and conclusions required to provide direction to the Army which could have resulted in
more effective tactics on the modern battlefield. Therefore, in their initial engagements,
the soldiers and Marines serving with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were
largelyforcedtorelyonmisguidedtrainingandtacticaldoctrinebasedextensivelyonthe
outdated concepts and prejudices of the Army’s leadership. In terms of the lives of U.S.
servicemen,thepricefortheshortfallsinleadership’svisionresultingintherequirement
tolearnasyoufightwashigh.
TheEvolutioninTactics-EuropeanArmiesandtheWesternFront1914-1917
To understand the shortfall the U.S. Army experienced in its offensive tactical
developmentitisimportanttofirstunderstandthechangesorevolutionintacticsonthe
WesternFrontduringtheinitialtwoandhalfyearsofconflict.Ifthesereportsweretobe
of use in influencing the tactical doctrine of the AEF it is important to understand what
information should have been transmitted. To be effective, the observers’ reports would
havetoalignwiththechangesoftacticsinEuropeanArmies.Understandingtheevolution
of offensive tactics also establishes a baseline for tactical doctrine at the time the AEF
entered the fighting. This baseline affords perspective regarding expectations for initial
Americanperformanceonthebattlefield.
AsEuropeanarmiesadjustedtothestalemateandtrenchwarfare,atacticalstateofthe
art, so to speak, emerged. Over time and based upon some differing experiences, all
armiesengagedformedanunderstandingofwhattacticsworkedandwhattacticsresulted
in heavy casualties with no appreciable success. While the senior military leadership of
each nation differed slightly in their opinions of what offensive approaches were most
effective,universally,andcertainlybythetimetheUnitedStatesenteredtheconflict,they
hadabandonedtheirpre-warconcepts.
TheWesternFrontatthebeginningofWorldWarIwasafluidbattlefieldenvironment.
As the Germans executed the Schlieffen plan, the French and the British attempted
frantically to stop the advance. The tactics employed by both sides were mobile tactics
aimed at the flanks of the opposing force. Little thought was given to doctrine and
techniques for fighting on the tactical level as the aim of General officers was to win
operationallydecisivevictories.
“Inkeepingwiththepredictionsoftheexperts,WorldWarIbeganasawarofgrandmaneuversinwhicheachside
sought victory at the operational level. In such a war, the art of tactics, concerned with winning battles, was less
importantthanoperationalart,concernedwithwinningcampaigns.Thelossofabattle,thedestructionofaregiment,or
eventhedestructionofadivisionwasseenbytheGeneralstaffvirtuososwhodirectedthemovementofmillionman
armiesasinconsequentialwhencomparedtotheconsiderationsthataffectedthecampaignasawhole.”
In this manner, with maneuver room found only to the west, the front quickly
leapfroggedalonguntilitbecameanchoredonthecoast.Inthistypeofwarfaremeeting
engagements were often the rule rather than the exception. Infantry with firepower
generatedbythemusketryofriflemenwasthedecisivearm.Cavalryhadthemissionsof
protectingflanks,locatingenemyformations,andexploitingsuccess.
Early in the fighting the increased power and lethality of both machine guns and
artillery was evident. Logistics, which had always limited armies, was made more
challenging by the increased appetite for all types of supplies, especially artillery
ammunition. On the German side, after the initial effort extended beyond the reaches of
Germanraillines,thefightingoftenboggeddownforwantoffoodandammunitionofall
kinds.AfterthebattleoftheMarneitwasacombinationoflogisticsculmination,lackof
maneuverspace,andtheeffectsoftheadvancedweaponssystemswhichencouragedthe
digging of the first opposing trench lines. Once the digging of trenches began, the front
stalemated.
OneofthekeypointsinunderstandingtheinitialnatureofthefightingofWorldWarI
was that it was warfare conducted in the manner which the German, French and British
armies of professional soldiers had anticipated and practiced. Strong traditions and
paradigms existed in all armies regarding the conduct of the offense.
Often these
existing paradigms prevented the flexibility required to adapt to the new reality. As the
fighting progressed, the strong traditions and existing conceptions of how the offense
should be conducted carried forward from the initial battlefield environment of fluidity
andfigurativelycrashedontherockyshoreofstalemateandtrenchwarfare.
ThesecondtacticalstageexperiencedbythearmiesengagedontheWesternFrontwas
thestageforwhichWorldWarIhasbecomeinfamous.Mostpeople,whentheyenvision
thebattlesoftheFirstWorldWarpicturefutilechargesofinfantrybeingmowndownby
machine guns and artillery as they leap from the protective cover of their trenches and
chargeacross“no-man’sland.”Fromlate1914until1917theantagonistsontheWestern
Front worked to understand the nature of the operational situation as it existed and to
overcomeitschallenges.Itbecameapparentthatoperationalsuccessdependedlargelyon
overcoming tactical challenges largely unforeseen by the leadership of all armies. It is
duringthisstageofthefightingbeginningSeptember1914,thatthebattlefieldobservers
fromtheUnitedStateshadasignificantopportunitytoreport.
During this time period armies experimented with many possible solutions as they
searchedforanswerstothedilemmaofattackingdefensesindepth.Atfirstitwasthought
that infantry attacking with the proper aggressive spirit could overcome the trenches if
only they chose the proper place to attack. When this failed to produce results the next
ideaexploredworkedonthetheorythatifenoughartillerycouldbemassed,thetrenches
of the opposing infantry could be completely destroyed. After the bombardment the
infantrywouldmerelyhavetooccupytheshatteredground.Thismethodfailedaswellfor
two reasons. First, most field artillery was unable to damage reinforced concrete
fortificationsdeepintheground.Second,defenseindepthallowthedefenderstoabsorb
thepoundingofartillerysimplybymovingbacktotrenchesfurtherintherear.
In both of the methods of attack described, the infantry employed skirmisher line
tacticsandformations.Skirmishertacticswerebasedupontheconceptthattheindividual
infantryman armed with a rifle was the key element to battlefield success. The
marksmanshipskillsoftheindividualriflemanandhisinitiativewereheavilyreliedupon.
Musketryfirewasconsideredtheprimarysourceofsupportingfirestodestroyorsuppress
enemy positions. Skirmisher line tactics normally employed infantrymen in linear
formationswithlittlespacingbetweenindividualriflemen.Theselinearformationswould
belaunchedintheattackinaseriesofwaves.Eachwavewouldconductrushesofupto
onehundredmetersandthensupresstheenemyforsubsequentwaves.
The closely aligned ranks of these formations formed ideal targets for machine guns
and artillery fire. Attacks would quickly bog down when the advancing troops were
caughtinmurderousfires.Insomecasesthefirestormfacedbytheadvancingsoldierswas
so severe they could not even clear their own trenches. Musketry in general had little
positive effect in reducing fortified machine gun nests or artillery positions. The
formations could not even expect any measure of success in facing similarly armed
infantry in an opposing trenchline. As had been evident as early as 1863 at the battle of
Fredericksburg during the American Civil War, the firepower even of the individual
riflemanarmedwithmodernweaponsinthedefensewasformidable.
Asageneralruleduringthefirsttwostagesofthefightingonthefront,skirmisherline
formations were employed without the thought of using coordinated artillery to support
the attack. Artillery was employed in two principal manners; an initial bombardment
which often served, more than anything else, to alert the enemy and in a timed “rolling
barrage” designed to suppress the enemy until the assaulting infantry could close to
bayonetrange.Machinegunswerelikewisenotgenerallyemployedinmobilesupportof
skirmisher line infantry attacks, their employment was largely limited to overhead fire.
Theconceptofcombinedarmshadyettoemerge.
Arguably the third stage in the evolution of tactics on the Western Front was that of
siege warfare. Armies became stagnant in their focus on surviving in the trenches and
small,localizedsuccessesasopposedtocontinuingthequestforbreakingthestalemate.
Aswithanydefensiveposition,thetrenchesbecamemoreandmoreformidableovertime.
The challenge of the offense in this environment increased proportionally to these
improvements.
“Frontal attacks, moreover, would be more difficult in position warfare than in mobile warfare. Barbed wire
severely limited opportunities for creeping up on an enemy in small groups. The fact that a defender could study the
ground in front of him over a matter of days and even weeks meant that effective fire could be brought against the
entriesandexitstocoveredpositionsalonganavenueofapproach.Finallytheopportunityforthedefendertointegrate
hismachinegunsandartilleryintohisdefensiveplanswasfargreaterinpositionwarfare.Allthesefactorscombinedto
make the dash across “no mans’ land” the few hundred meters that separated one side from the other, a very difficult
A significant advance in tactical concepts to emerge during this stage was the
realization that more powerful weapons than rifles were required by the infantry if they
weretoovercomedefensivepositionsintheattack.Technologywasleveragedinthehope
ofbreakingthestalemate.Eacharmybegantoemploygreaternumbersofmachineguns.
Advancesweremadeintheuseofgrenades,smallandportabletrenchmortars,andflame-
throwers.Versionsofanassaultrifleappeared.Hopeforasignificantbreakthroughonthe
operationalleveldiminishedduringthisphaseasthefocusshiftedtosolvingthetactical
problemsofthebattlefield.
It was during this phase of the tactical evolution that the AEF began to deploy to
Europe. The Americans were welcomed by the Allies as they brought with them
enthusiasmandconfidenceundimmedbythestalematethathadconsumedthearmiesof
Europe for the past three years. This enthusiasm embodied a level of naiveté to the
realitiesofmodernwarfaretheywereabouttoface.TacticshadchangedandAmericahad
notkeptpacewiththechange.
TheObserver’sReports
Thereportsfromthemilitaryobserversassignedtothearmiesoftheantagonistsonthe
WesternFrontcontainvastamountsofvariedinformation.Thereportsfromtheobserver
assignedtoBerlinforinstance,wereproducedonamonthlybasisandadheretoadistinct
and unique format. The focus of these reports is mainly on information that was
operationalandstrategicinnature.Anexampleofthismightbetheobserver’sopinionson
the state of German morale, or reports of large-scale troop movements. With limited
exceptiontherewaslittleinformationofthetacticalnatureofthewarorofeffortsbeing
madetoovercomethestaticnatureofthebattlefield.
Withthisinmindandafterreviewingsomeoftheoriginalordersissuedtoobservers
senttoEurope,thereseemstohavebeenlittleinthewayofguidanceprovidedbytheWar
DepartmentregardingwhatinformationwouldbeofusetotheU.S.Army.Thecontentof
thereportsappearsmainlytobedrivenbythoseissuestheobserverwaseitherdrawnto
byhisowninterestorbackgroundorbythefocusandissuesforemostatthetimeforthe
army he was observing. In some cases, later in the war, the observers received Western
Union telegrams from the War College Division requesting specific information.
These requests for details on a specific topic were sometimes prompted by information
includedinanearlierreport.Forthemostparthowever,theofficerswereontheirownto
determine and transmit the information they deemed valuable. This lack of guidance in
itself was a shortfall in U.S. efforts to gain knowledge on the war and a timeless lesson
learnedforfutureemploymentofofficersonsimilarmissions.
The reports of Majors James W. Barker and James Logan, Jr., and Captains Frank
BarkerandMorganChurchill,whowereassignedtoFranceandroutedreportsthroughthe
militaryattachéinParis,containsomeofthebestinformationandanalysisregardingthe
requirement for evolving offensive tactics in the face of the changes in warfare. The
usefulnessandfocusofthesereportsmayalsobearesultofthefreedomtheseofficershad
to move about and observe the battlefield or to talk with the men and officers of the
French army. As the war progressed and out of the interest of security, many of the
battlefield observers, especially those in Germany and Austria, were subjected to
censorshipbythearmytheywereservingalongside.
Additionally, based on the content of the reports reviewed it is clear the French,
perhaps more than the British or the Germans early in the war, recognized the required
changesintacticsandreacted.Thisobservationisfurthervalidatedbyothersources:
“TheBritishExpeditionaryForcedidnotreactasquicklyastheFrenchGeneralHeadquarterstotheevidenttactical
crisisoflate1914.”
TheFrenchfocusedtheireffortonattemptingtounderstandhowtheyneededtoevolve
theirdoctrine.Asaresult,someofthemosttacticallyinterestingreportssubmittedbythe
military observers assigned to France are simply forwarded copies of French papers and
pamphletsdiscussingtacticsfortrenchwarfare.
Examining observer reports in chronological order is useful as it potentially
demonstrates the refinement and maturation of tactical thought through the gaining of
experience.Anearlyreport,submittedbyMajorSpencerColbydetailedhisconversation
withaFrenchartilleryofficerinNovember1914.
Immediately,thefutilityofapplying
manpower against material was noted along with the potential of artillery and machine
guns.MajorSpencerreported:
“[Theartilleryofficer]believesartilleryisresponsibleforthegreaterpartofthelossestotheenemyduringthewar.
Hedidnotliketomakeanestimateastotheproportionofmenkilledbyartilleryfire,butonbeingurgedabitsaidhe
wouldnotbesurprisedifitwentupto75%.”
The artillery officer was referencing the casualties the Germans suffered in the attack
due to artillery fire. This indicated early in the war that the latest changes and
developmentsmakingartillerymoreeffectivehadcontributedtoitsoveralleffectiveness
on the battlefield against the massed troop formations employed by the Germans at the
onsetofthewar.
Maj. Colby’s report also mentioned the French artillery officer’s comments at this
openingstageofthewarregardingmachinegunsandentrenchedinfantry:
“Hestatestheworkofthemachinegunshasbeenmosteffective[inthedefense].Ifamachinegunisgivenanything
ofafieldoffireandafairchanceinnumbershedoesnotbelieveitcanbetakenbyinfantrycharge…heseemstohave
thesameideawithreferencetoinfantry.Hedoesnotbelieveindaylight,withanythingofequalnumbersdefendingit,a
fairlymadeandreasonabletrenchcanbetakenbyaninfantrycharge.”
In the case of this report, the artillery officer was not discussing tactics that were
successful in the offense, but noting rather the effectiveness of the defense armed with
modern weapons against skirmisher line tactics. The conclusions to be drawn from this
documentatthisearlystageofthewarwerereinforcinglessonsthatfirstbecameevident
to U.S. leadership during the American Civil War. It was proven at places like Mayre’s
Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg, Cemetery Ridge during the Battle of
Gettysburg,andatColdHarborthatinfantryattacksagainstentrenchedinfantrywereno
longer effective. In the years between 1865 and 1914, technological improvements in
weaponssystemsonlyenhancedthisrealityandincreasedthefutilityofanysimilarattack
attempted.
In another report, Lieutenant Colonel Spencer Crosby, the military attaché’ in Paris,
providedasynopsisofaconversationwithaFrenchcoloneloftheinfantrytitled“Infantry
Notes”.
InthisreporttheFrenchcolonelwascriticaloftheFrenchapproachplacing
too much responsibility for initiative on the individual soldier and on small units. The
colonel maintained that in the heat of battle the only actions troops could reasonably be
expectedtoexecutewere“thosesimpleprincipleswhichhavebeengroundintohim.”
This comment potentially resulted from initial frustrations on the part of the French in
making progress in the attack in the face of extreme firepower from machine guns and
artillery. In this case the French colonel’s analysis of the situation suggested that if the
successoftheattackdependedontheinitiativeoftheindividualsoldier,theattackwould
failastheindividualwasoverwhelmedbythesituationthatconfrontedhim.TheFrench
colonel’s reaction to this situation was to suggest a reduction of the responsibility for
individualinitiative.Inotherwords,maketheindividualresponsibleonlyforthesimplest
actionswhichhavebeendrilledintohimduringtraining.ThiswouldsuggesttheFrench
colonel to be an advocate of the tactics that would afford tighter control of troop
formationsbyofficersandnon-commissionedofficers.
The observations made by the French colonel regarding the difficulties of individual
action and the concern for loss of control and momentum in the offense in the face of
intensefirepowerwerenotunique.Hisperspective,sharedbyothersinEuropeandlikely
in America as well, was the basis for the continued use of skirmisher line tactics at the
beginning of the war in spite of the evidence from recent conflicts demonstrating the
futilityoftheseformations.
“Military authors such as Fritz Honig and J. Meckel had painted terrifying pictures of attacks conducted in open
orderfallingapartbecauselargenumbersoftroopstookadvantageofthefactthattheywerefarenoughawayfromtheir
officers to permit them to hide during the battle. The belief that the increased casualties that resulted from dense
formations were a fair price to pay for the guarantee that troops would remain under the direct supervision of their
officersbecamewidespread.”
Unfortunately, the conclusions the French colonel formed from his observations, that
thesolutiontotheproblemofattacksslowedbyenemyfirewastominimizetheinitiative
expectedoftheindividual,werelaterproventobeinaccurate.
AsecondshortfallinFrenchoffensivecapabilityidentifiedbytheFrenchcolonelinhis
comments was the lack of marksmanship skills of the individual soldier. The colonel
assertednotenoughemphasiswasbeingplacedonthisskillduringtraining.Thisshortfall
resulted in inaccurate and ineffective fire by the French, with most of their shots being
highabovetheheadsoftheGermans.Individualmarksmanshipwasdeemedimportantfor
theobviousreasonsofdesiringtomakeeveryshotaccountforonedeadGerman.Perhaps
however,thecolonel’sobservationswerenotanactualreflectionoftheinaccuracyofthe
riflefireasmuchastheywereastatementoftheineffectivenessofriflefireingeneralin
trench warfare. The French at this point in the war would have relied upon the rifle and
musketry to fix the Germans in order for other riflemen to gain ground in the attack. In
other words, sustained and accurate rifle fire was the only type of organic fire support
availabletotheinfantry.Theabilityoftheindividualtodeliveraccurateriflefirewasone
of the foundations of skirmisher line tactics. The French colonel’s explanation for the
failureofthistacticalapproachwastheinabilityoftheFrenchsoldierstomaketheirrifle
fireeffective.Thetruthwasmorelikelythatriflefireitself,nomatterhowaccurate,was
noteffectiveagainstwell-fortifiedsoldierspossessingevensimilarweaponscapabilities.
The conclusions Americans reviewing this report were likely to form would have
reinforcedtheperceivedeffectivenessofskirmisherlinetactics.ThefocusoftheFrench
colonel’s criticism centered on the shortfalls of the French troops in executing the basic
infantryman skills associated with skirmisher line tactics. In other words, it was not a
failure of the tactics, it was the failure of the poorly trained or disciplined troops to
execute the tactics properly. A similar and reoccurring theme criticizing the skills,
especially marksmanship, of the individual soldier was expressed by General Pershing
oncetheAEFengaged.
InareportsubmittedbyLieutenantColonelCosby,CaptainFrankBarker,anobserver
with the French Army, forwarded an article written by a French Infantry Company
Commandertitled“StudyontheAttackinthePresentPeriodoftheWar-Impressionsand
ReflectionsofaCompanyCommander.”
TheauthorwasCaptainAndre’Laffargueof
the 153rd French Infantry. Captain Laffargue’s article discussed his experiences with
trenchwarfare.Hewasprescriptiveinhiseffortstoexplainwhatwasrequiredforsuccess
intheattackonthemodernbattlefield.TheWarCollegeDivisionoftheWarDepartment
submitted the article for publication in the September-October 1916 issue of “Infantry
Journal.”Thisfactlendsconsiderablesignificancetothereportbecauseitindicatedarmy
leadershipthoughttheideasandconceptsworthyofconsideration.Throughpublicationin
a professional magazine the information had the potential to be viewed by a wide
audience.
Early in his article, Captain Laffargue revealed the drive behind his motivation to
producethisreportwastoexposethechangesintheassaultdictatedbytherealitiesofthe
modernbattlefield.Hehopedtowritesothatotherswouldprofitfromthesacrificesofhis
manycomradesinarms.
“Hewhoriskshislifeanddoesnotwishtodiebuttosucceed,becomesattimesingenious.ThatiswhyI,whowas
partofthehumancanisterformorethanninemonths,havesetabouttoconsiderthemeansofsavingtheinestimable
existence of so many humble comrades, or at least to figure out how the sacrifice of their lives may result in
victory.”
Captain Laffargue’s article does well in illustrating the problems facing assaulting
troopsinthiswar.Inhisopeningparagraphsheexplainedhowcriticalitwasforattacksto
accomplish their goals as quickly and as decisively as possible in the face of the new
levelsofoperationalmobility.
“It must be accomplished in one day as otherwise the enemy reforms, and the defense, with terrible engines of
suddendestruction,willlaterrecoveritssupremacyovertheattack.”
He demonstrated that he recognized and understood the capabilities of entrenched
troops, machine guns and artillery against attacking formations. He also understood and
illustrated the typical German trench system as well as the obstacle plans of wire
entanglementsthatsupportthedefensivetrenches.CaptainLaffarguediscussedartillery’s
role in the attack, although it is interesting that he did not express the importance of
artillery in direct support of attacking infantry. This was most likely a result of the
difficultyofcoordinatingthefiresofartillerywiththecommunicationssystemsoftheday.
However, in discussing the use of artillery as preparation fire for an attack, Captain
LaffargueexplainedhowineffectivetheFrench75mmgunprovedtobetothispointin
thewar.Heassertedthataerialtorpedoeswereworthwhiletouseagainstenemytrenches,
but the 75 mm had little positive effect at all. Fortified positions considered to be
destroyed by heavy 75 mm fire were hardly damaged. When the infantry attacked the
enemyemergedtomanhisweapons.
CaptainLaffarguebelievedsuccessonthebattlefielddependedmostheavilyuponthe
élan of the infantry. Pressing the attack vigorously, in the face of massive losses, was
requiredforsuccess.Asexpressedinthispassage,heisaproponentforthecontinueduse
of skirmishers attacking in waves from the trenches and for the rifleman as the key to
victory.Whileherecognizedthechangednatureofthebattlefield,hissolutionwassimilar
totheFrenchcolonel’ssolutionsexaminedearlier.Laffargueadvocatedpressingtheattack
with even more vigor and control and emphasized the foundations of skirmisher line
tactics.
“The March on the Line of Attack- Each echelon starts out successively at a single bound and moves at a walk
(evenincadenceifitwerepossible).Itiscurioustoobservehowmuchthispaceconducestoacoldresolutionandfierce
scorn of the adversary. At Neuville, all units instinctively started at a walk. Afterwards take the double time at slow
cadence,inordertomaintainthecohesion;makeseveralrushes,ifnecessary,of80to100meters.Theyshouldnotbe
multiplied,attheriskofbreakingtheélan.
Whenagreatefforthasbeenmadetoscornthefireoftheadversary,itshouldnotbedestroyedbyachangetoan
attitudesignifyingfear.
At60metersfromtheenemy,breakintocharge.
TheAlignment.-Tomarchinlineisthecapitolpoint,theimportanceofwhichonemusthaveexperiencedintragic
momentstotellhowprodigiousisitsinfluence.Moreover,themarchinlineisasoldaswaritself.Thealignmentholds
back the enthusiasts, and gives to everyone the warm and irresistible feeling of mutual confidence. At Neuville, we
marchedatfirstatawalk,thenataslowdoubletime,alignedasonparade.Iconstantlyheardbehindmethroughthe
rattling machine guns, the epic, splendid shout of supreme encouragement running all along the line. “Keep in line!
Keepinline!”downtothehumblereservist,C,whoinspiteofthebulletsmakinggapsallaboutintheranks,kepthis
youngandagitatedcomradesontheline.”
Captain Laffargue’s only recommendations to the attackers for reducing casualties
beingcausedbythedefendersinthetrencheswasfortheinfantryriflementoadoptaform
of quick shooting. As the Germans raised their heads he advocated shooting at them
quickly to keep their heads down. He further discussed the need to maintain the
momentum of the attack and explained how rapidly attacking troops were expended
throughheavycasualtiesandsheerexhaustion.
Towards the end of his article, Captain Laffargue asserted how helpful it would have
been to have organic firepower accompanying the attacking infantry to be employed to
reduceenemymachinegunpositions.Thisfirepower,hesuggestedwouldbelight,wheel
mounted artillery pieces, and could be used in the direct fire mode. He made the same
point regarding a similar utility for the light machine gun and even stated the need for
machinegunsintheattackcouldbereducediftheinfantrywereequippedwithautomatic
rifles.
Therefore, Captain Laffargue’s efforts transmitted a mixed message to the reader. He
demonstratesastrongunderstandingoftheproblemsinfantryfacedonthebattlefieldand
the deadly nature of modern weapons. He understood that the latest efforts to employ
artillerytoprepareenemypositionspriortotheattackwerelargelyfutile.Ononehandhe
emphasized skirmisher line methods which ultimately proved to be ineffective. At the
same time, almost as an afterthought he identified the need for mobile firepower in the
form of light howitzers and automatic rifles. He was on the brink of discovering and
expressingtherequirementforfireandmaneuvertactics,butwassoentrenchedwiththe
conceptofskirmisherlineformationsthathisgoodideaswerelost.
Americans reading Laffargue’s article could not be expected to draw accurate
conclusionsintermsoftherealityofthemodernbattlefield.Laffague’semphasispointed
to the continued employment of skirmisher line tactics. In his book, Stormtroop Tactics,
Bruce Gudmundsson, familiar with Laffague’s article, summarized the essence of the
messagethatwouldhavebeencleartoAmericansexposedtohisarticle.
“He was held back, however, by a desire, common to many military men to maintain control over the attack by
maintaining control over the attackers…. He insisted on the need to maintain the skirmisher line formations until the
pointwhere,50metersfromtheenemytrench,bayonetswereloweredandclosecombatbegan.”
Following on the heels of the submission of Captain Laffargue’s article, a report was
submitted by four military observers of a translation of a French report encapsulating
Frenchobservationsandlessonslearnedinthewartothispoint.Aninterestingfeatureof
thisarticleisthereportwasbasicallyasecretFrenchdocumenttheobserverscopiedand
passedtotheAmericanWarDepartment.
Inthisregardtheobserversstressedthatthe
contentsofthisreportwere“ofamostconfidentialcharacter.”
The article highlighted the fact that there were many changes in tactics from those
practiced prior to the outbreak of the war. The need for teamwork between the artillery
andtheinfantrywasstressed,theextentoftheuseofentrenchmentsasneverbeforeseen,
and the extensive use of the machine gun in the attack. This report also highlighted the
effectiveness of artillery fire against massed troops and specified the size of the ideal
fighting unit to be 50-60 men, with a requirement for the identity of the officers to be
concealed,astheywouldhaveundoubtedlybecometargetsofenemyfire.
Perhaps as a result of the article by Captain Laffargue, the report advocated the need
for absolute control of the infantry in skirmisher lines and recommended the training of
the individual infantryman to assume leadership and responsibility. Some final
observationsweremaderegardingtheemergingandcriticalroleofaerialobserversprior
to the commencement of any attack. The report ended with some remarks made by the
American observers of how some of the methods and equipment emerging as successful
ontheWesternFrontcouldperhapshavebeenemployedin“colonialwarfare”orwarfare
withtheIndians.ThislastremarkaffordedsomeinsightregardingtheAmericanArmy’s
perceptionoftheirmostlikelyinvolvementinfutureconflicts.
ThevalueofthisreporttotheAmericanreaderswouldhavebeenprincipallytoraise
levels of awareness of the difficulties of trench warfare by demonstrating the extent to
which the French are struggling. It offered, however, nothing in the way of insight or
conclusions as to how to align tactics to overcome these difficulties. Additionally, it did
not point to any shortfalls in American tactics compared to those being used in France.
Americans lacking the intimate perspective offered only through personal engagement
would have been hard pressed to use this report as the basis for a review of tactical
doctrine.
Colonel Joseph E. Kuhn, military attaché, Berlin, reported on 30 October 1916 the
resultsof the firsttwo days ofthe British and Frencheffort in theBattle of the Somme.
The report was significant only in that it portrayed again the utter futility of
attemptingattacksofmassedinfantryagainstentrenchedtroopsandtheineffectivenessof
fieldartilleryagainstfortifiedpositions.InthisbattletheBritishandFrenchbelievedthey
were attacking in a quiet sector where the Germans would not expect an offensive. The
BritishandFrenchattackedutilizingskirmisherlinetacticsonlyafteramassiveartillery
bombardment that was described as heavy as “20,000 shots of all calibers and many
hundreds of mines were counted against a front section of three kilometers.”
few,operationallyinsignificantexceptions,theattackingtroopswererepulsedacrossthe
frontwithabsolutelyhorrificcasualties.
CaptainLaffargue’sarticledemandedattacksbepressedhomewithvigorandspirit.It
appeared in the battle of the Somme, the British and French had plenty of energy, and
pressed the attack, but still failed at terrible cost. In what seems in retrospect to be
incredible, the report described how British officers in instances attacked mounted on
horseback against the German trenches. In other cases the German artillery fire was so
effective, that even after the massive pre-attack bombardment, British troops were not
evenabletogetclearofthetrenchesbeforetheywerecutdown.
“TheEnglishaswellastheFrenchattacks,whichtookplaceindeeplyechelonedthickcolumnsandwhichsurged
forwardinnumerouswaves,werecarriedoutwithnoteworthydash.Theleadersattimeschargedmountedinadvanceof
theirtroops.ButalmosteverywheretheattackswererepulsedinfrontoftheGermanpositionsbywell-placedGerman
artilleryfire.”
This report further discussed the effectiveness of machine guns in the target rich
environmentthegunnersfaced.Oneaccountwasgivenoftwogunsfiring27,000rounds
fromthreebarrelsinthreehoursagainsttheattackingtroops.FortheBritishtroopsonthe
ground the reality of what they faced and the futility of their efforts must have been
obvious. Colonel Kuhn observed that of the British prisoners captured, many had raised
their courage to clamber over the tops of the trenches by heavily fortifying themselves
withalcohol.
ThevalueofthisreportasitpertainstoAmerica’spreparationsforwarwasminimal.
ThereportaccuratelyexpressedtheresultsofBritishandFrencheffortsattheSommebut
failedtooffersolutions.Inasimilarmannertotheeffortsofallotherobservers,Colonel
Kuhnhighlightedthedeadlynatureoftrenchwarfarebutofferednothingtosuggestthat
the British might have enjoyed success had they changed their tactics. The report, while
interesting, reads much like a newspaper article and conveys only the facts surrounding
the action. Questions are not raised, conclusions are not drawn and solutions are not
offered.
The reports of the battlefield observers prior to the engagement of the AEF in World
War I accurately reflect the existing confusion and frustration European Armies
experienced in their attempts to overcome fortified defenses of great depth. As noted,
however,thereportslackanyconclusionsorrecommendationswhichwouldhavehadany
potentialuseinadaptingU.S.tacticaldoctrine.Theirshortfallisunderstandablewhenitis
considered that the observers could hardly have been expected to draw accurate
conclusionsormakerecommendationswheneventhoseengagedinthefightingfailedin
thisregard.
BelleauWood:AnExampleoftheFailureofU.S.TacticsintheInitialEngagements.
The AEF as an independent organization was to first participate in battles and
operations on the Western Front in 1918. These initial battles provided the most
compellingevidenceoftheeffectivenessandthestatusofAmericantacticaldoctrineand
training.ItwasinbattlessuchasBelleau-WoodandSoissonsandduringoperationssuch
astheMeuse-ArgonnewheretheAmericanArmy’sefforttobuildeffectiveunitswasbe
validated and where the AEF tested the effectiveness of its espoused key to tactical
success,theconceptofopenwarfare.
Strategically,theoutcomeofAmericaninvolvementinthewarwasneverindoubt.The
war had been, for the first three years, one of attrition at all levels of conflict. The
tremendousweightoftheAmericanefforttippingthebalanceexpressedinsheernumbers
of infantrymen alone would be decisive. Germany could not expect to counter the allied
efforts even with the recent relief gained through the peace with Russia or through their
emergingadvancedadaptationoftacticstomodernwarfare.Itwasattheoperationaland
tacticallevelhowever,whereAmericanperformancewhencomparedtoitsalliescouldbe
measured.Themeasurementwasquantifiedintermsofthespeedofoperationalgainsand
inthenumbersofU.S.soldiersandMarineskilledinbattle.Alliedofficersparticipatingin
thefightobservedthetacticalformationsandthecoordinationofsupportingarmssuchas
artillery, aircraft, and tanks and reported on American performance. British and French
units,experiencedinthreeyearsoftrenchwarfarefightinginunitsalongsideAmericans
quicklynotedthespeedoftheU.S.advanceandtheeffectivenessofAmericanleadership.
In May and June of 1918, American Marines and soldiers were rushed to blunt the
German offensive along the Marne. The Second Division, which included the Marine
brigade with battalions from the Sixth Marine Regiment, counter attacked to drive the
Germans from positions established in Belleau Wood. The German position was
foreboding. The boulder strewn, kidney shaped woods which measured roughly one by
threekilometerswereanaturalfortressfavoringthedefender.WhentheMarinesattacked
itwasonlineandwithoutsupportingartillery.Theclosestanalogytothetacticsemployed
inthefightwastothoseoftheCivilWarbattlefieldsofGettysburgandAntitiem.
“Yet today there seem to be marked similarities between the experiences of those men in 1918 and their
grandfathers in the 1860’s. Mounted dragoons with lances at rest; horse-drawn cannon wheeling into firing position;
linesofinfantry,dressingrightasifonparade,marchingacrossopenfieldstowardtheenemy—allseemtobelongtoan
earliertime,buttheywerepartoftheexperienceofthemenwhofoughtthroughBelleauWood.Morethanthesights,
therewasthesamebasicdependenceofthecommandersonthecourageandspiritoftheirmenratherthantechniqueto
winthebattle.Butinthe1860’sthecrueltestwasoverinhours.AtBelleauWoodthehoursranintodaysandoninto
weeks,withthegasbarragesintensifyingthehorror”
.
ThebraveryoftheMarinesatBelleauWoodwasunquestioned.Tacticalskillhowever,
was non-existent. “The Marines attacked in waves of four ranks, little different from an
American Civil War assault. To the German defenders it was like a flashback to 1916,
when they had mowed down British infantry at the Somme.”
5,200casualtiesinthetwentydaysoffighting,atotalwhichamountedtoapproximately
64%ofthestrengthoftheMarineBrigade.Ononedayalone,June6,theMarinessuffered
1,087 casualties as they “in well aligned waves…crossed the wheat fields dotted with
poppies.”
These casualties included those killed and wounded, many of whom were
gassed. General Lejeune, who was present for much of the fighting, noted “again it was
decisively shown the great importance of artillery to infantry. Infantry alone without
material makes little or no progress. If the enemy combines personnel and material, we
mustdothesame.”
InaccountsofthebattleforBelleauWoodtherewasnomentionoffireandmaneuver.
In fact, the opposite was true as the Marines attacked on line. Machine guns were not
employedintheoffensetosuppresstheenemyandtoallowtheinfantrytoadvance.Even
artillerywasignoredasattackswithoutevenapreliminarybarragewereconducted.The
Germans noted the Americans had severe leadership shortfalls and the troops attacked
bravelyandindensemasses.Thewooditselflimitedmaneuveronbothsidesofthefight
assurelyasanyintricatesystemoftrenchworkssupportedbyobstacles.Theabilityofthe
U.S.Marinestoflushtheenemyfromdefensivepositionsandtodefeathimintheopenas
advocatedatthetime,wasnotdemonstratedorrealistic.AtBelleauWood,theAmericans
combinedcourageandaggressivenesswithtacticsabandonedbytheBritish,French,and
Germans in the first years of the war. They made no attempt to fire and maneuver, and
whileultimatelysuccessful,thepricetheMarinespaidinbloodwassubstantial.
WhytheAmericanArmyFailedtoEvolve
It would appear, based upon the tactical methods employed by U.S. Soldiers and
Marines, that the reports of the battlefield observers had little impact upon the tactical
development of the AEF. The Americans in their first engagements executed tactics by
nowconsideredineffectivebyEuropeanarmies.Itisnotlikelyhowever,thatthereports
of observers were totally ignored, instead there were other, more significant factors
influencingthetacticaldoctrineoftheAEF.
American leadership, most particularly General Pershing, who alone was the most
influentialindividualshapingU.S.doctrineduringthewar,understoodthattacticsinthe
modernbattlefieldenvironmenthadchanged.
Hisunderstandingalignedwiththeone
clearthemethatcouldbeuniversallyextractedfromtheobserverreports.TheAmerican
shortfallwasnotafailuretorecognizethechange,itwasafailuretoaccuratelyinterpret
andadapttothechange.
AtthetimeofWorldWarI,theUnitedStatesArmydidnothaveanestablishedsystem
for the development of doctrine. The current doctrine development center, Training and
Doctrine Command, did not exist at the time. An analogy to this might be formed by
considering a modern day commander attempting to sort through information regarding
enemy activity without the benefit of an intelligence section. While conclusions may be
drawnbasedonthemassiveamountofdisorganizedinformationprovided,theyarelikely
to be inaccurate and influenced by that individual’s background, ideas, and prejudices.
GeneralPershingandtheAEF,blindfoldedbypoorinsighttothenatureoftheproblem,
completelymissedthemark.
The reports of the battlefield observers, far from being ignored, were likely read by
officers in the War Department who would distribute the information as they saw fit to
those who might have had an interest in the information contained. For instance, the
massiveamountofdetaileddescriptionconcerningtheconstructionoffieldfortifications
would have been distributed to army engineers. In another case, information regarding
mobile field kitchens or providing fodder for horses would have been forwarded to the
quartermasters.Thisprocesshoweverwashaphazardandfarfromadisciplinedevaluation
of the material with an eye for applicability to the U.S. Army. In the case of the
developmentofdoctrinefortheattack,interpretationofthereportswasnotsubjectedtoa
process designed to determine requirements or to refine tactics. The interpretation of
reports would be made by individual readers. The meaning, as it related to future U.S.
involvement in the conflict, was therefore subject to inaccurate interpretation. In this
regard these reports, rather than enlightening, may have been a key element in the
misguidance of the American Army. This is especially true when the content of articles
likeCaptainLaffargue’sisconsidered.
The strategic position of the United States up until the final months prior to its entry
intotheconflictmayhavehadbearingontheuseoftheobserverreports.Theobservers
with the French army suggested that some of the information they were gathering
regarding the effectiveness of machine guns might prove useful to the United States in
future“colonialconflicts.”ThisdriveshomethepointoffactthatmostAmericansdidnot
believe the United States would get involved in the war in Europe. The United States
Army until 1917 was not even preparing for fighting in Europe. With this prevailing
attitude it would have been difficult to generate the interest, or more importantly the
resourcesrequired,toembarkuponaseriousreviewofthechangingdoctrineinEurope
baseduponthereportsofbattlefieldobservers.Toimaginethenextstepoftranslatingthis
effortintodeterminingthedoctrinalrequirementsforanArmyoftheUnitedStates,which
bytheendof1918wouldbecomesolargeitwouldhavebeenunimaginablebyeventhe
mostvisionarymenofthetime,isunrealistic.
What the United States had instead of a combat development system was General
Pershing, a strong willed man with a well-established opinion concerning the nature of
tacticaldoctrineinmodernwar.GeneralPershingrecognizedthefutilityoftrenchwarfare
andunderstoodthesmalladvancesrepresentedbywrestingatrench-linefromtheGerman
defenders would not win victory on the operational or strategic level. He was further
convincedthattheFrench,andtoalesserextenttheBritish,wornoutfromthreeyearsof
fighting, had become overly conservative in their concern over casualties. The French
werebasingtheiroffensivetacticaldoctrineontheskillsrequiredtofightinthetrenches
withlittleconsiderationofwhatlaybeyond.
GeneralPershingresistedtheFrenchmethodoftraining,whichheviewedtobelimited
and narrow, as vigorously as he resisted European overtures suggesting amalgamation.
Pershingbelieved,accuratelyenough,thatvictorylayinsuccessbeyondthetrenches.He
underestimated, however, the significance of the challenge the trenches posed. In this
regard,theattitudeofGeneralPershingatthebeginningofAmericaninvolvementwasnot
unlikethatofEuropeangeneralsin1914.Hefocusedhisattentionontheoperationallevel
withoutconsideringtheprohibitivetacticaldifficulties.
To inspire the aggressive attitude among Americans he deemed essential for victory
andinrecognitionoftheneedtofightbeyondthetrenches,GeneralPershinginsistedon
trainingforwhathecalled“openwarfare.”Openwarfare,whichfocusedonthecapability
andélanoftheindividualrifleman,wasenvisionedbyPershingasthekeytothedefeatof
theenemyoncethefluidityofthebattlefieldhadbeenre-established.
ThereweretwoshortfallstoGeneralPershing’sinsistenceontrainingforopenwarfare.
The first shortfall as indicated earlier was in the accuracy of General Pershing’s
assessmentofeffectivetactics.TheGeneral’sconceptswhencomparedtothedirectionof
tacticstodateinthewarwerewrong.AccordingtoPershing,inopenwarfaretheroleof
the rifleman and musketry on the battlefield was the key to success. Machine guns,
grenades and automatic riflemen, relied upon to an increasing extent by all European
armiesatthetime,wereconsideredtheweaponstheFrenchwouldfavorfortheirshort-
sighted,trenchfocusedeffortsandwerethereforeunappreciatedbyGeneralPershing.
GeneralPershing’sconceptsoftherequirementsforsuccessonthemodernbattlefield
aligned with the main theme of the article by Captain Laffargue. General Pershing in a
similar manner to Captain Laffargue, championed the capabilities of the rifleman and
discusses the absolute requirement for aggressively pressing the attack. However, not
surprisingly, the General did not appreciate the use of machine guns in the attack, the
coordinationrequiredbetweeninfantryandartillery,ortheneedforincreasedfirepowerin
thehandsoftheinfantry.
The second shortfall in General Pershing’s insistence on open warfare was in its
implementation. As generals often do, General Pershing spoke in broad sweeping
generalities rather than specifics. For example, he did not articulate specific details on
battalionleveltrainingandtechniquesforopenwarfare,asnogeneralofficerwould.On
the other hand he was quick to recognize tactics and training he considered misaligned
withhisconceptandheappliedimmediateinfluencetocorrecttheseshortfalls.Hisbook,
MyExperiences,isfilledwithmanyexamplesofhiscorrespondencetotheUnitedStates
expressing concerns regarding the focus of training efforts for entry-level soldiers. In
applyingsuchpressure,GeneralPershing,whodidnothesitatetorelievecommandershe
believed incompetent, wielded tremendous influence on the direction of U.S. tactical
doctrine development. This influence served more to crush creative thought than to
enhanceinnovationandlefthissubordinateswonderingwhattheGeneralreallymeantby
openwarfareandhowtoimplementhisbroadbaseddirectioninactualtraining.
Aside from the deficiencies involving the lack of a combat development system,
preventingmaximizationoftheutilityoftheobserver’sreports,theAEFwasfacedbytwo
related, almost insurmountable obstacles in developing effective doctrine. The first
obstaclewastimeandthesecondtheexperienceoftheArmyasawhole.
What the AEF accomplished in a time period of approximately eighteen months was
staggering.TheAmericanArmyandMarineCorpstransformedfromranking16
th
inthe
worldin1917tofieldinganarmyacrossanoceanthatcontained,bythefallof1918,more
than a million men. Organizing, equipping, moving, and sustaining an Army of this
magnitudealonewasanincrediblefeat.Establishingschoolsandprovidingtrainingofany
quality was yet again another monumental effort. This is especially true when one
considerstheArmywasengagedinfightingsimultaneouswithitsmobilization.Withso
many focuses of effort combined with pressure from the sagging Allies to rush as many
menforwardaspossibletothefront,itisoflittlesurprisetheAEFdidnothavethetime
initiallytotakeahardlookatrefiningoffensivetactics.Everyonewassobusygettingto
thefightthattheconcernsofhowtoexecutewouldhavetobeaddressedonlywhenthey
becameanimmediateandpressingconcern.
The problem the AEF faced in providing adequate training for a rapidly mobilized
armywasnotuniquetotheAmericaneffortinthewar.TheGermanshadexperiencedthe
same problems in 1914. The description of their experiences in Gudmundssons’s
StormtroopTacticsalignsremarkablywithlateraccountsoftheAmericanexperience.
“ThemajordeficiencyoftheunitsintheFourthArmylayintheareaoftraining.Inthecourseofthemonthsof
August and September 1914, the volunteers had been trained by officers and NCOs largely ignorant of modern
warfare……Manywerenewtothelatestmodel(M1898)Mauserrifleandtacticsthathadbeendevelopedtomakethe
most of its virtues. As a result, the training that was imparted to the eager young men in surplus dark blue uniforms
consistedmostlyofcloseorderdrillandbayonetfighting.”
The second obstacle the AEF would have to overcome in refining doctrine was the
overallexperiencelevelofitsArmy.TheU.S.Armywasfarfromprofessional.Infactit
was so small that the professionals could not even be said to constitute the core around
whichtherestoftheorganizationgrew.Manyoftheprofessionalswhocomprisedthepre-
warArmydidnotproveeffectiveintheAEFandwerefiredbyGeneralPershing.Someof
these men were merely old men who lacked the aggression and physical stamina to
competeattheyoungman’sgame.Otherslackedthementalagilitytokeeppacewiththe
requirementsofsuchalargearmyatwar.
Withsomuchgeneralinexperience,whichwouldhavebeenespeciallypervasiveatthe
company grade and junior field grade levels, where the focus of tactics resides, it is
doubtful that many would recognize and understand the need to validate or modify U.S.
doctrineuntilfirstcontactwiththeenemy.
TothecreditoftheU.S.Army,onceexperiencehadbeengainedonthebattlefield,it
exhibitedtherapidabilitytochangeandadapteffectivetechniquesfortheattackaswas
evidentinthelatterstagesoftheMeuse-Argonnecampaign.Perhapsthisisanadvantage
ofanon-professionalarmythatdoesnotfightwithingrainednotionsofhowbattleisoris
not to be conducted. Effective tactics were able to evolve rapidly in an army with little
institutionalizedtraditiondictatingthemannerinwhichtacticswereexecuted.
Conclusions
Therefore,whiletheopportunityexistedfortheUnitedStatestogainanadvantagein
theevolutionoftacticaldoctrinethroughitsbattlefieldobserversthepotentialwasnever
realized. Given the climate of general tactical confusion resident among all European
armies at the time, the shortfalls in the substance of the observers’ reports is certainly
understandable. No army engaged prior to the deployment of the AEF, to include the
Germans,producedaviablesolutiontothechallengesoftrenchwarfare.
AstheUnitedStatesengaged,tacticaldoctrineinthewararguablyreachedafourthand
final stage. Following the third phase, which was more or less that of siege warfare, the
potential appeared for a return to a more fluid battlefield environment. This was made
possible through both German stormtroop tactics and allied tactics of fire and maneuver
capitalizing on combined arms attacks employing tanks and aircraft. The AEF, after
overcoming its initial shortfalls in tactical competence improved as rapidly as any other
armyengaged.
ThisdoesnotimplytheU.S.efforttosendobserverstothebattlefieldswaswastedand
the only valuable lessons to be learned are gained through personal experience. What it
does suggest is that there needed to have been a system in place to make sense of
information provided through observers and compare the refined information to current
doctrineandtacticalpractices.
Thislessonisasrelevanttodayasitwaseightyyearsago.Manyconsidertheadvances
intechnologythatchallengedthedoctrineofthedaytoconstitutearevolutioninmilitary
affairs.Ifthiswasthecaseonemustrecognizetherapidlyadvancingtechnologyoftoday
could generate or influence a revolution in military affairs that would make our current
doctrine obsolete. This revolution could potentially be demonstrated on a modern
battlefield in a conflict without U.S. direct involvement. In this situation, having trained
observersonthegroundandtheanalysisapparatusinplacetoaccuratelyassesstheimpact
ofnewtechnologycoulddeterminesuccessorfailureinfuturewar.
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1931)150
MajorGeneralRobertL.Bullard,PersonalitiesandReminiscencesoftheWar(NewYork:Doubleday,Page&
Company,1925).Gen.BullardemphasizesthroughouthisbookthatmanyoftheproblemstheAEFexperienced
earlyinthewarweretheresultofGovernmentallimitationsontheArmytoprepareforconflict.Gen.Bullard’s
assertioniscorroboratedbyothersourcesincludingGeneralsPershingandLejeune.
James W. Rainey, “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” Parameters,
JournaloftheUSArmyWarCollegeVolIII,no3(1983)
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8702-05.Thisfilecontainscopies
of the original orders issued to officers sent to Europe at the beginning of hostilities to include correspondence
betweentheofficersandtheWarDepartmentdiscussingsomeoftheuniquearrangementstheofficersmadeto
facilitatetheirefforts.
Johnson,59-62
Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics-Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (Westport Conn.:
Praeger,1989)1
Johnson,29-51
Johnson,61-62.TheideathatsomeoftheheavylossesexperiencedbyEuropeanarmiesduringthewarwas
attributabletoinstitutionalizedtrainingandtraditionsisexpressedinothersourcesaswell.Forexample,ithas
beensuggestedthattheBritishdisasterattheSomme,whichincludedtheemploymentofhorsemountedofficers
accompanyinginfantrycharges,wastheresultofjustsuchparadigms.
Gudmundsson,27
ThereportsreviewedincludethosefromtheNationalArchive,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision
1903-1918,files8977
It appears in some cases an observer would receive and respond to messages from the War Department
requestingclarificationofapriorreport.
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8799,8759
HubertC.Johnson,Break-Through!Tactics,TechnologyandtheSearchforVictoryontheWesternFrontin
WorldWarI(Novato,Ca.:PresidioPress,1994)61
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8698-1
NationalArchive,Correspondence.8698-1
NationalArchive,Correspondence.8698-1
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8698-31
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8698-31
Pershing.Throughouthisbook,GeneralPershingincludedlettershewrotetotheUnitedStatesindicating
his level of dissatisfaction with the training level of the American troops arriving in Europe. One of his major
complaintswasshortfallsinriflemarksmanshipskills.
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8698-42
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8698-42
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8698-42
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8698-42
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8698-47
NationalArchives,CorrespondenceoftheWarCollegeDivision1903-1918,8977
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8977-
NationalArchives,Correspondence,8977
Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars, The American Experience in World War I (New York:
OxfordUniversityPress,1968)215
RodPaschall.TheDefeatofImperialGermany1917-1918(ChapelHill,NC:AlgonquinBooks,1989)
David.F.Trask,TheAmericanExpeditionaryForcesin1918,(Washington,DC:NoPublisherListed,1989)
4,Chap.4
James W. Rainey, “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” Parameters,
JournaloftheUSArmyWarCollegeVolIII,no3(1983)
General John J. Pershing, My Experiences In The World War Vol II (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes
Company, 1931). General Pershing’s insistence that Americans train independently was based upon his strong
belief that the French had become defensive minded. This theme is repeated throughout his book and in his
correspondencethroughoutthewar.
James W. Rainey, “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” Parameters,
JournaloftheUSArmyWarCollegeVolIII,no3(1983)
James W. Rainey, “Ambivalent Warfare: The Tactical Doctrine of the AEF in World War I,” Parameters,
JournaloftheUSArmyWarCollegeVolIII,no3(1983)